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Abstract
In the 2016 edition of its World Development Indicators (WDI), the World Bank introduced an important change in the way it categorises countries: it explicitly stated the intention to eliminate the distinction of countries as ‘developing’ and ‘developed’. This decision represents the first time one of the world’s most powerful and influential international organisation has overtly decided to move away from this fuzzy-yet-ubiquitous terminology for categorising countries (and not proposing to replace the division). This paper takes this shift to discuss country groupings based on development levels, particularly the ‘developed’/’developing’ dichotomy, focusing on the latter term. The paper argues for a paradoxical scenario, wherein the label ‘developing’ will increasingly become analytically useless while concurrently retaining – or even strengthening – its power in the context of foreign policy strategies. The analysis details the motives behind this paradox and provides a reasoning for when and why the term’s usage is likely to be weakened or strengthened. Simply put, the ‘developed’/’developing’ dichotomy is weakening in its analytical capacity, mostly due to the increasing heterogeneity among countries under the ‘developing’ label and concurrent porosity of ‘boundaries’ between the two categories, while showing little sign of being phased as a term for self-identification.
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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 World Bank, World Development Indicators, iii (emphasis added). The subset of countries previously referred to as ‘developing’ was replaced by county groupings based only on geographical location.
2 Until 2016, the term ‘developing countries’ was ubiquitous in WDI publications. In 2014, for example, it appeared 50 times, and 116 times in 2015. In 2016, it was used 36 times (34 of which were in the re-reprint of the Sustainable Development Goals) and in 2017 the expression appeared only twice – once in a book title reference and another in the appendix. Therefore, the category has been made obsolete from WDI analyses.
3 World Bank, World Bank Group Strategy, 2.
4 Khokhar and Serajuddin, “Should We Continue to Use.“
5 Fantom and Serajuddin, “The World Bank’s Classification.“
6 Albert Sauvy (1952) introduced the tripartite world division: First, Second and Third worlds. Yet, over the years – and especially after the end of the Cold War – this division has been increasingly treated as a dichotomy, with the “Second World“ concept being obsolete.
7 Berger, “The End of the Third World?“; Berger, “After the Third World?“; Fialho and Van Bergeijk, “Proliferation of Developing Country Classifications“; Holm, “The End of the Third World?“; Muni, “The Third World“; Nielsen, “Classifications of Countries“; Solarz, “Birth and Development“; Solarz, “Third World“; Vaggi, “The Rich and the Poor“; Vázquez and Sumner, “Is the ‘Developing World’ Changing?“; Vázquez and Sumner, “Revisiting the Meaning of Development“; Zoellick, “The End of the Third World?“
8 Hurrell, “Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order“; Kahler, “Rising Powers and Global Governance.“
9 One can go even further back with China’s self-perception as ‘the Middle Kingdom’ or antient Greek writings on barbarians.
10 Obregón, “The Civilized and the Uncivilized“; see also Sloan, “Civilized Nations.“
11 Jennings and Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law, 87–8.
12 Calvo, Dictionnaire de Droit International, 149 (emphasis added); see also Obregón, “The Civilized and the Uncivilized“; Sloan, “Civilized Nations.“
13 Rist, The History of Development, 73; see also Solarz, Language of Global Development.
14 Balandier, “Le ‘Tiers Monde’“; Helleiner, Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods; Horowitz, Hemispheres North and South; Rist, The History of Development; Sauvy, “Trois Monde, une Planet.“
15 Rist, The History of Development, 74.
16 Unless otherwise noted, all data has been derived from the World Banks’ statistical database. The Atlas method calculates countries’ GDP based on exchange rates. As explained by the Bank, ‘The Atlas method dampens variability caused by fluctuations in exchange rates, while the PPP method – which began to be calculated in 1990 – eliminates the effects of differences and changes in relative price levels, particularly non-tradables, and therefore provides a better overall measure of the real value of output produced by an economy compared to other economies’ (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GNI-per-capita-Atlas-and-PPP-table). PPP provides a more appropriate method to compare income among countries, since exchange rates (as used in the Atlas method) are likely to result in systematic downward bias in GDP for lower income countries. See Fantom and Serajuddin, “The World Bank’s Classification.“
17 Nielsen, “Classifications of Countries,“ 1088 (emphasis in original).
18 Fialho and Van Bergeijk, “Proliferation of Developing Country Classifications.“
19 Kanbur and Sumner, “Poor Countries or Poor People?“
20 Moss and Leo, “IDA at 65.“
21 OECD, Income Inequality.
22 Milanovic, Worlds Apart; Quah, “Twin Peaks“; Shorrocks and Van der Hoeven, Growth, Inequality, and Poverty.
23 Remarks by US President Obama on Economic Mobility, 4 December 2013.
24 OECD, Income Inequality.
25 Ibid.
26 US Census, “Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2014.“
27 EUROSTAT, “The Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion.“
28 Dabla-Norris et al., Causes and Consequences of Income Inequality.
29 Credit Suisse, Media Release.
30 WTO, “Special and Differential Treatment,“ 2.
31 For example: ‘Goal 12.1: Implement the 10-year framework of programmes on sustainable consumption and production, all countries taking action, with developed countries taking the lead, taking into account the development and capabilities of developing countries’.
32 David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY.“
33 Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics, 2.
34 Smith, “Identities, Interests, and the Future,“ 302.
35 Onuf, World of Our Making, 6.
36 Rosenbaum and Tyler, “South–South Relations,“ 245.
37 G77 website, http://www.g77.org/doc/index.html
38 For example, Mexican President Salinas argued that being in the G77 was incompatible with belonging to the OECD and NAFTA. According to Gomez Bruera (“To Be or Not To Be,“ 239–40), this country’s diplomats have sought to position the country ‘as a mediator between industrialized and developing countries (…) and bridge between the South and the North’, although this self-image appears to be merely aspirational, since it is not perceived as such by others.
39 Toye, “Assessing the G77,“ 1772–3.
40 DBL Farias, “Brazil: the Next OECD Member?“
41 It should be noted that many ‘developing’ countries have a long history of providing development assistance since the 1950s, albeit at much lower levels than what they have received; see Farias, Aid and Technical Cooperation.
42 Daily Mail, 29 December 2011.
43 Chin, “China as a ‘Net Donor.’“
44 Woods, “Whose Aid?.“
45 Farias, Aid and Technical Cooperation.
46 Chin and Quadir, “Introduction“; Grimm et al., “European Development Cooperation to 2020“; Kragelund, “The Return of Non‐DAC Donors to Africa“; Mawdsley, From Recipients to Donors; Rowlands, Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance; Six, “The Rise of Postcolonial States as Donors“; UNGA, “Promotion of South–South Cooperation.“
47 Chin and Thakur, “Will China Change the Rules of Global Order?“; Ikenberry, “The Rise of China“; Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.“
48 UN-SSC, n.a., emphasis added.
49 China-WTO, “China in the WTO.“
50 China’s role in Copenhagen talks ‘important and constructive’ (21 December 2009). http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cedk/eng/zdgx/t647125.htm
51 China says communication with other developing countries at Copenhagen summit transparent (20 December 2009). http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t646954.htm
52 Chin and Quadir, “Introduction,“ 494.
53 Barnett, “Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy“; Kaarbo, “Foreign Policy Analysis“; Keyman, “Articulating Difference.“
54 Barnett, “Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy,“ 9.
55 IFC, “Overview“ https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/about+ifc_new
56 IFC, “How to Apply for Financing“ https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/solutions/how-to-apply-for-financing
57 UNFCCC, “Parties & Observers“ https://unfccc.int/parties-observers
58 GATT, “Twelfth Session“.
59 Orford, “Theorizing Free Trade.“
60 GATT, Committee on the Legal and Institutional Framework. For more on Part IV’s legal aspects, see Hudec, Developing Countries in the GATT.
61 Rolland, Development at the WTO.
62 Efstathopoulos, “Leadership in the WTO,“ 269.
63 World Bank, World Bank Group Strategy, 17 (emphasis added).
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Déborah B. L. Farias
Déborah B. L. Farias is a Lecturer at the University of New South Wales. Her research explores the role of ‘emerging’ countries in global governance from an multidisciplinary perspective. She has a Bachelor Degree in Law (University of Fortaleza – UNIFOR), a Bachelor Degree in Economy (Federal University of Ceará – UFC), an MA in International Relations (University of Brasilia – UnB) and a PhD in Political Science from the University of British Columbia (UBC). She is an expert in Brazilian domestic and foreign policy, having worked as a policy advisor for the State Government of Ceará (NE Brazil) and a trade analyst at the Consulate General of Brazil in Vancouver. Her newest book (Routledge – Development Series) is called Aid and Technical Cooperation as a Foreign Policy Tool for Emerging Donors: the Case of Brazil.