Evaluating Brazilian South–South Cooperation in Haiti

Abstract

I focus on evaluating Brazilian development and humanitarian cooperation in Haiti to answer how emerging providers such as Brazil are contributing to global development through cooperation. The paper establishes criteria for evaluation, arguing that global standards for aid effectiveness need to be expanded. I argue that when assessed on ownership, efficiency and sustainability, cooperation holds several advantages and limits, such as misplaced assumptions that Brazil’s approach is appropriate elsewhere. The discussion is rooted in the context of Haiti in order to underline how outcomes are not pre-determined, but rather depend on the model’s interaction with the partner context.

Keywords:

• South–South Cooperation
• Brazil
• Haiti
• aid effectiveness
• evaluative framework

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Laura Macdonald for her support in preparing the manuscript.

Notes

1. The DAC is a body housed within the OECD that governs the provision of official development assistance.

2. OECD, “Development Cooperation.”

3. Ibid.

4. See Rowlands, “Emerging Donors”; Manning, “Will ‘Emerging’”; Kragelund, “The Return”; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), “South–South Cooperation” for an introduction.

5. Zimmermann and Smith, “More Actors.”

6. OECD, “Development Cooperation.”

7. Quadir, “Rising Donors,” 324.

8. I use the term donors deliberately, as a way of contesting the claim that South–South Cooperation works as a horizontal vehicle.

9. Buss, “Brazil: Structuring.”

10. Zimmerman and Smith, “More Actors.”

11. Brazilian officials in author’s interviews; see also ABC & BRICS Policy Centre, O Brasil.

12. Woods (“Whose aid?”) provides an excellent overview of some of the controversies facing newer donors.

13. OECD, “Development Cooperation.”

14. UNCTAD, South–South Cooperation.”

15. Feldmann et al., “Lost in Translation”; Baranyi, Feldmann and Bernier, “Solidarity Forever?”

16. Kindornay, “Will the Global?”; Sinclair, “Beyond 2015.”

17. ABC, “Quantitativos de projetos.”

18. White, “Understanding Brazil’s.”

19. Leubolt, “From Inclusive”; Leubolt, “Institutions, Discourse”; Boito and Berringer, “Social Classes.”

20. Levitsky and Roberts, “Introduction: Latin”; Macdonald and Ruckert, Post-neoliberalism in the Americas; Grugel and Riggirozzi, “Post-neoliberalism in Latin.”

21. Sridhar, “Post-Accra.”

22. Babb, “The Washington Consensus.”

23. The Global Partnership, “Answers to Frequently.”

24. BRICS Policy Centre, “BRICS and the Global.”

25. See Rowlands, “Emerging Donors”; Manning, “Will ‘Emerging’”; Kragelund, “The Return”; UNCTAD, “South–South Cooperation”; Zimmerman and Smith, “More Actors”; Quadir, “Rising Donors.”

26. Besharati et al., Developing a Conceptual; ABC, Manual de Gestão; Plan Políticas Públicas and Articulação Sul, “Project Evaluation.”

27. ABC, Manual de Gestão.

28. Plan Políticas Públicas and Articulação Sul, “Project Evaluation,” 20; sustainability has some overlap with alignment but warrants a separate category as the Brazilian strategy of capacity building is much more direct and explicit than alignment’s focus on supporting existing institutions. As the authors of a UNDP report (“Monitoring and evaluation,” 17) note, their research found that capacity building was ‘highly emphasised by some interviewees as the main component of Brazilian cooperation’.

29. Plan Políticas Públicas and Articulação Sul, “Project Evaluation.”

30. Ibid.

31. Friedman, “Gender, Sexuality”; Marsiaj, “Federalism, Advocacy”; Htun, “From ‘Racial.’”

32. OECD, “DAC Criteria.”

33. Ibid.

34. While projects were selected randomly from the (small) total universe of cases, the health and agricultural sectors and the country case were chosen as they are found representative of Brazil’s wider efforts. For example, the sectors are those where Brazil has focused its efforts as part of exporting its ‘social technology’. Haiti also reflects logics behind the decision to intensify SSC given its importance for other foreign policy objectives, such as leadership of the UN Stabilisation Mission to promote Brazil’s peacekeeping norms and gain international prestige.

35. Portal Brasil, “Haiti recebe.”

36. Fiocruz, “Complexo hospitalar.”

37. Brazilian officials in author’s interviews.

38. CGFome, Subsídios – Coordenação-geral, 1.

39. Ibid, 2.

40. Brazilian officials in author’s interviews.

41. Brazilian officials and IO respondents in author’s interviews.

42. CGFome, Subsídios – Coordenação-geral, 1.

43. Ibid; Brazilian officials in author’s interviews.

44. CGFome, Subsídios – Coordenação-geral, 1.

45. Brazilian official quoted in author’s interviews, my translation.

46. Baranyi, “Canada and the Security-Development.”

47. Seitenfus, Haiti: Dilemas, 268.

48. Shamsie, “The Economic Dimension”; Shamsie, “Haiti: Appraising”; Shamsie, “Export Processing”; Shamsie, “Pro-Poor Economic”; Shamsie, “Haiti’s Post-Earthquake.”

49. “Manufacturing Corporate,” 180.

50. Baranyi, Feldmann and Bernier, “Solidarity Forever?”

51. Ibid., 169.

52. Diverse officials in author’s interviews.

53. ABC, Manual de Gestão.

54. In author’s interviews.

55. Haitian official in author’s interviews.

56. Farmer associations, school administrators and hospital administrators in author’s interviews.

57. In author’s interviews, my translation.

58. In author’s interviews.

59. Ibid.

60. In author’s interviews, my translation.

61. Brazilian and Haitian officials and IO representatives in author’s interviews.

62. In author’s interviews.

63. Haitian bureaucrats, medical professionals and civil society respondents in author’s interviews, my translation.

64. ABC, “Brasil, Haiti.”

65. Haitian officials in author’s interviews.

66. At the end of each period, the Haitian side was responsible for properly accounting for the use of funds before more funds would be released. However, at the time of my arrival, there had been a funding freeze and the Institute was effectively closed when I first visited in July 2015; it was up-and-running again during my second visit a couple of weeks later in August 2015. The explanations for this break were varied: while some Haitians suggested that the problem was delays on the Brazilian side in releasing the funding, others, including several Haitian respondents, argued that Haitian civil servants had not fulfilled the accounting requirements, which Brazilians confirmed (in author’s interviews).

67. Haitian official quoted in author’s interviews, my translation.

68. Quoted in author’s interviews, my translation.

69. Brazilian and Haitian officials in author’s interviews; Schaaf, “The Let Agogo.”

70. Author’s interviews.

71. Haitian official in author’s interviews.

72. Ibid.

73. ABC, Manual de Gestão, 72.

74. Haitian officials in author’s interviews.

75. Officials in author’s interviews.

76. Quoted in author’s interviews, my translation.

77. Haitian and Brazilian officials in author’s interviews.

78. Brazilian official in author’s interviews.

79. Former advisor to the Haitian government quoted in author’s interviews.

80. Brazilian official and IO representative in author’s interviews.

81. Former advisor to Haitian government quoted in author’s interviews and bilateral aid donor and IO representative.

82. Haitian civil society representative in author’s interviews.

83. In author’s interviews.

84. IO representative in author’s interviews.

85. In author’s interviews.

86. Quoted in author’s interviews, my translation.

87. Diverse Brazilian officials in author’s interviews.

88. Brazilian and Haitian officials, and Brazilian civil society representatives in author’s interviews.

89. Haitian officials quoted in author’s interviews.

90. In author’s interviews.

91. Baranyi, Feldmann and Bernier, “Solidarity Forever?”

92. Bry, “The Production of Soft,” 6.

93. Hayman, “Budget Support.”

94. Wolford and Nehring, “Constructing Parallels.”