The authoritarian turn of middle powers: changes in narratives and engagement

Abstract

Although middle powers are expected to behave as supporters of international organisations, cooperation, and as promoters of norms and ethics, as well as providers of international public goods, they are not immune to current global ‘de-democratisation’ processes. The authoritarian turn challenges the patterns of behaviour of middle powers. This article discusses the changes of middlepowermanship engagement by presenting an analysis of middle powers’ foreign policy and their narratives thereof. We analyse whether and how middle powers experiencing democracy backsliding have changed their language of political communication and contribution to international relations. We argue that the redefinitions of middle powers’ foreign policy remain in line with their broadly understood foreign policy culture, that is that a middle power embedded within consensus-oriented domestic political context is less likely to change its foreign policy than a middle power embedded within conflict-oriented domestic political context. The argument is substantiated by an analysis of political behaviour of Indonesia, representing the former, and Brazil, representing the latter.

Keywords:

• Middle powers
• de-democratisation
• narratives
• Indonesia
• Brazil
• foreign policy

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and the editors for their helpful comments and suggestions on the earlier drafts of this article.

Disclosure statement

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

Funding

This work was financed from the funds of the Polish Ministry of Education and Science granted to the Faculty of Business and International Relations of the Vistula University to maintain its research potential in 2019 and 2020.

Notes

1 The robust literature on middle powers provides different approaches to and analyses of middle powers’ behaviours, foreign, policy, or strategies. This characteristic is a summary and an attempt to merge a variety of features presented in the ample literature, see e.g. Holbraad, Middle powers; Cooper, Higgot, and Nossal, Relocating middle powers. Cooper ed., Niche Diplomacy; Chapnick, “The Middle Power.” Robertson, “Middle-Power Definitions.”

2 In this paper we use the terms: authoritarian turn and de-democratisation process as reflecting backsliding of democracy. According to the Democracy Index, the 2019 saw the worst global score since its inception in 2006.

3 Ravenhill, “Cycles of Middle Power Activism,” 312–13.

4 Although it may be argued that both Indonesia and Brazil are not ‘traditional’ middle powers, the actors are acknowledged for their middle power behaviour, see e.g. Belém Lopes, Casarões, and Gama, “A Tragedy of Middle Power Politics”; de Sá Guimarães and de Almeida, “From Middle Powers,” for Brazil, and Azra, “Indonesia’s middle power” for Indonesia.

5 Brommesson and Ekengren, “What Happens When a New Government Enters Office.”

6 Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy.

7 Brommesson and Ekengren, “What Happens When a New Government Enters Office,” 8–11.

8 Raunio and Wagner, “The Party Politics of Foreign and Security Policy.”

9 Verbeek and Zaslove, “The Impact of Populist Radical Right Parties on Foreign Policy.”

10 Brommesson and Ekengren, “What Happens When a New Government Enters Office,” 10–11.

11 Holsti, “Restructuring Foreign Policy.”

12 Cooper, Higgot, and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers.

13 Ibid., 19.

14 Cooper ed., Niche Diplomacy.

15 Jordaan, “The Emerging Middle Power Concept.”

16 We would like to thank one of the reviewers for underscoring this point.

17 Kavalski, “Breaking out of the Middle Power Straitjacket?”; Kim, South Korea’s Middle-Power Diplomacy.

18 Hurrell, “Some Reflections on the Role of Intermediate Powers,” 1.

19 For example, Sung-Mi Kim discusses the narratives on the South Korean example, arguing that a change of administrations results in a change of narratives, causing ambiguities over the direction of the state’s foreign policy, Kim, South Korea’s Middle Power Diplomacy.

20 Doyle and Rumley, The Rise and Return of the Indo-Pacific.

21 Ibid., chapter 7.

22 Croissant and Schächter, “Institutional Patterns in the New Democracies of Asia,” 187.

23 Duile and Bens, “Indonesia and the ‘Conflictual Consensus’,” 173.

24 Ibid., 176.

25 Although it has been changing in recent years, see Warburton, “Deepening Polarization and Democratic Decline in Indonesia.”

26 Kestler, Lucca, and Krause, “‘Break-In Parties’ and Changing Patterns of Democracy in Latin America.”

27 Anastasia and Las Casas, “Political Institutions, States Capacities and International Cooperation,” 424.

28 Kingston and Power, “Introduction”; Stuenkel, “Brazil’s Polarization and Democratic Risks.”

29 Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, Strategic narratives.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Roselle, Miskimmon, and O’Loughlin, Strategic Narrative, 7; Miskimmon, Roselle, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, “Introduction,” 8.

33 Roselle, Miskimmon, and O’Loughlin, Strategic Narrative, 2.

34 Patterson and Monroe, “Narrative in Political Science.”

35 Roselle, Miskimmon, and O’Loughlin, Strategic Narrative.

36 Roselle, Miskimmon, and O’Loughlin, “Strategic Narratives: Methods and Ethics,” 23–55.

37 Recently, the strategic narratives concept has been expanded by researchers to include visual components of narratives, but we focus on texts.

38 The full list of documents collected for the analysis is available at request.

39 Holsti, Taming the Sovereigns, 2.

40 Roselle, Miskimmon, and O’Loughlin, Strategic Narrative, 2.

41 Nolte, “How to Compare Regional Powers,” 889–94.

42 See the special issue ‘Rising Powers in International Conflict Management: Converging and Contesting Approaches’ of the Third World Quarterly 39 (12), 2018. The authors do not provide a clear-cut differentiation between middle and rising powers, but rather define these roles as complementary and overlapping.

43 See Parlal dal, “Rising Powers in International Conflict Management.” The researcher argues that: ‘rising powers’ strong attachment to the Westphalian norms of sovereign equality and non-interference in internal affairs and their ongoing criticism of the unjust Western-dominated liberal order also impact the way they conceive and construct their role in sustaining international peace and security,’ p. 2209.

44 He, “Indonesia’s Foreign Policy.”

45 Acharya, Indonesia Matters; Anwar, “The Impact of Domestic and Asian Regional Changes on Indonesian Foreign Policy.”

46 Laksmana, “Indonesia’s Rising Regional Role.”

47 Rüland, “Democratizing Foreign-Policy Making in Indonesia.”

48 Quayle, “Indonesia, the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community,” 135–6.

49 Diprose, McRae, and Hadiz, “Two Decades of Reformasi in Indonesia”; Power, “Jokowi’s Authoritarian Turn.”

50 Democracy Index 2017, 10, 20.

51 See Weatherbee, Indonesia in ASEAN; Rüland, The Indonesian Way; Emmers, “Indonesia’s Role in ASEAN.”

52 Acharya, Indonesia Matters; Poole, “The Foreign Policy Nexus.”

53 See Liow, “Can Indonesia Fulfill Its Aspirations to Regional Leadership?,” 179–82.

54 Fitriani, “Yudhoyono’s Foreign Policy.”

55 Ibid.

56 Connelly, “Sovereignty and the Sea.”

57 Tahalele, “Indonesian AID.”

58 Scott, “Indonesia Grapples with the Indo-Pacific”; Shehkar, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy.

59 Anwar, “Indonesia and the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific.”

60 See e.g. Yudhoyono, Opening Remarks, but also other Yudhoyono’s speeches at the BDD and the UN.

61 Natalegawa, Statement by H.E. Dr. R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa.

62 Widodo, Indo-Pacific Concept.

63 Hurrell, The Quest For Autonomy.

64 Cervo, “Um balanço da reunião da OMC em Cancún,” 1–3.

65 Cervo, O Brasil e os paísesemergentes; Cervo, “Brazil’s Rise on the International Scene”; Cervo, “Brazil in the Current World Order”; Cervo and Lessa, “O declínio: inserção internacional do Brasil.”

66 Another factor contributing to international performance of Brazil was professionalisation of Brazilian diplomats, see e.g. Milani and Pinheiro, “The Politics of Brazilian Foreign Policy,” 278–279.

67 Brooke, “Conversations/Jair Bolsonaro.”

68 A comparison of Indonesia and Brazil shows that democracy decline in Indonesia is greater than in Brazil, see Democracy Index 2019.

69 Democracy Index 2019.

70 Venezuela is a full member of MERCOSUR, but has been suspended indefinitely since August 2017.

71 Phillips, “Regionalist governance.”

72 Covarrubias, “Containing Brazil,” 53–4; see also Vivares and Dolcetti-Marcolini, “Two Regionalisms” for an overview of regionalisms in Latin America.

73 Golub, “From the New International Economic Order to the G20”; Abdenur, “Emerging Powers as Normative Agents.”

74 Cervo, O Brasil e ospaíses emergentes; Cervo, “Brazil in the Current World Order.”

75 See e.g. Müller and Steinke, “The Geopolitics of Brazilian Peacekeeping.”

76 Gratius, “¿Crónica de una muerte anunciada?”

77 Caetano, López, and Camilo y Lujan, “El Brasil de Bolsonaro”; Caetano, Morayta, and Mabire, “Los nuevos rumbos del MERCOSUR.”

78 Christensen, “Brazil’s Foreign Policy Priorities.”

79 Amorim, Discurso do Ministro das Relações Exteriores.

80 da Silva, Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, por ocasião do Debate.

81 da Silva, Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, por ocasião da cerimônia.

82 Ibid.

83 Amorim, Discurso do Ministro Celso Amorim.

84 da Silva, Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, por ocasião da abertura.

85 Araújo, Querer grandezza.

86 Araújo, Intervenção do Ministro Ernesto Araújo.

87 Araújo, “Trump e o Ocidente.”

88 Araújo, “Brazil is back.”

89 Araújo, Intervenção do ministro de Estado das Reslações.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Anna Grzywacz

Anna Grzywacz holds a PhD in Political Science (International Relations) from the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw, Poland. She is a researcher at the Faculty of Business and International Relations of the Vistula University, Warsaw, Poland. Her research interests include ASEAN and Southeast Asian politics, especially foreign policies of Indonesia and Singapore, middle powers, and discursive politics.

Marcin Florian Gawrycki

Marcin F. Gawrycki is a full professor at the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies of the University of Warsaw, Poland. His academic interests include politics and history of the Western Hemisphere and postcolonialism.