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Abstract
How much agency do African states have to shape global orders? This study puts the global nuclear order under scrutiny to answer this question. It amounts to a demanding case. Arms control is something that global great powers take very seriously, and there is no weapons category that they take more seriously than nuclear weapons. My findings provide a nuanced picture. Although often outflanked and frustrated by nuclear weapon states, the nuclear order would look different without African actors exerting their agency. They successfully shaped background and foreground institutions constituting the global nuclear order by building advocacies for new institutions upon already existing ones, reaching out to state and non-state actors outside of Africa, and channelling communication through African states with authority in global fora. This study makes three contributions: First, it underlines the key finding of recent literature on African agency that African actors are more to be reckoned with than often assumed. Second, it provides novel evidence about the diplomatic mechanisms through which they come to make a difference. Third, it adds to our grasp of the constitution of global orders as well as the processes through which they come to be made, re-made and unmade more generally.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the participants of the International Studies Association (ISA) catalytic workshop ‘African Order, Global Order: A Scrutiny of Diplomatic Borderlands’, held in Cape Town 16–17 February 2018, especially Katia Coleman, Annette Seegers and Tom Tieku, for their excellent feedback. Martin Senn remains a great source of inspiration for thinking about orders. I am also indebted to the participants of my diplomatic training seminars in Accra, Djerba, Gaborone, Luanda, Kampala, Maputo, Maseru, Nairobi, Pretoria and Windhoek (2016–2019) who sharpened my understanding of African diplomacy.
Notes
1 I borrow the conceptualisation of agency as efficacy from Sewell, “A Theory of Structure.”
2 Amin, “Underdevelopment and Dependence”; and Yates, Rentier State in Africa.
3 Rothchild and Emmanuel, “United States”; and Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy.
4 Ottaway, Soviet and American Influence; and Patman, Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa.
5 Chipman, French Military Policy and African Security; and Medard, “France and Sub-Saharan Africa.”
6 Bush, Imperialism, Race, and Resistance; and Cumming, “From Realpolitik to the Third Way.”
7 Campbell, “China in Africa”; Martin, “Africa’s Futures”; and Mason, “China’s Impact on the Landscape.”
8 Farrell, “Triumph of Realism over Idealism”; and Hurt, “Co-operation and Coercion.”
9 Jabri, Postcolonial Subject; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Coloniality of Power in Postcolonial Africa; and Werbner, “Introduction: Postolonical Subjectivities.”
10 Hobson, Eurocentric Conception of World Politics, 13.
11 Okafor, “Poverty, Agency and Resistance.”
12 Glenn, “Imperial Governance.”
13 Matthews, “Colonised Minds”; and Shilliam, “Perilous but Unavoidable Terrain.”
14 Taylor, International Relations of Sub-Saharan Africa.
15 Brown and Harman, African Agencyin International Politics.
16 Murray-Evans, “Regionalism and African Agency.”
17 Besada and O’Bright, “Maturing Sino–African Relations.”
18 Samuda, “African Agency and the World Bank.”
19 Coleman and Tieku, African Actors in International Security.
20 For important precursors of this literature, see Mazrui, Africa’s International Relations; Obasanjo, Balance Sheet of the African Region”; and Zartman, International Relations in the New Africa; see also recent more theoretically minded clues on African agency: Brown, “A Question of Agency”; Harrison, Neoliberal Africa, 14–8; and Taylor, International Relations of Sub-Saharan Africa, 22.
21 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence.
22 I borrow the distinction of background and foreground from Searle, “Background of Meaning.”
23 Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty; Colson, Tradition and Contract; Bull, Anarchical Society; and Buzan, From International to World Society, 161–204.
24 Adler, World Ordering; Nwanunobi, African Social Institutions; and Pouliot, International Pecking Orders.
25 Deudney and Ikenberry, “Liberal World: The Resilient Order”; Graham, “Institutional Design of Funding Rules”; and Kuperman, Constitutions and Conflict Management in Africa.
26 For further details on foreground and background institutions, see Kornprobst and Senn, “Introduction”. If ubuntu, for example, were to become widely shared and sink into the social background, it would be a rather different ‘standard operating system’ upon which to build institutional designs than, say, state sovereignty. On ubuntu, see Zondi, “Ubuntu and Sumak Kawsay.”
27 Newman, Networks: An Introduction, 53.
28 Shaker, Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, 1: 3–5.
29 UNGA 1378 (XIV), November 20, 1959.
30 In 1963, the OAU’s first Assembly of African Heads of State and Government passed four resolutions, one of which was about “general disarmament” (CIAS/Plen.2/Rev.2).
31 Ahlman, “Algerian Question in Nkrumah’s Ghana”; and Allman, “Nuclear Imperialism and the Pan-African Struggle.”
32 Adeniji, Treaty of Pelindaba, 35–41.
33 Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, Final Document.
34 Boutros-Ghali, “Foreign Policy of Egypt,” 770, 784; Guy, A to Z of the Non-Aligned Movement, 106; and Kochan, “Changing Emphasis in the Non-Aligned Movement,” 503–4.
35 Shaw, “Nigeria in the International System,” 207.
36 Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics, 82.
37 Ihonvbere, “Nigeria as Africa’s Great Power,” 510.
38 Holsti, “National Role Conceptions,” 287. Libya could have been a contender for entering this circle of reputable states as well, but its own nuclear ambitions stood in the way.
39 Zelleke quoted in Sokolski, “History of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” 45.
40 Sule Kolo in Sokolski, “History of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” 48.
41 Sokolski, “History of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” 41–2.
42 A/RES/2028 (XX), 23 November 1965.
43 Sokolski, “History of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” 40.
44 Swango, “United States and the Role,” 219.
45 NPT/Conf. II/C.I/2, Group 77, 1980, 2–3.
46 Abdel-Maguid, Summary Record of the Sixth Plenary Meeting; Dabiri, Summary Record of the Third Plenary Meeting; Gaynor, Summary Record of the Second Plenary Meeting; Elaraby, Summary Record of the Ninth Plenary Meeting; and Nasseri, Summary Record of the Third Plenary Meeting.
47 Fartash, Summary Record of the Second Plenary Meeting; Elaraby, Summary Record of the Ninth Plenary Meeting; and Spring, Summary Record of the Second Meeting.
48 Carter, Message to the Participants.
49 Abdel-Maguid, Summary Record of the Sixth Plenary Meeting.
50 NPT/Conf. II/C.I/2, Group 77, 1980, 2.
51 Brezhnev, Statement to the Participants.
52 Dhanapala, Multilateral Diplomacy and the NPT, 56.
53 Rauf and Johnson, “After the NPT’s Indefinite Extension,” 29.
54 Ibid., 40. In the years to follow, the standing of these states in world politics continued to grow, making authors include them in the exclusive club of the “BRIC plus.” Shaw, Cooper, Antkiewicz, “Global and/or Regional Development.”
55 Alden and Vieira, “New Diplomacy of the South”; and Schoeman, “South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power.”
56 Nzo, Statement at General Debate.
57 Dhanapala, “Management of NPT Diplomacy.”
58 Essis, “Individual State Preferences,” 536.
59 At the beginning of negotiations, most African states joined South Africa’s advocacy, but there were also a few supporters of the Canadian proposal. See Nwogugu, “NPT Review and Extension Conference,” 262–3.
60 Steinberg, “Impact of the Egyptian–Israeli Debate,” 239.
61 Goosen in Welsh, “Delegate Perspectives,” 2.
62 This group has a very good record in forging intra-African agreements on nuclear issues. See Murithi, “Briefing: The African Union at Ten,” 666; and van Wyk, “Africa and the 2015 NPT Review Conference.” On a more general note, see also Tieku, “Collectivist Worldview.”
63 Goosen in Welsh, “Delegate Perspectives,” 3.
64 Wittner, One World or None.
65 Bonhoeffer and Gerecke, “Maintain Life on Earth.”
66 Helfand, Nuclear Famine.
67 World Health Organization, Effects of Nuclear War.
68 Seegers, “New Security in Democratic South Africa,” 271.
69 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994.
70 Annan, In Larger Freedom.
71 Canberra Commission, Report on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.
72 New Agenda Coalition Paper, Preparatory Committee.
73 Data on partner organizations available online at: http://www.icanw.org/campaign/partner-organizations/ (accessed December 11, 2017).
74 Kellenberger, Statement to the Geneva Diplomatic Corps.
75 Swart, “African Contribution to the Nuclear Weapons Debate,” 760. These states were Niger, Uganda, Djibouti, Lesotho, Zambia, Libya, Malawi, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Ghana, Kenya, Congo, Togo, Algeria, Mali, South Africa, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Chad and Comoros.
76 A/RES/71/47 (2016).
77 A/RES/71/258 (2016).
78 Mukhatzhanova, “Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty.”
79 For further details on convergences and divergences across African states on cases beyond the three under scrutiny, see Ogunbadejo, “Africa’s Nuclear Capability”; Goldblat, “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones”; and Cawthra and Moeller, “Nuclear Africa: Weapons, Power and Proliferation.”
80 It is interesting to note that this finding elaborates on something that earlier literature on Africa in international relations already pointed out. Africans stand their ground in global affairs if they reach convergences among one another and link up with other powers in the Global North and South. See, for example, Akindele, “Reflections on the Preoccupation and Conduct”; and Zacher, International Conflicts and Collective Security.
81 On transposition, see Sewell, “A Theory of Structure,” 17; Boxenbaum and Battilana, “Importation as Innovation.”
82 Deudney and Ikenberry, “Liberal World: The Resilient Order”; Nye, “Will the Liberal Order Survive”; and Schmidt, “Roots of Neo-Liberal Resilience.”
83 Shaw, “Future Nexus of African Foreign Policies.”
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Markus Kornprobst
Markus Kornprobst holds the Chair of Political Science and International Relations at the Vienna School of International Studies. Previously based at the Ohio State University, Oxford University and University College London, his research interests encompass peace and security, international and regional orders, African politics, and European politics. His research appears in leading journals such as the European Journal of International Relations, International Organization, International Studies Review, International Theory, Review of International Studies, and Journal of Modern African Studies. He is the author of Irredentism in European Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2008) as well as Co-managing International Crises (Cambridge University Press, 2019), co-author of Understanding International Diplomacy (Routledge, 2013 and 2018), and co-editor of Metaphors of Globalization (Palgrave, 2007), Arguing Global Governance (Routledge, 2010), Communication, Legitimation and Morality in Modern Politics (Routledge, 2018) and Diplomacy in and beyond Africa: Orders and Borderlands (Routledge, 2020).