Solidarity forever? ABC, ALBA and South–South Cooperation in Haiti

Abstract

The growing influence of the global South in international affairs has prompted a passionate discussion about the role of South–South cooperation (SSC). SSC is sometimes uncritically portrayed as a uniform phenomenon that presents a superior alternative to North–South Cooperation (NSC). To problematise and deepen our knowledge about SSC, this article examines the intriguing case of Haiti, which has seen a wealth of SSC cooperation since the international intervention in 2004. Drawing on extensive fieldwork, the study compares the approaches of two distinct Southern groupings working in Haiti: Argentina, Brazil and Chile (the so-called ABC countries) and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) led by Venezuela. We argue that ABC and ALBA display marked differences and that, while their approaches have distinct strengths and weaknesses, they do not necessarily represent a fundamental improvement over NSC.

Keywords:

• South–South cooperation
• Haiti
• fragile states

Acknowledgements

The authors thank Bernabé Malacalza for comments and Francisco Vicencio for research assistance. Stephen Baranyi and Lydia Bernier acknowledge support from the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Social Sciences and the Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie; Andreas Feldmann acknowledges support from the International Development Research Centre, FONDECYT Project (1110656) and the Millennium Nucleus for the Study of Stateness and Democracy in Latin America (NS 100014).

Notes

1. Kent, Anatomy of Disaster Relief; and Gibson et al., The Samaritan’s Dilemma.

2. Kirk, Cuba’s Medical Interventionism.

3. Fukuyama, State Building; and Castañeda, “Not Ready for Prime Time.”

4. Châtaigner and Magro, États et Societés Fragiles. For critical analyses of the transnational social construction of the concept of ‘fragile states’, see Grimm et al., “Fragile States.”

5. Nussbaum et al., “A New Deal.”

6. Lengyel and Malacalza, Países de Renta Media, 132 (our translation).

7. Feldmann et al., “Lost in Translation.”

8. Shearer and Tres, “South–South and Triangular Cooperation.”

9. Feldmann et al., “Lost in Translation.”

10. Baranyi, “Reconstruction, Peace and Transformation.”

11. Giddens, The Constitution of Society.

12. Cox, Production, Power and World Order.

13. Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, Critical Security Studies; and Veltmeyer, The Critical Development Studies Handbook.

14. Duffield, Global Governance; Richmond, Peacebuilding; Paris, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding”; and Cooper and Flemes, “Foreign Policy Strategies.”

15. Timerman, “La Política de Cooperación de la Cancillería Argentina.”

16. Kern and Weisstaub, “El Debate sobre la Cooperación Sur–Sur.”

17. Lengyel and Malacalza, Países de Renta Media.

18. In 2005–09 Brazil’s total spending on overseas development aid reached US$1.6 billion – an annual average of $300 million, equivalent to 0.02% of the country’s GDP. See Ayllon, “Brazil’s Contribution,” 201.

19. Woods, “Whose Aid?”

20. Sweig , “A New Global Player.”

21. Hurrell, “Lula’s Brazil.”

22. Feldmann and Montes, “Learning to be Likeminded.”

23. Wilhelmy and Durán, “Los Principales Rasgos.”

24. Ayllon, “Brazil’s Contribution.”

25. Nel and Taylor, “Bugger Thy Neighbour?”

26. Regan and Valente, “Organic Gardens.”

27. Sorondo, “Pro Huerta.”

28. Lengyel and Malacalza, “Argentina–Haití.”

29. Surasky, “Argentina y la Cooperación Sur–Sur.”

30. Author’s skpye interview with Bernabé Malacalza, Researcher, Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, August 12, 2013.

31. CIDA, “Projet de Cooperation Trilatéral.”

32. Valler Filho, O Brasil e a Crise Haitiana.

33. O’Dwyer et al., “The Current Scenario.”

34. Hirst, Aspectos Conceituais.

35. Author’s skype interview with Fabiana Radke-Schwartz, Desk Officer, Brazilian Agency for Cooperation, Port-au-Prince, July 21, 2013.

36. Ibid.

37. Author’s Interview with Guillermo Rolando, Special Advisor, Unité de Construction de Logement et de Batiments Publics, and Chilean Ministry of Housing, Port-au-Prince, June 12, 2012.

38. ICG, Keeping Haiti Safe, 11.

39. Author’s Interview with Rogelio Rubiño, Haiti Desk Officer, Chilean Agency for Development, Santiago, August 13, 2013.

40. Author’s interview with anonymous source in Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Santiago, August 13, 2013.

41. Seitenfus, “The Nature of Haitian Politics.”

42. Dodson and Dorraj, “Populism and Foreign Policy.”

43. Jácome, Petrocaribe, 3.

44. Members include Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Santa Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Venezuela.

45. De la Fuente, ALBA.

46. Office of the UN Special Envoy to Haiti, “Assistance Tracker.”

47. Serbin, “Cuando la Limosna es Grande.”

48. Bonfili, “The United States.”

49. Lengyel and Malacalza, Países de Renta Media.

50. Soft balancing comprises non-military measures used to delay, irritate and challenge a rival. See Pape, “Soft Balancing,” 7–11.

51. Buxton, “South America”; and Corrales, “Using Social Power.”

52. Petrocaribe is a Venezuelan initiative fully integrated into ALBA. Venezuela provides the oil, while all member countries are part of its ministerial council. The debt contracted through Petrocaribe must be repaid to Venezuela.

53. Most of this $1.5 billion appears to have been disbursed, unlike the $1.2 billion that Venezuela pledged after the earthquake, of which roughly 52% had been disbursed by December 2012. See Office of the UN Special Envoy Haiti, “Assistance Tracker.”

54. According to this source, more than 63% of Petrocaribe funds are spent on infrastructure and energy projects. Government of Haiti, “Liste des Projets Petrocaribe.”

55. According to the Haitian government, 241 projects have been financed through Petrocaribe since September 2008. Government of Haiti, “Liste des Projects Petrocaribe.”

56. Kirk and Kirk, “Cuban Medical Cooperation.”

57. Gorry, Staying the Course; and author’s confidential interview with an ABC official, Port-au-Prince, April 2013.

58. Duval, “Qu’a fait Haïti?”

59. Edmonds, “Haiti.”

60. In the case of Haiti between 30% and 70% of the oil bought must be paid back within 30 days, depending on the price of the oil barrel, while the rest can be paid back within 25 years at an interest rate of 1%. Government of Haiti, “Partenaires.”

61. Government of Haiti, “Protocole d’Accord Haitiano–Dominicain.”

62. Serbin, “Cuando la Limosna es Grande.”

63. Author’s confidential conversation with a Haitian official, Port-au-Prince, April 9, 2013.

64. Lalime, “Petrocaribe.”

65. Government of Haiti, “Les Fonds Petrocaribe.”

66. Alphonse, “Petrocaribe.”

67. OECD, Rapport 2011; and Baranyi, “Reconstruction.”

68. Baranyi, “Reconstruction”; and OECD, Rapport 2011.

69. Author´s confidential interview with an international official, Port-au Prince, April 2, 2013.

70. Government of Haiti, “Les Fonds Petrocaribe.”

71. Lengyel and Malacalza, Países de Renta Media. 

72. MPCE, “Cérémonie de Lancement,” 1 (authors’ translation).

73. Notably an aid-tracking platform publicly accessible at https://haiti.ampsite.net/.

74. Desrosiers and Baranyi, “Development Cooperation in Fragile States.” Several of our conclusions converge with those of Richey and Ponte in their lead article in the recent special issue of Third World Quarterly on new actors and alliances in development. We share their concern about some new actors who ‘are limited in their ability to act as agents of development by their lack of accountability or pro-poor commitment’. Richey and Ponte, “New Actors,” 1. However, we underscore the importance of carefully studying variations on (and possible exceptions to) that common theme.