![Sample our Area Studies journals, sign in here to start your access, latest two full volumes FREE to you for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5922/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Area-Studies.jpg"})
Abstract
Piracy off the coast of Somalia has resulted in a steady decline in trade through the Arabian Sea and higher costs of doing business for multiple world regions. The EU has responded to the threat with a large-scale anti-piracy operation in the Horn of Africa, which constitutes the first free-standing Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) military operation that is not entirely dependent on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) planning and assets. The operation is designed to interdict Somali piracy operations across the Gulf of Aden and to keep some of the world’s busiest sea lanes open for reasons of world trade. This article argues that the EU preoccupation with military solutions to the piracy problem, based on interventions through the Somali federal government with an emphasis on security, is insufficient because it fails to address the underlying causes of piracy and misunderstands the Somali socio-cultural-security nexus and the need for practical longer term land-based approaches to development. The reduction of Somali piracy activities can be linked to this increased military response capacity as well as to increased security precautions undertaken by shipping companies, but none of these strategies has succeeded in dismantling piracy networks. They therefore offer only a temporary and costly stopgap measure.
Notes
1. USDT, Economic Impact of Piracy.
2. Kraska, “Coalition Strategy,” 197.
3. World Bank, Pirates of Somalia, xii.
4. Burlando, Cristea, and Lee, Trade Consequences of Maritime Insecurity, 2.
5. World Bank, Pirates of Somalia, xiii.
6. The Economist, “What Happened to Somalia’s Pirates?”
7. Rothe and Collins, “Got a Band-Aid?,” 328.
8. UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in Eastern Africa.
9. Reitano, “Comparing Approaches to the Security–Development Nexus,” 4.
10. According to one of the EU’s own advisors in Mogadishu, the international community response to Somalia’s needs has been lacklustre and overly centralised in the SFG itself. Indeed: ‘Parochial interests of international actors (UN, EU, USA) fuelled by geopolitical, national and bureaucratic factors are reducing the effectiveness of the commitment by the international community in Somalia, which is wanting in terms of strategy and insufficiently coordinated’. See: Brune, Baffled in Mogadishu.
11. Gilmer, “Hedonists and Husbands.”
12. Shortland and Varese, “Protector’s Choice.”
13. Galletti, “Multilevel Analytic Process,” 9.
14. Elmi, Understanding the Somali Conflagration, 29.
15. Anderson, CEADS Papers Volume 2: Somalia, 6.
16. Elmi, Understanding the Somali Conflagration, 29.
17. Ibid., 32.
18. Grant, “Clan Identity and Islamic Identity in Somalia,” 64.
19. Elmi, Understanding the Somali Conflagration, 30.
20. Grant, “Clan Identity and Islamic Identity in Somalia,” 65.
21. Samatar, “Destruction of State and Society in Somalia,” 630.
22. Ibid., 627.
23. Treves, “Piracy, Law of the Sea,” 400.
24. Sumaila and Bawumia, “Fisheries, Ecosystem Justice and Piracy,” 154.
25. Klein, “Moral Economy of Somali Piracy,” 97.
26. Gilmer, “Hedonists and Husbands,” 5.
27. Ibid.
28. Gilpin, “Counting the Costs of Somali Piracy,” 6.
29. Ibid., 7.
30. Gartner, “Making the International Local,” 145.
31. Klein, “Moral Economy of Somali Piracy,” 96.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Bueger, “Drops in the Bucket”.
35. House of Lords, European Union Committee, 12th Report of 2nd Session, 2009–10, 7.
36. Bueger, “Doing Europe”.
37. Bueger, “Making Things Known”.
38. Tardy, Fighting Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.
39. Percy and Shortland, “Contemporary Maritime Piracy.”
40. European Commission and European External Action Service, Joint Communication to the Council.
41. Skeppstrom, Wikland, and Jonsson, “EU Training Missions.”
42. Dzalbe, “Political and Security Committee.”
43. Biscop and Coelemont, “CSDP and the Ghent Framework.”
44. Riddervold, “New Threats – Different Response.”
45. European Commission, EU Development Assistance to Somalia.
46. Vines, “Rhetoric from Brussels and Reality on the Ground”; Papastavridis, “Piracy off Somalia.”
47. Cathelin, “EU’s Africa Foreign Policy after Lisbon.”
48. Merket, “EU and the Security–Development Nexus.”
49. European Commission and European External Action Service, Joint Communication to the Council.
50. Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in Eastern Africa.
54. de Waal and Ilbreck, “Human Security Strategy,” 5.
55. Ehrhart and Peretto, “Stabilizing Somalia.”
56. Stern and Öjendal, Security Dialogue Special Issue.
57. Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War.
58. Shortland, “Can We Stop Talking about Somali Piracy.”
59. Ibid.
60. Shortland and Varese, “State-Building, Informal Governance.”
61. Shortland and Varese, “Protector’s Choice.”
62. Coito, “Pirates vs. Private Security.”
63. Shortland, “Can We Stop Talking about Somali Piracy.”
64. Lindley, Somali Piracy, chap. 6.
65. Shortland and Percy, “Governance, Naval Intervention and Piracy.”
66. Policante, “New Pirate Wars.”
67. Policante, Pirate Myth.
68. Etim, Testimony.
69. World Bank and United Nations, Eastern Africa HOA Displacement Study, 14.
70. Etim, Testimony.
71. de Waal, “Real Politics of the Horn of Africa.”
72. Bueger, “Drops in the Bucket.”