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Abstract
Korea Aid was a development project delivering Korean medical services, food and pop music via trucks to rural communities in Africa. The project was poorly conceived, vulnerable to corruption and ultimately ineffective. While Korea Aid marked a backward step for Korea’s development cooperation, revealing many of the challenges associated with emerging donors, it also reflected Korea’s aspiration to become a cultural and developmental alternative to hegemonic nations. This paper examines the historical circumstances that led to the formation of Korea Aid, and further argues that Korea Aid embodied a synthesis of ‘cultural soft power’ and ‘developmental soft power’ intended to create the perception of Korea as culturally and developmentally attractive and benign. Korea’s current pursuit of developmental soft power intentionally transforms the country’s development experience into a ‘politically odourless’ model, masking its authoritarian undercurrent and in turn camouflaging growing aspirations to expand its global influence.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. Bahk, The Root of ‘Choi Soon-Sil Gate.’
2. ‘Korea Aid’ is a proper noun referring to the specific development project designed in 2016, and should not be confused with ‘Korea’s aid’ or ‘Korean aid’, describing aid by the Korean government in general.
3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “‘Korea Aid’, New Korean Style Development.”
4. Ibid.
5. Association of Humanitarian Practices, “Korea Aid Should be Abolished.”
6. Watson, Beyond the Aid Trap.
7. Mawdsley et al., “Political Leadership.”
8. Koh and Lee, “Problems and Directions.”
9. Democratic Party, “Election Pledges.”
10. Sunaga, “Reshaping of Japanese ODA.”
11. Nye, “Soft Power.”
12. Iwabuchi, “Marketing ‘Japan.’”
13. Kalinowski and Cho, “Korea’s Search for a Global Role”; Hwang, “Korea’s Soft Power.”
14. The challenge of situating Africa in IR is well discussed in Odoom and Andrews, “What/Who Is Still Missing.”
15. This argument was made by Lancaster, Foreign Aid.
16. For utility theories see Streeten, “Why Development Aid?” For a moralist approach, see Lumsdaine, Moral Vision.
17. Smith et al., “Trump’s Threat to Cut Aid.”
18. Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift and Taylor, China’s New Role in Africa are representative regarding China. For other emerging actors in Asia, see Van der Merwe et al., Emerging Powers in Africa.
19. McGillivray, Aid Effectiveness and Selectivity; Mohan and Power, “New African Choices?”
20. Naím, “Rogue Aid.”
21. Manning, “Will ‘Emerging Donors’ Change.”
22. Ibid.
23. TANZARA railway, connecting Tanzania and Zambia, made by Chinese foreign aid in the 1970s, is frequently cited as the example.
24. Mawdsley et al., “Political Leadership.”
25. Chun et al., “South Korea as an Emerging Donor.”
26. Jerve and Selbervik, Self-Interest and Global Responsibility.
27. Koo and Kim, “World Society and Foreign Aid”; Kim and Oh, “Determinants of Foreign Aid.”
28. KOICA, Statistics 2016.
29. Kim and Gray, “Overseas Development Aid.”
30. Mawdsley et al., “Political Leadership.”
31. Kalinowski and Cho, “Korea’s Search for a Global Role.”
32. Hwang, “Korea’s Soft Power.”
33. Yoon, Presidential Visit to Africa.
34. The Kyunghyang Shinmun, “Park’s Visit to Africa Wastes Tax Money.”
35. AFP, “Uganda Angered at Claim of Halt to N. Korea Military Ties.”
36. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “‘Korea Aid’, New Korean Style Development.”
37. Board of Audit and Inspection, “Korea Aid, Disclosure of Information.”
38. Ibid.
39. Board of Audit and Inspection, “Contract of production of video clips,” 8.
40. Lee, “K-Spirit Accompanies Presidential Visit.”
41. Lee, “Replace the Head of KOICA.”
42. Svensson, “Eight Questions about Corruption,” 20.
43. Transparency International, “Corruption Perception Index 2017”; World Bank, “DataBank, Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2016.”
44. Dator and Seo, “Korea as the Wave of a Future,” 36 (emphasis as in original).
45. Nye, “Soft Power.”
46. Nye, “Public Diplomacy.”
47. Korea Culture and Tourism Institute, Basic Plan for Building Nation Brand.
48. Cho, “Reading the ‘Korean Wave.’”
49. Kim, “The Rising East Asian ‘Wave,’” 124.
50. KOTRA/KOFICE, Research on the Economic Impact of Hallyu; Kim, “Who Watches Korean TV Dramas”; Elfving-Hwang, “South Korean Cultural Diplomacy”; Hübinette, “Reception and Consumption of Hallyu”; Ko et al., “Landing of the Wave”; Oh, “Hallyu.”
51. Joo, “Transnationalization of Korean Popular Culture,” 489.
52. Han, A Study for Hallyu Promotion.
53. Korea TV, “Visits Three African Countries.”
54. Kim, “Who Watches Korean TV Dramas.”
55. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “‘Korea Aid’, New Korean Style Development.”
56. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Korea’s Initiative for African Development.”
57. KOICA, Statistics 2016.
58. Johns Hopkins SAIS, “Chinese Loans to African Governments.”
59. China and Japan hold Forum on China–Africa Cooperation and Tokyo International Conference on African Development, respectively.
60. KOICA, History.
61. KOICA, Statistics 2016.
62. OECD, “Korea – DAC Peer Reviews 2012,” 11.
63. African Development Bank, “Korea is a Model for Africa.”
64. ANC, “African National Congress.”
65. Callahan, “Identity and Security in China.”
66. Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 6.
67. Zhang, “A World of Shared Influence.”
68. Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle.
69. Tonami, “Exporting the Developmental State.”
70. Darracq and Neville, South Korea’s Engagement, 4.
71. Park, “Ways to Share Korea’s Development”(my italics).
72. KOICA, Annual Report 2008.
73. Joo et al., “Devising Korea ODA Model.”
74. Kim and Tcha, Introduction to the Knowledge, 1.
75. Ministry of Strategy and Finance, “Knowledge Sharing Programme.”
76. Presidential Council on Nation Branding, What Is Nation Brand.
77. Gilboa, “Searching for a Theory.”
78. KDI, Press Release.
79. Li, The Will to Improve.
80. Doucette and Müller, “Exporting the Saemaul Spirit.”
81. KOICA, “Smart Saemaul Undong Story.”
82. YTN News, “Park, AU Speech.”
83. Mawdsley et al., “Political Leadership.”
84. The term ‘rendering spirit’ does not appear on Doucette & Müller or Li.
85. Iwabuchi, “Marketing ‘Japan’”; Iwabuchi, “Soft Nationalism and Narcissism.”
86. Nye, China’s Soft and Sharp Power.
87. Shahidul and Karim, “Factors Contributing to School Dropout.”
88. Association of Humanitarian Practices, “Korea Aid Should be Abolished,” 2.
89. Olken and Pande, “Corruption in Developing Countries”; Kwon and Park, “Korean Public Opinion on Development Aid,” 64–8.
90. KOICA, “KOICA Announces 10 Key Agenda.”
91. Yoon and Moon, “Korean Bilateral ODA”; Kim and Gray, “Overseas Development Aid.”
92. Euh, “From ‘Korea Discount’ to Korea Premium.”
93. Democratic Party, “Election Pledges.”
94. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “First Plans for Public Diplomacy.”
95. Pamment and Wilkins, “Introduction.”
96. Wu, “Measuring Soft Power.”
97. Dubey, Keynote Delivered at the International Seminar.
Additional information
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Suweon Kim
Suweon Kim is extraordinary research fellow in International Relations at University of the Western Cape (South Africa). Her research interests are development and soft power in the context of Afro-Asia Studies. She has recently published Who Watches Korean TV Dramas in Africa? She is writing a book on diplomatic rivalry between North and South Korea in Southern Africa.