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Abstract
Why do some peace agreements end armed conflicts whereas others do not? Previous studies have primarily focused on the relation between warring parties and the provisions included in peace agreements. Prominent mediators, however, have emphasised the importance of stakeholders at various levels for the outcome of peace agreements. To match the experience of these negotiators we apply a level-of-analysis approach to examine the contextual circumstances under which peace agreements are concluded. While prominent within the causes of war literature, level-of-analysis approaches are surprisingly scant in research about conflict resolution. This article compares two Sudanese Peace Agreements: the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) that ended the North–South war and led to the independence of South Sudan, and the Darfur Peace Agreement (2006) which failed to end fighting in Darfur. We find that factors at the local, national and international level explain the different outcomes of the two agreements. Hence, the two case studies illustrate the merit of employing a level-of-analysis approach to study the outcome of peace agreements. The main contribution of this article is that it presents a new theoretical framework to understand why some peace agreements terminate armed conflict whereas others do not.
Acknowledgements
Adam Azzain Mohammed inspired us to examine Darfur using a level-of-analysis approach, and we greatly appreciate our numerous discussions with him. We are also grateful for excellent comments from Desirée Nilsson and Roisin Read.
Notes
1. Yet the signatories’ relation is far from peaceful. Some clashes took place during the CPA’s interim period (2005–2011), and in 2012, Sudan and South Sudan fought each other in a border dispute. Yet none of these incidents has led to a return to war.
2. Mohammed, Evaluating the Darfur Peace Agreement; Duursma, “Mediation with Muscles or Minds?”
3. Zartman, Ripe for Resolution, 234.
4. Jan Eliasson, interviewed 24 May 2011, Stockholm.
5. Brosché and Rothbart, Violent Conflict and Peacebuilding.
6. Zartman, "Comparative Case Studies," 8.
7. Waltz, Man, the State, and War.
8. For example see: Waltz, Theory of International Politics.
9. See: Brown, “Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict”; Posen, “Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict”; Levy, International Sources of Interstate and Intrastate War.
10. Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa; Beardsley, Quinn, and Biswas, “Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes.”
11. Duursma, “Current Literature Review of International Mediation.”
12. See for example: Walter, Committing to Peace; Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?
13. Walter, Committing to Peace, 83.
14. See for example: Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation; Hartzell and Hoddie, Crafting Peace.
15. Hartzell and Hoddie, Crafting Peace, 82–3.
16. Beardsley, Mediation Dilemma; Quinn et al., "Crisis Managers but Not Conflict Resolvers."
17. Beardsley, Mediation Dilemma.
18. Brosché and Elfversson. "Communal Conflicts, Civil War and the State."
19. Desirée Nilsson, "Anchoring the Peace.”
20. For example, see: Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes.”
21. Reiter, "Does Spoiling Work?"
22. Svensson, International Mediation Bias and Peacemaking.
23. Brosché and Rothbart, Violent Conflict and Peacebuilding, 94.
24. Brosché and Höglund, “Crisis of Governance in South Sudan.”
25. Brosché, Masters of War; see also: LeRiche and Arnold, South Sudan: From Revolution to Independence.
26. See: Akol, SPLM/SPLA: The Nasir Declaration.
27. Enough Project, The Answer to Darfur.
28. Lual Deng, interviewed 3 February 2015, Addis Ababa.
29. Young, Fate of Sudan, 291.
30. Young, Emerging North–South Tensions; LeRiche and Arnold, South Sudan: From Revolution to Independence.
31. Burr and Collins, Sudan in Turmoil; Johnson, Waging Peace in Sudan, 14.
32. Lazaro Sumbeiywo, IGAD’s Chief Meditator in Naivasha, interviewed 1 February 2015, Addis Ababa; Luca Zampetti, Italian observer to the Naivasha negotiation, interviewed 4 February 2015, Addis Ababa; Jan Pronk, UN Special Representative to Sudan 2004–2006, interviewed 1 June 2015, The Hague.
33. Lazaro Sumbeiywo, IGAD’s Chief Mediator in Naivasha, interviewed 1 February 2015, Addis Ababa.
34. Ibid.
35. The SPLM/A expanded its size by recruiting militias and former rival rebel groups. See: Snowden, Work in Progress.
36. Natsios, Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur, 183.
37. Iyob and Khadiagala, Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace, 113.
38. Neu, “Restoring Relations between Uganda and Sudan.”
39. Jumbert, “Sudan’s ‘Rogue’ State Label,” 156–61.
40. Natsios, Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur, 169.
41. Iyob and Khadiagala, Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace.
42. Natsios, Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur, 169.
43. Rosalind Marsden, interviewed 21 February 2015, Oxford.
44. LeRiche and Arnold, South Sudan: From Revolution to Independence, 23.
45. Flint and de Waal, Darfur, 81.
46. el-Battahani, “Complex Web,” 13.
47. Brosché, Masters of War.
48. Maitre, "What Sustains 'Internal Wars'?”; Flint and de Waal, Darfur, 68–70; Brosché and Rothbart, Violent Conflict and Peacebuilding, 53.
49. Elhadi Idriss Yahya, interviewed by telephone 31 January 2015; Abdulaziz Juma, interviewed by telephone 11 February 2015.
50. Abdullahi El-Tom, Senior Member of JEM’s Executive Board, interviewed 22 February 2015, Oxford.
51. Khalil el-Amin, University of Khartoum, interviewed 5 December 2007, Khartoum.
52. Abdul-Jalil and Unruh, “Land Rights under Stress in Darfur”; Tubiana, “Darfur; a War for Land?”
53. Mohammed, Evaluating the Darfur Peace Agreement.
54. De Waal, “Sudan: Darfur.”
55. Communities victimised by Janjaweed attacks, in contrast, perceived Khartoum’s lack of commitment to disarmament as a crucial flaw of the DPA.
56. Arab rebel sympathisers and Arab neutrals from Darfur, interviewed November–December 2007, Juba/Khartoum.
57. Yahia Bashir, senior member of the SLM/A Abdul Wahid, interviewed 20 February 2015, London.
58. Toga, “African Union Mediation,” 231.
59. Flint and de Waal, Darfur, 230.
60. Ibid., 208.
61. Hilary Benn, interviewed 21 November 2014, London. See also: De Waal, “Darfur’s Deadline,” 273.
62. De Waal, “Darfur’s Deadline,” 274.
63. Brosché and Rothbart, Violent Conflict and Peacebuilding, 68.
64. Maitre, "What Sustains 'Internal Wars'?”
65. Natsios, Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur, 169.
66. Flint and de Waal, Darfur, 191–2.
67. Natsios, Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur, 169.
68. Cockett, Sudan, 225.
69. Flint and de Waal, Darfur, 191.
70. See: De Waal, “Sudan: Darfur.”
71. Flint and de Waal, Darfur, 211; Toga, “African Union Mediation”, 240.
72. Nathan, "Failure of the Darfur Mediation,” 498.
73. Hilary Benn, interviewed 21 November 2014, London.
74. Flint and de Waal, Darfur, 120–1.
75. Ibid.
76. Tanner and Tubiana, Divided They Fall, 24.
77. El Khalifa, Conflict in Darfur.
78. Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe, interviewed 13 February 2015, Addis Ababa; Lauri Nathan, interviewed 23 June 2016, Basel.
79. Cockett, Sudan, 180.
80. Cited in ibid., 180.
81. Flint and de Waal, Darfur, 143.
82. Flint and de Waal, Darfur, 173.
83. Beswick, “Peacekeeping, Regime Security.”
84. Flint and de Waal, Darfur, 143.
85. Ibid., 179.
86. Jumbert, “Sudan’s ‘Rogue’ State Label.”
87. Abdullahi El-Tom, Senior Member of JEM’s Executive Board, interviewed 22 February 2015, Oxford.
88. International Crisis Group, “Darfur's New Security Reality.”
89. De Waal, “Sudan: Darfur,” 292.
90. Hottinger, “Darfur Peace Agreement,” 48.
91. Alex de Waal, interviewed 3 September 2014, Boston; Lual Deng, interviewed 3 February 2015, Addis Ababa.
92. South Sudanese scholar, interviewed 6 April 2013, Juba.