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Abstract
This article explores the relationships between (so-called) ‘non-traditional’ development cooperation (NTDC) and political leadership. Using the case studies of Brazil and South Korea, we propose that certain emblematic elements of NTDC discourse and practice can act to influence the relationship with political leaders in particular ways. These are (a) elevated language of affect, (b) interleaving of personal biographies with the developmental trajectories of states, (c) the use of NTDC to legitimise domestic policies and promote domestic political leadership, (d) the prominence of presidential diplomacy and (e) the challenges confronting rapidly expanding domestic development cooperation institutions and systems.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to the editor and anonymous referees of Third World Quarterly for their reviews and suggestions for this paper. The paper was delivered at the international workshop “Looking ahead: South–South development cooperation in the next decade” which was supported by the UK’s Development Studies Association (Rising Powers Study Group), in Cambridge on 26 May 2015. We are grateful to other participants for their comments and constructive critique.
Notes
1. Mawdsley, From Recipients to Donors; Eyben and Savage, “Emerging and Submerging Powers”; Svent-Iványi and Lightfoot, New Europe’s New Development Aid; Kragelund, “Back to BASICS?”; Wiese, “Country Study: Saudi Arabia.”
2. Fejerskov, Lundsgaarde, and Cold-Ravnkilde, “Recasting the New Actors.”
3. This is, of course, a problematic designation. Many such donors and development partners have been engaged in various forms of development cooperation for decades; while the term inevitably bestows upon Western donors the stable identity of being ‘traditional’ or ‘established’. As discussed in detail by Mawdsley, From Recipients to Donors, and others, all labels (at this resolution) are imperfect. After much discussion between ourselves and in response to reviewers’ comments, we decided to use this term instead of South–South Cooperation. While the reviewers recognised that South Korea shows a series of similarities to Asian donors/partners (e.g. Japan, China) – a provisional and fluid grouping that disconcerts DAC/non-DAC categorisation – they were not comfortable with the designation of Southern donor for Korea.
4. Eyben, “Struggles in Paris”; Weiss and Abdenur, “Introduction”; Weinlich, “Emerging Powers at the UN.”
5. Sorensen, Challenging the Aid Paradigm; Mawdsley, “Development Geography 1.”
6. van der Merwe et al., Emerging Powers in Africa.
7. For an insightful example, see Kim and Kang, “Young and Dynamic?”
8. In 2015 Korea was ranked the 29th richest country in the world according to GDP per capita (adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity). For a list of how different countries rank in terms of wealth as measured by GDP (PPP) see: https://www.gfmag.com/global-data/economic-data/worlds-richest-and-poorest-countries. For comparison, the UK came 27th and Brazil came 79th. If calculated on GDP alone, Brazil would rank 7th and Korea 13th (http://www.worldsrichestcountries.com/).
9. Kim, “Domestic Politics of International Development.”
10. Sorensen, Challenging the Aid Paradigm; Kang et al., “Does Korea Follow Japan”; Kondoh, “Korea’s Pathway from Recipient to Donor”; Sato and Shimomura, The Rise of Asian Donors; Watson, Foreign Aid and Emerging Powers.
11. The data used here have been primarily collected by the different authors from interviews with aid officials, CSOs and researchers, and participant observation in different field sites, including Seoul, Paris, Busan, Brazil and Mozambique.
12. Hermann, “Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior”; Hermann et al., “Who Leads Matters”.
13. We are referring to the recently published contribution by Burges and Chagas Bastos, “The Importance of Presidential Leadership”, which focuses on Brazilian foreign policy.
14. Muchapondwa et al., “Ground-truthing Chinese development finance”.
15. Mawdsley, From Recipients to Donors.
16. van der Marwe et al. 2016, Emerging powers in Africa; Taylor, The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.
17. For example, China’s Second Africa Policy Paper 2015. See ‘China’s second Africa policy paper’ Xinhua, December 4, 2015. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-12/04/c_134886545.htm (Last accessed 14 July 2016).
18. Prashad, The Darker Nations.
19. Bayly, Asian Voices.
20. Monson, Africa’s Freedom Railway.
21. Mohan and Tan-Mullins, “Chinese Migrants”.
22. Taylor, The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.
23. Sidiropolous et al., Development Cooperation and Emerging Powers.
24. Kim, “Bridging Troubled Worlds”; Joo et al., The Establishment of the Korean ODA model; Kalinowski and Cho, “Korea’s Search for a Global Role”; Kim and Lee, “Busan and Beyond”.
25. Preliminary data provided at http://www.oecd.org/dac/korea.htm (accessed 26 April 2017).
26. See ‘Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth’ at https://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/development/Annex1-Seoul-Development-Consensus-Shared-Growth.pdf; and ‘Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation’ at http://www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/49,650,173.pdf
27. For a critical appraisal of South Korea’s middle power diplomacy over recent presidencies, see Kim, “South Korea’s middle power diplomacy”.
28. President Park’s powers were suspended in December 2016 after a legislative impeachment vote over corruption claims. On 10 March 2017 Korea's Constitutional Court has formally removed impeached President Park from office.
29. The speech is available in Korean at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=141zJSFEyYU (accessed 18 September 2014).
30. S Kim and Kang, “Young and Dynamic?”.
31. DiMoia, “Mobilizing the Development Narrative.”
32. SM Kim, “Critical Geopolitics”.
33. Mawdsley, Savage and Kim, “A Post-Aid World”.
34. Ikenberry and Mo, The Rise of Korean Leadership, 9.
35. Watson, “Global Korea”; Watson, “South Korea’s State-led soft Power”. The president’s personal attendance at the HLF-4 in Busan helped elevate the stature of the conference nationally and internationally, reflecting the president’s own intention (interviews with media and government).
36. Ikenberry and Mo, The Rise of Korea Leadership; Watson, Foreign Aid and Emerging Powers.
37. Korea Net, “Korea Leads the Green Way”.
38. Cho, “Officials Slam Four-River Audit”; JS Kim, “The Environmental Fallout”.
39. H Kim, “Excessive budgetary support”; NI Kim, “Parties Debate”; Chung, “Global Push for Saemaul Movement”; SM Kim, “The Domestic Politics”.
40. Soh et al., “Research on the Implementation of Saemaul Undong”; Soh et al., “Research on Ways to Enhance Effectiveness”.
41. Chung, “Global Push for Saemaul Movement”; H Kim, “Excessive Budgetary Support”; NI Kim, “Parties debate”; SM Kim, “The Domestic Politics”.
42. Han, “The New Community Movement”; Kwon, “Implications of Korea’s Saemaul”; Douglass, “The Saemaul Undong”.
43. SM Kim, “The Domestic Politics”.
44. OECD-DAC, “OECD-DAC Peer Review Korea”.
45. S Kim and Kang, “Young and Dynamic”.
46. Marcondes and Mawdsley, “South–South in Retreat?”
47. Harsch, “Brazil Repaying Its Debt”.
48. Author’s translation from President Lula’s speech at the African Union Summit in Sirte (2009). See: ‘Futuro do Brasil está ligado à África, diz Lula’, G1, 1 July 2009.
49. ‘Aula inaugural proferida pelo Ministro das Relações Exteriores Embaixador Celso Amorim por ocasião da abertura do curso de Relações Internacionais da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 13 de abril de 2009’.
50. Netto, “Lula ataca mídia”.
51. BBC News, “Dilma Rousseff”.
52. See: “World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz Meets Brazil’s President Lula.” Press Release No:2006/220/S.
Available at: http://web.worldbank.org/wbsite/external/extaboutus/organisation/extpresident/extpastpresidents/extofficepresident/0,,contentmdk:20758191~menupk:64343642~pagepk:51174171~pipk:64258873~thesitepk:1014541,00.html [accessed 10 February 2016].
53. By the same token, Southern partners are stung when these projects fail or encounter contestation, as has happened in the case of ProSAVANA.
54. Danese, Diplomacia Presidencial.
55. IPEA/ABC, Cooperação Brasileira.
56. The interviewee also suggested that Rousseff's negative views could help explain her decision to delegate certain competencies of the Foreign Ministry to other ministries such as Treasury and Trade. Interview conducted by Marcondes with Brazilian diplomat serving at the Brazilian Mission to the UN, New York, December 2014.
57. e.g. Vittorini, “A Nehru-lite Third India-Africa Forum Summit”.
58. Mawdsley, “South–South Cooperation in a New Era". As NTDC grows and consolidates, the role for political leaders we have described here may change in ways that continue to provide insight into this complex phenomenon. Finally, although we have not pursued a comparative approach in the paper, there are also clearly points of similarity and difference with the (so-called) ‘established’ donors – longer-standing DAC members. Some characteristics are differently performed and historically located (e.g. charity and humanitarianism rather than solidarity, empathy and justice), while others are not available to contemporary DAC leaders (e.g. the personal identification with a country’s development trajectory). By going beyond individual case studies, the aim here has been to explore NTDC in ways that provide more analytical purchase on such points of similarity and difference, and some of the patterns observable in what are a diverse and dynamic set of actors.