Humanitarianism in intra-state conflict: aid inequality and local governance in government- and opposition-controlled areas in the Syrian war

Abstract

This article argues that humanitarian aid in intra-state conflict plays a crucial but largely unrecognised role in shaping the preconditions for negotiations for peace and post-conflict reconstruction. Drawing on a spatial theory approach, it identifies the role of humanitarian aid as not being temporary and independent, but as forming an integral part of the daily lives of local communities and of continuously evolving structures of governance during conflict. As a result, significant imbalances in the distribution of aid between different geographical areas, as highlighted in the current Syrian war, threaten not only the immediate survival of civilians, but also their future.

Keywords:

• Humanitarian aid
• spatial theory
• Syria
• governance
• international humanitarian law
• intra-state war

Notes

1. UNOCHA, “Syrian Arab Republic.”

2. BBC, “Guide to the Syrian Rebels”; and Slim and Trombetta, “Syria Crisis Common Context Analysis,” 57–58.

3. UNSC S/2014/427, “Report of the Secretary-General,” 9.

4. Sarkees et al., “Inter-state, Intra-state, and Extra-state Wars,” 62–63.

5. Labonte and Edgerton, “Towards a Typology.”

6. Brauman, Humanitarian Medicine, 10–13.

7. Bernard, “Humanitarian Debate,” 1189; and Jacoby, Understanding Conflict and Violence, 13. Neutrality refers to the abstention from taking sides for or against a party to the conflict; impartiality refers to the impartial treatment of individuals who are victims of conflict, ie the abstention from any form of discrimination; and independence refers to organisational independence from any other actors. The ICRC has added more fundamental principles over the past few decades, but these remain at the core. UNOCHA, “What are Humanitarian Principles?”; and ICRC, “Fundamental Principles.”

8. Stoffels, “Legal Regulation of Humanitarian Assistance”; Schwendimann, “The Legal Framework of Humanitarian Access”; and Pfanner, “Various Mechanisms and Approaches.”

9. BBC, “Syria in Civil War”; and al-Jazeera, “Red Cross Declares Syria Conflict a Civil War.”

10. Stoffels, “Legal Regulation of Humanitarian Assistance,” 518–520.

11. Stoffels, “Legal Regulation of Humanitarian Assistance,” 521.

12. Pfanner, “Various Mechanisms and Approaches,” 299.

13. Duffield, “NGO Relief in War Zones”; Cooley and Ron, “The NGO Scramble”; Van Wassenhove, “Humanitarian Aid Logistics”; McCall and Salama, “Selection, Training, and Support”; Barnett, “Humanitarianism Transformed”; and Duffield, “Risk-management and the Fortified Aid Compound.”

14. O’Hagan, “Life, Death and Aid”; and Brauman, “Médecins Sans Frontières and the ICRC.”

15. Alexander, “Globalization of Disaster”; Jakobsen, “Focus on the CNN Effect”; and Robinson, “News Media and Communication Technology.”

16. Vaux, “Humanitarian Trends and Dilemmas”; Rigby, “Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Management”; and Bello, “The Rise of the Relief-and-reconstruction Complex.”

17. Bohnke and Zurcher, “Aid, Minds and Hearts”; Lischer, “Military Intervention and the Humanitarian ‘Force Multiplier’”; and Chandler, “The Road to Military Humanitarianism.”

18. Jung, Shadow Globalisation; and MacFarlane, “Humanitarian Action and Conflict.”

19. Barber, “Feeding Refugees or War?”; and Lischer, “Collateral Damage.”

20. Okumu, “Humanitarian International NGOs”; Schweizer, “Moral Dilemmas for Humanitarianism”; and Podder, “Non-state Armed Groups and Stability.”

21. Boyce and Pastor, “Aid for Peace.”

22. Global Humanitarian Assistance, “Global Humanitarian Assistance Report.”

23. Hardt and Negri, Empire, 313–314.

24. Brezhneva and Ukhova, Russia as a Humanitarian Aid Donor; Murthy and Meier, India’s Growing Involvement; and Petersen, “Islamizing Aid.”

25. Woods, “Whose Aid?”; Duffield, “NGO Relief in War Zones”; Beckfield, “Inequality in the World Polity”; and Baitenmann, “NGOs and the Afghan War.”

26. Hofmann et al., Measuring the Impact of Humanitarian Aid; and ALNAP, “Re-thinking the Impact of Humanitarian Aid.”

27. Le Billon, “The Political Ecology of War,” 563–572; Buhaug and Gates, “The Geography of Civil War,” 419–420; and Ross, “What do we Know?,” 419.

28. Chojnacki and Engels, Material Determinism and Beyond, 5.

29. Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 33; Gottdiener, “A Marx for our Time”; and Schmid, “Henri Lefebvre’s Theory,” 29, 36–43.

30. Watson, “Seeing from the South,” 2268.

31. Benvenisti and Cohen, “War is Governance”; Arjona et al., Rebel Governance in Civil War.

32. Hall and Taylor, Political Science, 954.

33. Mac Ginty and Sanghera, “Hybridity in Peacebuilding and Development,” 4.

34. Hilhorst and Jansen, “Humanitarian Space as an Arena.”

35. Cooley and Ron, “The NGO Scramble,” 6.

36. Chandler, “The Road to Military Humanitarianism”; Armstrong, “‘Seeing the Suffering’ in Northern Uganda”; and Cooley and Ron, “The NGO Scramble.”

37. Czaika and Kis-Katos, “Civil Conflict and Displacement,” 402–405.

38. Engel and Ibanez, “Displacement due to Violence in Colombia,” 356.

39. MacFarlane, “Humanitarian Action and Conflict,” 557f; McGinnis, “Policy Substitutability,” 66–67; and Terry, Condemned to Repeat?, 47.

40. Hyndman, Border Crossings, 28.

41. Labonte and Edgerton, “Towards a Typology of Humanitarian Access Denial,” 46–48.

42. Lischer, “Security and Displacement in Iraq,” 95.

43. Cf. Massey, “Concepts of Space and Power,” 16–17.

44. Meininghaus, Creating Consent.

45. HRW, “A Wasted Decade”; Lobmeyer, “Al-Dimukratiyya Hiya Al-Hall?”; and Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria. On the (albeit limited) leeway of religious groups and the Eastern tribes, see Pierret, The State and Religion in Syria; and Chatty, “The Bedouin in Contemporary Syria.”

46. George, Syria.

47. Kherallah et al., “Health Care in Syria”; and Meininghaus, Creating Consent.

48. van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria; Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria; Zisser, “Syria, the Ba’th Regime and the Islamic Movement”; and Landis and Pace, “The Syrian Opposition.”

49. UNOCHA, “2015 Syria Response Plan,” 2; and UNOCHA, “About the Crisis.”

50. O’Bagy, Syria’s Political Opposition; Holliday, Syria’s Armed Opposition; and Abboud, Syria.

51. Al-Shami and Yassin-Kassab, Burning Country.

52. SHARP data have been subject to government approval. ACAPS, “Regional Analysis Syria: Part I, Syria, 7 February 2014,” 36. Data on nongovernmental areas rely heavily on the following four major assessments: UNOCHA et al., “MSNA Syria Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment”; SINA Working Group, “Syria Integrated Needs Assessment”; Assessment Working Group for Northern Syria, “Joint Rapid Assessment of Northern Syria II”; and ECHO et al., “Joint Rapid Assessment of Northern Syria.”

53. Slim and Trombetta, “Syria Crisis Common Context Analysis,” 41. Until 2015 3RPs were called Regional Response Plans.

54. UNOCHA, “2015 Strategic Response Plan,” 2; UNOCHA, “2014 Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP),” 8; and UNHCR, “3RP 2016–2017.”

55. UNOCHA, “2015 Strategic Response Plan,” 5; and UNOCHA, “2016 Humanitarian Response Plan,” 10.

56. UNSC S/2015/862, “Report of the Secretary-General,” 10.

57. Slim and Trombetta, “Syria Crisis Common Context Analysis,” 53.

58. UNOCHA, “2014 Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP),” 4.

59. Government of the Syrian Republic and UN, “Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan September 2012,” 8; Government of the Syrian Republic and UN, “2014 Syrian Arab Republic Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP),” 3; and Government of the Syrian Republic and UN, “Revised Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan,” 8.

60. Government of the Syrian Republic and UN, “Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan September 2012”; Government of the Syrian Republic and UN, “2014 Syrian Arab Republic Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP),” 4; and Government of the Syrian Republic and UN, “Revised Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan,” 8.

61. SNAP, “SNAP Estimated Areas of Control,” 1.

62. Bosman, The NGO Sector in Syria, 11f.

63. Slim and Trombetta, “Syria Crisis Common Context Analysis,” 42.

64. ACAPS, “Relief Actors in Syria,” 3.

65. Atkinson, “Final Report,” 7f; Slim and Trombetta, “Syria Crisis Common Context Analysis,” 42; and UNSC S/2015/813, “Report of the Secretary-General,” 10.

66. Svoboda and Pantuliano, International and Local/Diaspora Actors, 2.

67. UNSC S/2015/813, “Report of the Secretary-General”; UNSC S/2014/427, “Report of the Secretary-General”; UNSC S/2014/840, “Report to the Secretary-General”; and UNSC S/2015/698, “Report of the Secretary-General.”

68. See, for example, UNSC S/2014/427, “Report of the Secretary-General,” 6, 15; and UNSC S/2014/840, “Report to the Secretary-General,” 15, 18.

69. UNSC S/2015/124, “Implementation of Security Council Resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014) and 2191 (2014),” 9.

70. UNSC S/RES/2165, “Resolution 2165 (2014)”; UNSC S/RES/2191, “Resolution 2191 (2014)”; and UNSC S/RES/2258, “Resolution 2258 (2015).”

71. UNHCR, “Living under Siege”; and Parker, “The Conflict in Syria.”

72. See, for example, UNSC S/2016/60, “Report of the Secretary-General,” 8–9; and UNSC S/2015/862, “Report of the Secretary-General,” 9.

73. Whittall, “The ‘New Humanitarian Aid Landscape’,” 13.

74. Borger, “Syria.” For a detailed analysis of the creation of a hierarchy of lives through a process of spatial–moral ordering, see Schetter and Prinz, “Spatial–Moral Ordering.”

75. Mortimer, “UN Accused.”

76. UNOCHA, “2016 Humanitarian Needs Overview,” 22.

77. UNOCHA, “2016 Humanitarian Needs Overview,” 19.

78. Lynch, “UN’s Fear of Angering Assad.”

79. Svoboda and Pantuliano, International and Local/Diaspora Actors, 10; ACAPS, “Relief Actors in Syria,” 6f; Slim and Trombetta, “Syria Crisis Common Context Analysis,” 43; and Whittall, “The ‘New Humanitarian Aid Landscape’,” 14.

80. Ibid., 15–17.

81. ACAPS, “Relief Actors in Syria,” 4; and Margesson and Chesser, Syria, 15.

82. UNOCHA, “2016 Humanitarian Response Plan,” 4.

83. UNGA A/HRC/27/60, “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry”; Hartberg et al., “Failing Syria”; UNSC S/2015/698, “Report of the Secretary-General”; and Whittall, “The ‘New Humanitarian Aid Landscape’.”

84. ACAPS, “Regional Analysis Syria: Part AI,” 16–19.

85. Whittall, “The ‘New Humanitarian Aid Landscape’,” 11. See also UNOCHA, “2016 Humanitarian Response Plan,” 17.

86. The submission of data on aid funding to FTS is voluntary.

87. UN CERF, “CERF Funding to Syria Crisis.”

88. UNOCHA, “About ERF Syria.”

89. Drummond et al., “An Evaluation of WFP’s Regional Response,” vii; and Stoianova, “ICVA’s Review of NGOs’ Experience,” 18, 40.

90. ACAPS, “Regional Analysis Syria: Part I, 26 September 2013,” 6; and Holmes, “Syria eases Aid Flow.”

91. WHO, “Syrian Arab Republic,” 6; Sengupta, “UN seeking more Ways to distribute Aid.”

92. ACAPS, “Regional Analysis Syria: Part AI,” 16.

93. Stoianova, “ICVA’s Review of NGOs’ Experience,” 13.

94. UNOCHA, “2016 Humanitarian Needs Overview,” 20.

95. Parker, “Humanitarianism Besieged,” 5.

96. UNOCHA et al., “MSNA Syria Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment,” 12.

97. UNOCHA et al., “MSNA Syria Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment,” 68.

98. Interview 1: personal interview with leading member of staff of an NGO operating in Syria, 2015.

99. UNOCHA et al., “MSNA Syria Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment,” 29.

100. Korf and Schetter, Geographien der Gewalt, 13ff.

101. Jessop et al., “Theorizing Sociospatial Relations,” 395.

102. Meininghaus, “Emergency Aid in Intra-state War.”

103. Parker, “The Conflict in Syria”; and MSF, “Aleppo.”

104. MSF, “Syria: MSF criticices Aid Imbalances”; Weissmann and Rodrigue, “Syria”; and Liu, “Letter to the Member States.”

105. Whittall, “The ‘New Humanitarian Aid Landscape’.”

106. MSF, “Syria: Siege and Starvation in Madaya.”

107. Whittall, “The ‘New Humanitarian Aid Landscape’,” 19.

108. Montgomery and Leigh, “Syria is Now the World’s Biggest IDP Crisis.”

109. ACAPS, “SNAP,” 11; Doocy et al., “Internal Displacement and the Syrian Crisis,” 1; Ferris et al., “Syrian Crisis,” vii; and UNGA A/67/931, “Situation of Internally Displaced Persons,” 7.

110. UNOCHA, “2016 Humanitarian Needs Overview,” 5.

111. UNOCHA, “2016 Humanitarian Response Plan,” 24.

112. UNGA A/HRC/23/58, “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry,” 22f; UNSC S/2015/813, “Report of the Secretary-General,” 5; UN, “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry,” 5–6; Khodr, “Syria Deal”; Chulov and Mahmoud, “Syrian Sunnis”; and AI, “‘We had Nowhere Else to Go’.”

113. REACH, “Displacement Patterns.”

114. UNOCHA et al., “MSNA Syria Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment,” 26; and ACAPS, “Relief Actors in Syria,” 9.

115. Mission Permanente de la Republique Arabe Syrienne, “Comments on UN Report ‘Living under Siege’.”

116. SARC’s impartiality on the ground has been subject to debate. See Parker, “The Conflict in Syria,” 4; Slim and Trombetta, “Syria Crisis Common Context Analysis,” 42; and Attar, “The Syrian Arab Red Crescent refutes Allegations.” Over time SARC has been facing increasing internal challenges, especially from leading staff, regarding uneven aid delivery, with some leading members calling for the organisation to exercise greater pressure on the government in order to gain greater access to opposition-held areas. Interview 2: personal interview with leading member of staff of an NGO operating in Syria, 2015. In the meantime SARC’s network of more than 10,000 volunteers has suffered violent attacks in government- and opposition-held areas alike, leading to the tragic deaths of 40 volunteers by February 2015. Svoboda and Pantuliano, International and Local/Diaspora Actors, 11; ACAPS, “Relief Actors in Syria,” 5; and ICRC, “Syria Crisis,” 3.

117. Drummond et al., “An Evaluation of WFP’s Regional Response,” 16.

118. ACAPS, “Relief Actors in Syria,” 8; Martinez and Eng, “Asad’s Bread Problem”; and Butter, Syria’s Economy.

119. ACAPS, “Relief Actors in Syria,” 1, 10.

120. Meininghaus, Creating Consent; and Ahmad, “خلخلة قيم.. في المقابل نقاط قوة صانت البلد من الانهيار والفتنة.”

121. Whittall, “The ‘New Humanitarian Aid Landscape’,” 16.

122. CIA Open Source Centre, “Syria,” 1.

123. Khoury, “Losing the Syrian Grassroots,” 5–6; and Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, “Local Administration Structures,” 17.

124. Khalaf et al., Activism in Difficult Times, 9; Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, “Local Administration Structures,” 15; Svoboda and Pantuliano, International and Local/Diaspora Actors, 17; and Khoury, “Losing the Syrian Grassroots,” 1–2.

125. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, “Local Administration Structures,” 21–22; and ACAPS, “Relief Actors in Syria,” 8.

126. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, “Local Administration Structures,” 15.

127. Khalaf, “Governance without Government in Syria,” 52.

128. Whittall, “The ‘New Humanitarian Aid Landscape’,” 19; and Khalaf, “Governance without Government in Syria,” 51. The Coalition was founded in Doha in November 2012, replacing the former National Council as the main umbrella organisation of the opposition, which had become dysfunctional and was regarded as unrepresentative. The National Council became part of the Coalition before withdrawing in protest against negotiations with the Asad regime during Geneva II. Despite its wide international recognition, a range of internal opposition groups have remained outside the National Coalition. Its actual support at grassroots level is impossible to gauge. See, for example, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “National Coalition”; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “The Syrian National Council”; and “Syrian National Council Quits Opposition Bloc.”

129. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, “Local Administration Structures,” 4.

130. Ibid.

131. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, “Local Administration Structures,” 24.

132. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, “Local Administration Structures,” 15.

133. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, “Local Administration Structures,” 16; and Khoury, “Losing the Syrian Grassroots,” 6ff.

134. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, “Local Administration Structures,” 17.

135. Khalaf, “Governance without Government in Syria,” 54.

136. Ibid; Whittall, “The ‘New Humanitarian Aid Landscape’,” 18; and Svoboda and Pantuliano, International and Local/Diaspora Actors, 21.

137. Ibid.

138. ICG, Syria’s Kurds.

139. UNOCHA et al., “MSNA Syria Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment,” 26.

140. Sayigh, “The Syrian Opposition’s Leadership Problem,” 19.

141. Caris and Reynolds, ISIS Governance in Syria, 22.

142. Miles and Holmes, “WFP Alarmed.”

143. Lewis, “The Utopia of Isis.”

144. Interview 3: personal interview with leading member of staff of an NGO operating in Syria, 2015.

145. See, for example, Haid, “Airdropping Aid to Starving Syrians.”

146. Goldman, “Airdrops called too Risky.”

147. Gutman, “Madaya was Starving”

148. In fact, the legality of merging humanitarian assistance and development is questionable under IHL. See Mackintosh, The Principles of Humanitarian Action, 9.