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Abstract
Iran has pursued a highly contradictory policy towards Afghanistan. On the one hand, it became a significant beneficiary of the overthrow of the Taliban regime by the US-led military intervention in 2001 in Afghanistan. The new Afghan government established cordial ties with Iran, allowing it to expand its political, economic and cultural influence in the country. Yet Iran has also provided significant support to the Taliban in its campaign to violently upend the political, social and economic processes in the country. This article examines the underlying domestic and regional security dynamics that contribute to this contradictory behaviour. It offers an assessment of how tensions between the United States and the Islamic Republic, as well as Tehran’s growing threat perception following the rise of the Islamic State – Khorasan in 2014, impact on Iran’s policy towards the Taliban. The paper argues that Tehran views the Taliban as an instrument to disrupt the influence of other actors in Afghanistan. The instrumentalisation of the Taliban, however, is likely to be counterproductive for Iranian security in the long run as it contributes to Afghanistan’s instability and insecurity and undermines Iran’s own long-term interests.
Disclosure statement
The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interests in this article.
Notes
1 For a review and discussion of the literature on proxy war see Rondeaux and Sterman, “Twenty-First Century Proxy Warfare”; Marshall, “From Civil War to Proxy War.”
2 See Hughes, “Syria and the Perils of Proxy Warfare.” For a similar discussion of the roles of spoilers in peace processes see Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes”; Motwani and Bose, “Afghanistan: ‘Spoilers’ in the Regional Security Context.”
3 DeYoung, Loveluck and Hudson, “US Military Announces Start.”
4 Roy, “Taliban: A Strategic Tool for Pakistan.”
5 Qassem, “Pak–Afghan Relations.”
6 Boone, “Musharraf: Pakistan and India’s Backing.”
7 For a discussion of the relationship between the Taliban and Pakistan see Schricker, “The Search for Rebel Interdependence: A Study of the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban.”
8 Mohammadi, “Afghanistan–Iran Trade Volumes Rise.”
9 Akbarzadeh, “Iran’s Policy towards Afghanistan,” 73.
10 For a discussion of the role of ideology on Iran’s foreign policy see Ramazani, “Ideology and Pragmatism in Iran’s Foreign Policy.” For a discussion of pragmatism in Iran’s Afghanistan policy see Koepke, “Iran’s Policy on Afghanistan,” and Barzegar, “Iran’s Foreign Policy in Post-Taliban Afghanistan.”
11 See Ibrahimi, Hazaras and the Afghan State, Chap. 4 and 5.
12 In 2017, the number of drug users in the country was estimated to have reached 2.8 million people, with 67% addicted to opium. See BBC News, ‘Iran’s Drug Problem.”
13 Slavin, “34 Years of Getting to No with Iran.”
14 Akbarzadeh, “Iran’s Policy towards Afghanistan,” 67.
15 Dobbins, “Negotiating with Iran,” 158.
16 International Crisis Group, US–Iranian Engagement, 3–4.
17 Akbarzadeh, “Iran’s Policy towards Afghanistan.”
18 Ferris-Rotman, “Insight: Iran’s ‘Great Game’ in Afghanistan.”
19 Iran and the Taliban had established significant relations prior to the US-led military intervention in Afghanistan in 2001. According to information provided by some Taliban detainees during their interrogation at Guantanamo Detention Camp, Taliban leader Mullah Omar sought to improve relations with Iran in 1999. When the Taliban regime was facing US military attack after 11 September 2001, Iranian intelligence offered to provide the Taliban intelligence and weapons, including surface-to-air missiles. It is not clear whether these promises materialised. See Department of Defense, “Secret/NOFORN/ 02330306.”
20 Levy and Scott-Clark, “Al-Qaeda Has Rebuilt Itself.” See also Farrall, “Interview with a Taliban Insider.”
21 Todd, “Coalition: Taliban Have Iran Arms.”
22 Synovitz, “Afghanistan: US Worried.”
23 Harding, “Taliban ‘Use Iranian Missiles on UK Troops.’”
24 McChrystal, “COMISAF Initial Assessment.”
25 US Department of the Treasury, “Fact Sheet: US Treasury Department.”
26 Roggio, “Iranian Qods Force Commanders Linked to Taliban.”
27 Abi-Habib, “Tehran Builds on Outreach to Taliban.”
28 Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Designates Iranian Qods Force.”
29 Farmer, “Taliban Opens Office in Iran.”
30 The existence and nature of a formal and permanent Taliban office in Mashhad continue to be debated. However, given its proximity to Afghanistan, Mashhad is likely to be an important place for regular liaising between the Taliban and Iranian officials. See Masiha, ‘Aya goruh-e Taliban dar mashhad daftar darad?”
31 Giustozzi, “Arab-Gulf Connections of the Taliban.”
32 Gall, “Tehran’s Turn: In Afghanistan.”
33 Giustozzi, Taliban and Islamic State: Enemies or Brothers.
34 Azhand, “Taliban Irani?”
35 Eatemadi, “Baray-e feshar ba amrica.”
36 Gohel, “Iran’s Ambiguous Role in Afghanistan.”
37 Nader and Laha, Iran’s Balancing Act in Afghanistan, 10.
38 Worden, “Iran and Afghanistan’s Long, Complicated History.”
39 Yusufzai and Rahim, “Afghan Taliban Delegation Visits Iran.”
40 Fars News Agency, “Shamkhani: goftuguhay-e iran ba Taliban.”
41 AFP, “Afghan Taliban Says ‘Post-Occupation’ Discussed.”
42 Mashal, “US and the Taliban Are Near a Deal.”
43 P. Baker, Mashal and Crowley, “Trump’s Plan to Secretly Meet with the Taliban.”
44 Tasnim News, “Dalayel-e alani shudan muzakerat.”
45 Razdan, “Taliban Will Have Role in Afghanistan.”
46 Ibid.
47 BBC Farsi, “Muwain sokhangoy-e riasyat jomhuri Afghanistan.”
48 See an interview with Fada Hossein Maliki, former Ambassador of Iran in Kabul. Iranian Labour News Agency, “Safir Pishin Iran dar Afghanistan.”
49 Ahmad, “Taliban Officials Say.”
50 Ibrahimi and Akbarzadeh, “Intra-Jihadist Conflict and Cooperation.”
51 International Crisis Group, Iran’s Priorities in a Turbulent Middle East.
52 Zarif, “Peace in Syria Is Vital.”
53 Fars News Agency, “DM: Iran Ready to Help Afghanistan.” See also Mehr News Agency, “Army Chief Bagheri.”
54 Ghubar, “Iran ‘Shares Info on Daesh.’”
55 Dabiq, “‘Rāfidah: From Ibn Saba’ to the Dajjāl.”
56 See eg Mashregh News, “Daesh: Mashhad ra ba khak yaksan mikunim.”
57 Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism, 73.
58 Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, “Kushtar-e mazhabi dasisay-e khatarnak doshman.”
59 International Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan.
60 Guillou, “Future of Sunni Jihadist Violence in Iran.”
61 See Zambelis, “Evolution of the Ethnic Baluch Insurgency in Iran.”
62 Dehghanpisheh, “ISIS Is Going after Iran.”
63 BBC Farsi, “Daesh dar video-ye iran ra tahdid kard.” It is important to note that IS-K did not develop a media strategy of its own. As a result, it is likely that Iranian officials view IS-K through the explicit threats issued by the central leadership of ISIS.
64 Faramarzi, “Iran’s Salafi Jihadis.”
65 Hawramy, “Iran Faces New Threat.”
66 Constable, “Islamic State Suicide Bombing.”
67 See Al-Tamimi, “Islamic State and the Kurds: The Documentary Evidence.”
68 Giustozzi, Islamic State in Khorasan, 149.
69 Giustozzi, “IS-Khorasan towards Financial Autonomy.”
70 Johnson, Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan, 7.
71 Global Witness, At Any Price.
72 The Islamic Republic News Agency, “Tafawut-e Taliban ba daesh.”
73 Mashregh News, “Taliban ra behtar bishnasid 1.”
74 Mashregh News, “Taliban ra behtar bishnasid 2.”
75 Ibid.
76 See Tasnim News, “Jamiat al-mustafa jenayate- terroristi”; and Tasnim News, “Wakunesh-e shamkhani ba jenayat akhir.”
77 Tasnim News, “Fajea’h wa penhan kari dar mirza olang.”
78 Moghadam Far, “Majaraye mirza olang afghanistan.”
79 Tasnim News, “Marasim khatm-e waleda Hamid Raza Moghadadam Far.”
80 Afghan Voice News Agency, “Moshawer wazir khareja Iran.”
81 Fars News Agency, “Afghanistan abastan fetnahay-e jaded.”
82 The Islamic Republic News Agency, “Rahbar-e muazam-e Inqilab Islami.” See also A. Baker, “Why Iran Believes.”
83 khamenei.ir, “Goziday-e az bayanat.”
84 Popalzai, “Iranian FM Accuses US.”
85 See eg the Islamic Republic News Agency, “Daesh wa rewayathay-e motafawet.”
86 The videos and photos, which are reported as exclusive reports, were widely available online. Most of these materials show the surrender of a group of IS-K in the province of Jawjzan to the Afghan government forces in August 2018. Nonetheless, the narrative presented in the report is indicative of broader views about the two groups in the Iranian press. See Tasnim News, “Jozaiat-e ekhtesasi tasnim.”
87 See the Office of the Supreme Leader, “Second Letter to Western Youth.”
88 Fars News Agency, “Daesh tanha yag halqa az sanariyoye kalan.”
89 Mashregh News, “Daesh wa raqabat keshwarhaye arabi dar Afghanistan.”
90 Landay and Wroughton, “Exclusive: Shared Afghanistan Interests.”
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Shahram Akbarzadeh
Shahram Akbarzadeh, PhD, is a research professor in Middle East and Central Asian politics and Deputy Director (International) of the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University (Australia). He held a prestigious Australian Research Council Future Fellowship (2012–2016) on the role of Islam in Iran’s foreign policymaking and recently completed a Qatar Foundation project on sectarianism in the Middle East.
Niamatullah Ibrahimi
Niamatullah Ibrahimi is an associate research fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University (Australia). His research focuses on dynamics of insurgency, contentious politics, and social movements in Afghanistan and the South Asia region. In 2018, he completed his PhD at the Australian National University, which was funded by an Endeavour Award granted by the Department of Education and Training of the Government of Australia. His recent publications include The Hazaras and the Afghan State: Rebellion, Exclusion and Struggle for Recognition (Hurst & Co., 2017).