Asymmetric alliances and high polarity: evaluating regional security complexes in the Middle East and Horn of Africa

Abstract

The Middle East and the Horn of Africa exist in two distinct regional security complexes (RSCs), groupings of states exhibiting intense security interdependence within a distinct region, but rarely between regions. Recent geopolitical changes and related analyses, however, point to either a subsuming or a joining of the two RSCs, potentially leading to a high degree of uncertainty in two conflict-prone regions. Given the importance of such developments, we question this theory of RSC expansion by offering a concise review of recent security interactions between the two RSCs as well as quantitatively and qualitatively measuring the material power capabilities of relevant states. Borrowing from and contributing to RSC theory, we also identify and analyse concepts and indicators such as threat perception and sub-regional alliances. Our findings demonstrate the Middle East RSC is not expanding to include that of the Horn of Africa. The two remain distinct and under internal consolidation, despite the current discourse. Rather, high polarity in the Middle East coupled with often-congruent interests in Horn of Africa states best explains the current pattern of their interaction, particularly as Middle East states pursue strategies that further their own security interests at the expense of rival states within their own RSC.

Keywords:

• Regional security complex theory
• Middle East
• threat perception
• Horn of Africa
• Arab Gulf States
• security interdependence
• polarity

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 Ulrichsen, “Geopolitics of Insecurity”; Lefebvre, “Iran in the Horn of Africa.”

2 Buzan, People, States and Fear, 190.

3 Gaddis, “The Long Peace”; Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change”; Koslowski and Kratochwil, “Understanding Change in International Politics.”

4 Troitskiy, “Central Asian Regional Security Complex.”

5 The concept of omnibalancing was developed by David in “Explaining Third World Alignment,” and refers, particularly in this article, to the difference between threats posed to the state leadership of, say, Egypt, rather than to threats to the state. As explicated by Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, the leaders of Egypt, in particular, have attempted to maintain power by balancing between perceived domestic threats to the regime and perceived external threats to the state as a whole. Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, “Foreign Policymaking in the Middle East,” 246–50.

6 Mayall, “Battle for the Horn”; Legrenzi and Calculli, “Middle East Security,” 221; Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, “Foreign Policymaking in the Middle East,” 246–50; Woldemariam, “‘No War, No Peace’ in a Region.”

7 Kabandula and Shaw, “Rising Powers and the Horn of Africa,” 13.

8 Huliaras and Kalantzakos, “Gulf States and the Horn of Africa,” 72. Verhoeven, “The Gulf and the Horn,” 335, also cites the potential for changes in the currently separate HOARSC and MERSC: ‘The geographically evermore expansive designs for regional order of the leading actors in the Gulf and the Horn are not solely contested by other aspiring hegemons within their respective subregions, but are clashing with those on the other side of the Red Sea’. Additionally, the International Crisis Group highlighted the perception that ‘The extension of the Middle East’s fault lines into the region have unsettled already fraught relations among Horn states and led their leaders to recalibrate their policies toward neighbours and outside powers alike’. ICG, “United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa.”

9 Verhoeven, “The Gulf and the Horn,” 349. Another notable Horn of Africa scholar recently noted a ‘new regional order’ emanating from the MERSC into the HOARSC: ‘the [Saudi-led] coalition [in Yemen] would likely remain politically committed to the Horn in a way that has no real historical parallel, even if the war in Yemen came to a conclusion and the purported Iranian threat in the Red Sea basin were to be fully neutralized. Put differently, this is no temporary excursion’. Woldemariam, “Old Game, New Stakes.”

10 The analyses of think tanks as well as media reports and journal articles maintain an intent focus on the perceived projections of power by new state actors in the Horn. Indeed, the word ‘scramble’ – a throwback to the nineteenth-century European colonial scramble for Africa – appears to be the nomenclature of choice. For example, in July 2018, The Economist proclaimed: ‘The UAE is scrambling to control ports in Africa’. In October 2018, a headline in The East African, published in Nairobi, read ‘Scramble for Eritrea likely to change Horn, Nile geopolitics’. Even the London Review of Books featured a blog post entitled the ‘Scramble for the Horn’ in mid-2017.

11 Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier, “Regional Powers and Security”; Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier, Regional Powers and Security Orders.

12 Adler and Barnett, Security Communities.

13 McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests, 63; Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, 40.

14 Funston, Government & Politics in Southeast Asia, 295–6.

15 Geographical variables are central to regional security complex theory. Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, 70.

16 Lake and Morgan, Regional Orders; Kelly, “Security Theory in the ‘New Regionalism,’” 203.

17 Katzenstein, A World of Regions.

18 Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, Security: A New Framework, 13–4.

19 Ibid., 14. See also Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, 61–4.

20 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, 61.

21 Ibid.

22 Merom, “Realist Hypotheses on Regional Peace.”

23 Taliaferro, “Neoclassical Realism and the Study of Regional Order,” 81–2.

24 See Map 7 in Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, 231.

25 See Map 5 in Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, 189.

26 Buzan and Wæver based their analysis on the ‘firm consensus among the experts’ on the subject, such as Clapham and Tibi. Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 188.

27 Verhoeven, “The Gulf and the Horn,” 340–2; Cannon, “Foreign State Influence.”

28 Huliaras and Kalantzakos, “Gulf States and the Horn of Africa,” 64. Verhoeven, “The Gulf and the Horn,” 349. Woldemariam, “Old Game, New Stakes”; Kabandula and Shaw, “Rising Powers and the Horn of Africa,” 13; Telci and Horoz, “Military Bases in the Foreign Policy,” 161.

29 Ethiopia’s and Somaliland’s efforts to engage Arab Gulf States in development projects and rivalries, particularly at the Berbera Port, are detailed by Rossiter and Cannon, “Re-Examining the ‘Base.’” Verhoeven, “The Gulf and the Horn,” provides an excellent primer of the age-old links across the Red Sea. However, he also aptly demonstrates Saudi Arabia’s long-term interest in the Horn, particularly Sudan. Donelli, “Ankara Consensus,” highlights how Turkey has nurtured long-standing geopolitical interests throughout the Horn.

30 Telci and Horoz, “Military Bases in the Foreign Policy.”

31 Rossiter and Cannon, “Re-examining the ‘Base’.”

32 The Houthis are Zaydi Shiites, or Zaydiyyah. Their grievances against Yemen’s ruling elite date back years, resulting in an insurgency that took control of the capital, Sana, in 2015. Iran is a source of support to the movement in the form of weapons and training. The Houthis and Iranians share a common enemy in Saudi Arabia. Bruce Riedel, “Who Are the Houthis and Why Are We at War with Them?,” Brookings, December 18, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/12/18/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/

33 Telci and Horoz, “Military Bases in the Foreign Policy,” 147–9.

34 For an overview of Turkish involvement in Somalia, see Donelli, “Hybrid Actor in the Horn of Africa.”

35 Cannon, “Deconstructing Turkey’s Efforts in Somalia,” 113–4.

36 Verhoeven, “The Gulf and the Horn,” 350–1; Cannon and Rossiter, “Ethiopia, Berbera Port,” 16.

37 Meester, Van den Berg, and Verhoeven, The Political Economy of Gulf Investments, 47. P&O Ports is a sister company of DP World, and though they share the same chairman, DP World is owned by the Dubai investment company Dubai World while P&O Ports is owned by the state entity Ports, Customs and Free Zone Corporation (PCFC).

38 Joseph Braude and Tyler Jiang, “Why China and Saudi Arabia Are Building Bases in Djibouti,” Huffington Post, December 6, 2017, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-braude/why-china-and-saudi-arabi_b_12194702.html (accessed November 26, 2018).

39 Qatar built its relations with individuals and groups in Mogadishu beginning in 2006, and began using its resultant political clout along with large financial incentives to reportedly swing the presidential elections in favour of its desired candidates in both 2010 and 2017. Despite its inability to project hard power to the region on account of its small population, in the political realm Qatar has been the kingmaker in Mogadishu for nearly a decade. See Cannon, “Foreign State Influence.”

40 Rossiter and Cannon, “Re-examining the ‘Base.’”

41 Ali Kucukgocmen and Khalid Abdelaziz, “Turkey to Restore Sudanese Red Sea Port and Build Naval Dock,” Reuters, December 26, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-sudan-port/turkey-to-restore-sudanese-red-sea-port-and-build-naval-dock-idUSKBN1EK0ZC (accessed December 14, 2018).

42 “Sudan, Turkey Deny Military Naval Base Deal,” Sudan Tribune, December 29, 2017, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article64364 (accessed September 23, 2018).

43 Kabandula and Shaw, “Rising Powers and the Horn of Africa,” 10–1.

44 Weber, Red Sea: Connecter and Divider; Woldemariam and Young, “After the Split.”

45 AFP, “Ethiopia, Eritrea Sign Statement That War ‘Has Come to an End,’” The East African, July 9, 2018, https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/africa/Ethiopia-Eritrea-sign-statement-that-war-has-come-to-an-end/4552902-4654052-50srfd/index.html (accessed November 28, 2018).

46 Aaron Maasho, “UAE to Give Ethiopia $3 Billion in Aid and Investments,” Reuters, June 16, 2018, https://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFKBN1JC07G-OZABS (accessed November 28, 2018); Nizar Manek, “Saudi Arabia Brokers a New Ethiopia–Eritrea Peace Deal,” Bloomberg, September 17, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-17/ethiopia-eritrea-leaders-sign-peace-accord-in-saudi-arabia (accessed December 2, 2018).

47 Fisher and Gebrewahd, “‘Game Over’?.”

48 Santini, “New Regional Cold War.”

49 Aras and Akpınar, Turkish Foreign Policy and the Qatar Crisis; Oktav, “Quo Vadis Turkey–GCC.”

50 Cannon, “Foreign State Influence.”

51 On the concept of ‘tripolarity’, see Schweller, “Tripolarity and the Second World War”; Wohlforth, “Stability of a Unipolar World.”

52 Rossiter and Cannon, “Re-examining the ‘Base,’” 15–7.

53 Ethiopia remains the biggest recipient of Turkish direct investment in Africa and its fourth largest trading partner on the continent. Sano Akino, “Turkey Jockeys with China for Influence in Africa,” Asian Review, May 12, 2018, https://www.asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-Relations/Turkey-jokceys-with-China-for-influence-in-Africa (accessed November 18, 2018).

54 Ethiopia reportedly imports and exports 95% of its goods through the Port of Djibouti. Anudalem Sisay Gessesse, “Ethiopia to Trade Using Regional Ports,” The East African, April 11, 2015, https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Ethiopia-to-trade-using-regional-ports/2558-2682324-11idtdp/index.html (accessed December 14, 2018).

55 Salih Noor, “Eritrea: Why Change Abroad Doesn’t Mean Change at Home,” African Arguments, September 12, 2018, https://africanarguments.org/2018/09/12/eritrea-why-change-abroad-change-home/ (accessed January 10, 2018).

56 Lefebvre, “Iran in the Horn of Africa”; Lob, “Islamic Republic of Iran’s Foreign Policy.”

57 Sudan lost 75% of its oil reserves after the southern part of the country became independent in July 2011. Oil revenue constituted more than half of Sudan’s revenue and 90% of its exports. See Sharfi, “Dynamics of the Loss of Oil Revenues.”

58 This publicly neutral stance was understandably questioned by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi when Somalia President Mohamed Farmajo reportedly signed a US$200 million financing deal with Doha to refurbish government buildings, construct city roads and build schools. Aggrey Mutambo, “Somalia, US and UAE Relations Telltale of Suspicions,” Daily Nation, April 28, 2018, https://www.nation.co.ke/news/africa/Somalia–US-and-UAE-relations-telltale-of-suspicions/1066-4535116-14riujsz/index.html (accessed December 12, 2018).

59 Somalia has not been a unitary, sovereign state since the outbreak of its civil war in 1991. Officials in Mogadishu remain unable to extend their writ of government across a number of federal districts or states, including two de facto or largely autonomous regions: Somaliland and Puntland. Additionally, the governments in each state often assume differing positions from Mogadishu, and may establish their own relations with different MERSC states and poles.

60 Braden Fuller and Valentin D’Hauthuille, “Exporting (In)Stability: The UAE’s Role in Yemen and the Horn of Africa,” ACLEDATA, October 10, 2018, https://www.acleddata.com/2018/10/10/exporting-instability-the-uaes-role-in-yemen-and-the-horn-of-africa/ (accessed December 10, 2018). See also “Ethiopia: The Thorny New Port Deal on the Horn of Africa,” STRATFOR Snapshot, https://www.stratfor.com/article/ethiopia-port-deal-presents-thorny-issue-horn-africa-berbera-somaliland-farmajo; Somalia and the Gulf Crisis. International Crisis Group: Crisis Group Africa Report 260; Martina Stevis-Gridneff, “Middle East Power Struggle Plays Out on New Stage,” Wall Street Journal, June 1, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/global-powers-race-for-position-in-horn-of-africa-1527861768 (accessed December 10, 2018).

61 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell. Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics.

62 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers.

63 For example, and regardless of Turkey’s currently uncomfortable alliance-of-convenience with Russia in Syria, Turkey’s mistrust of Russia dates back centuries and has resulted in multiple wars. Since the demise of the USSR, Turkey still considers Russia’s build-up of the Black Sea fleet, its presence in Syria (and what it means for Turkey) and its omnipresent interest in controlling the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits to be existential threats. See Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy,” 167–9; Toucas, “Turkey Has No Allies.”

64 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, 344.

65 Ayata, “Turkish Foreign Policy”; Ehteshami, “Middle East Middle Powers”; Hazbun, Regional Powers and the Production of Insecurity.

66 Egypt’s position had been consistently anti-Ethiopian for at least the previous 50 years, supporting Somalia in 1977 against Ethiopia, and Sudan in 1976 against Ethiopia. Egypt worries about control of the Nile waters, and thus opposed the secession of South Sudan from Sudan, and Ethiopia’s building of the Grand Renaissance Dam on the headwaters of the Blue Nile. Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 243.

67 Ayoob, “Regional Security and the Third World,” 6.

68 Bruce Byier, Regional Organisations in Africa – Mapping Multiple Memberships. ECDPM, 2017, https://ecdpm.org/talking-points/regional-organisations-africa-mapping-multiple-memberships/ (accessed November 12, 2018).

69 “Saudi Arabia Announces Creation of Entity for Red Sea, Gulf of Aden Countries,” Al Arabiya English, December 12, 2018, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2018/12/12/Saudi-Arabia-announces-creation-of-entity-for-Red-Sea-Gulf-of-Aden-countries.html (accessed December 23, 2018).

70 Hollis, “Europe in the Middle East,” 390–2.

71 Rossiter and Cannon, “Re-Examining the ‘Base,’” 177–80; Telci and Horoz, “Military Bases in the Foreign Policy,” 157–8; Khan, Gulf Strategic Interests.

72 Khairuldeen Al Makhzoom and Adel Albdeewy, “Race to the Sea: Qatar and the Balance of Power in the Middle East,” Open Democracy, July 30, 2017, https://www.opendemocracy.net/north-africa-west-asia/khairuldeen-al-makhzoomi-adel-albdeewy/qatar-MiddleEast-power-US-SaudiArabia-Iran-Turkey-Egypt-GCC-gulf (accessed July 12, 2018).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Brendon J. Cannon

Brendon J. Cannon is an assistant professor of international security at the Institute of International & Civil Security, Khalifa University of Science & Technology, in Abu Dhabi, UAE. He earned a PhD in political science with an emphasis on international relations and comparative politics at the University of Utah, USA (2009). His research interests include contextualising domestic, regional and international relations in eastern Africa; regional security in the Gulf and western Indian Ocean region; the political economy of ports, bases and airports; and the Indo-Pacific strategy of India, Japan, the US and Australia in contrast with China’s BRI in the western Indian Ocean region. He is the author of multiple articles and books, with publications appearing in African Security, Terrorism and Political Violence, The Journal of Strategic Security, Defence Studies and African Security Review.

Federico Donelli

Federico Donelli is a postdoctoral research fellow in political science and international relations at the University of Genova (Italy) and a visiting fellow at the Center for Modern Turkish Studies at the Istanbul Şehir University (Turkey). His research has covered international relations and foreign policy of the Middle East with a particular focus on the engagement of Middle Eastern states in the Horn of Africa. Among his latest works is ‘The Ankara Consensus: The Significance of Turkey’s Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa’, published in Global Change, Peace & Security.