The UAE’s foreign policymaking in Yemen: from bandwagoning to buck-passing

Abstract

The military intervention in Yemen is analysed in this paper within a context dominated by the United Arab Emirates (UAE). There are several scholarly works regarding the Emirates’ involvement in Yemen, but there are only a few about the recent series of transformations that the policymaking has undergone. This research aims to fill this gap by arguing that the prioritisation of national interest has transformed the Emirati policy regarding Yemen from ‘bandwagoning’ to ‘buck-passing’. The main objective in this paper is to scrutinise the UAE’s motivations in engaging in a buck-passing strategy towards Qatar and Saudi Arabia. From this point of view, any proper examination of the UAE’s drivers in policy change must begin by investigating the relationship between internal and external motivations. The assessment combines levels of systemic and individual dimensions in order to examine two main motivations as to why the buck-passing is articulated to bandwagoning. A structural complexity is embedded in the UAE’s strategies. Prioritisation of economic gains over military interests and the consolidation of internal power are two reasons for such policy transformation.

Keywords:

• United Arab Emirates
• Arab Gulf States
• Horn of Africa
• foreign policy
• realism
• Yemen

Introduction

Almost five years after the war began, the fight to control Yemen remains in a stalemate. The Yemeni Civil War is a repercussion of the Arab Spring and, moreover, a triggering element for substantial disagreements and conflicts among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. The United Arab Emirates (which will be referred to herein as the UAE or the Emirates) is a rising small power in the Gulf due to its economic, political and military role in a multipolar power structure under the competing interests of Iran and Saudi Arabia. In other words, Gulf politics is imbued with the Saudi hegemony over the GCC states, and, thus, the potential hegemonic influence of Iran in the wider Gulf cannot be ignored. Setting off the UAE’s involvement with a Saudi-led military intervention, Operation Decisive Storm (OPD) – and later Operation Restoring Hope – which was carried out in March 2015, the Yemeni civil war has become an important factor indicating a change in the UAE’s foreign policy. This change is an overall process of sustaining a multi-dimensional and hyperactive foreign policy that exemplifies offensive tendencies, when it is possible for the national interest. With a realist approach, this study argues that the prioritisation of national interest has transformed the Emirati policy on Yemen from ‘bandwagoning’ to ‘buck-passing’. However, the change in policymaking does not refer to a total elimination of bandwagoning; rather, the current version is a fallacious articulation of buck-passing to bandwagoning with regards to Saudi Arabia. This revised strategy of the UAE also overlaps with the fact that the objectives of the UAE and Saudi Arabia in Yemen, especially in the South, have been dissociated.

This article primarily scrutinises political means of buck-passing, referring to the cost of failure and the cost of dealing with Iran in Yemen, although in realism buck-passing implies passing on the economic burden of handling an aggressor to another state. Thus, to study a combination of economic and political dimensions and the relationship between domestic and international politics, two levels of analysis – system and individual – are undertaken in this paper, based on the theoretical structure of realism. It is important to note that this paper does not evaluate GCC policymaking towards Yemen; rather, its scope is limited specifically to the UAE’s policymaking. The absence of common policy among GCC countries is the main reason for this decision, given the fact that Oman is not a member of the coalition, and Qatar has been isolated following the blockade.

The discussion is divided into three main parts, which explore the transformation of the UAE’s policies in Yemen from bandwagoning to buck-passing. The first discussion summarises the UAE’s bandwagoning behaviour in foreign policymaking and renders a theoretical framework for applying the realist approach to this case study. The second part aims to illustrate how the buck-passing has been articulated to the bandwagoning by critically engaging with two practices of buck-passing on Qatar and the Saudi-led coalition. The mobilisation of the Emirati military resources in Yemen is also briefly addressed in this section in order to link it with the UAE’s economic policies. The third discussion scrutinises why the buck-passing is articulated, through prioritising economic interests over military and the consolidation of internal power, highlighting the structural complexity of the UAE’s strategies embedded in the structural complexity. At this point the paper aims to present a short outlook on the parallel story of the Horn of Africa in order to compare it with Yemen. It is concluded that the UAE has converted its multi-dimensional foreign policy strategies from bandwagoning to buck-passing towards Yemen since the eruption of the Arab Spring through prioritising economic interests over military and internal power.

Bandwagoning

Bandwagoning is a pragmatic alignment with the leading hegemon of the region – in other words, the source of danger.¹ This is where small states, which are more vulnerable to political dilemmas and/or political pressure, choose to create alliances with powerful states to reduce the possibility of attacks.² To put it simply, bandwagoning refers to following foreign policy choices of the powerful opponent to avoid political or military clashes regarding regional affairs.

As a small state with vulnerable security conjectures, the UAE’s initial years of foreign policy construction provide an example of a controlled system of alliances to improve its power. These years of foreign policymaking, under the leadership of Sheikh Zayed, were defined by friendship and partnership with the UAE’s neighbours and brothers of the Islamic world, in addition to Arab-centred policymaking. Along with this, the UAE’s foreign policy started moving towards a proactive stance of close security relations with the USA, particularly through partnerships in the international interventions in Bosnia and Afghanistan.³ Bandwagoning with the US during these interventions helped the UAE’s forces to engage with international military operations and gradually, step by step, improve their military power on the global stage. What is more, Sheikh Zayed engaged in multi-layered diplomacy with both Arab countries and Western powers to put the UAE on the global map in a visible and influential position.⁴ This was made possible through the ‘no offensive foreign policy’ initiative, which was launched during his rule. He only presented defensive strategies in relation to the territorial conflict with Iran and a potential occupation threat from Saddam’s Iraq.⁵ Although bandwagoning is not an offensive strategy, for a small state, it provides a space to manoeuvre without being threatened by an opponent state, along with the opportunity to strengthen its ties and roles before moving to such a level that it may openly declare its disagreements with a powerful neighbour state. Under the rule of Sheikh Zayed, bandwagoning has thus been a rational strategic choice for the UAE considering the geographical proximity of Saudi Arabia, which is the regional dominant power, and its ties with the external security provider, the USA.⁶

Foreign policy choices of the UAE did not change after the succession of Sheikh Khalifa; however, the Arab Spring had a significant impact on the country’s foreign relations, heralding a new era of multi-dimensional foreign policy.⁷ Conducting a multi-dimensional or, to use another word, hyperactive foreign policy refers to operating diplomacy at different and interconnected levels along with ‘employing a soft-power and diplomatic influence-based discourse and practice’.⁸ The UAE’s foreign policy behaviour towards the Yemeni Civil War follows the same path as its overall strategy: bandwagon towards Saudi Arabia and the USA until the ties are strong enough to go beyond it. The hyperactive foreign policy is thus supported by the buck-passing strategy, where possible. Even so, the current version of the foreign policymaking in Yemen, whether it fits with the national interests of the UAE or not, is an intensive articulation of buck-passing to bandwagoning instead of a total elimination of bandwagoning towards Saudi Arabia. The next section analyses two practices of buck-passing in Yemen to understand structural complexities embedded in UAE’s policymaking.

Buck-passing

This paper approaches Emirati policymaking in Yemen from a power politics perspective. Foreign policy behaviour of the Emirates observed in Yemen has transformed into a complex version in which buck-passing is articulated through bandwagoning, which includes economic and domestic elements. Realism not only provides the assessment of policy preferences under the realistic framework of buck-passing, but also the opportunity to articulate domestic calculations with the foreign policymaking. It also underlines the importance of economic wealth in the pursuit of power, which is a vital element in the UAE’s role in Yemen. In this case, a realist approach provides an appropriate perspective to explore the multipolar pursuit of hegemony in Yemen.

Buck-passing is a strategy of pursuing power in which ‘the endangered great power tries to get another state to shoulder the burden of deterring or defeating the threatening state’.⁹ Thus, ‘buck-passing is principally a deterrence strategy, with war-fighting as the default option’.¹⁰ When the UAE’s offensive steps are only taken as aggression in a foreign land or military intervention, it is not rational to apply a buck-passing strategy. However, the way that UAE policymakers achieve their goals in Yemen is beyond a solely military role through merchandising war conditions, which strengthens the UAE’s economic role rather than fulfilling their task in a military coalition.¹¹

Buck-passing is a cheaper method for assuring states’ security because they can gain more power by accommodating other states.¹² However, it should be clarified that this paper does not aim to assess the buck-passing strategy in terms of the financial cost of the war in Yemen. In contrast to leaving the financial cost to Saudi Arabia, the UAE’s choice to pass the buck was more closely related to political cost in terms of taking responsibility for the military intervention and its aftermath.

There are several types of buck-passing. When a state initiates a piecemeal expansion (such as the UAE in South Yemen and East Africa, regarding both economic goals through the purchase of ports, and opening military bases),¹³ this is called predatory buck-passing, applied in an offensive way through taking risks.¹⁴ This article conceptualises the UAE’s buck-passing combined with pragmatism, risk-taking and profit maximisation in two practices, which are scrutinised in the next section. Buck-passing is a part of offensive realist structure and a hidden strategy in the national interests of the UAE. However, in the realist paradigm, buck-passing is an option for great powers. Thus, applying this theoretical framework to a small power requires further explanation before defining the methods and motivations of the UAE.

Buck-passing of a small state

The first important point for defining Emirati policymaking as buck-passing is the use of a great power strategy by a small power. The UAE does not aim to hold great power in the Middle East, but to pursue power under the hegemony of Saudi Arabia. Specifically, the current issues in the Middle East, and particularly in the Gulf, are not a ‘tragedy of great powers’, but a ‘tragedy of the Gulf powers’. Since buck-passing is a method of obtaining a position of dominant power over a case, whether the states are great or not, the influence matters.¹⁵

Secondly, although Mearsheimer’s work focuses primarily on buck-passing, the literature provides diverse opinions regarding whether a small power can pass the buck or not. Rather than being prompted by a direct military threat from Yemen, the UAE’s expansionism is an external result of the combination of internal power consolidation and economic goals in the region. Morgenthau states that the motivation of a state in foreign policy strategies is dominance, which is, according to Mearsheimer, security.¹⁶ There are other voices in realism calling for studies regarding the impact of domestic dimensions and profit over foreign policy. In terms of profit maximisation, although the UAE is not geographically vulnerable, as in the case of Yemen, it is heavily involved in the intervention and passes the buck politically when needed. Within this context, Snyder provides the criticism that offensive realism over-emphasises the role of power and security maximisation in motivating the state’s behaviour.¹⁷ Especially in the case of Gulf states, domestic policies have significant importance and can prompt risk-taking in foreign policy. In contrast to Mearsheimer’s solely foreign policy-oriented threat perception, the defensive realist literature assigns importance to domestic politics and profit maximisation.¹⁸ Hence, this paper combines the assumptions of traditional and structural realism with regard to buck-passing. As Christensen and Snyder aptly point out, ‘the less the vulnerability of states, the greater is the tendency to pass the buck’¹⁹. Thus, the purpose of the intervention is not to eliminate a threat to the UAE and to obtain political hegemony in Yemen, but to provide a balance of power in which the UAE will be satisfied with its economic gains and the dominant hegemonic power of the region – Saudi Arabia – will be the leading political figure.

The third point regarding the buck-passing of a small state comes from Waltz’s clarification of the state’s other profit-oriented initiatives when sufficient security is assured.²⁰ The UAE is not under a direct threat from the civil war in Yemen; hence, its intervention is not derived from the need for military survival but rather from the quest to obtain more economic gain in this chaotic environment around a strategically crucial region. Waltz states that ‘superpowers also do not pass the buck, since smaller allies cannot possibly confront the opposing superpower alone’.²¹ Therefore, it can be argued that there is a disagreement in the literature regarding the buck-passing of a great power.

Two practices of buck-passing

This section addresses two overlapping practices of buck-passing by drawing from Mearsheimer’s motivations and options for a buck-passer. The UAE’s buck-passing in Yemen can be conceptualised as a grey zone between self-extensionist bandwagoning ‘jackals’ with limited aims, and risk-acceptant aggressor ‘wolves’ with unlimited aims.²² According to Schweller, ‘the jackal is a scavenger and not a true predator, this type of bandwagoning is a form of predatory buck-passing: the jackal seeks to ride free on the offensive efforts of others’,²³ and ‘will pay high costs to defend their possessions but even greater costs to extend their values’.²⁴ Thus, predatory buck-passing is defined as ‘attempts to ride free on the offensive efforts of others’.²⁵ The UAE method of buck-passing is not through economic but political free riding. Put differently, the UAE is not looking to become a status quo power in Yemen, nor is it trying to be a hegemon of the Gulf as an alternative to the Saudi policymaking process. In contrast, the UAE policies are oriented to achieve a balance of power in Yemen at a unit level through articulating buck-passing to its traditional bandwagoning. Hence, it plays an active diplomatic game among the actors (the secessionist Southern movement, the Houthis), the business networks (DP World or other Emirati business elites) and the states (the US for its anti-terrorism projection in Yemen, China regarding its business relations in South Yemen, Iran and Saudi Arabia), in addition to its militarised position. Passing the buck of the political cost of the operation to Qatar and Saudi Arabia enables the UAE to focus more on its economic interests in Yemen rather than carrying the burden of all political calculations among internal and external powers.

Buck-passing the cost of failure

The first practice of buck-passing has been applied since the blockade where Qatar has been blamed for the failure of the intervention in Yemen. Although the intervention has not yet ended, it was able to fulfil its primary goal of providing peace in Yemen. There is discontentment at the regional and global levels regarding the deteriorating conditions in war-ravaged Yemen. This study argues that declaring Qatar as a scapegoat for the unsuccessful military attempt in Yemen is buck-passing the burden of political cost to the Qatari state. The Emirati policymakers argue that Qatar shared intelligence with third parties and prevented a successful operation in Yemen.²⁶

Although buck-passing is primarily of a defensive nature, it can also have an offensive dimension, which can make it even more attractive as a strategy. ‘Specifically, if the aggressor and the buck-catcher become involved in a long and costly war, the balance of power is likely to shift in the buck-passer’s favour: it would then be in a good position to dominate the post-war world’.²⁷ This quotation from Mearsheimer clearly defines the Emirati policymaking, in which Yemen has become a war zone where everyone loses except the main aggressor, in this case Saudi Arabia or the Houthis (connecting them to Iran) depending on which perspective is taken as self-defence. Although the UAE has enormous military power in Yemen, the expenditure and role of the Saudi army should not be underestimated.²⁸ The war in Yemen is damaging for Saudi Arabia, not only in economic terms but also in carrying the responsibility for initiating war in a Muslim country, causing millions of people to suffer.²⁹

This offensive dimension is also visible in the Qatari–Emirati tension in Yemen. Starting with the blockade, UAE officials – and several Yemeni commentators – had begun accusing Qatar of failure in the military intervention.³⁰ Omar Saif Ghobash, who was the UAE’s ambassador to Russia during that period, made a statement to the BBC alleging that Qatar had shared intelligence with Al-Qaida in Yemen. As a result, the coalition forces were not able to conduct operations as they had planned.³¹ These accusations did not go beyond personal comments as sufficient evidence has not been presented.³² Qatar has denied all allegations of cooperation with terrorist groups, and Defense Minister Khalid bin Mohamed Al-Attiyah emphasised the limited role of Qatar in Yemen as only border security with no involvement in the military intervention.³³ However, the UAE has maintained its allegations against Qatar and used them as justification for the unsuccessful military intervention. Although statements by Al-Attiyah and the Military Balance data define Qatar’s role in Yemen as limited, Blumi provides an alternative approach by referring to the Qatari state’s position in the pre-war conflict-resolution process as investing heavily in financial projects.³⁴ Despite the disagreements regarding the roles of the parties in Yemeni civil war, it is valid to state that these allegations help the UAE legitimise and increase its military presence and role in Yemen.

The cost of dealing with Iran

The second practice of buck-passing has been applied since the beginning of the OPD. It entails cooperating with various states in the Middle East to eliminate the Iranian threat in Yemen under the coalition forces.³⁵ In other words, the UAE has concerns in regard to Yemen and applies policies to address the Iranian threat and internal insecurities. However, this is not a national initiative; rather, it is under the umbrella of coalition forces dominated by Saudi Arabia. When considering the geographical proximity of Yemen, the perceived threat from this civil war to the UAE cannot be as high as it is for the KSA, which is a neighbouring country. Yemen is not a direct threat to the UAE’s border security; however, its geostrategic position and the UAE’s investments in the South relate the political stability of Yemen to the UAE’s national interests. Hence, the UAE passes the buck to the other coalition states, primarily Saudi Arabia and Qatar, without risking its convenient relations with Iran and focussing on its economic objectives.

Mearsheimer clarifies further motivations behind this foreign policy behaviour.³⁶ One of the motivations for buck-passing as presented by Mearsheimer is a reduction in the number of threats: ‘passing the buck is also an attractive option when a state faces more than one dangerous rival but does not have the military might to confront them all at once’.³⁷ The UAE is passing the buck to eliminate the Iranian threat and to limit the power of any other Gulf states in Yemen, as has been clear in the Emirati-led anti-Qatar blockade, where Qatar was accused of cooperating with Iran and terrorist groups.³⁸ In the multipolar world of the Gulf, Emirati policymaking is based on the idea of eliminating any possible rival and accommodating the buck-passing. However, the question mark continues over Iran–UAE relations, and the perceived threat from Iran in the context of the UAE policymaking. This is a controversial and complex statement because, when considering the Emirati foreign policy towards Iran, one might argue that the country is not a threat to the UAE, but rather an excuse to be in Yemen.

Mearsheimer proposes that conducting viable diplomatic relations with the aggressor is another motivation which helps clarify the UAE’s buck-passing strategy regarding Iran. For a long time the alliance between Iran and the UAE has been balanced and supported by economic relations. The Emirates’ non-oil trade with Iran reached US$16 billion by March 2018, a 21% increase compared to 2017.³⁹ Thus, the UAE has good economic relations with Iran when compared to the Iranian trade with Qatar which was worth US$250 million by March 2018, up 2.5% from the previous year.⁴⁰ However, there is a certain amount of mistrust and threat perception in the UAE regarding the historical tension with Iran, such as territorial issues, and the number and status of Iranian residents in the UAE; thus, viable diplomatic relations are required on both sides.⁴¹

Keeping relations moderate with the intended buck-catcher and allowing the buck-catcher to gain limited power, so that they are sufficiently powerful to fight the aggressor, are other options for a buck-passer that fit with the UAE’s strategies in Yemen. Whether Iran is a genuine threat to the UAE is still valid under these conditions. Nevertheless, these options intersect in the UAE’s case, for two reasons. First, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have been identified as the main buck-catchers. In this context, Qatar was intended to shoulder the burden for the military intervention failure in front of the international community, along with the consequences for its relations with Iran. The UAE prompted Qatar to join the Saudi-led military intervention; however, Qatar’s role was quite limited and did not include close combat.⁴² As stated by Qatar’s Defense Minister, Qatar was involved with diplomacy-oriented solutions and methods, as has been visible in the mediation budget since 2007.⁴³ Within this framework, buck-passing towards Qatar has been evident since the blockade, as discussed above, with the country being used as a scapegoat for the intervention.⁴⁴ The second reason is that Saudi Arabia has been actively involved in the military intervention in Yemen by leading the intrusion so that it is sufficiently powerful to fight the aggressors.⁴⁵ Thus, the Emirates’ policies in Yemen constitute a process that has changed over time and also in its methods during the civil war. By mid-2018, the UAE had from the war zone and power vacuum in Yemen by consolidating its national interest, while engaging in combat in cooperation with Saudi forces.⁴⁶ However, the UAE’s policy preferences have changed since the beginning of the intervention, and evolved into an economically driven secessionist model openly supporting the Southern Movement.⁴⁷

A structural complexity embedded in the UAE’s motivations

There are two ways to define the structure of the Gulf politics by considering it in an extended form, which includes Iran, Iraq, Yemen and the GCC states. The first views Saudi Arabia and Iran as competing regional powers in a bipolar regional order. The second includes rising (UAE–Qatar) and traditional (Kuwait–Oman) powers in the GCC’s small and middle states, and defines the region as a structured multipolarity under the dominance of Iran and Saudi Arabia.⁴⁸ The case of Yemen resembles the inherent structural complexity of the Gulf regarding the conceptualising of the state’s role, size and power within it. In addition, rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, competition among rising powers, and the role of the US all increase the structural complexity.⁴⁹ Being a multipolar system with two potential hegemonic powers (Iran and Saudi Arabia) and rising small and medium powers, results in regional complexity. The system structure is not bipolar, even though the two powers are competing and have diverse political influence. However, this does not mean one can ignore the impact of global powers and rising powers in Gulf politics.

The UAE is a revisionist rising power which does not specify its aims. However, the state’s policy choices seemingly do not aim at security maximisation; instead, they tend to accept the risk of aggressive actions in Yemen. In this regard, the next part discusses the UAE’s two aims derived from its policymaking towards Yemen: (1) economic gains as a result of its dominance in Yemen; (2) domestic political consolidation through representing an active image to its citizens and passing the ‘buck’, in this case the political cost of any failure, to Saudi Arabia. However, the UAE’s mobilisation of military sources in Yemen requires attention, before scrutinising the two primary goals of buck-passing.

Mobilising sources: military involvement

Based on a system-level of analysis, the primary principle of the UAE in Yemen is the enhancement of the country’s international profile with indication of its military development by taking on the second largest role in the military intervention and building military bases around Yemen and the Horn of Africa. The Saudis have accused Iran of military involvement in Yemen and isolated Qatar for their regional policies – the ones that clash with the Saudis – and the Kingdom embeds pursuit of its national interest in the military intervention.⁵⁰ The Emiratis also, as discussed above, have incorporated their national and regional interests into post-Arab Spring policymaking, accusing Qatar of ‘misleading’ policies in Yemen.⁵¹ However, in Yemen, the Emirati policymaking has now moved significantly away from its starting point, which was initially a military intervention intended to help legitimise the government of Yemen in moving to colonise Yemeni territory for the consolidation of the UAE’s economic power.⁵² In particular, the UAE’s support of the secessionist movement in Aden and deployment of troops in Socotra Island,⁵³ and the opening of a military base in the Horn of Africa, caused disagreement with the Saudis, although the existence of any contradictory policies among them was denied.⁵⁴

As Mearsheimer posits, the mobilisation of their own resources for buck-passing to work is an option of a buck-passer. This is why buck-passers usually increase their defence spending.⁵⁵ In the World Bank database, there is no information available for the UAE’s military expenditure (as a percentage of central government expenditure) and the military expenditure (current local currency unit (LCU)), and military expenditure (% of gross domestic product (GDP)) are only available up to 2014. The UAE’s military spending as a percentage of GDP changed slightly, decreasing to 5.6% in 2014 from 6.04% in 2013.⁵⁶ According to data in the Military Balance yearbook of 2013, 2014 and 2015, the UAE’s defence budget has increased slightly: it was recorded as US$9.2 billion in 2012, US$13.9 billion in 2013, and US$14.4 billion in 2014.⁵⁷ Also, the UAE’s estimated defence expenditure in 2015 increased to 7.4% from 7.1% in 2014.⁵⁸ Neither the percentage of military spending in government expenditure nor per capita military spending has been shared with the public after 2014.⁵⁹ However, Bachman’s study illustrates the UAE’s and Saudi Arabia’s share in the US arms trade for 2016 and 2017. It states that for 2016, both UAE ($5.3 billion) and Saudi Arabia ($5 billion) were behind Qatar ($22.2 billion) and Kuwait (over $12.4 billion) in the list of countries exporting American arms to the Middle East, whereas, in 2017, the Kingdom was at the top of the list with a bill worth $17.8 billion, and the UAE was ninth with $2.8 billion on notifications of weapons sales.⁶⁰ In addition to notifications of US arms sales, the opening of military bases in Yemen and Africa – as emphasised by the Military Balance 2018 – with a ‘growing willingness to take part in operations’ is a clear indication of an increase in military spending, beside the militarisation of policymaking.⁶¹

When the Security Belt Forces (the SBF) under the secessionist Southern Transitional Council took control of Aden in early August 2019, a direct fight occurred between Hadi’s government and the SBF. The government forces were close to controlling Aden; however, the UAE’s airstrike on Hadi’s forces had led the secessionist to achieve total control of Aden. The UAE officials stated that the air strikes were self-defence against armed groups affiliated with terrorist organisations; to protect Saudi forces, the Emirati air forces were on stage.⁶² The deployment of the UAE’s air force indicates not only its rising military power but also the complexity of the case, for two reasons. First, it is a clear sign of simmering divisions between the Saudis supporting the Hadi government and the UAE – supporting the secessionist. Previously, the UAE has trained 90,000 military personnel in south Yemen to overcome the Houthi threat and take back Aden from the Houthis in 2015.⁶³ However, neither the UAE nor the Saudis accepted this disagreement in Yemen, and clashed over interests. Even in September 2019, they released a joint statement to indicate their unified front on Yemen, calling for a constructive dialogue among the parties. Second, the UAE had already announced its withdrawal from Yemen in July 2019; however, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash stated that this is not a total decline of its military role, that the Emirati army operates differently, and that its military presence will remain to assist local Yemeni forces.⁶⁴ The more simmering among the allies of the coalition becoming clear, the more the complexity of their military role and objectives become blurred.⁶⁵ The next section explores two main interests embedded in this military enhancement of the UAE.

Economic interests over military ones

The United Arab Emirates, as a relatively small oil-reliant monarchy in the Gulf, has been visible in international politics with a rising economic and political role since the Arab Spring. The UAE produces 4.07 million barrels of oil per day,⁶⁶ and its GDP per capita was US$37,622 in 2016.⁶⁷ The economic positioning of the UAE has prompted the country to improve its political engagement; hence, in the early years of the Emirates, foreign policy principles were centralist, defensive and diplomacy oriented under the leadership of Sheikh Zayed.⁶⁸ Since the civil war of 1994, Yemeni–Emirati economic relations have been growing not only with Yemenis working in the UAE but also with the Emirati business elites investing in Yemen. Blumi defines the UAE as a latecomer – compared to Saudi Arabia and Qatar – in economic rivalry over Yemeni sources, especially in lucrative sectors, referring to education, tourism, construction and property development.⁶⁹

However, prior to political changes in 2011, the Emirati state has started having consortiums in various sectors, especially in Southern Yemen, including construction (the Yemeni Group and the Sahara Group), mining gold (Thani Dubai Mining worth US$3 billion) and – of course – the Port of Aden project.⁷⁰ In this context, DP World, the Emirati logistics company, is one of the biggest global companies, operating in various locations with an annual revenue of US$5.6 billion.⁷¹ DP World has port development projects in the Horn of Africa, in Doraleh, Port of Berbera and Port of Bossaso, which is an element connecting the UAE’s military presence in Yemen and Africa to its economic interests.⁷² The clash over Emirati economic interests in Southern Yemen starts with change in the ruling method, when the Hadi government did not accept agreements conducted under the Saleh regime by revising the ‘granted concession’. It is quite obvious, as Blumi aptly points outs, that DP World’s plan in managing the Port of Aden is like a counter-economic initiative for The Bin Laden Bridge, which is a Saudi project to enhance economic cooperation between Yemen and Africa through constructing ‘a massive bridge connecting Djibouti to Yemen complete with a shiny new city on each side’.⁷³ The land allocated to the Port of Aden project is one third of the total land in the city and includes seaside territories that may be devoted to The Bin Laden Bridge. Hence, the UAE’s giant investments in Aden Port for a 30-year management deal have been in a stalemate depending on who is ruling Southern Yemen.⁷⁴

The economic interests in Yemen are fundamental for the UAE and for a buck-passer, as the gain from the political decision is crucial; however, this does not trivialise the importance of the UAE’s military role, including its presence in the Horn of Africa. Realism admits that the economic wealth of a country is determinative of its military power if the country aims to use its financial power for armament or defence. Being a big economy does not necessarily mean that the country has great military powers – here Mearsheimer gives the example of Japan – however, economic power is an embedded element of possessing military power in the long run.⁷⁵ The prioritisation of economic interests over military ones comes together with the military power of the UAE in the long run, and thus it does not trivialise the mobilisation of defensive or offensive sources. Rather, as realism aptly posits, profit maximisation does not enhance one dimension of the national interest; instead, it provides a comprehensive benefit to the state’s overall power.⁷⁶

The Horn of Africa: a parallel story to Yemen?

The UAE’s military and economic engagement in Yemen has had an undeniable impact on Africa. The Emirati’s political interests have been moved to Africa with the use of their engagement in Yemen, and two military bases have been opened in Eritrea and Somaliland.⁷⁷ The Assab military base operated in Eritrea provides excellent access for the Emirati forces to Huthi-controlled coastline, rather than using the navy home base of Jizan in the north of Saudi Arabia. Perim Island and Somaliland also improve manoeuvrability and support the Emirati army in logistic terms. Geographic opportunities offered to the states in the Horn of Africa have definitely underlined the strategic value of the continent since the start of the Yemen war. Beside this, a good number of Yemenis have been moving to Africa as refugees in search of a safe area to live. Although there are no exact numbers, Djibouti, for instance, was home to 40,000 Yemenis by November 2017.⁷⁸ Thus, the Emirati’s economic plans, including management of all these strategically vital ports and terminals in both Yemen and the Horn of Africa, explain its heavy military presence in the region and buck-passing the political burden of the Yemen war to Saudi Arabia. Blumi considers the role of political economic dynamics in Yemen to be the real clash, which is far from a so-called Iranian influence.⁷⁹ This article argues that the heavy military role of the Emirates in Yemen and in the Horn of Africa is the instrumentalisation of military power and presence to assure its economic share in strategic sources and to consolidate its power internally. The country reads its further military presence in the Horn of Africa (Somaliland, Puntland and Eritrea) and Yemeni Islands (Socotra and Perim) from this perspective of economic pragmatism rather than ruling these territories as a political power. Therefore, although the centre of this research is not the Horn of Africa, the struggle over economic gain in Yemen and the effort to raise the power of the leader internally cannot be separated from the UAE’s current moves on the continent.

Two-level game: the UAE’s internal motivations

The state-level and international-level analyses regarding the transformation of the UAE’s foreign policymaking are combined in the case of Yemen. This is known as the ‘two-level game’.⁸⁰ This concept refers to ‘a metaphor for domestic–international interactions’ provided by Putnam, who explains that it is

at the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international-level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision-makers, so long as their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign.⁸¹≪TS: Please format this as a block quotation.≫

As part of this dual game, decision-makers can ‘try to satisfy domestic constituencies and international imperatives simultaneously, which oftentimes requires a delicate balancing’.⁸²

In this regard, the transformation of the UAE’s foreign policy strategy has been driven by a balancing strategy that involves internal and external power dynamics within policymaking. The leadership of the union is responsible for foreign relations and for defending the country in the case of a threat.⁸³ Although the UAE is a federal state, the individual Emirates are able to maintain foreign relations – though limited – with the permission of the central authority.⁸⁴ This does not necessarily mean that the seven Emirates must agree on foreign policy decisions; however, UAE is a monarchy where the Emir has the executive decision-making power. Since 2014, power has been concentrated in the hands of the Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (hereafter MBZ), as Sheikh Khalifa is not able to rule the state due to ongoing health conditions.⁸⁵ MBZ, who is Sheikh Zayed’s son from the ‘Bani Fatima Block’ and the most powerful figure in the family, has modified Emirati foreign policy. Unconventionally, Sheikh Zayed selected the next Crown Prince before his death and made this decision public, to prevent any internal conflict within the family.⁸⁶ The change in leadership after the death of Shaikh Zayed, with the peaceful succession of Sheikh Khalifa, has provided an opportunity for MBZ’s greater involvement in policymaking than is usual for a Crown Prince.⁸⁷

MBZ has a strong personality and a lot of support from his brothers from the Bani Fatima Block, in addition to his close relationships with the US and Saudi Arabia.⁸⁸ Sheikh Zayed’s foreign policy was heavily personalised and of a fatherly style: ‘I am like an old father who heads his family and takes care of his children. He takes them by the hand and supports them until they have passed through adolescence’.⁸⁹ Hence, a strong and personalised leadership style and foreign policy under the authority of MBZ is not surprising and is acceptable in the national context, when Sheikh Zayed’s foreign policymaking is considered.

However, motivations behind the change in the Emirati foreign policymaking from bandwagoning to an articulated buck-passing are not limited to personalised decision-making. The UAE has started having a greater military role, including its raising economic and political strategies. The heavy military intervention in Yemen is closely related to MBZ’s leadership and the increasing economic role of the UAE in the Gulf.⁹⁰ In addition, though there is no academic evidence to support this, one can argue that with the engagement of the UAE in the Yemeni case, MBZ, as future president of the UAE, is aiming to strengthen his leadership position and prestige, both domestically and regionally, through indicating his ‘strong’ policymaking. The individual level of analysis requires an examination of the perceived threat of leaders who led countries to buck-passing.

The public’s opinion is a crucial dynamic in transforming the foreign policy approach of the UAE towards Yemen, because the military success of the Emirati army in the intervention has contributed to its image in national and international politics. Even in The Military Balance 2018, the UAE’s rising military role in the region is emphasised, with the statement ‘the UAE’s armed forces are arguably the best trained and most capable among the GCC states’. ⁹¹ Hence, the UAE has consolidated domestic power through emphasising nationalism by framing the role of the Emirati army in the Yemeni civil war as a national security issue rather than a military intervention. For instance, during the Yemeni civil war, the concept of martyrdom was used for the first time in the history of the state: the first Emirati martyr, who died in 1971 while fighting against Iranian occupiers on the island of Greater Tunb, was re-represented and the day of his sacrifice (November 30) was declared a Commemoration Day.⁹² In another case, in September 2015, a three-day-mourning was declared after the ‘martyrdom’ of 45 Emirati soldiers in Yemen.⁹³ The establishment of the Wahat Al Karama memorial in 2016 is a prominent example of the consolidation of national values and nationalism.⁹⁴ The Martyrs’ Families’ Affairs Office also began operating, tasked with taking care of the martyrs’ families. The director, Sheikh Khalifa bin Tahnoon, stated that ‘Wahat Al Karama embodies the values of unity, solidarity and synergy between the leadership and the people that are so deeply embedded into the culture of the UAE’.⁹⁵

The leadership of the UAE frames casualties of the intervention in Yemen as an inevitable outcome of being a strong military state that takes risks and proactive roles.⁹⁶ Hence, the state’s narrative in regard to the military intervention in Yemen somehow aims to increase internal power and trust in the power of the state, which is framed as a risk-taker and strong military body. However, this can raise domestic concerns because most of the soldiers fighting in Yemen on behalf of the UAE are low-economic-class Emirati citizens from cities such as Ras Al-Khaimah, rather than Dubai or Abu Dhabi.⁹⁷ It is a reality in Emirati society that citizens of the less wealthy emirates are more likely to join the army than others, due to their economic status and the benefits afforded to officers in the national forces.⁹⁸ However, this can lead to social problems in the future when only these Emirates contribute to the war and lose citizens. As Breuning explains, ‘the lack of accountability may make it easier for the leaders of nondemocratic societies to make unpopular decisions, but they cannot do so with impunity’.⁹⁹ Hence, the foreign policy behaviour of the Emirates in Yemen has a definite connection with the internal politics of this relatively small monarchy. Buck-passing is not centrally visible in these two levels of analysis; nevertheless, the impacts of leadership and domestic concerns are important in understanding the bigger picture considering the UAE’s political system and small-state behaviour. In other words, although the UAE prioritises its economic interests in Yemen, the way political elites framed its military role in the intervention has enabled them to consolidate power by supporting nationalism and passing the buck of greater regional responsibility to Saudi Arabia.

Conclusion

The UAE has been adopting multi-dimensional foreign policy strategies since the eruption of the Arab Spring by prompting a change from its role as a state that bandwagons Saudi Arabia to a state that buck-passes to others. Indications of the policy transformation have been highlighted, bringing domestic and international dimensions using a two-level analysis. The United Arab Emirates, as a small oil-based monarchy in the Gulf, has been influential in the context of regional politics, with an increasing economic and political role. Its foreign policy in Yemen provides an important example of the transformation of the country’s profile. Buck-passing options were discussed in depth from a systemic perspective (at the state and international levels) to explore the foreign policy of the small state, and the conclusion was reached that foreign policymaking is interlinked at two levels.

The paper is left with a question that is seemingly almost impossible to answer: do any of the actors named in the discussion have relative power in Yemen? Although there is no clear-cut answer, since the beginning of the intervention the UAE’s policy in Yemen, analysed through a realist structure, has been an expansionist and extended deterrence rather than an alliance with coalition forces with the aim to protect local society and stabilise the region. Passing the buck provides the UAE with an opportunity to empower its own hegemony and prioritise its national interests in overachieving stability in Yemen and – partially – the Horn of Africa, by replacing its traditional bandwagoning strategy.

Acknowledgements

Open Access funding was provided by the Qatar National Library. The initial version of this paper was presented at the 2018 Gulf Research Meeting held at the University of Cambridge, at a workshop coordinated by Robert Mason and Simon Mabon. I thank the participants and coordinators of the workshop, and Dr Afyare Elmi, Dr Ali Balci and Arwa Kamaleldin Abbas, whose comments and feedback helped develop the research substantially.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Betul Dogan-Akkas

Betul Dogan-Akkas is a PhD candidate in a joint degree programme between Qatar University and Durham University. She received her MA degree from Qatar University Gulf Studies Center for a thesis titled ‘Securitization of Qatari Foreign Policy’. She completed her BA in international relations at Bilkent University. Her research and publications focus on foreign policymaking, security policies and state–society relations of the Gulf states.

Notes

1 Walt, “Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning,” 103.

2 Elman, “Foreign Policies of Small States,” 31.

3 Carvalho Pinto, “From ‘Follower’ to ‘Role Model,’” 238.

4 Ulrichsen, United Arab Emirates, 65–9,138, 140.

5 Sherwood, “Risk Diversification,” 144–68; Al-Suwaidi, “United Arab Emirates at 40,” 44–58.

6 Elman, “Foreign Policies of Small States,” 31.

7 Al-Mashat, “Politics of Constructive Engagement,” 465; Ulrichsen, United Arab Emirates, 151–68.

8 Keyman and Aydın, “Turkish Foreign Policy in a Globalizing World,” 39.

9 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 13.

10 Ibid., 162.

11 Telci and Öztürk-Horoz, “Military Bases in the Foreign Policy,” 145–7; Telci, “A Lost Love,” 4; Reimann, “Abu Dhabi’s Quest for an Eighth Emirate in Yemen,” Middle East Eye, February 23, 2018. https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/abu-dhabis-quest-eighth-emirate-yemen

12 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 267–334.

13 Telci, “A Lost Love,” 5; Telci and Horoz, “Military Bases in the Foreign Policy,”147; Seche, Shaping the South.

14 Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit,” 94.

15 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 267–334.

16 G. H. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World – Offensive Realism,” 151.

17 Ibid.

18 Christensen and Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks,”; G. H. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World – Offensive Realism”; Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit”; Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck?”; Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power.”

19 Christensen and Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks,” 145.

20 G. H. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World – Offensive Realism,” 152.

21 Quoted in Christensen and Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks,” 141.

22 Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit,” 100–03.

23 Ibid., 94.

24 Ibid., 103.

25 Ibid.

26 “Omar Saif Ghobash – Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to Russia,” BBC News, July 22, 2017. http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b08y9vfr

27 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 160.

28 Bachman, “A ‘Synchronised Attack’ on Life,” 307.

29 Ehteshami, “Saudi Arabia as a Resurgent Regional Power,” 75–94.

30 “Omar Saif Ghobash – Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to Russia,” BBC News, July 22, 2017. http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b08y9vfr.

31 Ibid.

32 “How Did Qatar Back the Houthis in Yemen?,” Egypt Today, August 2, 2017. https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/2/15264/How-did-Qatar-back-the-Houthis-in-Yemen

33 “Emir Speech in Full Text: Qatar Ready for Dialogue But Won’t Compromise on Sovereignty,” The Peninsula Qatar, July 22, 2017. https://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/22/07/2017/Emir-speech-in-full-text-Qatar-ready-for-dialogue-but-won’t-compromise-on-sovereignty; Soraya Lennie, “Qatar’s “So-Called Brothers” Have a Long History of Meddling,” TRT World, July 18, 2017, https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/qatars-so-called-brothers-have-a-long-history-of-meddling-403453

34 Blumi, Destroying Yemen, 175–93.

35 Clausen, “Justifying Military Intervention,” 8.

36 Ibish, “UAE’s Evolving National Security Strategy,” 5–8; Zweiri, “Yemen in the Context of Iran–Gulf Relations,” 83–101.

37 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 161.

38 “Arab States Issue 13 Demands to End Qatar–Gulf Crisis,” Al Jazeera, July 12, 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/arab-states-issue-list-demands-qatar-crisis-170623022133024.html

39 “Iran’s Trade with UAE Topped $16b Last Year,” Financial Tribune, April 17, 2018. https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-business-and-markets/84808/irans-trade-with-uae-topped-16b-last-year

40 “Iran, Qatar Boosting Economic Cooperation,” Financial Tribune, April 6, 2018. https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-business-and-markets/84152/iran-qatar-boosting-economic-cooperation.

41 Sadjadpour, Battle of Dubai, 4–9.

42 Soraya Lennie, “Qatar’s “So-Called Brothers” Have a Long History of Meddling,” TRT World, July 18, 2017, https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/qatars-so-called-brothers-have-a-long-history-of-meddling-403453

43 Ibid.

44 “Arab Coalition Suspends Qatar’s Participation in Yemen,” Al Arabiya English, June 5, 2017. https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2017/06/05/Arab-coalition-suspends-Qatar-s-participation-in-Yemen.html; “How Did Qatar Back the Houthis in Yemen?,” Egypt Today, August 2, 2017. https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/2/15264/How-did-Qatar-back-the-Houthis-in-Yemen; “Qatar Helped Al Qaida Target UAE Troops in Yemen: Diplomat,” Gulf News, July 20, 2017. http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/qatar/qatar-helped-al-qaida-target-uae-troops-in-yemen-diplomat-1.2062033

45 Jensen, “Future of Yemen,” 45–67; Rossiter, “Yemeni–Saudi Border,” 29–45.

46 Ibish, “UAE’s Evolving National Security Strategy,” 5.

47 Telci and Horoz, “Military Bases in the Foreign Policy,” 143–66.

48 Lackner, “GCC, Iran and Yemen,” 7–29.

49 Bachman, “A ‘Synchronised Attack’ on Life,” 306–09.

50 Clausen, “Competing for Control over the State,” 570; Clausen, “Justifying Military Intervention,” 5–7.

51 Ibish, “UAE’s Evolving National Security Strategy,” 41.

52 Reimann, “Abu Dhabi’s Quest for an Eighth Emirate in Yemen,” Middle East Eye, February 23, 2018. https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/abu-dhabis-quest-eighth-emirate-yemen

53 “What Does UAE Want with Yemeni Island Socotra?,” Al Jazeera News Inside Story Episodes, May 8, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/program/episode/2018/5/8/what-does-uae-want-with-yemeni-island-socotra/?gb=true

54 “UAE–Saudi Disagreement in Geneva Puts Yemen’s Unity at Risk,” Middle East Monitor, March 16, 2018. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180316-uae-saudi-disagreement-in-geneva-puts-yemens-unity-at-risk/

55 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 157–58.

56 The World Bank (accessed September 4, 2020). https://data.worldbank.org/

57 IISS, “The Military Balance 2013,” 407; IISS, “The Military Balance 2014,” 348; IISS, “The Military Balance 2015,” 355.

58 IISS, “The Military Balance 2016,” 357.

59 Ibid.

60 Bachman, “A ‘Synchronised Attack’ on Life,” 307.

61 IISS, “The Military Balance 2018,” 367.

62 “Joint Call by Saudi Arabia, UAE to End Fighting in Southern Yemen,” Al Jazeera, September 8, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/joint-call-saudi-arabia-uae-fighting-southern-yemen-190908172946837.html

63 “UAE Not Leaving War-Torn Yemen Despite Withdrawal, Says Minister,” Al Jazeera, July 23, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/uae-leaving-war-torn-yemen-drawdown-minister-190723114457594.html

64 Ibid.

65 Mundy, “Strategies of the Coalition in the Yemen War,” World Peace Foundation, October 9, 2018, https://sites.tufts.edu/wpf/strategies-of-the-coalition-in-the-yemen-war/

66 Statista (accessed May 24, 2018), https://www.statista.com/statistics/265191/oil-production-in-the-united-arab-emirates-in-barrels-per-day/

67 The World Bank (accessed May 24, 2018), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=AE

68 Almezaini, UAE and Foreign Policy, 178–230; Ibish, “UAE’s Evolving National Security Strategy”; W. A. Rugh, “Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates,” 57–70; Sherwood, “Risk Diversification,” 144–68.

69 Blumi, Destroying Yemen, 177.

70 Carlisle, “Dubai Family Strikes $3bn Gold Deposit in Yemen,” The National, https://www.thenational.ae/world/dubai-family-strikes-3bn-gold-deposit-in-yemen-1.501487 in Blumi, Destroying Yemen, 178.

71 “Annual Report and Accounts 2018,” DP World, 1, https://www.dpworld.com/-/media/82C51A91422A4AEBB83655E376DD2472.ashx

72 Blumi, Destroying Yemen, 175–92; Cannon and Donelli, “Asymmetric Alliances and High Polarity,” 5–6.

73 Knaup, “The Bin Laden Bridge: A Vision to Connect Africa and Asia.” Der Spiegel, August 22, 2008. https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-bin-laden-bridge-a-vision-to-connect-africa-and-asia-a-573588.html

74 Blumi, Destroying Yemen, 174–5.

75 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 37, 55–56.

76 Ibid., 16, 52, 55–6.

77 “UAE’s Battle-Hardened Military Expands into Africa, Mideast.” ABC News, April 29, 2017. http://abcnews.go.com/; “Somaliland Agrees to UAE Military Base in Berbera.” BBC News, February 13, 2017. http://www.bbc.com; Shazar, “UAE to Open Second Military Base in East Africa.” Middle East Eye, February 13, 2017. http://www.middleeasteye.net

78 Adow, “Yemenis Find Refuge in Africa’s Djibouti.” Al Jazeera, November 17, 2017. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/yemenis-find-refuge-africas-djibouti-171117110454303.html

79 Blumi, Destroying Yemen, 205.

80 Breuning, Foreign Policy Analysis, 13.

81 Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,” 433–4.

82 Breuning, Foreign Policy Analysis, 13.

83 Federal Supreme Council, “Constitution of the United Arab Emirates Art. 120–123,” The Federal Supreme Council.

84 Ibid., Art. 10–60.

85 Almezaini, “Transformation of UAE Foreign Policy since 2011,” 191–200.

86 A. Rugh, Political Culture of Leadership, 90.

87 Al-Mashat, “Politics of Constructive Engagement,” 457–81.

88 “What Mohammad Bin Zayed Said to Trump at White House,” Gulf News, https://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/what-mohammad-bin-zayed-said-to-trump-at-white-house-1.2027371

89 A. Rugh, Political Culture of Leadership, 217; Soubrier, “Evolving Foreign and Security Policies,” 123–44.

90 Almezaini, “Transformation of UAE Foreign Policy since 2011,” 191–200.

91 IISS, “The Military Balance 2018,” 367; A. Rugh, Political Culture of Leadership, 217–37.

92 Mubarak, “UAE’s First Martyr: Even in Death, He Held the Flag High,” Gulf News, https://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/commemoration-day/uae-s-first-martyr-even-in-death-he-held-the-flag-high-1.1626612

93 WAM, “3 Days of Mourning Declared in UAE for Martyrs in Yemen,” Gulf News, September 5, 2015. https://gulfnews.com/news/uae/emergencies/3-days-of-mourning-declared-in-uae-for-martyrs-in-yemen-1.1578501

94 “Wahat Al Karama Memorial to Open for Public,” The National, December 5, 2016. https://www.thenational.ae/uae/wahat-al-karama-memorial-to-open-for-public-1.172834

95 Ibid.

96 IISS, “The Military Balance 2016,” 357.

97 WAM, “UAE Martyr Sultan Al Naqbi Laid to Rest in Ras Al Khaimah,” Emirates 24/7 News, September 13, 2017. https://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/uae-martyr-sultan-al-naqbi-laid-to-rest-in-ras-al-khaimah-2017-09-13-1.658939; Zriqat, “Hundreds Attend Funeral for UAE Martyr in Ras Al Khaimah,” The National, May 3, 2017. https://www.thenational.ae/uae/hundreds-attend-funeral-for-uae-martyr-in-ras-al-khaimah-1.83048

98 Davidson, “Dubai and the United Arab Emirates,” 441.

99 Breuning, Foreign Policy Analysis, 31.