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Abstract
Somalia has become a front in the US Global War on Terror (GWoT) because of the potential connection between terrorism and state fragility. While originally oriented towards ‘building states while fighting terror’, Enduring Freedom in Somalia obtained quite the opposite result of deepening the existing conflict. Why and how did the GWoT result in the controversial outcome of ‘building terror while fighting enemies’? This article argues that the GWoT sponsored in Somalia an isolationist strategy that encouraged the political polarisation and military radicalisation of the insurgency. To explore this argument, the article first analyses the structure of the intervention by focusing on the interests and strategies of the interveners. Then it evaluates the conditions under which the modality of intervention (through the use of diplomatic, economic and coercive measures) violated the conditions essential to resolving conflict.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Andrea Carati and Alessandro Colombo for their valuable feedback and discussions on earlier versions of this article. I thank the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.
Notes
1. Patman, “The Roots of Strategic Failure.”
2. Rotberg, When States Fail.
3. CJTF-HOA, “About the Command.”
4. “CJTF-HOA Factsheet.” April 26, 2009. http://web.archive.org/web/20090426223216/http://www.hoa.africom.mil/AboutCJTF-HOA.asp.
5. Ibid.
6. Quaranto, “Building States while Fighting Terror.”
7. Brunstetter and Braun, “The Implications of Drones”; Elshtain, Just War against Terror; Ratner, “Jus ad Bellum”; and Sloane, “The Cost of Conflation.”
8. Brunstetter and Braun, “The Implications of Drones”; and Shah, “War on Terrorism.”
9. Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror.
10. Agamben, Stato D’eccezione; Aradau and Van Munster, “Exceptionalism and the ‘War on Terror’”; Patman, “Globalisation”; and Rojecki, “Rhetorical Alchemy.”
11. Blum and Heymann, Laws, Outlaws, and Terrorists.
12. Agamben, Stato D’eccezione; Ralph, America’s War on Terror; and Neal, Exceptionalism and the Politics of Counter-terrorism.
13. Erjavec and Volčič, “‘War on Terrorism’ as a Discursive Battleground”; Hodges and Nilep, Discourse, War and Terrorism; and Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism.
14. Fairclough, “Language in New Capitalism”; Fairclough et al., “Critical Discourse Analysis”; and Stampnitzky, Disciplining Terror.
15. Fairclough et al., Discourse and Contemporary Social Change.
16. Stampnitzky, Disciplining Terror.
17. See, for instance, Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror.
18. Chandler, “The Revival of Carl Schmitt”; Colombo, La Guerra Ineguale; Müller, “‘An Irregularity that cannot be Regulated’”; and Odysseos and Petito, The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt.
19. Patman, Strategic Shortfall.
20. Eland, The Failure of Counterinsurgency; and Rogers, Why We’re Losing the War on Terror.
21. Bryden, The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab; Hoehne, Counter-terrorism in Somalia; and Marchal, “The Rise of a Jihadi Movement.”
22. Rogers, Why We’re Losing the War on Terror.
23. Keen, Endless War?
24. Verhoeven, “The Self-fulfilling Prophecy of Failed States.”
25. See Pape, “It’s the Occupation, Stupid”; and Rogers, Why We’re Losing the War on Terror.
26. Cole and Lobel, “Why We’re Losing the War on Terror”; Dodge, Inventing Iraq; Dodge, “The Causes of US Failure in Iraq”; Dodge, “The Ideological Roots of Failure”; Eland, The Failure of Counterinsurgency; and Mitchell and Massoud, “Anatomy of Failure.”
27. “Global Terrorism Index.”
28. Van Linschoten and Kuehn, An Enemy We Created; Dear, “Beheading the Hydra?”; and Marchal, “A Tentative Assessment.”
29. Hoffman, “The Changing Face of Al Qaeda”; and Cole and Lobel, “Why We’re Losing the War on Terror.”
30. Cole and Lobel, “Why We’re Losing the War on Terror.”
31. Galbraith, Unintended Consequences.
32. See Bradbury and Kleinman, “State-building, Counterterrorism, and Licensing Humanitarianism”; Möller, “The Horn of Africa and the US ‘War on Terror’”; and Menkhaus, Somalia after the Ethiopian Occupation.
33. Hoehne, Counter-terrorism in Somalia; Marchal, “The Rise of a Jihadi Movement”; Möller, “The Horn of Africa and the US ‘War on Terror’.”
34. Verhoeven, “The Self-fulfilling Prophecy of Failed States.”
35. Bercovitch and Jackson, “Negotiation or Mediation?”
36. Burton, Conflict, 3.
37. Bercovitch and Jackson, “Negotiation or Mediation?,” 75.
38. Modelski, “The International Relations Internal War.” Diffusion occurs when the interveners encourage insurgents and demoralise incumbents. Isolation occurs when foreign actors aim to weaken the insurgents: they reinforce the incumbents because the insurgents’ claims seriously challenge the international system. Reconciliation occurs when ‘the outcome of the war itself is less important than the very fact of the occurrence of violence’. Ibid., 35.
39. Ibid., 61.
40. Verhoeven, “The Self-fulfilling Prophecy of Failed States”; and Patrick, “‘Failed’ States and Global Security.” See also Piazza, “Incubators of Terror.”
41. Hagmann and Hoehne, “Failures of the State Failure Debate.” See also Piazza, “Incubators of Terror”; Samatar, “Ethiopian Occupation and American Terror”; and Sanín, “Evaluating State Performance.”
42. Verhoeven, “The Self-fulfilling Prophecy of Failed States.”
43. Initially, the OEF-HOA consisted of seven African partners (Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya and the Seychelles).
44. According to Jendayi E. Frazer, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, at the House International Relations Committee Joint Hearing, ‘When considering the Africa policy of this Administration it is worth noting that this credo has two implications; the United States is contributing generously toward improved democratic governance, health and economic growth in Africa, and the United States is also actively engaged in denying safe haven to terrorists with the help of African partners. Africa finds itself involved in the Global War on Terror, and Somalia is a critical element of our broader efforts to fight global terrorism.’ Frazer, “Somalia.”
45. Swan, “U.S. Policy in the Horn of Africa”; See also Malito and Ylönen, “Bypassing the Regional?”
46. Ibid.
47. Smith, Securing Africa, 185.
48. Abbink, “Ethiopia–Eritrea.”
49. See De Guttry et al., The 1998–2000 War. See also Iyob, “The Ethiopian–Eritrean Conflict.”
50. Jacquin-Berdal and Plaut, Unfinished Business.
51. Reid, Eritrea’s External Relations.
52. Rabasa et al., Beyond Al-Qaeda.
53. Menkhaus, Somalia.
54. Roth et al., Monography on Terrorist Financing.
55. The Arta process was supported by IGAD member states, the UN, the Organisation of African Unity, the League of Arab States, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and the European Union.
56. Bradbury and Healy, “Whose Peace is it Anyway?,” 117.
57. United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia,” October 11, 2001, 3.
58. Ibid., 2.
59. United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Monitoring Group.”
60. Malito and Ylönen, “Bypassing the Regional?”
61. The first meeting was held in Eldoret, the following ones, from February 2003, in Mbagathi.
62. Somalia National Reconciliation Process, “Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities.”
63. United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia,” June 27, 2002.
64. International Crisis Group, Can the Somali Crisis be Contained?
65. International Crisis Group, Somalia: Continuation of War by Other Means?
66. Malito and Ylönen, “Bypassing the Regional?”
67. Somalia National Reconciliation Conference, “Phase II Mbagathi.”
68. International Crisis Group, Somalia: Continuation of War by Other Means?
69. Ibid., 8.
70. International Crisis Group, Can the Somali Crisis be Contained?, 3.
71. International Crisis Group, Can the Somali Crisis Be Contained?
72. Möller, “The Horn of Africa and the US ‘War on Terror’.”
73. Frazer, “Somalia.”
74. “Ethiopian Tanks Roll.” December 26, 2011. http://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2006/Dec/738/ethiopian_tanks_roll_in_somali_battle_s_fourth_day.aspx
75. Allo, “Ethiopia’s Armed Intervention in Somalia.”
76. Menkhaus, Somalia after the Ethiopian Occupation, 3.
77. Ibid.
78. Berhane, “Meles Zenawi asked US for Intel.” April 11, 2011. http://hornaffairs.com/en/2011/11/04/meles-zenawi-asked-us-for-intel-ethiopias-somalia-intervention-2006/
79. Landay and Bengali, “US Policy in the Horn of Africa.”
80. Department of State, “Congressional Budget Justification.”
81. SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook; Department of State, “Congressional Budget Justification.”
82. According to the Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations for fiscal year 2009: ‘The increase of funding between FY 2008 and FY 2009 to support programs in the Peace and Security Objective reflect increased national security threats posed by domestic insurgents, Eritrea, and extremists from Somalia, requiring a significant increase in foreign assistance for this strategic partner of the United States.’ Department of State, “Congressional Budget Justification.”
83. Department of State, “FY 2008 Congressional Budget Justification.”
84. Samatar, “Ethiopian Occupation and American Terror,” 177.
85. “Amnesty International Report 2007.”
86. Albin-Lackey, ‘So Much to Fear’.
87. Melvin and De Koning, “Resources and Armed Conflict.”
88. SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook.
89. See Hoehne, Counter-terrorism in Somalia; International Crisis Group, “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East.”
90. Gleditsch et al., “Armed Conflict 1946–2001.”
91. “Eight Killed in Mogadishu Clashes.” March 28, 2008. http://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2008/Mar/6162/eight_killed_in_mogadishu_clashes.aspx; Gettleman, “Ethiopia Attacks Airport in Somali Capital.” December 26, 2006. New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/25/world/africa/25cnd-somalia.html?pagewanted=all.
92. “Somalis Poised to Launch a Massive Attack.” December 17, 2007. http://www.ethiopianreview.com/index/1643
93. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2007, 260.
94. Marchal, “The Rise of a Jihadi Movement.”
95. Ibid.
96. Hagmann and Hoehne, “Failures of the State Failure Debate.” See also Hoehne, Counter-terrorism in Somalia; Mantzikos, “The International Community’s Role”; Marchal, “Warlordism and Terrorism”; and Marchal, “The Rise of a Jihadi Movement.”
97. International Crisis Group, Somalia: The Transitional Government on Life Support.
98. International Crisis Group, “Somalia’s Divided Islamists,” 14.
99. International Crisis Group, “Somalia’s Divided Islamists.”
100. See Bryden, The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab; Marchal, “The Rise of a Jihadi Movement”; and “Partial Translation of AlShabaab’s Leader Oath of Allegiance.”
101. Ali, “Somalia: Cautious Welcome for UN-Brokered Peace Deal,” Garowe Online, http://allafrica.com/stories/200806101135.html
102. United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia,” S/2008/466, 3.
103. Interview by the author in Somaliland, 2011.
104. ”Al-Shabaab reiterates opposition to new Somali leader”. February 12) 2009. http://www.hiiraan.com/news2/2009/feb/al_shabaab_reiterates_opposition_to_new_somali_leader.aspx
105. International Crisis Group, Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State, 20.
106. International Crisis Group, “Somalia’s Divided Islamists,” 6.
107. Apuuli, “Somalia after the United Nations-led Djibouti Peace Process,” 24.
108. “Partial Translation of AlShabaab’s Leader Oath of Allegiance.”