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Abstract
In recent years, there has been a rise of interest in the concept of autocracy promotion, with scholars questioning whether the efforts by authoritarian governments to influence political transitions beyond their borders are necessarily pro-authoritarian. An extension of this question is whether some authoritarian governments may at times find it in their interest to support democracy abroad. This article aims to answer this question by focusing on the case of Turkey. It argues that, despite its rapidly deteriorating democracy since the late 2000s, Turkey has undertaken democracy support policies with the explicit goal of democratic transition in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region during the Arab Spring and, while not bearing the intention of democratic transition, has employed democracy support instruments in the form of state-building in sub-Saharan Africa since 2005 to the present day. Based on original fieldwork, the article finds that non-democracies can turn out as democracy supporters, if and when opportunities for strategic gains from democratisation abroad arise. The article further suggests that even in those cases where strategic interests do not necessitate regime change, a non-democracy may still deploy democracy support instruments to pursue its narrow interests, without adhering to an agenda for democratic transition.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Thomas Carothers, Gencer Özcan, Soli Özel and Tsveta Petrova for their valuable comments on the earlier versions of this paper and Melike Ayşe Kocacık for research assistance. This research benefited greatly from the discussions held at the workshops of the Carnegie Rising Democracies Network.
Notes
1 Burnell, New Autocracy Promotion; Kneuer and Demmelhuber, “Gravity Centers”; Vanderhill, Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad; Yakouchyk, “Beyond Autocracy Promotion.”
2 Carothers and Samet-Marran, New Global Marketplace, 23. For a critical treatment of the concept of autocracy promotion, see, among others, Way, “Limits of Autocracy Promotion”; Way, “Weaknesses of Autocracy Promotion”; Börzel, “The Noble West?”; Nodia, “Revenge of Geopolitics; Tansey, “Problem with Autocracy Promotion.”
3 Somer, “Understanding Turkey’s Democratic Breakdown”; Rodriguez et al., “Democratization Processes in Defective Democracies.”
4 Somer, “Understanding Turkey’s Democratic Breakdown.”
5 Esen and Gümüşçü, “Rising Competitive Authoritarianism.”
6 See also Somer, “Conquering versus Democratizing.”
7 Somer, “Understanding Turkey’s Democratic Breakdown,” 483–4. See also Tansel, “Authoritarian Neoliberalism.”
8 Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Bank, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home
9 Annual Freedom in the World Reports on Turkey, Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/turkey
10 Yakouchyk, “Beyond Autocracy Promotion,” 10.
11 Huber, Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy; Özel and Özcan, “Do New Democracies,” 129.
12 Huber, Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy, 23.
13 Cox et al., American Democracy Promotion; Schraeder, Exporting Democracy; Petrova, From Solidarity to Geopolitics.
14 Each interviewee was assured at the stage of requesting an appointment for the interview that the interviews were confidential and anonymous and that no information that can be traced back to individuals would be provided in the final text.
15 Balkans and South and Central Asia have also been target regions of Turkish democracy assistance policies.
16 TIKA, Turkish Development Assistance 2016.
17 For a full list of projects, see TIKA, Annual Reports (2002–2017). For a detailed survey of the Turkish ODA projects in sub-Saharan Africa, see TIKA, Special Report: Africa.
18 Author’s interview with state official, Ankara, 28 March 2018.
19 Huber, Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy.
20 Özkan and Orakçı, “Turkey as a ‘Political’ Actor in Africa.”
21 Carothers, “Democracy Assistance,” 5.
22 Huber, Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy, 27–8.
23 Ibid.
24 Keyman, “New Turkish Foreign Policy.”
25 Author’s interview with former government official, Istanbul, 16 March 2018.
28 Altunışık, “Turkey as ‘Emerging Donor.’”
30 Özcan, “If The Crisis Is,” 182.
31 Ibid., 191.
32 For a similar approach, see Petrova, From Solidarity to Geopolitics.
33 İpek, “Ideas and Change.”
34 Author’s interview with former government official, Istanbul, 15 March 2018. See also Özel and Özcan, “Do New Democracies.”
35 Author’s interview with former state official, Ankara, 26 March 2018.
36 Özel and Özcan, “Do New Democracies,” 130.
37 Wheeler, Turkey’s Role and Interests, 3–4.
38 İpek, “Ideas and Change,” 79.
39 Sazak and Özkan, Turkey’s Contributions to Security-Sector, 16.
40 Author’s interviews with former state and government officials, Istanbul and Ankara, 15, 26, 28 March 2018.
41 Aras and Akpınar, “Role of Humanitarian NGOs,” 10.
42 Ibid., 10–11.
43 Bilgin and Bilgiç, “Turkey’s ‘New’ Foreign Policy.”
44 Davutoğlu, “Medeniyetlerin Ben-Idraki.”
45 Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik, 70, quoted in Bilgin and Bilgiç, “Turkey’s ‘New’ Foreign Policy,” 181.
46 Ibid., 182.
47 Bilgin and Bilgiç, “Turkey’s ‘New’ Foreign Policy,” 182.
48 Ibid., 189.
49 Özkan, “Turkey, Davutoğlu.”
50 Ibid., 124.
51 Özdamar et al., “Good Neighbour to Model.”
52 Özkan, “Relations between Turkey and Syria.”
53 Ibid., 4.
54 Ibid., 2.
55 Kirişçi, Turkey and the West, 161.
56 Author’s interview with former state official, Ankara, 29 March 2018.
57 See, for instance, TIKA, Turkish Development Assistance 2008, 19; TIKA, Activity Report 2008, 117.
58 I reviewed all of the annual, development, regional and country reports published by TIKA from 2004 to the present as well as the publications of individual TIKA officials.
59 I reviewed all of Erdoğan’s and Davutoğlu’s domestic and international speeches on the Arab Spring, Turkey’s Africa policy and international democracy since 2005. I also reviewed current Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu’s speeches on Africa and international democracy support since he assumed office in November 2015.
60 Former Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ in the introduction of TIKA, Turkish Development Assistance 2010, 4.
61 Kulaklıkaya and Nurdun, “Turkey as New Player,” 132.
62 Author’s interview with government official, Ankara, 28 March 2018.
63 Former Minister of State Beşir Atalay in the Preamble of TIKA, Activity Report 2004, VII; Former Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ in the Foreword to TIKA, Turkish Development Assistance 2012, 3.
64 Author’s interviews with government official, Ankara, 28 March 2018.
65 Serdar Çam (President of TIKA) in the Foreword to TIKA, Turkish Development Assistance 2014, 4.
66 Serdar Çam in the Foreword to TIKA, Turkish Development Assistance 2016, 9.
67 TIKA, Turkish Development Assistance 2016, 10; TIKA, Annual Report 2017, 7.
68 “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Bu Adayı (Sevakin Adası) Bize Tahsis Etseniz de Restore Etsek” [President Erdoğan: Let Us Restore This (Sevakin) Island], 25 December 2017, https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-bu-adayi-sevakin-adasi-bize-tahsis-etseniz-de-restore-et,LpJl1WTMBEelh-s5j6_z6A
69 Erdoğan’s speech delivered at the AKP group meeting in Turkish parliament, 6 March 2018.
70 Author’s interview with government official, Istanbul, 15 March 2018.
71 Quoted in Huber, Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy, 157.
72 Davutoğlu, Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy, 5.
73 TIKA, Turkish Development Assistance 2012, 5.
74 See also Özcan, “If The Crisis Is,” 183–5.
75 Kirişçi, Turkey and the West, 160.
76 Interview with Ahmet Davutoğlu, Yeni Şafak, 1 March 2013, https://www.yenisafak.com/yazidizileri/yuzyillik-parantezi-kapatacagiz-494795
77 Altunışık, “Turkey as ‘Emerging Donor,’” 345.
78 Author’s interviews with government and state officials, Ankara, 28 March 2018.
79 Piccone, Five Rising Democracies, 177–8.
80 Trade data were retrieved from Turkish Statistical Institute, http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt_id=1046
81 Sucuoğlu and Stearns, Turkey in Somalia, 45–8.
82 “Turkey, Somalia Sign Economic Partnership Pact,” Anadolu Agency, 12 January 2018, https://aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkey-somalia-sign-economic-partnership-pact/1029413
83 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa
84 “Turkish Airlines Profits in Africa, Where Others Fear to Fly,” Reuters, 12 September 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkishairlines-africa/turkish-airlines-profits-in-africa-where-others-fear-to-fly-idUSKCN1BN1CZ
85 Sucuoğlu and Stearns, Turkey in Somalia, 46.
86 Langan, “Virtuous Power Turkey,” 1408.
87 TIKA, Country Report: Sudan, 51–7.
88 Fehim Taştekin, “Erdoğan’s Ottoman Dream Causes Storm in the Red Sea,” Al Monitor, 4 January 2018, http://qorilugudnews24.com/2018/01/18/erdogans-ottoman-dream-causes-storm-in-red-sea/
89 Ali Topchi, “Why Is Sudan’s Suakin Island Important for Turkey?” TRT World, 26 December 2017, https://www.trtworld.com/turkey/why-is-sudan-s-suakin-island-important-for-turkey–13630
90 “Erdoğan Açıkladı: Tutuklayın Dediler, Güldük Geçtik” [Erdoğan Declared: They Told Us to Arrest, We Laughed It Off], Hürriyet Daily, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/erdogan-acikladi-tutuklayin-dediler-gulduk-gectik-40692380
91 Börzel, “The Noble West”; Way, “Weaknesses of Autocracy Promotion,” 71.
92 Youngs, Upholding Democracy, 9.
93 Ibid., 4.
94 Way, “Weaknesses of Autocracy Promotion,” 74.
95 Carothers and Youngs, “The Long Road.”
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Senem Aydın-Düzgit
Senem Aydın-Düzgit is an Associate Professor of International Relations at Sabancı University, Istanbul. She is the author of Constructions of European Identity (Palgrave, 2012) and co-author of Turkey and the European Union (Palgrave, 2015).