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Abstract
This paper focuses on understanding the different evolutions of business’ associational paths in post-Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) Chile and Uruguay, offering an explanation at the crossroads of the institutional change and international trade literatures. The argument is that the different forms in which ISI institutions were transformed during the liberalisation period facilitated a greater mobility of factors to different degrees, triggering divergent enduring associational strategies on the part of business. The proliferation of narrow-based special benefits during the ISI fuelled preferences for the formation of sector-based coalitions oriented towards rent-seeking activities. Nevertheless, while ISI regulations were displaced in Chile during the military period, Uruguay followed a gradual process of layering of new rules alongside old ones. These diverging strategies, having different effect on established inter-sectoral regulatory distortions, propitiated alternative associational paths of local business.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Acknowledgements
The author acknowledges the contributions to previous versions of the paper: Russell Bither-Terry, David Collier, Cecilia Giambruno, Diego Hernández, Jonathan Hartlyn, Santiago López-Cariboni, Evelyne Huber, Victoria Murillo, Martín Opertti, Rafael Piñeiro, Rosario Queirolo, Cecilia Rossel, Eduardo Silva, Lars Schultz, John D. Stephens, participants at previous LASA and APSA meetings, and a workshop at the Universidad Católica del Uruguay.
Note on contributors
Juan A. Bogliaccini is Associate Professor at the Department of Social and Political Sciences at the Universidad Católica del Uruguay. He has a PhD in Political Science from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (2012). His research focuses in the study of the political economy of capitalist systems, welfare states and related policy-making. His academic production has been published in several journals and edited books, including Economics and Politics, Latin American Research Review, CEPAL Review, Revista de Ciencia Política, Revista de Ciencia Política, Oxford University Press, Cambridge University Press, among other places. He was founding chair at the Department of Social and Political Sciences at the Universidad Católica del Uruguay (2012–2016).
Notes
Notes
1 Martin and Swank, Political Construction of Business Interest; Swenson, Capitalists against Markets.
2 Mahoney and Thelen, Explaining Institutional Change.
3 Hiscox, International Trade and Political Conflict, 5.
4 Frieden, Debt, Development and Democracy.
5 Silva, “Capitalist Coalitions,” 526–59; Silva, “From Dictatorship to Democracy,” 299–320.
6 Schneider, “Organized Business Politics,” 95–127; Schneider, Business Politics and the State; Schneider, “Organizing Interests and Coalitions,” 456–79; Schneider, “Comparative Political Economy,” 178–201.
7 Kingstone, “Corporatism, Neoliberalism,” 73–95; Kingstone, “Why Free Trade ‘Losers’ Support,” 986–1010.
8 Shadlen, “Neoliberalism, Corporatism, and Small Business,” 73–106.
9 Thacker, “Private Sector Trade Politics,” 161–87.
10 Fairfield, "Business Power and Tax Reform,” 37–71.
11 Etchemendy, Models of Economic Liberalization.
12 Gates, “Theorizing Business Power,” 57–95.
13 Fairfield, Private Wealth and Public Revenue.
14 Schneider, Business Politics and the State.
15 Frieden, Debt, Development and Democracy.
16 Silva, “Capitalist Coalitions,” 526–559; Silva, “From Dictatorship to Democracy,” 299–320.
17 Kingstone, “Corporatism, Neoliberalism,” 73–95; Kingstone, “Why Free Trade ‘Losers’ Support,” 986–1010; Madariaga, “Mechanisms of Neoliberal Resilience.”
18 Korpi and Shalev, “Strikes, Industrial Relations,” 164–87; Crouch, Industrial Relations and European; Huber and Stephens, Development and Crisis; Thelen, How Institutions Evolve.
19 Cusack et al., “Economic Interests and the Origins,” 373–91; Martin and Swank, Political Construction of Business Interests.
20 Olson, Logic of Collective Action; Offe and Wiesenthal, “Two Logics of Collective Action,” 67–115.
21 Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence," 251–67.
22 Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions; Frieden, Debt, Development and Democracy; Midford, "International Trade and Domestic Politics,” 535–64; Hiscox, "Class Versus Industry Cleavages," 1–46; Hiscox, International Trade and Political Conflict, 5.
23 Hiscox, "Class Versus Industry Cleavages," 1–46; Hiscox, International Trade and Political Conflict, 5.
24 Mahoney and Thelen, Explaining Institutional Change.
25 Schneider, “Organizing Interests and Coalitions,” 456–79.
26 Pierson, Paul. with space “Big Slow-Moving, and … Invisible,” 177–207.
27 Ibid., 177–207.
28 George and Bennett, Case Studies, Theory Development; Beach and Pedersen, Causal Case Study Methods.
29 Press releases were collected for relevant parliamentary debates of labor and tax reforms in both countries for grasping the evolution of debates and for confirmation about information obtained from interviews. Interviews were semi-structured.
30 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 156.
31 Offe and Wiesenthal, “Two Logics of Collective Action,” 67–115.
32 Swenson, Capitalists against Markets; Martin and Swank, Political Construction of Business Interests.
33 Joint Committee on Western Europe, Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism; Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets; Crouch, Industrial Relations and European.
34 Haindl, Chile y su Desarrollo; Caetano, El asedio conservador.
35 Caetano, El asedio conservador; Arriagada, Los Empresarios y la Política; Zurbriggen, Estado, Empresarios y Redes Rentistas.
36 Gomá and Arriagada, Orígenes Políticos y Económicos; Silva, “From Dictatorship to Democracy,” 299–320; Schneider, Business Politics and the State.
37 Silva, State and Capital in Chile, 36–7.
38 Zurbriggen, Estado, Empresarios y Redes Rentistas.
39 Zahler, " Recent Southern Cone Liberalization,” 509–62; Haindl, Chile y su Desarrollo.
40 Cheyre, Análisis de las Reformas Tributarias 1974–1983.
41 Rama, Protección y Crecimiento Industrial; Hanson and De Melo, " The Uruguayan Experience,” 477–508.
42 Bension and Caumont, "Uruguay," 499–530.
43 Silva, “Capitalist Coalitions,” 526–59.
44 Silva, State and Capital in Chile, 161–6.
45 Gomá and Arriagada, Orígenes Políticos y Económicos; Silva, “Capitalist Coalitions,” 526–59; Silva, “From Dictatorship to Democracy,” 299–320.
46 Luna, Segmented Representation.
47 Ibid., 98.
48 Ibid., 98.
49 See Luna, Segmented Representation, 211– 212, for detailed data on these issues.
50 Levitsky and Roberts, Resurgence of the Latin American Left.