Justifying military intervention: Yemen as a failed state

Abstract

The Saudi-led military intervention into Yemen began on 26 March 2015, and it has largely been supported by the international community despite resulting in the world’s largest current humanitarian disaster. The paper explores the emergence of the failed state concept, particularly as it has impacted the norm of sovereignty. It shows how being defined as a failed state can undermine the norm of sovereignty. This article argues that Saudi Arabia has utilised the failed state concept to legitimise its military intervention into Yemen by framing the intervention as necessary to establish a strong executive power and protect the Yemeni people.

Keywords:

• Yemen
• failed state
• Saudi Arabia
• intervention
• sovereignty

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Maria-Louise Clausen holds a PhD in political science from the University of Aarhus, Denmark, and is currently a postdoctoral researcher in international security at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). She specialises in theories of state-building including the interaction between state and non-state actors in governance with a geographical focus on the Middle East, particularly Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Currently, she is working on a project that investigates whether and how Islamic State seeks to present itself as an alternative to the (Iraqi) nation-state. Her latest article was ‘Competing for Control over the State: The Case of Yemen’ in Small Wars and Insurgencies (2018).

Notes

1 See Woodward, Ideology of Failed States, for a fuller discussion of this.

2 Rotberg, When States Fail, 5. Alternative terms include ‘failing’, ‘crisis’, ‘weak’, ‘collapsed’, ‘poorly performing’, ‘ineffective’, ‘lame Leviathan’, ‘neopatrimonial’, ‘quasi’, ‘premodern” or ‘shadow’ state. Other efforts have suggested terms such as ‘areas of limited statehood’, ‘fragile situations’ or ‘hybridity’. Call, “Fallacy of the ‘Failed State’”; B⊘ås and Jennings, “Insecurity and Development”; John, “Concept, Causes and Consequences”; Lemay-Hébert, “Statebuilding without Nation-Building”; Nay, “Fragile and Failed States.”

3 Ezrow and Frantz, “Revisiting the Concept”; Call, “Beyond the ‘Failed State’”; Jones, “Global Political Economy.” See also Clausen, State-Building in Fragile States, for a fuller discussion of this.

4 Fearon, Do Governance Indicators Predict Anything?, 2.

5 Hagmann and Hoehne, “Failures of the State Failure Debate.”

6 B⊘ås and Jennings, “‘Failed States’ and ‘State Failure,’” 475.

7 Hagmann and Hoehne, “Failures of the State Failure Debate,” 43; Chandler, “Resilience and Human Security,” 213.

8 Grimm, Lemay-Hébert and Nay, “Fragile States,” 197.

9 B⊘ås and Jennings, “‘Failed States’ and ‘State Failure.’”

10 The operation was renamed Operation Renewal of Hope on 22 April 2015.

11 “Video: Saudi Ambassador in US Speaks on Military Campaign in Yemen,” March 26, 2015. Accessed January 4, 2017. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/webtv/reports/2015/03/26/Video-Saudi-ambassador-in-U-S-speaks-on-military-campaign-in-Yemen.html

12 “Yemen Facing Largest Famine the World Has Seen for Decades, Warns UN Aid Chief.” UN News Center, November 9, 2017. Accessed January 4, 2017. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=58058#.Wk4R1NhG2Uk; United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner. Accessed December 22, 2017. http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22025&LangID=E

13 See the American National Security Strategy from 2002 which famously states: ‘America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few’. White House, “National Security Strategy,” 1. The same tendency spilled over into academia. See for example Piazza, “Incubators of Terror”; Krasner and Pascual, “Addressing State Failure”; and Fukuyama, State Building.

14 Although the idea of the failed state as a key threat to regional and global security and stability has been challenged, it continues to hold importance as an intuitive model. Chandler, Empire in Denial; and Hehir, “Myth of the Failed State.”

15 Buzan and Waever, Security: A New Framework, 31.

16 The analysis is based on searches in the Official Document System (ODS) using Boolean search terms – ‘failed state’ OR ‘failed states’ – for all years available in the database including 2016. The database can be accessed through the UN website, un.org. The database holds selected scanned documents from before 1993 and is fully updated from 1993 onwards.

17 The manual examination was done to exclude documents that referred to the ‘failed state’ of something.

18 CD/PV.651 (1993) and A/48/PV.1 (1993). This echoes a 1992 article, Helman and Ratner, “Saving Failed States,” that had a substantial impact on the early understanding of the failed state concept as a new and disturbing phenomenon.

19 An example is when the representative from Canada, Mr. Chrétien, argues in the Security Council that ‘Helping Africa get on its feet is in our interest from the perspective of our common humanity and from the perspective of creating a more prosperous world with new markets. It is profoundly in our self-interest from the point of view of our own security. We have seen right here in New York the tragic consequences that can result from failed States in faraway places. Simply put, we cannot afford not to address these issues’ (A/57/PV.10 (2002)).

20 S/PV.4484 (2002).

21 See for example S/PV.4053 (1999), A/55/PV.15 (1999), S.PV.5187 (2005), A/64/PV.5 (2009) and S/PV.7758 (2016).

22 Jung, State Formation and State-Building, 38.

23 A/61/PV.13 (2006).

24 Bickerton, “State-Building: Exporting State Failure,” 99.

25 A/57/303 (2002).

26 S/PV.4414 (resumption) (2001): 23–4.

27 S/1997/894-A/52/682 (1997).

28 Call, “Beyond the ‘Failed State’,” 304.

29 Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” 169.

30 Connolly, Terms of Political Discourse, 28.

31 S/PV.3641(1996).

32 See article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, which states that: ‘The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members’ (United Nations, June 26, 1945).

33 Sovereignty understood as follows: ‘Generally, sovereignty is taken to mean the absolute authority a state holds over a territory and people as well as independence internationally and recognition by other sovereign states as a sovereign state’, Weber, Simulating Sovereignty, 1. Herbst, States and Power in Africa, 259. There are conditional terms of sovereignty, such as deferred sovereignty, conditional sovereignty and earned sovereignty, but these are not of the same importance as the unqualified notion of sovereignty. Scharf, “Earned Sovereignty: Juridical Underpinnings.”

34 Thiessen, “Conceptualizing the ‘Failed State’”; Doty, Imperial Encounters, 3.

35 B⊘ås and Jennings, “Insecurity and Development,” 387.

36 Doty, Imperial Encounters, 4.

37 Thiessen, “Conceptualizing the ‘Failed State,’” 134; B⊘ås and Jennings, “‘Failed States’ and ‘State Failure.’”

38 Nay makes this argument for ‘a limited number of Western governments’. Nay, “Fragile and Failed States.”

39 Finnemore, Purpose of Intervention, 85.

40 Glosemeyer, How Democratic Is Yemen?

41 S/2013/525 (2013); S/PV.7247 (2014); S/2014/213 (2014); S/PV.7143 (2014); S.PV.6897 (2015); S/PV.7361 (2015); S/2015/6 (2015); S/PV.7533 (2015). See also, for example, the Council of the European Union, 3291st Council meeting, press release 6264/14, Brussels, February 10, 2014. Interviews, Sana’a, 2013 and 2014.

42 Heinze, “Introduction – The ‘New Yemen.’”

43 See Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen, for a detailed account of the history of the Houthi movement.

44 Heinze, “From the Margins of Yemen.”

45 Ragab, “Beyond Money and Diplomacy.”

46 Mazzetti and Hubbard, “Rise of Saudi Prince Shatters Decades of Royal Tradition.”

47 A search was made in the UN documents database, but restricted to documents from the General Assembly and the Security Council until 1 January 2017. The search is an attempt to capture how Yemen has been used in discussions which also featured the use of the ‘fragile state’ or ‘failed state’ concept. The specific search phrase used was: ‘Yemen’ AND ‘fragile state’ OR ‘failed state’, using Boolean operators. This only captures certain types of documents and has certainly excluded some documents which could be relevant. Yet, due to limited capacity, some delimitation had to be made in documents referring to Yemen. The analysis includes 46 documents. Each document in the UN system has a unique reference code, so this code is used to specify which documents are relevant to specific points.

48 See Ruys and Ferro, “Weathering the Storm”, and Nuβberger, “Military Strikes in Yemen,” for more narrow legal discussions of whether the self-defence justification or the intervention by invitation doctrine provides a reasonable legal basis for the Saudi-led operation in Yemen.

49 Boucek and Ottaway, Yemen on the Brink.

50 S/PV.7561 (2015); S/PV.7533 (2015); S/PV.7442 (2015); S/PV.7361 (2015); S/PV.7351 (2014); S/PV.7343 (2014); S/PV.7331 (2014); S/PV.7323 (2014); S/PV.7316 (2014); S/PV.7160 (2014); S/PV.6965 (2013).

51 S/PV.7597 (2015).

52 Cilluffo, Understanding the Threat, 5.

53 Resolution 2201 (2015), adopted by the Security Council at its 7382^nd meeting, on 15 February 2015 (S/RES/2201 (2015). The Security Council adopted two more resolutions on Yemen in 2015, clearly demonstrating that the Security Council was increasingly concerned. See S/PV.7398 (2015); S/PV.7442 (2015).

54 Clausen, “Competing for Control over the State,” 564.

55 “Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland – Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, 112 congress, First session, March 2, 2011, Serial No. 112-5. Accesssed January 25, 2018. https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=734037

56 Lewis, “Unpacking Terrorism,” 78.

57 See for an overview of verified airstrikes in Yemen: Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “Drone Wars: The Full Data.” Accessed December 11, 2017. https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2017-01-01/drone-wars-the-full-data; Green, “A New Strategy.”

58 Data from the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “Yemen: Reported US Covert Actions 2017.” Accessed February 1, 2018. https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/yemen-reported-us-covert-actions-2017

59 Hudson, Owens, and Callen, “Drone Warfare in Yemen,” 145. See also Ty McCormick, “Yemeni President: I Love Drones,” Foreign Policy, September 28, 2012. Accessed February 1, 2018. http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/28/yemeni-president-i-love-drones/

60 In the letter Hadi informed the UN Security Council that he had requested the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League to provide immediately all means necessary to protect Yemen, including military intervention.

61 UNSC, “Identical Letters Dated 26 March 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council.” S/2015/217, 27 March 2015. Accessed February 6, 2018. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_217.pdf

62 Ibid.

63 Saudi Press Agency, “Saudi Arabia Affirms its Keenness to Protect and Promote Human Rights and Renews its Commitment to International Conventions,” November 5, 2018. Accessed November 12, 2018. https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1837928

64 Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, “Ambassador Al-Jaber Confirms Saudi Arabia and Coalition Have No Ambitions in Yemen,” Washington DC, May 4, 2017. Accessed February 19, 2019. https://www.saudiembassy.net/news/ambassador-al-jaber-confirms-saudi-arabia-and-coalition-members-have-no-ambitions-yemen

65 In 2018, an internal UN document was leaked showing substantial Saudi pressure on UN agencies to accept strings to aid, for example stating that beneficial publicity in relation to current grants would impact future grants. See “Saudis demanded good publicity over Yemen aid, leaked UN document shows.” The Guardian, October 30, 2018. Accessed November 12, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/oct/30/saudis-demanded-good-publicity-over-yemen-aid-leaked-un-document-shows

66 Saudi Press Agency, “Spokesman of Coalition Forces to Support Legitimacy in Yemen: We Will Not Accept the Gray Ideas that Legitimate the Coup,” 2017. Accessed November 12, 2018. https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1615393

67 William E. Connolly underscores how this type of political action, the overthrow of a legitimate government, is a political action described from a moral point of view, indicating how there are potentially competing understandings of the same action. Connolly, Terms of Political Discourse, 27.

68 Interviews, Sana’a, 2013 and 2014. Salisbury, Yemen: National Chaos.

69 Iran and Syria point to the hypocrisy of the UN in failing to criticise Saudi Arabia for transgressions of human rights or accusing Iran of interfering in the domestic affairs of other countries, while they themselves are ‘busy bombing innocent civilians in Yemen’; (S/PV.7433 (2015) and S/PV.7837(2016)).

70 Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Press Releases, “Statement by Saudi Ambassador al-Jubeir on Military Operations in Yemen,” March 25, 2015. Accessed 19 February 2019. https://www.saudiembassy.net/press-release/statement-saudi-ambassador-al-jubeir-military-operations-yemen

71 See Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington D.C., Saudi Ministry of Defense: We will preserve the safety and security of our border, 5 May, 2015 (webpage for Operation Renewal of hope), http://www.operationrenewalofhope.com/saudi-ministry-of-defense-we-will-preserve-the-safety-and-security-of-our-border/ for an early statement on this. Despite the military intervention, the Houthis continue to launch missiles deep into Saudi Arabia.

72 “Saudi-Led Coalition Threatens Retaliation against Iran over Missiles,” Arab News, March 26, 2018. Accessed November 12, 2018. http://www.arabnews.com/node/1274016/saudi-arabia.

73 Yemen is the militarily and economically weaker part, with fewer international friends; it constitutes the most potent threat to Saudi hegemony on the Arabian Peninsula. Gause, Saudi–Yemeni Relations, 2.

74 S/PV.7450 (Resumption 1) (2015).

75 S/PV.7442 (2015).

76 S/2015/217 (2015).

77 Saudi Arabia declined to take a seat in the UNSC for the period 2014–2015 (A/68/599).

78 News, see note 64 above.

79 See Kendall, Iran’s Fingerprints in Yemen, for a nuanced discussion of the role of Iran in Yemen.

80 Krasner and Risse, “Well-Governed Failed States?”; Coggins, “Does State Failure Cause Terrorism?”; Piazza, “Incubators of Terror.”

81 Resolution 2216 (2015), adopted by the Security Council at its 7426th meeting, on 14 April 2015 (S/RES/2015).