![Sample our Global Development journals, sign in here to start your access, latest two full volumes FREE to you for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5929/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Global-Development.jpg"})
Abstract
In the Chinese view, the architecture of contemporary global governance – especially that of the Bretton Woods institutions – is flawed and in need of reform. Developing nations (like China), the argument runs, need to be given a role proportionate to their global economic influence. Since the Group of Twenty (G20) became a leaders’ summit in 2008, China has used the forum to push for such reform. But today, despite some supposed progress, reform has stalled. Recognising this fact, China is increasingly emphasising regional integration in its strategy for overcoming the middle-income trap. Global reform has not been abandoned, but – given its infeasibility – is no longer a short-term priority.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Ren Xiao, Jonathan Luckhurst, David Shambaugh and the two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments.
Notes
1. Xi, “Jointly Shoulder Responsibility.”
2. “The New Davos Man.”
3. The ‘middle income trap’, a term coined in 2006 by two World Bank economists, refers to the difficulty countries experience transitioning from ‘middle-income’ status, which the World Bank (for the 2018 fiscal year) defines as Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of US$1006 to US$12,235, to ‘high-income’ status, which is income per capita above $12,235. The theorised sources of this growth slowdown differ, but generally the loss of a nation’s competitive advantage in cheap manufacturing, along with the simultaneous inability to compete with entrenched competitors at higher levels of value added, is seen as responsible for slowing growth. For recent reviews, see Agénor, “Caught in the Middle?”; Felipe, Kumar, and Galope, “Middle-Income Transitions”; Lin, “Industrial Policies for Avoiding”; Wade, “Industrial Policy in Response.”
4. Colomer, How Global Institutions Rule, 74.
5. Examples from Wade, “Emerging World Order?,” 350. Precise Nixon quote from “Transcript of a Recording,” 12.
6. Figures calculated by the author using World Bank (market rate) data.
7. Author’s calculation with World Bank data. Wade, “Emerging World Order?,” 351, using IMF data at market exchange rates, puts the number at 72%.
8. Kirton, China’s G20 Leadership, 19.
9. Yu, “G-20 and China,” 8.
10. Ibid., 9.
11. Ibid., 12; cf. A. He, The Dragon’s Footprints, 36.
12. Colomer, How Global Institutions Rule, chap. 7.
13. Yu, “G-20 and China,” 13; also see Chen, “China’s Perspective on Global Governance.”
14. Martin, “Global Answer to Global Problems.”
15. Kirton, China’s G20 Leadership, 24.
16. “The Global Economic Summit.”
17. Kirton, China’s G20 Leadership, 32 ff.
18. Ibid., 34.
19. Ibid., 35.
20. Ibid., 37.
21. Ibid., 39.
22. Luckhurst, G20 Since the Global Crisis, 225; A. He, The Dragon’s Footprints, 82–84.
23. Kirton, China’s G20 Leadership; A. He, The Dragon’s Footprints. For China’s diplomacy in the 2016 Hangzhou summit, see Ren, “G20: Emerging Chinese Leadership.”
24. Kirton, China’s G20 Leadership, 42.
25. A. He, The Dragon’s Footprints, 41–43.
26. Kirton, China’s G20 Leadership, 69.
27. Ibid., 79.
28. Figures calculated by the author using World Bank data, 1976 and 2015.
29. “G20 in Figures,” slide 3.
30. Ibid, slide 4.
31. O’Neill, “China’s ‘New Normal.’”
32. Xi, “Seek Sustained Development.”
33. “Xi’s ‘New Normal’ Theory.”
34. Xi, “Shaping the Future.”
35. Xi, “Promoting Innovative Development.”
36. Xi, “A New Blueprint.”
37. Xi, “A New Blueprint.”
38. Wang, “Remarks by Foreign Minister Wang Yi.”
39. For example, “G20 Hangzhou Summit Continues.”
40. Carin and Ye, “The G20 Preparatory Process.”
41. M. Li, “Rising from Within,” 24.
42. Luckhurst, G20 Since the Global Crisis.
43. Quotations in the preceding two paragraphs from Ying Wang and Li, “China and the G20.”
44. Lei Wang and Wang, “G20 Institutionalization.”
45. “China’s G20 Presidency,” 4.
46. A term suggested by one of the article’s anonymous reviewers.
47. Rathus, “Japan and the G8/G20.”
48. “G20 Leaders’ Communique: Hangzhou Summit.”
49. Carin, “China and the G20,” 20.
50. Liu, “The Role of the G20,” 67.
51. Luckhurst, G20 Since the Global Crisis; Postel-Vinay, G20: A New Geopolitical Order, 14 ff.
52. Eccleston, Kellow, and Carroll, “G20 Endorsement.”
53. Bradford, “G20 Hangzhou Summit.”
54. Kirton, “Summit of Significant Success.” China’s conformity with G20 decisions, incidentally, has increased with time, and if the trend continues will soon rival America’s. See “The Multilateral Kingdom.”
55. Luckhurst, “G20’s Growing Political and Economic Challenges”; Bradford, “2016: The Year for Leadership.”
56. Y. He, “Proactive Approach to Global Governance,” 195.
57. For a similar finding based on different evidence, see Paradise, “Role of ‘Parallel Institutions.’”
58. Vestergaard and Wade, “Still in the Woods,” 6.
59. Development Committee, “Dynamic Formula.”
60. Vestergaard and Wade, “Protecting Power,” table 10.3.
61. Calculations by the author according to 2015 World Bank economic data and March 2017 World Bank vote distributions; see World Bank, “International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.”
62. “Document 32381 v2” Attachment E Annex.
63. Vestergaard and Wade, “Protecting Power.”
64. This section updates Vestergaard and Wade, “Still in the Woods,” but with a slightly different GDP formula.
65. Weisbrot and Johnston, “Voting Share Reform.”
66. IMF, “IMF Members’ Quotas.”
67. Author’s calculations, April 17, 2017.
68. IMF, “Fifteenth General Review of Quota.”
69. Wade, “Emerging World Order?,” 366.
70. Author’s interview with Antonio de Lecea, Principal Advisor to the Director General of Finance Affairs of the EU. Singapore, April 7, 2017.
71. Wade, “Art of Power Maintenance,” 23–29. For further background on the domestic drivers of US foreign policy, see Layne, “US Foreign Policy Establishment.”
72. Wade, “Emerging World Order?,” 368.
73. This paragraph updates Luckhurst, G20 Since the Global Crisis, 237, using IMF, “Annual Report 2015: Diversity & Inclusion.”
74. Grades B01-B05: IMF, “Web Table 5.4: IMF Staff Salary Structure.”
75. IMF, “Annual Report 2015: Diversity & Inclusion,” 59, table 18.
76. Ibid., 60–64.
77. The same is apparently true of the UN Secretariat, where by a Chinese count in mid-2013, the US had four times more senior managers, and the UK and France roughly twice as many, as China. See Chan, “China and Global Governance,” 167.
78. In the interview referenced above, Antonio de Lecea predicted that next managing director, to be selected in 2021, will be non-European.
79. Paradise, “Role of ‘Parallel Institutions,’” 168.
80. Ren, “Reform-Minded Status Quo Power?”; also see Sohn, “Between Confrontation and Assimilation.”
81. Wu, “In the Process of Multi-Polarization.”
82. Ren, “Reform-Minded Status Quo Power?,” 2033.
83. Harpaz, “China’s Coherence”, 131
84. This paragraph is based on the evidence presented in Harpaz, “China’s Coherence.” For a now-dated analysis that found a similar conclusion, see Kent, Beyond Compliance.
85. Fues and Messner, “G20: Balancing National Interests.”
86. Cooper, Lesage, and Graaf, “G20 and Rising Powers.”
87. Andrew F. Cooper and Daniel Femes, “Foreign Policy Strategies of Emerging Powers.” Also see Hongsong Liu and Shaun Breslin, “Shaping the Agenda Jointly?”
88. Zhang, “China and the Struggle for Legitimacy.”
89. Deng, “Power and Politics of Recognition.”
90. Xinhua, “Xi Stresses Urgency.”
91. Y. He, “Proactive Approach to Global Governance.”
92. To some extent, it is also a response to America’s ‘pivot’ to Asia, particularly the (now moribund) Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). See Ren, “US Rebalance to Asia.”
93. Quoted in Katada, “In Pursuit of Stability”, 2.
94. Kroeber, China’s Economy, chap. 7, 12, and 13.
95. Katada, “In Pursuit of Stability.”
96. Zha, “G20’s Institutional Weakness”; Zhou, “Plight of the G20,” 129.
97. Hsu, “RMB Internationalization: Are We There Yet?”
98. Wei and Han, “Road to a Great Monetary Power”; C. Li and Zhang, “Renminbi Internationalization in the New Normal.”
99. Stephen, “Emerging Powers and Emerging Trends.”
100. The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security; Kazinform, “SCO to Strengthen.”
101. A. He, The Dragon’s Footprints, 126–132; 258–259.