‘France is back’: Macron’s European policy to rescue ‘European civilisation’ and the liberal international order

Abstract

French President Emmanuel Macron has put forward extensive proposals to strengthen the European Union. In order to better understand their nature and rationale, this article argues that it is essential to take into account a core – yet overlooked – aspect of Macron’s foreign policy: his unique use of a civilisational lens to frame and structure his approach to world politics. Based on a discourse analysis of 211 foreign policy speeches, press statements and interviews given by Macron between May 2017 and May 2021, this article shows that he has urged for a strengthening of the EU by arguing that it was necessary to protect both the international liberal order and what he refers to as ‘European civilisation’, and has insisted that France has a responsibility to facilitate this process. Through this analysis, the article provides a stronger understanding of France’s foreign policy, whilst shedding light on how middle powers like France claim to influence the future of the liberal order, and how civilisational debates are still being used.

Keywords:

• France
• EU
• civilisation
• liberal order
• NATO
• Russia

Introduction

The state and future of the liberal international order have always generated heated debates, which have only been intensified by the presidency of former American President Donald Trump (see, for instance, Mearsheimer 2019; Ikenberry 2018; Nye 2017). Authors such as Roland Paris (2019) have argued that middle powers could play a central role in maintaining – or at least reshaping – this order. This article focuses on one in particular – France – since President Emmanuel Macron has made the survival of the liberal order a priority of his presidency. To understand why and how Macron aims to fulfil this objective, this article analyses one of the most interesting yet underexplored aspects of his foreign policy: his unique use of a civilisational lens to frame and structure his approach to world politics, and the subsequent ambitious yet risky European policy it has enabled.

The article builds on role theory, which is interested in how states’ actions are partly informed by their sense of place in the world and their desire to be seen by others as a particular kind of actor (see McCourt 2014). Methodologically, the analysis is grounded in discourse analysis. This tool is particularly adapted to this analysis since the latter is not interested in the veracity of Macron’s understanding of world politics or whether or not he believes what he is saying, but rather aims to investigate the ideological positing of his European and foreign policy, and the kind of policies this has enabled. More specifically, the analysis draws on the work of two leading scholars of critical discourse analysis, Iver Neumann (2008) and Lene Hansen (2006), since their research provides a clear pathway to better understand how Macron has framed and structured his approach to world politics, the role that the EU and France should play in it, and the associated policies.

While other forms of language are important,¹ the analysis focuses on text – in both its oral and written forms – and therefore looks at Macron’s official speeches, press statements (including written press releases) and interviews. This focus on the president can be explained by the fact that French foreign policy has been considered to be his domaine réservé in light of the powers given to the president by the 1958 constitution. Therefore, 211 foreign policy speeches, press statements and interviews given by Macron between his election in May 2017 and May 2021 were exhaustively analysed,² and particular attention was paid to 60 that could be seen as ‘events’ or ‘monuments’ since they were key in helping ‘institutionalise’ and ‘normalise’ certain language over time (Neumann 2008, 61, 67).³ Considering the importance of intertextuality, since ‘a text is simultaneously drawing upon a textual past and constructing this past into a unique new text’ (Hansen 2006, 50; see also Neumann 2008, 66–67), the analysis placed each text in the context of previous and ongoing French debates on the European Union, French foreign policy and other predominant debates such as civilisational ones, in particular by looking at similar texts from Macron’s predecessors and analysis about their foreign policy. It also accounted for how Macron’s proposals – especially the ones put forward in the texts that were identified as ‘events’ – were received within and outside France by other world leaders, leading newspapers⁴ and think tanks. Finally, it paid particular attention to the timing, audience and genre of the texts in order to determine how these factors mattered. From this analysis, six themes emerged as being central to this analysis and, once combined, provided a framework to make sense of the discursive practices underpinning Macron’s foreign policy.

The article argues that Macron has claimed we are witnessing a crisis of the liberal international order (theme 1), and that the latter is particularly problematic because, as a result, what he refers to as ‘European civilisation’ is under threat (theme 2). Subsequently, he has called for a strengthening of the EU (theme 3) so that it could compete with great powers – such as China and the United States – and protect both ‘European civilisation’ and the liberal order. Additionally, he has contended that France has a responsibility to play a central role in strengthening the EU (theme 4), not only because it is in its interests and it is capable of doing so, but also because ‘European civilisation’ and French exceptionalism are linked, and France best encompasses what the liberal order stands for. Through these bold claims, Macron has therefore depicted a world where France – through the EU – should play a central role in world politics, and as a result, he has put forward an ambitious European policy, which has not been welcomed by everyone. In addition to extensive internal European reforms, Macron has indeed advocated for a stronger relationship between Russia and the EU (theme 5) and some adjustments when it comes to the EU’s relationship with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (theme 6).

Through this analysis, the article provides a stronger understanding of France’s European and foreign policy, whilst also shedding light on how civilisational debates are still being used, and how middle powers like France claim they can influence the future of the liberal order and world politics. It proceeds in four parts. The first section analyses Macron’s approach to world politics, and specifically the civilisational lens he uses, and the European policy it has enabled. The second section explores Macron’s determination to ‘bring France back’ to the centre of EU politics and the rationale behind it. The final two sections analyse how Macron aims to implement these goals. Section three focuses on the complex and multilayered EU internal reforms put forward by Macron. The fourth section discusses the adjustments Macron wants the EU to make when it comes to its relationship with key external actors, such as Russia and NATO.

The return of the ‘clash of civilisations’ in an increasingly illiberal world

This section demonstrates how Macron has used a civilisational lens to approach world politics. Whilst the use of such a lens is not unique to Macron,⁵ it differs from his predecessors’ approach in the post-Cold War era and, in particular, this section emphasises two ruptures: first, Macron has implicitly suggested that we are witnessing a ‘clash of civilisations’,⁶ and secondly, he has implied that this clash also exists within the ‘Western bloc’. Taking into account Macron’s unique use of a civilisational lens is key to understanding his European and foreign policy since Macron has called for a strengthening of the EU so that it can protect ‘European civilisation’, but also the liberal order.

According to Macron (2018c), ‘we are currently experiencing a deep crisis of the Westphalian liberal world order’, and as a result, we are witnessing the emergence of an increasingly bipolar and illiberal world. He has been particularly critical of the role played by the United States and quotes (2018b) Washington’s ‘doubt about NATO, the unilateral and aggressive trade policy …, the withdrawal of the Paris agreement, [and] the exit of the Iranian nuclear agreement’ as evidence that the United States is no longer capable of – or interested in – being the leader of this liberal order. Even though this critique could be seen as only targeting Trump, this is not entirely the case, as Macron (in The Economist 2019) has maintained that Barack Obama’s decision to not intervene when chemical weapons were used in Syria was the ‘first collapse of the Western bloc’. Concerns also emerged following Joe Biden’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan and the way this withdrawal was undertaken.

But what is particularly interesting in Macron’s analysis of world politics is that the crisis of the liberal order has been deemed particularly problematic in light of the civilisational lens he has used. Macron has indeed increasingly contended that considering the crisis of the liberal order and ‘the end of the Western hegemony of the world’, ‘European civilisation’ is under threat (see, in particular, 2019b). Whilst Macron has not defined what he means by the term ‘civilisation’, he has explained that the ‘European one’ is at the heart of the EU since it ‘unites, frees and protects us’ (2019a), and that it is a ‘model [that] was built in the Eighteenth century with the European Enlightenment, market economy, individual freedoms, democratic regime and the progress of the middle class’ (in The Economist 2019). According to the French president, it makes Europe ‘the only geographical area that has put human with a capital H at the heart of its project’ (2019b) and ‘one of the last havens where we collectively continue to harbour a certain idea of humanity, law, freedom and justice’ (2017c).

However, Macron (2019b) has warned that we will soon live in a world where ‘we will have the choice between [the] dominations’ of China or the United States and where ‘European civilisation’ will disappear since the values it stands for are no longer represented by either power. Indeed, according to Macron (2019b), ‘Chinese civilisation does not … have the same collective preferences to speak in candid terms, nor the same values’. Similarly, he (2019b) has argued that the United States ‘are in the Western bloc but they do not carry the same humanism. Their sensitivity to climate issues, to equality, to the social equilibrium that is ours does not exist in the same way’. These claims have persisted despite Biden’s election, since Macron (2020c) has continued to argue that ‘we are not the United States. They are our historical allies … but … our values are not exactly the same. We are committed to social democracy, to more equality, … culture is more important for us’.

Whilst Macron has not explicitly used the term ‘clash of civilisations’, his claims are reminiscent of those made by Samuel Huntington (1996). While he is eager to prevent any conflict between the various civilisations and wants rather to promote dialogue between them, he has often depicted European, Chinese and American civilisations as competing models. His comments on what he refers to as Chinese and American ‘civilisations’ are complemented by his claim (2019b) that new economies such as India are becoming ‘not only economic powers, but also political ones … which define themselves … as true civilisation-states and which are … disrupting our international order’. Additionally, Macron (for instance, in The Economist 2019) has argued on multiple occasions that we need to stop ‘believing in the idea of the end of history, in a never-ending expansion of democracies, in a Western bloc which would have managed to universalise itself and which would have won’. This can be interpreted as a rejection of Francis Fukuyama’s (1992) work, which is often read as the counterpoint to Huntington’s.

Macron is not the first world leader to have relied on civilisational debates.⁷ Similarly, although the invocation of the term ‘civilisation’ is not a recent development in French politics but rather has a long history,⁸ the way that Macron has engaged with this concept – and, in particular, his indirect references to a ‘clash of civilisations’ – constitutes one of the most unique aspects of his foreign policy. In the post-Cold War era, whilst other French presidents like Chirac had referenced the uniqueness of the European project and even the existence of ‘European civilisation’ (see, for instance, Chirac 1999), it was mainly to promote a ‘dialogue of civilisations’ between the EU and Muslim states (Chirac 2006). Similarly, even when there was a push by some commentators and politicians to refer to a ‘clash of civilisations’ after the 2015 terrorist attacks in France, François Hollande (2012–2017) explained that ‘we are not involved in a war of civilisation, because these assassins do not represent any’ (2015). Even Nicolas Sarkozy (2007–2012), who often used the term ‘civilisation’, mainly did so within the context of domestic politics (see, for instance, 2007b).

In addition to these implicit references to a ‘clash of civilisations’, a second rupture is particularly noteworthy: Macron’s distinction between ‘European civilisation’ and other civilisations of the ‘Western bloc’, such as ‘American civilisation’. Ever since the presidency of Charles de Gaulle (1958–1969), the various French executives have promoted the idea that France and the United States are ‘amis, alliés, mais pas alignés’⁹ as part of their quest to promote France’s independence. However, the Franco–American relationship has overall been strong since the end of the Cold War, and in a speech to the American Congress, Sarkozy (2007a) explained that this was partly because ‘the United States and France are two nations that are faithful to the same ideal, who defend the same principles, who believe in the same values’. Although Macron has not contested the strong – and necessary – alliance between France and the United States (despite several clashes with Trump), his claim (2019b) that the EU and the United States do not share ‘the same humanism’ is thus particularly noteworthy.

Whether Macron’s approach to world politics is correct could be debated at great length. Even without getting into his implicit – and, as many would argue, controversial – claim of a ‘clash of civilisations’, his definition of what constitutes a ‘civilisation’ is questionable since he sometimes seems to use the terms ‘identity’ and ‘civilisation’ as if they were interchangeable, especially at the beginning of his mandate (see, for instance, 2017e). In light of France’s commitment to laïcité, he has also not made a reference to religion, which is often seen as a core element of what constitutes a ‘civilisation’ (Huntington 1996).

Yet what matters here is less whether Macron is right or not but rather how, in light of this civilisational lens, he has called for an extensive strengthening of the EU. His predecessors had gotten us accustomed to hearing that such a strengthening was a necessity, by arguing that the EU should be a counterbalance to the influence of other powers such as the United States, and even calling for an ‘Europe puissance’ (see, for instance, Chirac 2000). But according to Macron, what is at stake here goes well beyond this rationale since he has argued that the future of ‘European civilisation’ and the liberal order depends on the strengthening of the regional organisation.

Macron (2017c) has in fact contented that ‘more than ever today, we need Europe. The world needs Europe’,¹⁰ but that the EU is currently ‘too weak, too slow, too inefficient’ (Macron 2017e). In contrast, Macron’s ambition is for the EU to no longer ‘be subjected to what the superpowers will do better than we will’ (Macron 2017c), but ‘to be a power of equilibrium’ (in The Economist 2019). He wants the EU to be able to ‘stand up to China and the United States’, to be ‘capable of defending our values and interests in the face of authoritarian regimes’ (2017c), and to address great contemporary challenges such as terrorism (2017d). According to Macron, this strengthened EU would thus protect ‘European civilisation’ and associated ‘European specificities’ (2020b), such as the will ‘to defend the force and vitality of human rights which have weakened so much over the past few years’ (2019b).

But more than that, Macron (2018c) has argued that the EU has a ‘responsibility’ to help ‘forge together a new model, to find together a new world balance’. If we look closely at what Macron means by that, it becomes clear that he is advocating for the survival of the liberal international order (see also Gheciu 2020; Rieker 2018), led by the EU. Macron (2018c) has argued that the ‘new world balance’ promoted by the EU would have to recognise – among other things – ‘the non-negotiable defence of our values, human rights, the dignity of individuals, gender equality’, the central importance of multilateralism, and the need for strong democracies that are capable of fighting nationalism, all of which are key features of what the liberal order aspires to do. In other words, Macron has depicted a world in which the liberal order and ‘European civilisation’ are under threat and where the EU bears the responsibility to become stronger in order to protect both.

‘France is back at the Centre of Europe’

Just as Macron has maintained that the EU has a ‘responsibility’ to become stronger, he has argued that France has a central role to play to make this happen and he has thus claimed that ‘France is back at the centre of Europe’ (2018a).

The idea that France should play a central role in strengthening the EU can partly be explained by the fact that doing so would promote France’s interests (Macron 2020a). As Macron (2019a) explained, no ‘country can act alone against the aggressive strategies of great powers’. Additionally, since the end of the Cold War, the various French executives have made the EU a priority since they have argued that France’s role in it partly determines its international ‘rank’.¹¹ For instance, the 2008 White Paper on France’s Foreign and European Policy (Juppé and Schweitzer 2008, 37) explained that ‘France’s status in the world will depend on the driving role it will maintain in the European endeavour. … There is no strong France without Europe’. Similarly, Macron (2017b) has explained that playing a central role in the EU would ‘allow France, among a relaunched Europe, to maintain its rank in an international order that is profoundly shaken up’.

But more than that, Macron’s will to ‘bring France back’ to the centre of European affairs can be explained by the grand vision he has of France’s role in the world. He has argued that as a ‘great economic and industrial power, … military and diplomatic power’ (2019b), ‘member of the Security Council, nuclear power, France must know how to exercise its role of counterweight when imbalances appear’ (2017b) and ‘must allow Europe to become the leader of the free world’ (in Dupont, Guernelle, and Le Fol 2017). This grand vision of France’s role is not unique to Macron, but rather has a long history. Justifiably or not, the idea that France is ‘more than a middle size power’¹² is indeed one of the key parts of its identity that has remained fairly stable over time.

Yet the extent of Macron’s vision of France’s role has been somewhat unmatched in the post-Cold War era (see also Tiersky 2018). He (in Dupont, Guernelle, and Le Fol 2017) has indeed argued that France’s ‘responsibility is unprecedented’ and that ‘it is particularly up to us, as Europeans, to defend the common goods of the free world. I assume this discourse of grandeur, because it is appropriate to the moment that we live’. Whilst this kind of claim can partly be explained by Macron’s Gaullist heritage,¹³ the key to understanding Macron’s grand vision of France’s role once again also partly lies in considering the civilisational lens used by the French president. More specifically, we need to look closely at how he has defined ‘European civilisation’. Macron has used a very Franco-French lens, and in fact, has made this very explicit since he explained that ‘the European project … is very profoundly a French project too …. It is the spirit of the Renaissance, it is the spirit of the Enlightenment. It is the very deep spirit of this French humanism that we have always embodied, invented and that we must reinvent today’ (Macron 2019b).

In other words, Macron has linked ‘European civilisation’ to ‘French exceptionalism’. The concept of ‘exceptionalism’ is complex and multifaceted (see Gordon 1993; Godin and Chafer 2005), but one of its central components is the idea that France should be seen as the ‘homeland of human rights’, and as such has a very specific conception of ‘humanism’ and a subsequent responsibility to promote it (Staunton 2018, 373; 2020, 34–35). For instance, like his predecessors before him, Macron has argued that ‘France must be the tireless advocate [of the ideals of the Enlightenment], because it is the heart of its vocation’ (2017b), and ‘defending freedoms is not only a right, it is a duty’ (2017d).

Consequently, whilst Macron could have justified a strong French involvement in the strengthening of the EU by the fact that France’s interests are at play, he has gone further by making the bold – and debatable – claim that France is one of the states best suited to do so not only because of its ‘rank’, but also because it best embodies what ‘European civilisation’ and the liberal order stand for. Therefore, whilst the idea that France is ‘more than a middle size power’ (partly thanks to the EU) and that it is the ‘guardian of liberal values’ (Rieker 2018, 436) are not new, scholars such as Ronald Tiersky (2018, 88; see also Zaretsky 2019) are right to argue that Macron’s presidency is unique in that he ‘has a sense of personal destiny similar to de Gaulle’s, one that is bound up with his idea of what a twenty-first-century France must be’. This has led him to put forward a very bold European and foreign policy where, more than ever, France’s world ambitions and its European policy have been depicted as two sides of the same coin.

Looking inwards: Macron’s proposed reforms for the EU

In order for France to fulfil its self-proclaimed responsibility and for the EU to become a power capable of protecting ‘European civilisation’ and the liberal order, Macron has promoted significant internal EU reforms. While many French presidents have done so, the scope and depth of Macron’s proposals are noteworthy. Before looking into them in more depth, it is worth noting that in light of the civilisational lens used by Macron and the associated aim for the EU to embody a certain understanding of ‘humanism’, he has framed these reforms as a ‘project of European civilisation’ (2019b). According to Macron (2019b), the aim is to strengthen the EU, but in a manner that also ‘put[s] back … the men and the women at its heart’ and makes the ‘dignity of mankind’ a priority. In other words, Macron has called for a strong, but also a protective EU.

More concretely, ever since the beginning of his presidential campaign, Macron has promoted a strengthening of European sovereignty which he has justified by explaining that ‘sovereignty means the capacity of acting in concrete terms to protect ourselves and defend our values’ (2017a) because ‘not being sovereign means allowing others to choose in our place’ (2017c). This does not mean that Macron no longer values France’s own sovereignty (see, for instance, Macron 2020a). Rather, he has contended that some issues need to be addressed at the European level, in the interest of both France and the EU.

This will to strengthen European sovereignty applies to a wide range of areas such as security, migration, the Euro, taxation, trade, climate, social issues, health, food, sustainable development and digital policy, and has led Macron to put forward proposals in each field.¹⁴ All his proposals cannot be explored in depth here, but a brief overview is important in order to demonstrate both how ambitious Macron’s vision is and what it consists of. Whilst this categorisation is not perfect, his proposed reforms can broadly be discussed around three themes: physical protection, socio-economic protection and democratisation.

First, in terms of physical protection, the French president has emphasised that the EU needs to undertake political and military reforms so that it can protect its citizens from internal and external attacks and so that states like China and the United States will see it as ‘a power with a strategic autonomy’ comparable to theirs (Macron 2018b). To do so, he has proposed key initiatives such as a European Intelligence Academy, a European Council for Internal Security, a common civil protection force, a border police force, and a treaty on defence and security.

Secondly, he has argued (in Dupont, Guernelle, and Le Fol 2017) that the EU requires ‘an economic and social transformation’ so that it can be economically strong whilst also being more protective. According to Macron, the EU needs to become a ‘model of this humanist reconstruction of globalisation’ (2018b) rather than a ‘market without a soul’ (2019a). Therefore, he has advocated for a proper budget and finance minister for the Eurozone, the adoption of European preferences in strategic industries, and the definition of a competition policy that could protect the EU from ‘dumping’ practices of countries like the United States. Additionally, he has called for a reform of labour laws, the implementation of a common minimum wage adapted to each country, a carbon tax, a climate bank, a food safety force, and the development of European regulation of the digital world.

Thirdly, Macron has pushed for the democratisation of the EU. He (2017a) has explained that this is key to reducing the contestation the EU faces and the rise of nationalism, and that it would help unify Europe. To do so, he has argued that ‘democratic conventions’ should be organised throughout the EU to discuss the necessary reforms – an initiative that is similar to the grand débats he organised throughout France during the gilet jaunes protests.¹⁵ He has also suggested transnational electoral lists at the 2019 European Parliament elections to strengthen its legitimacy and performance.

In order to promote these ambitious reforms, Macron has relied on a very specific diplomatic style which he (2019b) has referred to as ‘the strategy of audacity, of risk taking’. As German Chancellor Angela Merkel (in Erlanger 2019) pointed out, he likes to practice ‘disruptive politics’, meaning that has been known to make controversial statements in order to spark what he deems to be a necessary debate. His comments (2019b) regarding ‘the end of the Western hegemony of the world’, discussed in the previous section, or his reference (in The Economist 2019) to NATO being ‘brain-dead’ analysed in the next section are only a few examples among many. Additionally, he has also not hesitated to pitch his reforms beyond the usual political and diplomatic circles, for instance by addressing European citizens directly in order to engage them in the reform process (see, in particular, Macron 2019a).

Yet, beyond these changes in style, Macron – like his predecessors – has also strongly emphasised the Franco–German partnership, and he (2017e) has argued that the latter should remain tasked with providing the EU with a ‘decisive and concrete … impulsion’. He (2017a) indeed explained that the idea ‘that Germany and France have moved apart so much that it is time to work on new alliances’ was ‘pure bullshit’.¹⁶

Whilst it would be mistaken to idealise the relationship between Merkel and Macron, since some tensions – and even confrontations – have emerged around topics such as the nature and speed of the reforms needed, Brexit, the membership in the EU of North Macedonia, or NATO, this strategy has had some success since some key partnerships have been secured between Paris and Berlin. For instance, in June 2018, France and Germany agreed in the Meseberg Declaration to increase their collaboration in order to create a roadmap for the EU to address the challenges it is facing, be it in terms of security, the economy or climate change (French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs 2018). In January 2019, they also signed the Treaty of Aix-la-Chappelle, taking the Franco–German cooperation a step further by creating a binational Parliamentary Assembly, and promoting increased collaboration within the EU and the United Nations.

More generally, a few of Macron’s proposals have come to life. To use defence as an example, the European Intervention Initiative was officially launched in June 2018 to ‘[create] the pre-conditions to conduct coordinated and jointly prepared future commitments, on the whole spectrum of possible crises’ (Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy 2019). According to Macron (2019b), it ‘gives us back some room to manoeuvre and some strategic autonomy’. The agreements with Germany, and later Spain, to build a European combat aircraft (Le Monde 2021), the creation of a €13 billion European Defence Fund to finance research and equipment, and the establishment of a ‘European force of civilian protection’ are also worth highlighting (Élysée 2020).

That being said, and as Macron acknowledged himself (2019b), many aspects of his foreign policy have not advanced as quickly as he had hoped, and this has certainly been the case for his European policy. Part of the reason lies in the fact that the EU is deeply divided, often struggles to agree on the best approach to follow (as illustrated by the handling of the COVID-19 pandemic), and is experiencing a rise of nationalism and anti-European sentiment. The challenges to overcome have thus been considerable.

But part of the issue also comes from Macron’s methods. First, Macron is not the first French president to suggest European reforms and to talk about themes such as democratisation and protection (see, for instance, Chirac 1999). But never has a French president been so unapologetically ambitious in his proposals, and his fast-paced and provocative style has ruffled more than a few feathers and has at times weakened his agenda. For instance, Merkel (in Erlanger 2019) commented that she is ‘tired of picking up the pieces. Over and over, I have to glue together the cups you have broken so that we can then sit down and have a cup of tea together’. European deputy Reinhard Bütikofer (in Lattier 2019) also explained that ‘the French President seems to tell us: “I am in command, I know where to go, and you are the infantrymen and you follow me!” Europe does not work like that!’

Secondly, Macron has also failed to convince others that he is not only using the EU as a way to promote France’s interests (see, for instance, former President of the European Council Donald Tusk in Rankin 2019). The European project being framed as also being profoundly French has not helped. Thirdly, Macron’s focus on the Franco–German partnership has also been somewhat problematic, because in addition to having very different personalities, it is clear that Macron and Merkel have not necessarily had the same understanding of what the EU needs to do, and putting too much emphasis on this partnership has been risky, especially at a time when the German Chancellor is on her way out and it is unclear who her successor will be.

Consequently, Macron needs to make some adjustments if he wants to succeed with his reforms. The fact that Macron managed to secure relatively pro-French personalities such as Christine Lagarde, Ursula von der Leyen, and Charles Michel in top EU jobs might make this process easier, but it will not be enough. In addition to learning to adapt his style, Tusk (in Rankin 2019) has argued that Macron needs to follow Merkel’s example and demonstrate that he is ‘ready to sacrifice some internal or national interest to protect Europe as a whole’. Some compromises from Macron on core issues, such as North Macedonia’s EU membership application – which he has vetoed – could go a long way to repair some of the relationships he has damaged. He also needs to keep working on the Franco–German partnership with Merkel’s successor, whilst also going beyond it. The fact that Macron has undertaken over 60 trips to EU countries – not counting Germany – shows that he is aware of this, but he still has much to do and will need to keep paying particular attention to Eastern European states which, as discussed in the next section, have expressed concerns over some of his policies, such as his proposed rapprochement with Russia.

Looking outwards: one step away from NATO, two steps towards Russia

Macron’s proposed internal reforms for the EU being clearer, this section now turns outwards to discuss the adjustments he is suggesting the EU should make in terms of its relationship with other key actors, such as NATO and Russia.

In addition to – and partly as a result of – the civilisational lens used by Macron and the associated critique of the United States and the ‘humanism’ it embodies, the French president has claimed that the EU has relied too much on NATO even though it is not always a dependable partner. In the lead-up to the 2019 NATO summit, he (in The Economist 2019) argued that the evolving position of the United States towards the organisation, the lack of American collaboration with its NATO partners, Trump’s use of NATO as a way to force its members to buy American products, and Turkey’s conduct of an operation in Syria without coordination with other NATO members – despite their interests in the region – demonstrated the ‘cerebral death of NATO’. As a result, Macron (in The Economist 2019) explained that the EU should no longer rely exclusively on NATO for its defence.

This kind of critique of NATO would have been expected during de Gaulle’s presidency, since he withdrew France from NATO’s integrated military command in 1966 so that it could ‘regain on her whole territory the full exercise of her sovereignty’ (De Gaulle 1966). However, Macron’s more recent predecessors, such as Chirac, Sarkozy and Hollande, had promoted a stronger relationship with the organisation (Staunton 2020). In 2009, Sarkozy even completed what Chirac failed to do in 1995 by re-joining the integrated military command after arguing that it was in the interest of both France and the EU (Sarkozy 2009).

It is nevertheless important to once again take into account Macron’s very specific diplomatic style in order to make sense of his comments regarding NATO’s brain death. As mentioned previously, he likes to practice ‘disruptive politics’, by making controversial statements to spark debates that he deems necessary. Consequently, rather than promoting a rupture in the EU’s relationship with NATO, it can be argued that Macron was suggesting an adjustment by providing two warnings.

The first was directed at the EU members and aimed to promote the idea that, independently of the extent of NATO’s support, the EU still needs to develop ‘a stronger European defence’, because it cannot always rely on the United States, and without it, the EU would not be able to protect itself, or ‘European civilisation’ and the liberal international order it aims to embody. Macron (2020b) has argued that ‘if we have no freedom of action, we have no credibility in foreign policy and we cannot be the “junior partner” of the United States of America, because sometimes we have disagreements that must be assumed’. That being said, and as he has emphasised on several occasions (see, for instance, Macron 2021b), he has not pushed for this European defence to be an alternative to NATO. Rather, he has argued that its strengthening was necessary to reinforce European sovereignty and fully assume the European pillar within NATO.

The second warning was directed at NATO and the United States. In the lead-up to the 2019 NATO Summit, Macron explained that he was worried the debates around the organisation had been too focused on how much each country contributed financially, rather than on the nature, objectives and means of the organisation. Rather than questioning the need for the organisation to exist, calling NATO ‘brain-dead’ was thus partly aimed at refocusing the debate on more fundamental issues (as Macron later explained; see 2019d).

While it could be assumed that Biden’s election has put some of Macron’s concerns at ease, especially since his American counterpart (see, for instance, Biden 2021) has emphasised his support for a strong NATO, the French president has made it clear that even though discussions would likely be easier under the new administration, his goals had not changed. Macron indeed wants to keep promoting both the strengthening of NATO and the development of a European defence so that the EU can be an ‘autonomous partner’, because ‘the day that cooperation becomes dependence, you have become somebody’s vassal and you disappear’ (Macron in Cohen 2021; see also Macron 2020c, 2021a).

The call for a stronger European defence was reiterated particularly following the end of the Attack class submarine programme negotiated by France and Australia in 2016, which was sparked by a new security partnership among Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom (AUKUS), which was announced on 15 September 2021. Macron (2021b) argued that ‘Europeans should stop being naïve’, while a French communiqué published in response to AUKUS argued that the new partnership ‘only reinforces the need to make the issue of European strategic autonomy loud and clear. There is no other credible way to defend our interests and our values in the world’ (Le Drian and Parly 2021).

Consequently, Macron’s position on NATO needs to be put into perspective. His aim has not been to exit the organisation or suggest a rupture of its partnership with the EU, since – as Macron has reiterated on several occasions (see, for instance, Macron 2021b) – the European defence is not a ‘substitution’ for NATO. Rather, he has aimed to make sure that NATO does not get in the way of the development of the European defence that he deems essential to the empowerment of the EU, and that NATO is adapted to the twenty-first century.

In addition to arguing that the historical relationship between the EU and NATO should not be taken for granted, the French president has sparked controversy by suggesting that it might be time to rethink the EU–Russia relationship. Like Chirac before him, he (see in particular 2019b) has argued that a rapprochement between the EU and Russia is necessary because the status quo would constitute a core obstacle to the EU becoming a stronger power. According to him, it would indeed generate instability on the European continent and would deprive the EU of Russia’s cooperation, which it requires to deal with important issues, such as terrorism and cybersecurity.

But even more interestingly, Macron has argued that a partnership between Russia and the EU is needed, because the former is also part of ‘European civilisation’. As Macron (2017d) has explained, ‘it is Europe in the historical sense of the term, from the Atlantic to the Urals,¹⁷ a Europe that reaches its ancient steps, like Turkey’. Beyond the fact that this claim would in itself generate heated debates, it is interesting to note that Macron’s conceptualisation of the relationship between the EU and Russia is thus once again linked to the civilisational lens he has used to frame and structure his approach to world politics. Macron has indeed argued that the EU’s strategy must include a ‘profound reconsideration of our ties with Russia’ because ‘Russia is European, very deeply so’ (2017e), and because otherwise, the necessary conditions to protect and promote ‘European civilisation’ will not be met (2019b).

In addition to emphasising the necessity of this rapprochement, Macron has argued that there is a window of opportunity to make it happen. He has acknowledged that under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, Russia has aimed to weaken the transatlantic link and divide the EU, and has referred to Russia as an ‘authoritarian power’ (in The Economist 2019), and even a ‘threat’ (2019c). But he (2019b) has contended that Putin’s behaviour is partly the result of a succession of misunderstandings and missed opportunities between the EU and Russia during the 1990s and 2000s, which led the latter to try to undermine the West by weakening the EU.

According to Macron, this may change today. He has explained that Russia has been predominant on big international dossiers such as Syria because Putin wants to ‘restore Great Russia’ (in Lasserre 2017), yet Russia ‘has the gross domestic product of Spain, a declining demography … and rising political tensions’ (2019b). Consequently, Macron (2019b, see also in The Economist 2019) has argued that redefining the EU–Russian relationship would benefit both the EU and Russia since it would provide more stability on the European continent, while constituting one of the only options for Putin to fulfil his ambitions for Russia and prevent it from simply being the ‘junior ally of China’.

As a result, whilst Macron has argued that the EU should not be naïve since some of the tensions it has experienced with Russia are justified, he has suggested that it should start progressively redefining its partnership with its neighbour, ‘step by step’, over the next decade. In order to commence this rapprochement, Macron has called for the ‘setting up [of] a so-called structured dialogue focusing on five points: sharing expertise and intelligence; a mechanism to defuse EU–Russia tensions; arms control in Europe; European values; [and] working together on international crises’ (Emmott, Irish, and Rinke 2019).

Once again, Macron (2019e) has argued that France has a central role to play in this ‘reinvention of the security and trust architecture between the European Union and Russia’, and as a result, he began reaching out to Putin very early on. For instance, on 29 May 2017, only two weeks after his mandate began, Macron invited his Russian counterpart to Versailles. Additionally, with the support of Germany, he facilitated the return of Russia at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in June 2019. He has also signalled on several occasions that he would push for a lifting of EU sanctions against Russia, if progress was achieved on Ukraine.

Whether or not Macron’s strategy towards Russia is the right one is debatable, but so far, as Armed Forces Minister Florence Parly (in Reuters 2020b) explained in July 2020, very little progress has been made. His strategy has also proven to be divisive, as illustrated by the fact that Macron and Merkel had to give up, in June 2021, on the idea of holding an EU–Russia Summit in light of the strong backlash the proposal generated from other EU members.

Yet one thing is clear: it would be a mistake to oversimplify Macron’s foreign policy. His criticisms of NATO and his proposed rapprochement with Russia should not be analysed in a vacuum. They are part of his broader end goal, which is to strengthen the EU in order to promote ‘European civilisation’ and the liberal international order, along with France’s role in the world. As Macron (2020b) said in reference to Russia, ‘I am not pro-Russian, I am also not anti-Russian, I am pro-European’. In other words, Macron’s strategies towards actors such as NATO and Russia do not constitute aims in themselves, but are rather means to an end. If the situation develops, so could the means that are used, meaning that Macron’s policy towards these actors could evolve.¹⁸

Conclusion

In order to shed light on Macron’s grand vision of France’s and the EU’s roles in the world and the associated policies, this article has explored a core aspect of his foreign policy which had been overlooked for too long: his use of a civilisational lens. Whilst the use of such a lens is not uncommon in French politics, two ruptures can be identified between Macron and his predecessors. First, Macron has implicitly suggested that we are currently witnessing a clash of civilisations in what he deems to be an increasingly illiberal world. Secondly, he has claimed that these tensions are occurring even within the ‘Western bloc’. As a result, Macron has called for a strengthening of the EU so that it can protect both ‘European civilisation’ and the liberal international order, and has argued that France has a central role to play in making this happen. As a result, he has put forward some ambitious internal reforms for the EU to undertake, along with some adjustments when it comes to its relationships with other key international actors, such as NATO and Russia.

Macron’s grand plan is ambitious but not without risk. In particular, his proposed rapprochement between the EU and Russia has already shown that it has the potential to divide the EU even further if it is not handled properly. This rapprochement, but also Macron’s calls for more European autonomy, could also damage the EU’s relationship with NATO and its Atlantic partner (especially since Biden has signalled a strong shift from his predecessor when it comes to the Russia–US relationship).¹⁹ Additionally, the list of challenges to overcome is long, and for Macron to succeed in pushing his proposed reforms forward, three factors need to be particularly emphasised.

First, Macron’s conception of structural power²⁰ needs clarifying. For instance, beyond the fact that Macron has grand ambitions for France, it is not always clear what kind of power he wants France to be. To borrow Barry Buzan’s (2004) categorisation, Macron has defined France as both a regional power and a great power with the potential to become a superpower. This is confusing. Secondly, Macron has also put forward some contradictory means. For example, he has defined Russia as an authoritarian state, yet he has also argued that it is part of ‘European civilisation’ and is key to the survival of the liberal international order. Some clarity is needed on these contradictions if Macron is to convince his European partners. Thirdly, so far Macron’s ‘strategy of audacity’ appears to have upset – rather than inspired – many of his European and Atlantic partners. Consequently, in order to succeed, Macron will have to adjust his diplomatic style, reach beyond the traditional Franco–German partnership, and develop a coherent and pragmatic strategy to handle dossiers such as the EU–Russia relationship.

Only the future will tell if Macron will be successful, and he will need to secure a second mandate in April 2022 to achieve his ambitious agenda. But, as Tiersky (2018, 88) argues, it has been a long time since France has had a leader who aims to be a ‘transformative president’. Beyond the implications for France’s – and the EU’s – foreign policy, his presidency reminds us of the need to look at how civilisational debates are still influencing foreign policy, and how middle-size powers like France claim they can play a role in the future of the liberal order.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to my colleagues from the Department of International Relations at the ANU for their incredibly valuable feedback. Special thanks go to Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, Luke Glanville, Cian O’Driscoll, Cecilia Jacob, Benjamin Zala, George Lawson, and Joseph MacKay.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

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Eglantine Staunton

Eglantine Staunton is Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University (ANU). Her work focuses on France’s foreign policy, human protection and norm diffusion. Her book France, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect was published by Manchester University Press in 2020. Her research has also been published in journals such as the European Journal of International Relations, International Relations, Global Responsibility to Protect and Modern and Contemporary France, and in edited volumes such as The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect.

Notes

1 See, for instance, Gheciu’s (2020) analysis of Macron’s use of ‘symbols’.

2 Please see the Supplementary appendix for a full list of these 211 texts. The initial pool of texts (which was collected from the Elysée and Vie Publique) included 418 texts. It was narrowed down to 211 by excluding those on irrelevant events or bilateral relationships, but keeping all the texts on France’s foreign objectives, the EU, Europe, Russia, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the United States and relevant situations such as Ukraine, Georgia, Palestine–Israel and Syria. All translations were made by the author.

3 They are marked with a red asterisk in the appendix and many are showcased in this article.

4 Such as Le Monde, The Guardian and The New York Times.

5 See, for instance, Charillon (2011, 2021).

6 Understood here as competing models, or even tensions or confrontations, but not as armed conflict.

7 See, for instance, Fermor (2016) and Persaud (2019) on the use of such debates in American politics.

8 The term ‘civilisation’ has been central to French foreign policy debates since the late eighteenth century (Braudel 1958). For instance, even in the post-Cold War era, President Jacques Chirac (1995–2007) was known for his fascination with various African and Asian ‘civilisations’.

9 ‘Friends, allied, but not aligned’. An expression made popular by former French Minister of Foreign Affairs Hubert Védrine.

10 In this context, Macron is using ‘Europe’ to refer to the ‘EU’. Whilst they acknowledge the differences between the EU and Europe, it is common for French leaders to use the terms Europe and the EU interchangeably, and Macron is no exception.

11 A term that has commonly been used by French leaders to refer to France’s international status and its prestige in the world. This notion of ‘rank’ has often been described by French scholars as an obsession of the various French executives for centuries, making it not only a means of France’s foreign policy, but also an end in itself (see, for instance, Staunton 2020; Vaïsse 1998; Rieker 2017; Bozo 2012; Charillon 2011).

12 Idea commonly used by the various French executives over time (see for instance, Chirac 1995).

13 De Gaulle (1954) famously claimed that ‘France cannot be France without grandeur’.

14 Most of these were suggested in 2017 (Macron 2017e), but Macron has kept promoting new initiatives throughout his presidency (see, for instance, Macron 2019a).

15 A protest movement that began in October 2018.

16 This is very unusual language for Macron.

17 Expression used by De Gaulle (see, for instance, De Gaulle 1959).

18 For instance, when it comes to Russia, the coming months will be telling, as Macron’s proposed rapprochement has been complicated by recent events such as the arrest of Russian opposition leader Alexei Nalvany in January 2021 and his reluctance to make any compromise when it comes to core dossiers like Ukraine.

19 Biden (in Gittleson 2021) referred to Putin as a ‘killer’ and claimed that Russia was ‘the biggest threat to America right now in terms of breaking up our security and our alliances’ (in Reuters 2020a).

20 See Strange (2015).