How local political economy dynamics are shaping the Belt and Road Initiative

Abstract

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)’s ambiguity has opened the door to varied interpretations. Developing a structural political economy analysis, we push back against overgeneralised one-directional accounts in favour of a more nuanced localised reading, to show how recipient state political economy dynamics mediate the BRI as it unfolds in participating countries. We demonstrate this through analysis of Cambodia’s industrial development, drawing from evidence of special economic zones (SEZs), and specifically the Sihanoukville SEZ, now touted as a ‘model’ of BRI cooperation by both China and Cambodia. We show this model to be a continuation of earlier neoliberal logics of uneven growth and precarity, perpetuating Cambodia’s conflictual authoritarian developmentalism. This investment, now increasingly framed under the BRI, supports infrastructure development and industrial expansion, feeding the ruling Cambodian People’s Party’s longstanding elite-patronage system, while generating jobs for ordinary Cambodians in manufacturing and other low-added-value industries. In our analysis, local political economy dynamics and contestation emerge as critical for explaining trajectories and outcomes associated with the BRI. In the process we unpick the discourses ascribed to the BRI in Cambodia and more broadly. Our findings have implications for policymaking in Cambodia and China, and for other development actors engaging with the BRI.

Keywords:

• China
• Cambodia
• Belt and Road Initiative
• political economy
• investment

Acknowledgements

The authors thank Lee Jones, Ivan Franceschini, Steve Heder, Hong Zhang, Sabina Lawreniuk and Laurie Parsons for insights and comments on earlier versions of this draft. The article was also improved by the input of two anonymous reviewers.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

ORCID

Neil Loughlin https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5670-4264

Notes

1 Boston University. ‘China’s Overseas Development Finance’ (n.d.) https://www.bu.edu/gdp/chinas-overseas-development-finance/

2 We would like to thank Dr Lee Jones for his input and suggestions in formulating these questions.

3 Loughlin interview with Cambodian political analyst, November 2018.

4 CPP Central Committee list obtained by Loughlin. Document in author’s possession.

5 Information available on the SSEZ’s website http://www.ssez.com/en/company.asp?Ione=3

6 Loughlin interview with foreign trade official, Skype, December 2018.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Neil Loughlin

Neil Loughlin is Postdoctoral Fellow in political science at the Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies. He also lectures in development politics and authoritarianism at Leiden University and the University of Amsterdam. His research interests include authoritarian politics, political economy, development, conflict, and land and resource extraction.

Mark Grimsditch

Mark Grimsditch is China Global Program Director at Inclusive Development International. His work follows trends in both private and state-backed Chinese investment in Southeast Asia and Africa. He works closely with local civil society organisations to monitor and advocate for improved environmental and social practices in Chinese overseas projects.