Negotiating interference: US democracy promotion, Bolivia and the tale of a failed agreement

Abstract

Since 2009 the USA and the Bolivian government have been trying to fix their broken diplomatic relations. These negotiations culminated in 2011 in the signing of a bilateral agreement but, ultimately, failed to establish a basis for mutually acceptable development aid relations. This article analyses these negotiations and suggests a partial explanation that accounts for their dynamics and results. Specifically it shows how the negotiations have pitted Bolivian demands for state sovereignty and mutual respect, based on an egalitarian understanding of inter-state relations, against the US emphasis on common obligations and universal rights, informed by a non-egalitarian notion of liberal hegemony.

Keywords:

• Democracy promotion
• development aid
• South America
• USA
• Bolivia
• foreign policy

Acknowledgements

This paper was written in the context of the research project ‘Justice Conflicts in Democracy Promotion’ directed by the author at the PRIF. I thank Harald Müller, Annika E Poppe and two anonymous reviewers for comments, as well as Lisa Picott and Sophia Zender for research assistance.

Funding

The paper draws on previous research conducted at PRIF, including research trips to Bolivia and the USA, which were generously funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG).

Notes

1. Freedom House, Investing in Freedom, 5.

2. US Department of State, “Joint Statement.”

3. Bolivia and United States, “Convenio Marco de Relaciones Bilaterales.”

4. Carothers, “The Continuing Backlash”; and Gershman and Allen, “The Assault on Democracy Assistance.”

5. Carothers and Brechenmacher, Closing Space, 5.

6. Spector and Wagner, “Negotiating International Development”; Whitfield, The Politics of Aid; and Zartman and Rubin, “Symmetry and Asymmetry in Negotiation.”

7. This literature will be introduced in the following section.

8. These diplomatic cables will be cited in brackets, giving the official code (XXLAPAZXX) by which they can be identified and found at http://www.wikileaks.ch.

9. These interviews were conducted during research trips to Bolivia (mainly La Paz) in April–May 2009 and March 2013; and to the USA (Washington, DC) in May 2010.

10. Zartman et al., “Negotiation as a Search for Justice,” 87.

11. Zartman, Negotiation and Conflict Management, 6.

12. Müller, “Arguing, Bargaining and All That,” 422.

13. Carothers, “The Continuing Backlash,” 67.

14. McMahan, “Intervention and Collective Self-determination,” 2; and Poppe and Wolff, “The Normative Challenge of Interaction.”

15. Welch, Justice and the Genesis of War; and Müller, “Justice and Peace.”

16. Carothers, “The Continuing Backlash,” 67–71.

17. Müller and Druckman, “Introduction,” 402–404. Important contributions include Albin, Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation; Albin and Druckman, “The Role of Justice in Negotiation”; Müller, “Justice and Peace”; Zartman, Negotiation and Conflict Management, chaps. 4–5; Zartman et al., “Negotiation as a Search for Justice”; and the articles in the special issue of International Negotiation on ‘Justice in Security Negotiations’ (see Müller and Druckman, “Introduction”).

18. Zartman et al., “Negotiation as a Search for Justice,” 80. See also Albin, Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation, 218.

19. Zartman, Negotiation and Conflict Management, 83.

20. Zartman et al., “Negotiation as a Search for Justice,” 87.

21. Albin, Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation, 218–219. See also Albin and Druckman, “The Role of Justice in Negotiation,” 110.

22. Zartman and Rubin, “Symmetry and Asymmetry in Negotiation.”

23. Zartman, Negotiation and Conflict Management, 83.

24. Zartman and Rubin, “Symmetry and Asymmetry in Negotiation,” 289–290. Justice concerns are, of course, not the only explanatory factor that may strengthen the negotiating power of parties that are relatively weak in terms of material (power) resources. See Zartman and Rubin, “Symmetry and Asymmetry in Negotiation,” 278–280; Spector and Wagner, “Negotiating International Development,” 330–331; and Whitfield, The Politics of Aid.

25. Albin, Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation, 227–228.

26. Albin, Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation, 224–228; Müller, “Justice and Peace,” 49–52; and Welch, Justice and the Genesis of War, 40–41.

27. Albin, Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation, 225.

28. Welch, Justice and the Genesis of War, 44–45.

29. Albin, Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation, 219; and Müller, “Justice and Peace,” 50.

30. For overviews, see Crabtree and Whitehead, Unresolved Tensions; Farthing and Kohl, Evo’s Bolivia; Zegada et al., La democracia desde los márgenes; and Wolff, “Democracy Promotion,” 419–422.

31. Gray Molina, “The United States and Bolivia,” 171–176.

32. Wolff, “Democracy Promotion,” 423.

33. US Department of State, “United States–Bolivia Bilateral Dialogue”; and LaPrensa.com.bo, May 20, 2009.

34. US Department of State, “Secretary Clinton’s Meeting.”

35. Bolivia Information Forum, “US decertifies Bolivia.”

36. Wolff, “Democracy Promotion,” 426.

37. Freedom House, Investing in Freedom, 5.

38. US Department of State, “United States–Bolivia Bilateral Dialogue.”

39. Bolivia and United States, “Convenio Marco de Relaciones Bilaterales.”

40. US Department of State, “Joint Statement.”

41. US Embassy La Paz, “Statement by the Joint Commission.”

42. Achtenberg, “A Political Victory for Bolivia”; and Walser, “The State Department’s Turn-the-other-cheek Policy.” See also LosTiempos.com, November 8, 2011; and PaginaSiete.bo, November 10, 2011.

43. Gamarra, “The United States and Bolivia”; and Lehman, Bolivia and the United States.

44. US Department of State, “Congressional Budget Justification,” 750.

45. For a summary of these charges, see the official report on US ‘interference’ in Bolivia published by the Bolivian Vice Presidency in August 2009. Vicepresidencia de Bolivia, “Injerencia de los Estados Unidos en Bolivia.”

46. Wolff, “Democracy Promotion,” 424–425.

47. Burron, “Unpacking US Democracy Promotion in Bolivia,” 125–127.

48. Burron, “Unpacking US Democracy Promotion in Bolivia,” 124–125.

49. 09LAPAZ1046; 09LAPAZ1027; and Vicepresidencia de Bolivia, “Injerencia de los Estados Unidos en Bolivia.”

50. Claims for (national) sovereignty were, for instance, made by the Minister of Autonomy, Carlos Romero, and by Vice President García Linera. LaPrensa.com.bo, September 22, 2009; November 22, 2009. In its draft Framework Agreement, the Bolivian government included ‘Unrestricted respect for the sovereignty…of the States’ and ‘Full respect for the free determination of the peoples’ as key principles for governing the bilateral relationship (09LAPAZ66).

51. Bolivia’s draft ‘Framework Agreement’, for instance, contains several guidelines for bilateral cooperation that emphasise principles of national ownership, government control and alignment with national development strategies (09LAPAZ66).

52. See also La-Razon.com, December 16, 2010; and LaPrensa.com.bo, March 20, 2009, July 8, 2009.

53. See, again, Bolivia’s 2009 proposal for a bilateral framework agreement (09LAPAZ66). See also La-Razon.com, December 16, 2010.

54. Similar claims were also directly articulated by Morales himself (09LAPAZ89).

55. Wolff, “Democracy Promotion,” 422–423.

56. In addition, Bolivia also for some time pursued the aim of regaining eligibility for the MCA (see 09LAPAZ658). A further issue concerned the Bolivian demand for the extradition of former president Sánchez de Lozada (see 10LAPAZ7).

57. Therefore Morales even threatened to lodge a complaint against the suspension of the ATPDEA at the WTO (09LAPAZ89).

58. Erbol.com.bo, September 21, 2010; US Department of State, “Secretary Clinton’s Meeting”; 09LAPAZ1333; 09LAPAZ828; and 09LAPAZ1595.

59. Responding to the first US decision to suspend trade preferences under the Bush administration, Morales reportedly said ‘We cannot kneel for 63 million dollars’ (09LAPAZ89).

60. Bolivia Information Forum, “US decertifies Bolivia.”

61. Farthing and Kohl, Evo’s Bolivia, 128–143.

62. More specifically the USA emphasised that ‘people hired for USAID democracy programs were selected based solely on expertise and not on political affiliation’ (09LAPAZ1027) and that USAID’s work at the regional level included all departamentos and not only those governed by the opposition, while support for political parties had, since 2007, consisted in multiparty activities only and also included MAS representatives. See Wolff, “Democracy Promotion,” 425–426.

63. Wolff, “Democracy Promotion,” 425.

64. It should be noted that in internal negotiations the US embassy also used more pragmatic arguments (or threats) in order to convince the Bolivian government that it should not insist on the closure of USAID’s democracy programme. Such a move, the Bolivian authorities were told, would potentially have a ‘negative impact’ on ‘the ongoing bilateral talks’ between the two governments and could lead the US Congress ‘to transfer a significant amount of USAID’s Bolivia funding to other countries’ (09LAPAZ1027).

65. Carothers and Brechenmacher, Closing Space, 39–40.

66. Wolff, “Democracy Promotion,” 425.

67. Development cooperation, according to the agreement, is not limited to ‘state-to-state’ cooperation, as initially demanded by the Bolivian government but includes ‘public, private, public–private and nongovernmental organizations’; intergovernmental consultations would only define the ‘type of executing organization or organizations as well as the criteria and the process of selecting them’. Bolivia and United States, “Convenio Marco de Relaciones Bilaterales,” 4. The Bolivian government announced that it would respect US assistance in the country, whether implemented by USAID or channelled through NGOs. Opinion.com.bo, November 14, 2011.

68. Bolivia and United States, “Convenio Marco de Relaciones Bilaterales,” 2.

69. 09LAPAZ631; and US Department of State, “2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,” 9–10. It should be mentioned that the changes in Bolivia’s economic policies did not directly challenge US economic interests as the ‘nationalisations’ mainly affected Spanish and Brazilian gas companies.

70. While the above-mentioned cable from the US embassy argued that the ‘steady erosion of democratic practices and institutions under the Morales regime shows no sign of abating and is likely to prove a serious irritant to the bilateral relationship’ (09LAPAZ722), neither the leaked cables nor media reports suggest that US concerns regarding the state of Bolivian democracy significantly affected bilateral relations in general or the negotiations between the two governments in particular.

71. Bolivia and United States, “Convenio Marco de Relaciones Bilaterales.”

72. US Department of State, “Joint Statement.”

73. This balancing continues, with the fifth principle referring to the ‘universal respect and observance of human rights and fundamental liberties’ and the seventh one emphasising ‘the development of friendly and cooperative relations based on the respect for the principle of equality of rights and self-determination of the peoples’. The sixth principle refers to peaceful solution of conflict (including a reference to the ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘political independence’ of the states), the eighth refers to ‘social justice’ and the ninth and last one to the environment and ‘sustainable development’. Bolivia and United States, “Convenio Marco de Relaciones Bilaterales,” 2–3.

74. Crandall, Driven by Drugs, 9–10.

75. In terms of justice principles this normative template is based on a compound version of justice that combines egalitarian principles at the level of individual (human) rights with non-egalitarian principles at the level of collective (state) rights. The latter, if implicitly, include status-related notions of proportionality or equity (based on the superior capabilities and merits of the hegemon) as well as of priority justice (in line with principles such as ‘noblesse oblige’ and ‘primogeniture’). See Zartman, Negotiation and Conflict Management, 84–85.

76. In fact, this is what Bolivia’s Foreign Minister Choquehuanca had already suggested in late 2009 in a private conversation at the US Embassy (09LAPAZ1595).

77. Müller, “Arguing, Bargaining and All That,” 422–425.