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Abstract
This article analyses the implications and consequences of the rise of BRICS for the developing world and for global governance. In doing so, it examines BRICS’ increasing importance among developing countries and their growing significance in the world economy, situated in historical perspective, and considers the factors underlying the evolution of the group as an economic and political formation. This is followed by an analysis of the possible economic impact of future growth in BRICS on other developing countries, which could be complementary or competitive, positive or negative. In conclusion it discusses the potential influence of BRICS, extending beyond economics to politics, in the wider global context, with reference to international institutions and cooperation among developing countries.
Acknowledgements
This article is based on the author’s keynote address at the Conference on South–South Cooperation and the Role of BRICS in New Delhi, 25 September 2014. Atul Sanganeria provided some research assistance.
Notes
1. UNCTAD Stat (unctad.org/en/Pages/Statitstics/aspx) based on United Nations, National Accounts Statistics and Population Statistics.
2. See O’Neill, et al., Growth and Development.
3. For a discussion on the limitations of this exercise, see Rowthorn, “The Renaissance of China and India”; and Nayyar, “The Rise of China and India.”
4. In 2013 GDP per capita in US dollars at current prices and market exchange rates was $15,011 in Russia, compared with $11,232 in Brazil, $1537 in India, $6726 in China, and $6679 in South Africa. United Nations, UNCTAD Stat, based on UN National Accounts Statistics.
5. The discussion that follows in this section, and the supporting evidence that is cited, both draw upon recent work by the author. See Nayyar, Catch Up.
6. Developing countries are made up of those in Africa, Asia excluding Japan, and Latin America including the Caribbean. Industrialised countries are made of those in North America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Eastern Europe and the former USSR are a separate country group in this classification.
7. Maddison, The World Economy; Nayyar, Catch Up; and Maddison Online Database, http://www.ggdc.net.MADDISON/oriindex.htm.
8. Calculated from United Nations, National Accounts Statistics and Population Statistics.
9. For a detailed discussion, and evidence, on growth rates of GDP and GDP per capita in the two country groups over time, see Nayyar, Catch Up.
10. Cf. Nayyar, Catch Up.
11. The evidence cited in this paragraph draws upon Nayyar, Catch Up.
12. The idea and conception of the Next-14 comes from earlier work by the author. See Nayyar, Catch Up.
13. During the period from 1000 to 1700 China and India, taken together, accounted for 50% of world income and 50% of world population. Maddison, The World Economy; and Nayyar, Catch Up. These proportions were roughly the same in 1820 (Table ).
14. For a detailed discussion on the issues outlined briefly in this paragraph, see Nayyar, Catch Up.
15. If BRICS and the Next-14 are at the top in the catching-up process for the developing world, the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), which are falling behind, almost excluded from the process, are at the bottom. It would be too much of a digression to enter into a discussion on this here. Suffice it to say that catch-up has been associated with growing divergences within the developing world. For an analysis and discussion of the issue, see Nayyar, Catch Up. For evidence on the economic performance of LDCs, see UNCTAD, The Least Developed Countries 2011 Report.
16. It is worth noting that, between 1990 and 2013, the share of developing countries in world GDP rose from 17.5% to 36.9%, ie by almost 20 percentage points, entirely at the expense of industrialised countries, as their share in world GDP fell from 77.5% percent to 57.4%. This is attributable largely to the much higher share of developing countries in 1980 on account of the sharp increase in oil prices that bumped up the GDP of oil-exporting developing countries.
17. The evidence on growth rates in GDP and GDP per capita cited in this paragraph draws upon Nayyar, “BRICS, Emerging Markets and the World Economy.” For a more detailed analysis of outcomes and the underlying factors, see Nayyar, Catch Up.
18. The figures cited in this paragraph are from Nayyar, “Emerging Markets and the World Economy.” For a discussion, see also Nayyar, Catch Up.
19. The evidence cited in this paragraph, on the significance of BRICS in the world economy and the importance of China in BRICS, draws upon Nayyar, “BRICS, Emerging Markets and the World Economy.”
20. For an analysis of the impact of the financial crisis and the Great Recession on the developing world, in comparison with its impact on industrialised countries, see Nayyar, “The Financial Crisis.”
21. These possibilities are analysed in Nayyar, “China, India, Brazil and South Africa.” The discussion that follows in this section draws upon this earlier work by the author.
22. This proposition is emphasised by Kaplinsky, “Asian Drivers”; Singh, Globalization; Rowthorn, “The Renaissance of China and India”; and Nayyar, “The Rise of China and India.”
23. See Toye, “China’s Impact on Sub-Saharan African Development”; Cheru and Obi, The Rise of China and India; and Nayyar, “The Emerging Asian Giants.”
24. Kaplinsky and Morris show that China’s emergence as a large exporter of manufactured goods in the world economy poses severe problems for export-oriented growth in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in textiles and clothing. Kaplinsky and Morris, “Do the Asian Drivers undermine Export-oriented Industrialization?”
25. See IADB, The Emergence of China; United Nations, Diverging Growth and Development; Jenkins et al., “The Impact of China”; and Nayyar, “The Emerging Asian Giants.”
26. This argument is developed, at some length, elsewhere in Nayyar, Catch Up.
27. For a detailed discussion, with evidence and analysis, see Nayyar, Catch Up. This process was discernible even earlier, at the turn of the century, and was described as ‘The Rise of The Rest’. Amsden, The Rise of the Rest.
28. This list of countries is at best suggestive and by no means definitive. It might change as circumstances change or reality unfolds. Amsden and Nayyar have also speculated about countries that might constitute the next generation – ‘The Rest’, or the ‘Following-10’, respectively – with some differences between them. The listing above is similar but not the same. See Amsden, The Rise of the Rest; and Nayyar, Catch Up.
29. This hypothesis and its possibilities are discussed at length elsewhere by the author. Nayyar, “The Existing System”; and Nayyar, “China, India, Brazil and South Africa.” For an overview of how the rising powers of the global South might be challenging the existing framework and institutions of global governance, see Gray and Murphy, “Rising Powers.”
30. Thakur explores the potential of BRICS to represent the global South and argues that it remains unclear whether BRICS can morph from a countervailing economic grouping to a powerful political alternative. Thakur, “How Representative are BRICS?”