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Abstract
States in the same region are bound together by the ways in which the world imagines them as a collective. One distinguishing feature of post-Cold War regionalism is its outward orientation – the importance of the external dimension of regional cooperation. By and large, though, existing analysis of regional institutional development in the Global South does not explicitly conceptualise and theorise collective image consciousness and management. This paper works to address this conceptual gap. Making use of two cases of regional image crisis – post-1980s Africa and post-1997 Southeast Asia – it draws out two primary logics of regional image consciousness: the logic of influence and the logic of resources. A region’s ‘brand’ with respect to (dys)function and international norm (non-)compliance matters to regional actors because it affects the region’s political influence in international arenas and the region’s ability to attract resources from donors and investors.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Funding
This paper is the product of a postdoctoral fellowship at the the Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG), ‘The Transformative Power of Europe’ [funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG)]. A version of this paper appears as part of a KFG working paper series: http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/en/v/transformeurope/news/allgemeines/KFG-Working-Paper-No-79.html. It draws content from and builds on Brooke Coe’s book, forthcoming from Cambridge University Press.89
Notes
1. Katzenstein, A World of Regions; Acharya, The End of American World Order; Kupchan, No One’s World.
2. This is the ‘second wave’ of regionalism. The ‘first wave’ refers to regional projects in the 1950s and 1960s.
3. Krapohl, Meissner, and Muntschick, “Regional Powers as Leaders or Rambos?”; Büthe and Milner, “Politics of Foreign Direct Investment”; Jaumotte, Foreign Direct Investment.
4. See Chaban et al., “Images of the EU”; Larsen, “The EU as a Normative Power”; and Lucarelli and Fioramonti, External Perceptions of the European Union.
5. For important exceptions, see Jones, “ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia”; Jetschke, “Why Create”; and Jetschke and Murray, “Diffusing Regional Integration.”
6. OAU, “The Secretary General’s End of Year Message,” 10; Menguistu, “Chairman’s Report,” 14.
7. Adedeji and Tariq, “The Leadership Challenge for Improving the Economic and Social Situation,” 39, 43.
8. General Obasanjo ruled Nigeria from 1976 to 1979 and then later served as Nigeria’s democratically elected president (1999–2007).
9. Obasanjo and Mosha, Africa, Rise to the Challenge.
10. Tieku, “Explaining the Clash,” 253.
11. Yukawa, “Transformation of ASEAN’s Image.”
12. Jones, ASEAN and the Norm of Non-Interference, 2; Acharya, Constructing a Security Community, 199; and Yukawa, “Transformation of ASEAN’s Image,” 266.
13. Narine, “ASEAN in the Aftermath,” 183.
14. The Economist, “Ten Years On.”
15. Jones, “ASEAN’s Unchanged Melody?” 494.
16. Narine, “ASEAN in the Aftermath,” 184.
17. Acharya, “Southeast Asia’s Democratic Moment,” 420.
18. Jones, “ASEAN’s Albatross,” 275; Acharya, “Democratisation and the Prospects,” 381, 383.
19. See Jones, “ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia”; Jetschke, “Why Create.” And since the mid-2000s, Indonesia has taken the lead in promoting these kinds of reforms in ASEAN; see Sukma, “Do New Democracies Support Democracy?”
20. See Stubbs, “Performance Legitimacy and Soft Authoritarianism.”
21. Yukawa, “Transformation of ASEAN’s Image.”
22. ASEAN, “Manila Declaration of 1987.”
23. ASEAN, “Joint Press Statement.”
24. Suharto, “Inaugural Address at the Opening Ceremony,” 7.
25. Abdullah, “Opening Statement.”
26. Jayakumar, “Opening Statement.”
27. I thank Kathryn Nash for this point about the OAU achieving a certain success during this period by building consensus in international arenas about the problem of colonial and racist regimes on the continent.
28. UNECA, African Alternative Framework, 9.
29. Ibid., i.
30. Ghai and de Alcantara, The Crisis of the 1980s, 26–27.
31. Mengistu, “Chairman’s Report,” 14.
32. Ba, (Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia, 120.
33. Acharya, “Southeast Asia’s Democratic Moment,” 423f.
34. Jetschke, “Why Create.”
35. Pitsuwan, “Statement by His Excellency Dr Surin Pitsuwan,” emphasis mine.
36. Osagie, “Stability, Security and Cooperation in Africa,” 99.
37. Africa’s Dual Challenge of Survival and Development, 237.
38. Wood, “Prestige in World Politics,” 389.
39. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War; and Joshi, Honor in International Relations.
40. Lebow, Cultural Theory of International Relations; and Lebow, “Fear Interest and Honour.”
41. Quoted in Vale and Maseko, “South Africa and the African Renaissance,” 285. Afro-pessimism refers of course to negative perceptions of the continent, often with respect to economic and political development.
42. 30th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, July 24–29, 1997, accessed at http://www.asean.org/asean-political-security-community/asean-foreign-ministers-meeting-amm/asean-foreign-ministerial-meetings/the-30th-ammpmc/
43. Nye, “Soft Power.”
44. Wood, “Prestige in World Politics,” 397.
45. Larson and Shevchenko, Status, Identity, and Rising Powers, 8. The authors use the term ‘identity’ where I would use ‘image’.
46. Ibid, 11.
47. Ibid, 15.
48. As noted in the introduction, most research on the link between the international perceptions of a RO and its international influence has pertained to the European Union (EU), ie whether or not the EU is seen (by states, organisations and publics) to be a global leader (generally or in particular issue areas) or special normative power (because of its legitimacy and role in exporting norms). See Chaban et al., “Images of the EU”; Larsen, “The EU as a Normative Power”; and Lucarelli and Fioramonti, External Perceptions of the European Union.
49. Fukuyama, “The End of History?” 3.
50. Jones, ASEAN and the Norm of Non-Interference, 2.
51. Goh, “Institutions and the Great Power Bargain.”
52. Acharya, Constructing a Security Community, 168, 199.
53. Yukawa, “Transformation of ASEAN’s Image,” 266.
54. Narine, “ASEAN in the Aftermath,” 184.
55. Ibid.
56. Quoted in Jones, “ASEAN’s Albatross,” 275.
57. Mosha, “Change for Survival and Progress in Africa,” 208.
58. Ibid., 210.
59. Machungo, “The History,” 4.
60. OAU, “African Charter for Popular Participation.”
61. Obasanjo, “Africa’s Rendezvous with History,” 260.
62. Collective Continental Security, 221.
63. Tieku, “Explaining the Clash,” 255.
64. African Union, “The Common African Position.”
65. Ibid., 6.
66. Jetschke, “Why Create.”
67. Anholt, Competitive Identity, 11.
68. Ibid., 4.
69. Adedeji and Tariq , “The Leadership Challenge for Improving the Economic and Social Situation,” 39.
70. Ibid., 39.
71. UNECA, “Abuja Statement on Economic Recovery.”
72. Ndegwa, “Africa and the World,” 13.
73. The Economist, February 2, 1991, p. 17, quoted in Ndegwa, “Africa and the World,” 17–8.
74. Acharya, “Democratisation and the Prospects,” 378.
75. Acharya, “Southeast Asia’s Democratic Moment,” 419.
76. Narine, “ASEAN in the Aftermath,” 185.
77. Acharya, “Southeast Asia’s Democratic Moment,”421.
78. Gray, The Company States Keep.
79. Mosha, “The Impact of Changes in Eastern Europe,” 8, 22.
80. Collective Continental Security, 221–2.
81. Tieku, “Explaining the Clash,” 253.
82. Quoted in Landsberg, “Promoting Democracy,” 108.
83. Tieku, “Explaining the Clash,” 253.
84. Jayakumar, “Opening Statement.”
85. Quoted in Jetschke, “Why Create,” 122.
86. Jetschke and Murray, “Diffusing Regional Integration,” 181f.
87. Sukma, “Do New Democracies Support Democracy?,” 111f.
88. See, for example, the explanation for Africa’s regional institutional development put forward by Williams, “From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference.”
89. Coe, Sovereignty in the South.
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Brooke Coe
Brooke Coe is an assistant professor of political science at Oklahoma State University (USA). She previously held research positions at Georgetown University and the Free University of Berlin, and teaching positions at Wake Forest University and Stetson University. Her work focuses on the regional level of governance in the Global South.