Framing and movement outcomes: the #BringBackOurGirls movement

Abstract

This paper is concerned with two questions: What are the master frames of the #BringBackOurGirls (#BBOG) movement? Why did the #BBOG attract significant global attention but achieve only moderate success in its goal – the release of all the school girls kidnapped by Boko Haram in Chibok in April 2014? The paper draws on primary and secondary data to argue that the international attention generated by #BBOG framing had historically specific resonance with local contestations for political power. The reverberation of the framing led to the alienation of key political actors in Nigeria who could have helped achieve the movement’s objective. The involvement of elite women in the movement played a major role in its global popularity but their political activities and loyalties before and during movement activities influenced local perceptions of the movement. The #BBOG’s rhetorical over-reliance on international support for achieving the movement’s objective was a strategic error. The #BBOG experience suggests the need for activists, particularly in the developing world, to recognise the constraints of their political context, work with local actors to achieve objectives, and publicise what ‘international support’ means for movement objectives.

Keywords:

• #BringBackOurGirls (#BBOG) movement
• social movements
• framing
• human rights

Introduction: the Nigerian state, Boko Haram and #BringBackOurGirls

The Jama’at ahlis Sunnah lid Da’wat wal Jihad [People committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and Jihad], or Boko Haram, was established in the early 2000s in Northeast Nigeria. Poverty, institutional fragility, religious ideology, intelligence failure, failed shari’a implementation and elite manipulation, among other things, contributed to the rise of Boko Haram (Gray and Adeakin 2015; Akinola 2015). Boko Haram clashed with state forces in July 2009. Mohammed Yusuf, the Boko Haram founder, was killed while in police custody during the crisis. His deputy, Abubakar Shekau, emerged a year later and a terroristic turn began ostensibly as revenge for the assassination of Yusuf and hundreds of his followers. Over 35,000 people have been killed since the start of the Boko Haram crisis. Boko Haram kidnapped 276 girls at Federal Government College, Chibok, Borno State, on 14 April 2014. Over 50 of the girls managed to escape by jumping off vehicles. Boko Haram released 106 girls in two tranches after ransom payment and prisoner exchange. Boko Haram uses young women as part of its killing machinery. This includes suicide bombings, domestic servitude, and serving as human shields and sources of finance. Women are considered fundamental to the group’s perpetuation of its ideology through progeny produced via rape (Oriola 2017).

President Goodluck Jonathan (2010–2015), a Christian from the Ijaw (minority) ethnic group in the southern Niger Delta region, and opposition politician General Muhammadu Buhari, a northern Muslim, sought political capital from the Boko Haram crisis. The Chibok kidnapping occurred approximately a year before the 2015 presidential elections and quickly became part of the political theatre. Buhari had lost three successive presidential elections in 2003, 2007 and 2011. In May 2012, fresh from his third electoral loss, Buhari criticised the government for its use of force against Boko Haram. He described the Jonathan administration as ‘the biggest Boko Haram’ (Aziken 2012). Buhari claimed that President Jonathan ought to have offered amnesty to Boko Haram operatives the way President Umaru Yar’Adua (2007–2010), a northerner, had done for insurgents from President Jonathan’s Niger Delta region. The comments indicated a fixation on the 2015 elections and ethno-religious perceptions of government action.

The presidential contest between Jonathan and Buhari contributed to what Claude Ake describes as the ‘overpoliticization of social life’ (cited in Marenin 1988, 221). Ake argues that the ‘Nigerian state appears to intervene everywhere’. Ake presupposes that overpoliticisation is coterminous with interventionist overreach. The Nigerian state, however, adopts a matrix of non-intervention when the talakawa (the poor) are the actors in harm’s way and/or state interests are not directly threatened. This appears to have been the case with the Chibok girls’ kidnapping: the Nigerian state initially overpoliticised the Chibok kidnapping without intervening. The Jonathan administration was unconvinced that the Chibok girls were missing. The government assumed that the Borno state government, which was headed by a member of the opposition party, was merely playing politics. As it became clear that the girls were genuinely missing, the administration then assumed the girls were ‘kidnapped to embarrass the government and make it look incompetent in an election season’ (Godwin 2015).

Nine days after the Chibok kidnapping, Dr Obiageli Ezekwesili, former Minister of Education, addressed the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) forum in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. Ezekwesili criticised the reluctance of the government to acknowledge the kidnapping incident. She asked the audience to demand that the government ‘bring back our daughters’. Ibrahim Abdullahi, who was watching the event on television, began to tweet about it. Abdullahi created two hashtags –‘#BringBackOurDaughters’ and ‘#BringBackOurGirls’ – drawing on Ezekwesili’s speech. Ezekwesili retweeted Ibrahim’s ‘#BringBackOurGirls’ tweet after her presentation. She encouraged followers to publicise the victims’ plight by using the hashtag. This marked the start of the social media dimension of the BringBackOurGirls movement.

Another concerned member of the elite, Hadiza Bala Usman,¹ engaged several influential women leaders to protest government inaction. A plan to start a ‘physical movement’² was broached. A protest in Abuja was announced on social media, bringing together the offline efforts of Usman and Ezekwesili’s social media engagement. Over 2000 people attended the first #BBOG protest in Abuja on 30 April 2014. The group decided to meet daily until the girls were rescued. The focus of the movement was to persuade the Nigerian government to use its military capacity to rescue the girls, or to solicit external intervention if the Nigerian government failed to fulfil its duty.³

There are two emerging trajectories in scholarly work on #BBOG movement. The first focuses on the immanent problematic of how the agitation for the rescue of the girls is being framed (Loken 2014). The second problematises the ‘imperialist appropriations’ of the movement (Maxfield 2016, 1). The locus of these concerns (particularly the linguistic iteration of the movement between 2014 and 2015) is three-fold. The discursive machinery of the movement that emphasises the missing girls were ‘daughters’ and ‘sisters’ and therefore privileges the ‘narratives of women as rights-deserving only through the capacity to be claimed’ (Loken 2014, 1) is criticised as highly problematic. The use and disuse of the hashtag (ie ‘#BBOG’) by various actors, especially in the geo-political West, has been explicated as constitutive of the limitations of social media activism, ‘slacktivism’ or ‘hashtag activism’ (Scott 2014) – a convenient (computer-based) vociferous agitation that generates few results. The third element is the ostensibly intricate entanglement of the movement in the labyrinth of imperialist discourse – or ‘the white savior industrial complex’ (Maxfield 2016, 2). The movement is criticised for purportedly providing an avenue for colonialist discourses and another non-committal ‘cause’ for the geo-political West.

Social movements in developing countries draw on the grammar of movements in the developed world, particularly in relation to framing and overall ideational framework. Activists deploy frames such as human rights, injustice and environmental justice, among others (Urkidi and Walter 2011). Großklaus (2015, 1255) argues that

Local struggles may be transferred to the international level by appropriating the respective language. In so doing, local politics can be dealt with in ‘universal’ terms without having to fall back on the traditions of Western societies at the same time. It becomes possible to challenge local social realities in a language bearing foreign roots that has yet become one’s own. It is local while still maintaining a semantic relation to international (‘modern’) frameworks of reference.

However, Bob (2002, 398) cautions that ‘international developments will not affect domestic politics so obviously and directly. Instead, the national opportunity structure will dominate. This is particularly true in highly repressive states and in poor communities of the developing world’. For example, the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) reframed its grievances from claims over ethnic genocide to environmental concerns in Nigeria’s Delta region in order to garner international support (Bob 2002; Saro-Wiwa 1992). The ensuing protests from 1993 received huge international attention but firmly entrenched MOSOP in the crosshairs of the General Sani Abacha regime. Nine leaders of MOSOP, including the famous writer Ken Saro-Wiwa, were hanged in November 1995. The state executions marked the start of MOSOP’s steady decline (Bob 2002; Nyiayaana 2018). The cleanup of the Ogoni environment, one of the cardinal demands of (the reframed) MOSOP, began in June 2016, following changes in Nigeria’s political process (Nyiayaana 2018) – over 20 years after the killing of MOSOP’s leaders. The Ogoni experience accentuates a ‘tight dialectic between the domestic and international levels’ (Bob 2002, 397). It signifies the importance of political context, particularly in the developing world (Bob 2002).

This paper demonstrates ways in which transnationalised framing (1) is refracted across local political conflicts, (2) complicates the dynamics of the socio-political environment in which framing takes place and (3) influences movement outcomes. This paper is concerned with two key questions: What are the master frames of the #BringBackOurGirls (#BBOG) movement? Why did the #BBOG movement attract significant attention both nationally and internationally but achieve only moderate success in its goal – the release of all the school girls kidnapped by Boko Haram? The paper argues that (1) the #BBOG movement deployed four main master frames. (2) The international attention generated by the framing during the Goodluck Jonathan presidency (2010–2015) had historically specific resonance with local contestations for political power. (3) The reverberation of the framing of the movement led to the alienation of key local actors who could have helped achieve the movement’s objective. (4) The involvement of elite women in the #BBOG movement played a major role in its global popularity, but their political activities and loyalties before and during movement activities influenced local perceptions of the movement. (5) The #BBOG’s rhetorical over-reliance on ‘international support’ for achieving the movement objective was a strategic error.

This is not a simple case of framing backfire. The situation is an intrinsically complex entanglement of movement objective with local politics. This paper aims to foster understanding of the framing of the #BBOG, how this framing influenced the political context, and the outcomes of the movement. While emphasis is placed on framing, the paper in no way suggests that framing causally or exclusively produced certain outcomes. Causality is difficult to establish in this case, and the ambitions of the paper are much more modest.

Previous studies have focussed on one frame – the motherist frame. This study identifies and unpacks three other master frames. Beyond detailing the master frames, this paper also contributes to the literature by analysing the refraction and consequences of the #BBOG framing. The remainder of the paper is divided into four parts. The first part focuses on the methods and data. The master frames of the #BBOG movement are analysed in the second section. The third section problematises the movement’s framing. The concluding part analyses the outcomes of the movement and the lessons activists can draw from the #BBOG experience.

Data and methods

Two sets of data are utilised. First, qualitative data garnered through interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) are analysed. Twenty-eight individuals participated in in-depth interviews in July–August 2015 and May–July 2017. They included 25 members of the #BBOG, two army generals, and one journalist covering Northeast Nigeria. The #BBOG participants included five members of the Strategic Team, the #BBOG’s highest decision-making organ. Four of the Strategic Team members were interviewed multiple times during fieldwork. Each interview lasted 40–60 minutes. Four FGDs were also conducted (N = 8; 2 persons per group) with #BBOG members. Each FGD lasted 60–90 minutes.

Primary data are complemented by secondary data. These include the #BBOG website (http://www.bringbackourgirls.ng), five publicity and strategy-related materials of the #BBOG (three unpublished), a speech delivered in 2015 by Obiageli Ezekwesili, #BBOG’s prominent co-convener, and 23 media reports. The reports were selected purposively based on media coverage of subjects relating to the #BBOG. These included Nigerian newspapers such as The Vanguard, The Punch, Premium Times and Daily Post and a report from Channels Television. International media sources such as Time, BBC, CNN, The Guardian (US), Reuters, The Telegraph and al-Jazeera are also utilised. The main inclusion criteria were coverage of and relevance to #BBOG activities. These variegated sources have multiple advantages. They indicate (1) the level of global coverage generated by #BBOG activities, (2) the diffusion of its narratives and (3) the international attention drawn to the cause. Media reports are used in three cognate ways. First, media reports are used as evidence of major political events and episodes before and during #BBOG mobilisation. Second, they are deployed to demonstrate the larger socio-political process within which the #BBOG was embedded; and, third, they are used to show the spread of #BBOG’s framing. The framing explored in this study concerns the #BBOG’s narratives and the movement’s discursive representation of its grievances, cause and objective. This paper is concerned with how the #BBOG framed its activities rather than how the media framed the #BBOG.

The interviews and FGDs were transcribed and coded thematically. Passages in the transcript with common themes or ideas were identified through intense close reading. The identified passages were indexed into various categories for purposes of establishing a ‘framework of thematic ideas’ (see Gibbs 2007). This process involves multiple readings to identify all the major and minor thematic ideas in the transcript. This theoretical and analytical process (BetterEvaluation 2016) utilised a range of questions proposed by Charmaz (2003, 94–5) for such an exercise: ‘What is going on? What are people doing? What is the person saying? What do these actions and statements take for granted? How do structure and context serve to support, maintain, impede or change these actions and statements?’

Framing the #BBOG movement

A frame is ‘an interpretive schemata [sic] that simplifies and condenses the “world out there” by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present or past environment’ (Snow and Benford 1992, 137). Framing is a process, which involves competing assessments, definitions and understanding of a given situation by political actors such as activists, state agents, elites and journalists, among others. Framing helps to accentuate the grievances of a movement, its cause, the locus of responsibility for an identified issue and a call to action for meaningful change. Framing is contentious because it emphasises specific aspects of a complex reality while deemphasising others, and often challenges existing characterisation or radically differs from widespread understanding of a situation (Benford and Snow 2000). For social movement activists, framing helps to make participating in collective action meaningful (Klandermans 1997; Gamson 1992) and is fundamental to movement mobilisation, acceptance and overall outcomes.

Social movement leaders devote significant time and resources to framing their cause (Bob 2005). Therefore, unpacking the framing of the #BBOG has the potential to articulate the constitutive elements of its rationale, orientation and social positionality in interaction with the political context. A key member of the #BBOG’s Strategic Communication Team (SCT) highlights the salience of the movement’s framing and approach to public communication. He explains that the name of the communication arm was changed from ‘media team’ because

what we do is beyond media. It is not just media; it is the whole gamut of strategic communication, about how the advocacy is perceived; about how our Chibok girls’ issue is always on the front burner, deflecting attacks, everything that has to do with strategic communication. That is why we renamed it ‘strategic communication team’.⁴

Therefore, #BBOG activists who formed the nucleus of the movement’s strategic media engagement are bemused by the widespread perception that the movement simply walked into the global media spotlight.⁵ In reality, the #BBOG engaged in rigorous framing of its grievances against the backdrop of antagonism from two successive governments, an ethno-religiously divided society and a public sceptical about the authenticity of the Chibok kidnapping.

The #BBOG has engaged in a sophisticated framing of the Chibok kidnapping for multifarious audiences. These audiences include the Nigerian government, security apparatus, religious communities and the public. The audience also includes transnational non-governmental organisations (NGOs), multilateral organisations, state actors and influential global elites. Framing has played a fundamental role in the international attention the #BBOG has garnered. The four major master frames in the movement are the motherist frame, the human rights frame, the girl-child’s right to education frame and the state failure frame. These are analysed below.

Motherist or maternalist framing

Motherist or maternalist framing ‘refers to elements of motherhood, mothering, and maternal identities deployed to evoke meanings within a given context and elicit participation and/or support of collective action’ (Carreon and Moghadam 2015, 19). Women-led social movements in Africa and Latin America tend to draw on maternalist framing arguably more than their counterparts in Western societies. Mothers in highly patriarchal societies have a level of legitimacy that is not afforded other women. The motherhood identity is a powerful resource deployed to make claims on the state and other actors. For instance, motherist framing was used by women in the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa (Wells 1993), the mobilisation of Mothers of Political Prisoners in Kenya (Worthington 2001), the quest for human rights in Augusto Pinoche’s Chile (Noonan 1995) and Madres de la Plaza de Mayo in Argentina (Howe 2006). The motherist framing is particularly useful in authoritarian settings to attenuate state repression.

Scholarly analyses of movements using motherist framing have engaged with its use for ‘strategic gender interests’ and/or ‘practical gender interests’ (Valiente 2003, 241). Strategic gender interests relate to demands that challenge structural bias against women (Valiente 2003). Practical gender interests concern basic demands such as improvements in health care, education and lower food prices (Valiente 2003). The #BBOG’s use of maternalist framing is nested in practical gender interests.

The victims’ biological mothers in Chibok organised the first protest for the rescue of the girls on 29 April 2014. However, factors such as social class, minority status, geographic location and limited media coverage ensured the Chibok mothers’ maternal identity did not generate momentum. This is congruent with research on the role of class and ethnicity in the ability of maternal identity to serve as a cultural resource (Milman 2014). Next, mothers who were well placed in society intervened. Hadiza Bala Usman, who led efforts for the first #BBOG protest a day after the Chibok mothers’ protest, ‘started it from the angle of we are mothers that are agitating for other mothers whose children have been taken’.⁶ The #BBOG’s mobilisation of women through their social positionality as mothers strongly resonated in the population.

Motherist framing became the nucleus of the entire framing universe of the #BBOG and helped to mobilise Nigerian women. Large banners bearing the central message have been part of the aesthetics of #BBOG protests: ‘Would you be silent if your daughter was missing?’ Publicity material with the same title articulates this framing:

The girls could have been our sisters, daughters, cousins and nieces. Our ability to imagine the unfortunate position of the girls and their families drives us to rise and act in the manner that we would, if the girls were our own. What if your daughter, sister, niece or cousin was among the girls? How would you feel? … Would you appreciate it if someone was there for you?

This framing interpellated the audience and urged them to consider the plight of the victims’ parents. The evidence indicating the efficacy of this approach is overwhelming. One participant noted she joined the movement because of the ‘fact that I have a daughter and what later kept me is the fact that I was just like them 24 years ago’.⁷ Michelle Obama, for instance, states, ‘In these girls, Barack and I see our own daughters. We see their hopes, their dreams, and we can only imagine the anguish their parents are feeling’ (quoted in McVeign 2014).

Maternal framing was used to draw attention to the facticity of femaleness and the risks the victims were exposed to because of their gender. This has several tactical advantages that are connected with the normative articulation of femaleness: vulnerability, innocence, fecundity, beauty and youth. Making claims on the government through motherist framing provided a strong basis for legitimacy, as mothers enjoy a greater discursive opportunity structure than other women and men (Valiente 2003, 258). This was enhanced by the social status of the convenors of the movement. This framing is pragmatic rather than revolutionary; it does not turn patriarchy on its head but instrumentalises patriarchal notions about gender.

Human rights framing

Human rights framing was included in the repertoire of the #BBOG as it sought to raise global awareness about the girls and retain members’ support. This requires symbolically appealing to a common denominator – humanity. One #BBOG member from the Kibaku Area Development Association (KADA), Abuja, which represents the Chibok people, notes that the #BBOG ‘preach[es] humanity, they preach equality, they preach change for the nation.⁸ Beyond mobilising its members through an emphasis on ‘collective humanity’, the #BBOG adopts a universalistic human rights discourse nested in the idea of global citizenship. The #BBOG argues that their members are ‘not all from Chibok but our sense of shared humanity makes it legitimate to connect with the missing girls and their people’.⁹ The #BBOG also emphasises that the ‘key element of human rights is the dignity of human life’, and that ‘regardless of differences in geography, culture, race and other markers of difference, we must dignify each other’s right to life’ (Ezekwesili 2015). This framing emphasises a sense of collective responsibility. This globalised rights narrative construes the issue as a transnational concern, not simply another African crisis.

This framing helped legitimise the existence of the #BBOG movement. Questions were being raised about why the group was ‘crying more than the bereaved’¹⁰ and whether the movement existed (in late 2014 and early 2015) as a political tool of the opposition the All Progressives Congress (APC). The latter issue was particularly problematic given that some key leaders of the movement were active in the opposition party. The group also used human rights framing to highlight the insouciant attitude of the government to the girls’ abduction.

Kidnapping had become common in Nigeria since at least the early 2000s. A standard matrix was established: families of victims paid ransom to kidnappers. The police intervened predominantly in cases when victims were elite. Therefore, the #BBOG’s argument is that the Chibok girls’ rescue was not a priority because they were the ‘daughters of the lowest income group’ (Ezekwesili 2015). This hinges on the idea that

when consideration is given to people’s socioeconomic or political status in the enjoyment of rights, such [a] human rights framework is no longer consistent with the unalloyed interpretation of the fact that every human being has a right to life and a right to freedom. (Ezekwesili 2015)

Consequently, a social class permutation is introduced into the narrative to emphasise that the Chibok girls are also bearers of human rights and deserve to be rescued by the state.

‘Global Days of Action’ are regularly organised by the #BBOG to keep alive the memories of the girls and provide a rationale for audience engagement. The argument centres on the fact that the Chibok girls have the right to life ‘simply because they are human beings; not because they are men or women, rich or poor, black or white’ (Ezekwesili 2015). This framing provides a liberal democratic, gendered and race-conscious perspective familiar to Western audiences. Western audiences are interpellated by #BBOG as entities that can make a difference in pressuring the government. For instance, while presenting a keynote address, Ezekwesili informed her Canadian audience that ‘As people of this same planet, this [the Chibok girls issue] is a symbol for us and it is one that we must not be careless with’ (Ezekwesili 2015). This framing legitimises external assistance or intervention by other states, suggesting any intervention was justified given that human lives were at stake.

Girl-child’s right to education framing

The use of the girl-child’s right to education framing draws on lessons from Boko Haram’s massacre of 59 boys at the Federal Government College, Buni Yadi, in 2014. Boko Haram ordered the girls to abandon school and get married (Oriola 2017). The incident revealed Boko Haram’s gender ideology. The incident and the Chibok kidnapping were instructive for #BBOG’s framing. One #BBOG Strategic Team member notes that ‘education just was it; the fact that they did seek education that led to their abduction’ influenced the emphasis on the girl-child’s education.¹¹ Consequently, the #BBOG uses the girl-child’s right to education framing to spotlight (1) the symbolism of the space in which the girls were kidnapped, (2) the significance of the efforts of the girls to become educated, (3) the movement’s counter-narrative to Boko Haram’s perspectives on female education, (4) the subliminal message the kidnapping sends to girls in Northern Nigeria and other developing regions, and (5) the overall implications of the incident for the girl-child’s education.

Educating girls in Northern Nigeria has been particularly challenging. Cultural bias (eg prioritisation of male children), poverty, early marriage (under 16 years in core Northern states) and inadequate access to education, among other factors, have led to low school enrolment (Action Health Incorporated 2011). The #BBOG recognises that the kidnapped girls (aged 14–21 years) represent a small number among many. Therefore, the Chibok kidnapping has the potential to concretise the resolve of parents against sending their female children to school. It also accentuates the risks of going to school in a culture that places low value on female education. One speech act explicates the scope and use of the girl-child’s right to education:

As global citizens we have to realize that if we allow the story of the Chibok girls to end without a concerted determination to solving it, we would lose our credibility in telling the girl-child anywhere in the world that the best thing they can do is to get an education …. (Ezekwesili 2015)

This framing encourages the audience to consider the implications of the kidnapping. It draws attention to the incident as an affront on global efforts to educate girls. This framing aligns with well-established concerns at the United Nations and other organisations (UNICEF 2012). Therefore, it is founded on an on-going global narrative but also resonates in Nigeria given the North–South education gap.

State failure framing

Marenin argues that Nigeria is

characterized … by a ruling class without vision or will and a populace not yet awakened to its power and density. The unwillingness and incapacity of the state to meet the massive expectations placed upon its shoulders have undermined its standing, power, and legitimacy. (Marenin 1988, 222)

This speaks to state failure. Scholars have examined factors such as incapacity to monopolise the means of violence, breakdown of authority, the law and the political order, and endangering the lives of citizens as some of the basic characteristics of a failed state (Helman and Ratner 1992). While the debate over state failure remains unsettled, a shared quality of failed states is that the ‘capacity to execute any form of policy has quite simply evaporated and its place has been taken … by churches and religious solidarities, a burgeoning informal economy, and military organizations and militias’ (Bayart, Ellis and Hibou 1999, 19). The state is reduced to a ‘legal fiction’ (21) because state bureaucracies are rendered ineffective by personalisation of political power and extra-state machineries.

The framing of the grievance of the #BBOG movement began to change to a more critical narrative as the rescue of the girls failed to materialise. Movement activists had envisaged a swift return of the girls.¹² The government set up a fact-finding team on 2 May 2014 (18 days after the kidnapping) to ascertain the number and identity of the girls who were kidnapped, how many had escaped, why their school remained open to boarding students when other schools had been shut and to ‘articulate a framework for a multi-stakeholder action for the rescue of the missing girls’ (Channels Television 2014). This was perceived as a lack of urgency. Activists were frustrated by the lethargic response.

The language of the messaging increasingly emphasised the ineptitude and failure of the Nigerian state. For instance, the #BBOG’s document ‘The ABC of our demands’ highlights 13 critical issues.¹³ Items 2 and 3 on the list of demands are ‘An apology from the government for the failure that led to the abduction’ and ‘An apology for the failure of governance that caused failure to rescue the Chibok girls’. Other demands on the list suggest that the #BBOG was sceptical about state capacity. For example, item 4 is ‘A demand for the government to devise strategies for dealing with the emergence, and growth of various religious sects in Nigeria’, while item 13 notes ‘A demand for the government to put into consideration the adoption of “Community/Proximity Policing”’. One of the movement’s publicity documents notes that the #BBOG ‘recognizes the constitutional responsibility, power, and mandate of government as enshrined in Section 14(2) of the Nigerian Constitution wherein it is stated “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government”’¹⁴ (italics original). Emphasising the government’s responsibility under the constitution provides a discursively powerful way to convey that the government bears primary responsibility for security. Therefore, the Chibok kidnapping was an insignia of state failure. As #BBOG activists strategised on how to secure the rescue of the girls, there was a distinctive belief within the leadership that the ‘Nigerian government seems to respond to the language of international embarrassment’.¹⁵ The state failure narrative gradually became the epicentre of #BBOG framing as it gained traction in national and international media.

There are four key elements in the use of the state failure master frame by the #BBOG. First, it is a strong critique of the government. Second, it is aimed at shaming the government into action; and, third, it is directed at the international community to put pressure on its Nigerian counterpart. Lastly, it is centred on a structured and strategic appeal to the international community. It hinges on the hope that the international community would help with the rescue if the Nigerian government failed. The #BBOG framing gained traction in the media and became transnationalised. It reverberated locally and internationally in contextually specific ways, as analysed below.

Problematising the #BBOG’s framing

As the battleground between movement actors and authorities becomes less physical or less direct (Koopmans 2004), ideational contestation over the meanings of (in)action, events and symbols becomes the epicentre of contentious politics. Koopmans (2004, 367) identifies three ‘discursive opportunities’ that affect what specific iteration of reality is spread and accepted. These are ‘visibility (the extent to which a message is covered by the mass media), resonance (the extent to which others – allies, opponents, authorities, etc.– react to a message), and legitimacy (the degree to which such reactions are supportive)’ (italics added). The #BBOG has enjoyed tremendous visibility in the media despite the widespread misperception that the movement relies mainly on social media platforms to spread its narratives. In reality, the #BBOG adopts a hybridised communication process that seamlessly combines the immediacy and global tendrils of platforms such as Twitter and Facebook with the credibility and ambit of traditional print and electronic media. Global media hegemons such as the CNN, BBC and al-Jazeera routinely cover #BBOG activities by interviewing movement leaders or asking world leaders questions about the cause.

The #BBOG framing has also resonated to the extent that allies, opponents and various audiences have had strong reactions – for better or worse – to it (see Koopmans 2004). However, its resonance is bifurcated. As demonstrated below, #BBOG framing after the initial mobilisation worked positively in the international arena but shut off avenues for collaboration with key local actors who could have been useful to the movement’s goal. This speaks to the dialectic between the local and the international (Bob 2002) and the refraction of the movement’s framing with local political conflicts. The resonance of #BBOG’s transnationalised framing is problematised in the remainder of the paper.

The literature on transnationalising local struggles engages with the networks and resources that local activists utilise (Gilson 2011). Such transnationalisation has at its epicentre ties with NGOs in the US and Western Europe. Tarrow articulates the short-term nature of opportunities for coalition-building, externalisation of claims by local actors and problems such as cultural differences and entrapment in local conflict situations when a transnational movement seeks to become domesticated (Tarrow 2005). He also argues that disputes may arise in terms of the direction of the movement. Tarrow’s work speaks to the growing recognition that transnationalising local struggles produces mixed results at best. For instance, Bob (2002, 397) notes the ‘dialectical relationship’ between transnational opportunities and local mobilisation. Schmitz (2001) finds that the reliance of local activists on transnational networks and support helped with protests against the Arap Moi government in Kenya but left them ill equipped for the challenges of local politics. Similarly, Widener (2007) investigates four oil struggles in Ecuador and finds that the move towards transnationalisation simplified complex issues and pivoted the activists towards the priorities of international partners.

However, despite the spin-off #BBOG protests in major cities such as New York and London, the original #BBOG organisation in Abuja has had few formal institutional arrangements with transnational advocacy networks. The effectiveness of the #BBOG’s internationalised framing is evident in how the #BBOG hashtag went viral. Heads of states, celebrities and other opinion leaders held the #BBOG placard on global television to demonstrate their support for the cause. The #BBOG received multiple offers of financial support from several European and US-based organisations.¹⁶ The movement declined the offers.¹⁷ This decision was predicated on realities in the Nigerian protest environment and the legitimacy problems that might arise. The Strategic Team believed accepting financial support would discredit the movement and taint its leadership.

Consequently, the #BBOG did not become ‘transnationalised’ in the conventional sense, but its framing (specifically, all but the maternalist framing) was internationalised. The #BBOG framing was bifocal in orientation. Maternalist framing was directed locally to Nigerian women (in terms of micro-mobilisation) while the girl-child’s right to education was also well received in Nigeria. However, the human rights and state failure frames were externally oriented. State failure framing in particular antagonised political and military elite in Nigeria. It also inadvertently enmeshed the movement in ethno-religiously charged presidential politics.

The experience of the #BBOG demonstrates how transnationalised frames interact with the contours of historically specific contentious politics. It symbolises, on one hand, the benefits and limits of transnational awareness and, on the other, mobilisation to achieve movement objectives. For instance, state failure framing used by the #BBOG during the Jonathan administration was effective in shaping political discourse prior to the 2015 presidential elections – the need for regime change. President Jonathan acknowledges the role in his electoral loss of a discursive battlefield in which the world’s superpowers ‘made it very clear to me by their actions that they wanted a change of government in Nigeria’ (quoted in The Vanguard2017). The Jonathan government believed the Chibok kidnapping and the #BBOG were used as part of the international politics to ensure regime change in Nigeria (Adeniyi 2017). This orientation influenced the reaction of the Jonathan administration to #BBOG activities and framing from April 2014 to 29 May 2015 when the APC government was installed.

However, despite worldwide concerns over jihadi terrorism, Heads of state who held placards with the #BBOG slogan on global television did little to rescue the girls during the Jonathan administration.¹⁸ Geo-politics appears to have gotten in the way. For instance, news about US deployment of surveillance drones to find the girls emerged on 12 May 2014 (Reuters 2014). The drones were withdrawn before any progress was made. US military officials argued that they were frustrated by the lack of cooperation of their Nigerian counterpart, while the Nigerian military questioned the motive of US military assistance. A Nigerian Army General argues:

the whole world felt that they [the US] had the answer. They gave the impression that within three days they would bring back the girls. After six months there was no clue …. Some of the questions they asked were not related to the issue …. We need weapons, we need intelligence. We open up our needs but how far have they been met with sincerity? We are ready to pay. We are not asking for them to be donated which is what a helper should do. Even when we are ready to procure and you still put stumbling block on our way, how does that translate to assistance?¹⁹

The general stated that the leaders of the US forces came off as ‘spies’. The Nigerian military was also frustrated by the refusal of the US and its allies to sell arms to Nigeria. The US government, in contrast, cited concerns about the Nigerian military’s human rights record. The government lost valuable time between May 2014 and early 2015 while waiting to purchase arms from the US and other Western countries.²⁰ The government decided to use clandestine means to purchase arms in South Africa, as soldiers began to flee from the superior firepower of Boko Haram. The US did not sell arms to Nigeria until August 2015, following a change in the political context – the inauguration of President Buhari.

Movement members were frustrated that the international community’s engagement with their grievance was to ‘condemn’ Boko Haram’s atrocities without any further ‘action’.²¹ By October 2014, the group had begun to feel abandoned. Hadiza Bala Usman stated:

People need to remember that 219 girls remain in captivity …. We appreciate the fact that the media propelled a lot of support around the world, but that support has not translated into any rescue. For us, if whatever is said and done doesn’t translate into the rescue of the girls, it hasn’t really achieved anything. (Ogene 2015)

The movement seemed to have put a lot of stock in the international community – the notion of a rescue organised by concerned Western powers.

However, only the motherist and girl-child’s right to education framing were suited to the conditions of Nigeria’s political environment. Motherist framing was largely abandoned within the first six months of the advocacy, despite its success as a mobilisation tool. The girl-child’s right to education framing continues to be useful in a national discourse on education and gender in Northern Nigeria. The emphasis on state failure framing did not take into consideration the realities of Nigeria. The narrative excessively relied on human rights discourses from the geopolitical West. Such discourses are suited to environments where an effective Weberian ideal-type state exists. As #BBOG framing got closer to the grammar of transnational movements, the movement moved away from local institutional actors. The #BBOG approach spoke above the heads of major players in Nigeria and ultimately prolonged the realisation of the movement’s objective. The real ‘institutional sovereigns’ (Matusiak 2014, 1) in the movement’s social milieu, the Nigerian government and military, were antagonised by the state failure framing and the extremely negative attention it attracted.

This speaks to a lack of strategy about the minutiae of how to secure the girls. Some members of #BBOG wanted a more diplomatic engagement with the government. The military was interested in engaging the #BBOG in 2014. For instance, #BBOG representatives were given a briefing at the defence headquarters regarding efforts of the military to rescue the girls.²² That avenue was closed as #BBOG’s framing gained international momentum. A member of the #BBOG group’s Strategic Team argues:

The language, the approach of engagement would have been different if we had done proper analysis and profiling of our stakeholders right from the beginning. At the time we developed the strategic document, we had gone too far, and the narrative of we being against them had been formed. It was too late to be redeemed. But I wish we did that right from the beginning because … they became defensive and not collaborative.²³

A particularly damaging trend began to emerge in fall 2014: the movement began to be perceived as opponents of the government – a political tool to wrest power from the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) government. For instance, Hadiza Bala Usman was an APC member who had contested a seat in the federal parliament. She was part of the Strategic Team of the APC while serving the #BBOG in a similar capacity. Ezekwesili delivered a keynote speech at an event of the opposition party, although she mainly criticised the political elite. Some regular #BBOG members openly wore APC publicity materials to the daily sit-out prior to the 2015 presidential elections.²⁴

The perception was reinforced in 2014 by a rhetorical slip by Audu Ogbeh, the national chair of the APC, when Muhammadu Buhari formally declared his interest in running for president for the fourth time. Ogbeh stated: ‘We commend the #BringBackOurGirls movement led by members of this party; we thank them for their commitment to Nigeria because they remain the only living evidence that Nigeria has a conscience’ (Isine 2014). Ogbeh apologised for his comments, but the damage was done. Presidential spokesman Doyin Okupe claimed that ‘One of the reasons the Chibok girls were kidnapped was to present Jonathan’s administration as incompetent and hold it to ransom against 2015 elections …. One of the reasons the #BBOG was formed was to sustain and internationalise the embarrassment’ (Godwin 2015).

The #BBOG’s framing raised the world’s consciousness about the Chibok girls. However, that has come at a huge price – turning the girls into prized assets in the hands of Boko Haram. For instance, Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau mockingly told the #BBOG movement in a July 2014 video to ‘bring back our army’ (quoted in Freeman 2014). The video demonstrated that Boko Haram was aware of the efforts of prominent women to secure the girls. Top echelons of the Nigerian military believe the high-profile #BBOG movement made it more difficult to find the girls.²⁵ No Chibok girl was among the 2063 women and children rescued by the Nigerian military, mainly from Sambisa forest, between 19 January 2015 and 28 October 2015 (Oriola 2017). Some of the rescued women claimed that Boko Haram put the Chibok girls under a stricter security regimen (Ross 2015).

Only two of the activists interviewed for this study did not agree that #BBOG activities might have prolonged the girls’ captivity. The question was posed to Obiageli Ezekwesili, the movement’s most prominent leader:²⁶

Interviewer: There is a belief in certain quarters that as crucial as the #BBOG was in raising awareness about the Chibok girls … the #BBOG has inadvertently raised the profile and the value of the Chibok girls … these girls have become prized assets in the hands of Boko Haram. How do you respond to that?

Ezekwesili: I respond to that by saying: What’s the counterfactual? The counterfactual would have been to say don’t say anything about the girls so that they would forever be lost. By saying something about the girls, and enabling a focus on them, you stood a 50–50 chance on their rescue. By being quiet about the girls you simply said they don’t matter. So, which would you have chosen? … In situations like this, the choices are seldom easy …. All the choices are not good. So, it’s the least bad one that you go for.

The #BBOG’s framing was well intentioned and mostly theoretically sound. However, its immanent problematic was five-fold: (1) non-recognition of the refraction of the framing of the movement across local political power conflicts, (2) interpellation of the movement leaders in the hyper-partisan political environment, (3) the presupposition that the Nigerian government could be forced or shamed into taking action on an issue in which it had little interest, (4) the notion that the international community would help to rescue the girls if the Nigerian state was unable or unwilling and (5) not thinking through the step between mobilising opinion and how the girls would be rescued.

The #BBOG experience shows how the effects of internationalised framing are refracted through a range of variables inherent in the local political context. These include closeness of movement mobilisation to a major event (such as elections) in the political calendar, the nature of the cause, primary beneficiaries of movement activities, and social positionality of key movement leaders – political affiliation and ambitions – before and during movement activities. The ‘narrative that a #BringBackOurGirls leader ha[d] been rewarded’ for her efforts emerged when the APC governor of Kaduna state appointed Usman Chief of Staff in June 2015.²⁷ Usman was appointed managing director of the Nigerian Ports Authority in 2016. Several other co-convenors of the #BBOG, such as Maryam Uwais, have also accepted prominent positions in the new APC-led federal government. Opposition party politicians such as Reno Omokri, a former aide to President Jonathan, insist that the #BBOG was used by the APC ‘to undermine the Jonathan administration and rise to power’ (Omokri 2020). Omokri argues that Obi Ezekwesili and other #BBOG co-founders ‘cannot claim altruism’ in the struggle to rescue the Chibok girls. Omokri’s perspective reflects the standpoint of the PDP administration regarding the objectives and motivations of the leaders of the #BBOG movement.

The #BBOG experience suggests movement framing may be viewed through the prism of partisan politics if movement activities occur close to a major election, and when movement leaders are politically ambitious. These factors influence the way a movement and its framing are interpreted and treated by opponents. The #BBOG framing could not overcome three major obstacles: the ethno-religiously tinged partisan politics and power contestation in Nigeria, the salience/absolutism of geopolitical interests and the low priority in the global imaginary of the lives of poor high school girls in the Northeast corridor of Nigeria. Retired US Major General James ‘Spider’ Marks offered a candid perspective on the inadequate international efforts to rescue the Chibok girls during a CNN (2015) interview:

What is happening in Nigeria is barbarous, it is horrible, it is complete madness, yet it’s not a priority. The United States unilaterally could do anything it needs to do to root out Boko Haram …. But it’s not a priority. We’re committed elsewhere in the world. Black West Africa is not a priority.

Outcomes of the #BBOG movement

A #BBOG internal document, ‘The Strategic Angle to #BringBackOurGirls’, engages in, inter alia, ‘scenario building’ for the movement.²⁸ Three scenarios were envisaged. First, ‘success – All our girls are brought back, safe and alive’. Second, ‘Failure – All or some of our girls are not brought back due to failed rescue operation, death, or being killed by the insurgents’. Third, ‘No Closure – The situation drags for months and beyond’. A hybrid of the second and third scenarios applies to the current situation – 106 girls have been released and four have been found, while 113 are still missing.²⁹ However, movement outcomes are far more fluid and complicated. The terms ‘success’ and ‘failure’ are increasingly problematised (Amenta 2006).

Gamson (1990) has argued for analysing movement ‘success’ ‘as a set of outcomes’. His schema on outcomes is dyadic: (1) ‘acceptance of a challenging group by its antagonists’ as a legitimate representative of a particular interest and (2) ‘new advantages’ gained by a group’s constituency during or after a challenge (Gamson 1990, 28–29). Kitschelt (1986) has suggested focussing on procedural impacts, substantive impacts and structural impacts of movements. His approach enhances the analysis of movement outcomes within specific political contexts (Giugni 1998). This approach bridges the superficial distinction between Social Movement Organization (SMO) tactical characteristics such as framing and the influence of the political context.

The media attention given to the #BBOG movement in the first six months (April to October 2014) has largely evaporated, and membership – denoted by attendance at the daily sit-out – has plummeted. World leaders and celebrities have moved on to other priorities. The notion that protests and the overall approach of the movement cannot bring back the girls but merely antagonise the government has gained traction among the constituency of the #BBOG. Several parents of the Chibok girls have adopted a strategy of distancing themselves from the #BBOG in order not to antagonise the government. For example, parents of the Chibok girls boycotted a #BBOG march in August 2016. The women’s leader of the Chibok parents’ association, Yana Galang, provides the rationale behind avoiding the #BBOG:

We do not want to do anything that the government will not be happy about …. We are not after any organization that is against any party or religion, and we are supporting the federal government to help us release our girls. (quoted in The Vanguard2016)

However, die-hard #BBOG activists remain committed. The #BBOG movement is synonymous with agitations for the rescue of the Chibok girls. The recognition cuts across the Nigerian government, multilateral organisations and the international community. The #BBOG’s procedural impact or acceptance is evident in the regular visits at its daily sit-out in Abuja by representatives of various organisations and governments. In January 2017, three #BBOG leaders, on the invitation of the government, went on a tour of Sambisa forest, where the girls were believed to be held (Onyeji 2017). The tour shows a significant degree of acceptance of the #BBOG as a legitimate actor in the Chibok issue, although the government continues to have a frosty relationship with the movement. This supports evidence that privileges new advantages over acceptance (Amenta, Carruthers and Zylan 1992).

The #BBOG movement has had numerous impacts. The negotiated release of 106 girls is arguably a substantive impact of the relentless efforts of the movement. Although legitimate questions may be raised over whether the movement has inadvertently prolonged the captivity of the Chibok girls, it is not inconceivable that the society would have moved on without #BBOG intervention. Other substantive impacts are reflected in the reinvigorated attention on the education of the girl-child in northern Nigeria. Resources are now being channelled towards rebuilding schools in the Northeast, partly because of #BBOG advocacy.

Although the government has refused to acknowledge its indebtedness to the #BBOG, the blueprint for psychotherapy, and other (educational) activities for the rehabilitation of the freed girls, was articulated by the movement long before the girls were released. The government’s uncharacteristic devotion to the rehabilitation of the Chibok girls has led to concerns about the neglect of the ‘other victims’ of Boko Haram (Baker 2017). These ‘new advantages’ are direct effects of #BBOG advocacy.

There are other indirect impacts of the #BBOG movement. These include support for internally displaced persons in the Northeast region. Some members of the movement have set up NGOs, such as ‘Adopt-a-camp’ and ‘Girl-child Africa’ which assist those displaced by Boko Haram. Although the #BBOG has decided not to transmute into an NGO, the newly formed organisations indicate that the #BBOG has nurtured the humanitarian drive of several members.

At a structural level, the #BBOG has advanced the frontiers of non-violent protest in Nigeria through a lawsuit filed in Abuja in 2014. The #BBOG’s victory in the case made the police ‘backtrack’ over cancellation of peaceful protests in Abuja and issue a statement in September 2016 that they were ‘committed to the principles of democratic policing and adherence to international best practices in public order management’ (Okakwu 2016). The #BBOG movement contributed to a major political change – the first electoral defeat of an incumbent president in Nigeria’s history. How the Chibok girls’ case was handled galvanised international support for political change (The Vanguard2017; Adeniyi 2017).

Framing and political context are mutually reinforcing and co-referential. Activists adopt specific kinds of framing based on their assessment of the political context. The framing adopted, alongside other variables (movement leadership and international opportunities, for example), in turn influences the political context. This dialogic process has an impact on movement outcomes and necessitates attention to framing. The #BBOG framing and attendant consequences provide lessons for movement actors around the world, particularly those in developing societies. These include working conscientiously with local actors to achieve movement objectives. Movements also need to recognise the constraints of their political context and avoid framing that may be deemed oppositional; strategise on and publicise what ‘international support’ means for movement objectives and ensure movement framing does not become entangled in partisan politics.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

Funding

The support from Killam Trusts through a Killam Cornerstone Grant and from the University of Alberta’s General Research Fund is gratefully acknowledged. The research was also supported by two Carnegie African Diaspora Fellowships [CADF] (University of Port Harcourt, 2015 and University of Ibadan, 2017) administered by the Institute of International Education (IIE), Washington DC.

Notes on contributors

Temitope B. Oriola

Temitope B. Oriola is joint Editor-in-Chief of the journal African Security and an Associate Professor at the University of Alberta, Canada. A recipient of the Governor General of Canada Academic Gold Medal (first awarded in 1873), Oriola’s book Criminal Resistance? The Politics of Kidnapping Oil Workers is one of a small number of book-length sociological investigations of political kidnapping in the English language. Oriola is president of the Canadian Association of African Studies (CAAS).

Notes

1 The daughter of a revered Nigerian historian, Bala Usman.

2 Interviewee 30: female member of the #BringBackOurGirls Strategic Team, personal interview, Abuja, July 2015.

3 Multiple interviewees.

4 Interviewee 33: male #BBOG SCT member, personal interview, Abuja, July 2017.

5 Interviewee 33.

6 Interviewee 30. This view is widely shared by participants.

7 Interviewee 12.

8 Interviewee 01: male #BBOG member and leader within KADA, personal interview, Abuja, 2015.

9 #BBOG publicity material # 1.

10 #BBOG publicity material # 1.

11 Interviewee 30.

12 Interviews 06, 07, 08, 09, 10, among others. Activists had assumed the movement would exist for only a few days or a few weeks.

13 See “The ABC of our demands,” available at http://www.bringbackourgirls.ng/downloads/ (accessed 16 March 2016).

14 Ibid.

15 Interviewee 30: female member of the #BBOG Strategic Team, personal interview, Abuja.

16 Interviewees 12, 30, and many others.

17 Interviewees 12, 30, and many others.

18 Interviewee 04: Army General; personal interview, Defence Headquarters, Abuja 2015.

19 Interviewee 04: Defence Headquarters, Abuja, July 2015.

20 Interviewee 04, July.

21 Interviewee 01.

22 Interviewee 04, July.

23 Interviewee 30. There were also members who felt that #BBOG was too soft and needed to be tougher in its approach.

24 Interviewee 30.

25 Interviewee 04, July.

26 Interviewee 32, personal interview, Abuja, May 2016.

27 Interviewee 30. Usman had previously worked with the Governor of Kaduna.

28 #BBOG internal document # 2.

29 See http://www.bringbackourgirls.ng/