Conceptualising eco-violence: moving beyond the multiple labelling of water and agricultural resource conflicts in the Sahel

Abstract

The conflict over water and agricultural resources within the Sahel of Africa has led to the destruction of lives, property and nature for decades. The extant practice is to label these conflicts with multiple names and conceptualise them as single-issue events. This article illustrates this practice further and highlights some issues associated with such approaches. Existing terms for these conflicts in Africa’s Sahel region are primarily linked to people’s occupations and ethnic identities, distracting efforts to gain a deeper understanding. This view obscures the broad dimensions of these struggles among those competing for water and agricultural resources. Thus, this paper remedies the conceptual gaps by recommending ‘eco-violence’ as an umbrella term for these conflicts and foregrounding the emerging trends of eco-violence within the Sahel region. By referring to these conflicts as eco-violence, we can foster a more inclusive perspective that incorporates social and environmental injustices and political failures as factors related to these conflicts.

Keywords:

• Eco-violence
• farmer–herder conflict
• Sahel of Africa
• pastoral conflicts
• resource conflict
• resource scarcity

Introduction

There are ongoing confrontations between nomadic herders and farmers in various rural communities throughout the West African sub-region for water, crop land and grazing options. These conflicts have raged for decades in the Sahel in the aftermath of the drought of the 1970s and 1980s, affecting the region’s security, agriculture, human security and human (im)mobility (Kuusaana and Bukari 2015; Ajala 2020). For example, on New Year’s Day 2018 in Benue State, Nigeria, Fulani militants raided several Tiv agricultural settlements, killing over 70 people and destroying property (Sule 2021). Similarly, on 23 March 2019, at around 4am, armed Dogon farmers assaulted and killed 175 Fulani residents in Ogossagou village; the incident was blamed on ‘ethnic violence’ and tensions between Dogon farmers and Fulani herders (Benjaminsen and Ba 2021). Such violent attacks result in not just the deaths and destruction described above, but also the displacement of hundreds of individuals from affected communities, and the destruction of the environment and the means of subsistence of those affected (Pettersson, Högbladh, and Öberg 2019; Nwankwo 2021; Nwozor et al. 2021). These conflicts have increased in the last decade due to the use of assault rifles and other military-grade weaponry in cattle herding, as well as a new cattle ownership and management system known as neo-pastoralism¹ (Ajala 2020; Ojo 2020; Nwozor et al. 2021). These conflicts are not just localised ‘pastoral nomadic conflicts’ but also have a transnational dimension, owing to some of the actors’ access to their transnational kinship networks for sourcing access to grazing opportunities and resolving issues that they may confront (Olaniyan, Faleye, and Moyo 2022, 9).

A variety of labels have been used to refer to these conflicts devastating rural communities across the Sahel. Numerous studies refer to these disputes between and among farmers and herders over water and farmland as ‘farmer–herder conflicts’ (Brottem and Mcdonnell 2020; Eke 2020; Lenshie et al. 2020; Benjaminsen and Ba 2021). These conflicts have been portrayed as a sort of militancy and such studies often position the herdsmen as culpable at face value. In other words, it is seen as a sort of ‘herdsmen militancy’ (Okoli 2016; Okoli and Ogayi 2018; Igbokwe and Iwuoha 2019). In some studies, they are also referred to as ‘land-use conflicts’ (Benjaminsen et al. 2012; Shittu, Galtima, and Yakubu 2016; Adeoye 2017; Ogebe, Abah, and Ligom 2019). Others regard it as ‘resource conflict’ (Akov 2017; Seter, Theisen, and Schilling 2018; Brottem and Mcdonnell 2020). It is necessary to emphasise that these disputes frequently involve herders, who are sometimes mainly from the Fulani ethnic groups, and sedentary farmers of different ethnic groups in various communities over a good part of Africa’s Sahel (Ajala 2020).

Assigning nomenclature as discussed above to the violent clashes between herders and sedentary farmers over lands and grazing opportunities makes it appear as though single issues are the cause of the violent conflicts. Thus, the term ‘farmer–herder conflicts’ is not a fitting concept for these conflicts because it does not adequately describe them. While the term sheds light on specific aspects of these conflicts, it obscures others. By referring to these as ‘farmer–herder conflicts’, we emphasise the contending groups’ social identities while directly connecting their occupation to the conflicts. Thus, the conflict appears to be solely a commercial dispute between two social groups, obscuring additional concerns such as political factors and social and environmental injustices that may be causal factors in the conflicts. To resolve the nomenclature issues surrounding these conflicts, we must examine all critical causal processes, not just issues related to the contending parties and their identities, to better our knowledge and description of these conflicts. As a result, it becomes important to make a case for a new label; we suggest ‘eco-violence’.

This article advocates a transition in the terminology used to refer to the so-called ‘farmer–herder conflicts’ and similar terms used to describe the violent clashes and competition for agricultural resources in Africa’s Sahel region. Similarly, Idowu (2022) calls for the use of terminologies that adequately describe the violent interethnic relations in Africa to address the terminological discrepancies in the existing conceptualisation of such relations. We argue that conceptualising these disputes as ‘herder–farmer’ conflicts instead of eco-violence obscures numerous causal elements that must be addressed to understand these conflicts better and formulate strategies for their peaceful resolution. Hence, the core contribution of this article is the provision of a logical basis for a generic nomenclature and description of the conflicts over water and agricultural resources.

Following this introduction, we interrogate the extant literature and discuss the justifications for labelling these conflicts as eco-violence. We further ground the conceptualisation of eco-violence in the peculiarities of the Sahel in West Africa. Finally, we outline the evolving nature of eco-violence in the Sahel.

Extant perspectives on the conflicts between herders and farmers

Extant literature on the competition over water and agricultural resources between herders and farmers shows that it has resulted in mass murders and displacements; damage to livelihoods, infrastructure and the environment; and the spread of ethnic animosities in many rural communities in Africa’s Sahel (Ajala 2020; Eke 2020; Ojo 2020; Vanger and Nwosu 2020; Benjaminsen and Ba 2021). According to scholars, adverse climatic circumstances, such as droughts and desertification, and their consequences, like resource scarcity, affect the nature of these conflicts (Kuusaana and Bukari 2015; Omilusi 2016; Ducrotoy et al. 2018; Ojo 2020). This unfavourable circumstance motivates some pastoral nomads to use their transnational networks when crossing borders in search of agricultural resources, putting them in direct conflict with sedentary farmers (Folami and Folami 2013; Ajala 2020; Olaniyan, Faleye, and Moyo 2022).

However, while the severe adverse weather conditions affect cattle grazing, increasing the likelihood that migrating herders may trespass on new regions across the Sahel, resulting in conflict with farmers, there is no obvious causal link between climate change and conflict (de Coning et al. 2021). In fact, some writers argue that it was not the scarcity of resources but an abundance of resources and economic opportunities that precipitated the 1989 Senegal–Mauritania war and disputes between herders and farmers in Ghana’s Agogo region (OECD 2010; Bukari, Sow, and Scheffran 2018).

Crop and agricultural damage caused by cattle encroaching on farmers’ property and herders raping and murdering people in their communities are among the farmers’ grievances against the herders (Olaniyan 2015; Olaniyan, Francis, and Okeke-Uzodike 2015; Okoli and Ogayi 2018). On the other hand, other studies have claimed that the herders’ grievances stem from being denied access to graze their cattle, cattle rustling, the killing of their people, and violations of their rights as citizens (Ogbette, Attama, and Okoh 2018; Sule 2021; Nwozor et al. 2021). Among the reasons for these conflicts are institutional failures resulting in the loss of the monopoly of violence by the state, the emergence of ‘ungoverned’ spaces, and the proliferation of weaponry (Ajala 2020; Lenshie et al. 2020; Ojo 2020; Sule 2021). Others argue that there is a tepid approach towards resolving insecurity concerns concerning eco-violence; and the Fulani herders receive support from the Nigerian federal government, which is led by a Fulani man, emboldening the herders to commit violent acts against others (Apeh et al. 2021, 209; Nnorom 2021, 91). Grievances shape these disputes over perceived social injustices and contradictory government regulations on land use (Bassett 1988; Sayne 2012; Kuusaana and Bukari 2015). The creation and portrayal of people and their livelihoods within specific frames that influence their social interactions with others, particularly between competing groups, and the nature of the disputes, are factors that contribute to these sorts of conflicts (Okoli and Ogayi 2018; Eke 2020; Nwankwo 2021).

Recent studies indicate that agricultural investors and elites’ efforts to protect their interests in Nigeria, Ghana, Mali and Cameroon have intensified these disputes (Bukari, Sow, and Scheffran 2018; Ajala 2020; Kratli and Toulmin 2020; Mbih 2020). According to studies conducted in Nigeria and Cameroon, elites – in a bid to protect their investments in cattle and crops and other forms of agrarian interests – are fuelling eco-violence within the communities (Ajala 2020; Mbih 2020). Additionally, economic activity in Ghana has exacerbated tensions amongst communities living in the Agogo region (Bukari, Sow, and Scheffran 2018). According to some scholars, political leaders and jihadist leaders in Nigeria and Mali exacerbate these conflicts by manipulating ethnic and religious identities (Kratli and Toulmin 2020). For example, Amadou Kouffa, a radical Fulani cleric in Mali, has mobilised a sizable following among groups of Fulani who feel politically and economically marginalised (Kratli and Toulmin 2020, 41).

To resolve eco-violence in the Middle Belt, which is widely believed to be the epicentre of Nigeria’s eco-violence (Nwangwu et al. 2020), the federal government established a restitution scheme called ‘Ruga’ to provide grazing land and settlements to nomadic Fulani herders across the country’s 36 states; the move was interpreted as a ploy to offer the herders free land (Ojo 2020, 100; Sule 2021; Musa 2021). In complete opposition, several state governments enacted anti-open grazing legislation and refused to accept the federal government’s ‘Ruga’ programme, impeding the federal government’s efforts to secure grazing reserves for Fulani herders (Ele 2020; Sule 2021). Similarly, in May 2021, the state governors of Nigeria’s Southern geopolitical region unanimously agreed to prohibit open grazing of cattle across the region’s 17 states (Ahon, Agbakwuru, and Iheamnachor 2021; Kabir 2021); less than a month later, the federal government of Nigeria, led by a Fulani man, President Mohammadu Buhari, reaffirmed his government’s support for open grazing of cattle by nomadic Fulani herders (Akinkuotu 2021; Jimoh et al. 2021). These adversarial and contradictory government policies promote a sense of deprivation and grievances among contending social groups, consequently fuelling these conflicts.

Scholars of various disciplines, including politics, developmental studies, security studies, and migration studies, have given these conflicts names, which some may argue are reflections of contextual realities within the areas studied. Okoli was the first to use the phrase ‘herdsmen militancy’ to describe these conflicts, which thrive in an environment marked by arms proliferation, communal conflict, rural banditry and insurgency (Okoli 2016, 23). The term ‘herdsmen militancy’ does not fully describe the circumstances because herders are not only the perpetrators of these conflicts; there have also been cases of herders being victims of violence or militancy (Benjaminsen and Ba 2021). The term ‘herdsmen militancy’ falls short of capturing such instances, which are not uncommon. Other scholars have also used the terms (Okoli and Ogayi 2018; Igbokwe and Iwuoha 2019). Using ‘herdsmen militancy’ to refer to these conflicts portrays the herders as overwhelmingly the perpetrators. This type of portrayal is the sort of construction and representation that, among other factors, shapes social relations and the nature of these conflicts (Chukwuma 2020; Nwankwo 2021). Even when it is also called ‘farmer militancy’, it is hardly a neutral term.

Labelling these conflicts using ethnic and occupational classifiers portrays the conflict over water or agricultural resources as a conflict that can exist only between non-state actors. State actors do engage in conflict over water and agricultural resources – as was the case between Senegal and Mauritania in 1989 and in the six-day war between Israel and the Arab nations in 1967 (Cooley 1984; Nicolaj 1990; Parker 1991). It can also occur between state and non-state actors, like when Bakalori villagers revolted against the Nigerian state in the 1980s for appropriating the rural farmers’ arable lands and giving them to an Italian investor, Impresit (Yahaya 2002, 425).

Among the causes of these conflicts is competition for access to and control of cropland, forests, and river water (Homer-Dixon 1999, 8). Acts of violence are used as a means of gaining access to scarce resources and as a bargaining chip in the negotiation of power in the context of Africa’s transborder conflicts between nomadic pastoral groups and sedentary farmers (Olaniyan, Faleye, and Moyo 2022, 9). This practice has been corroborated in Mali’s Mopti region, where attacks on specific social groups were meant to be utilised to gain access to land (Burchall Henningsen 2021, 383). Nonetheless, labelling these merely as ‘land-use conflicts’ tends to obscure other, non-environmental factors that may indirectly cause the eruption of violence, such as demographic changes and political factors. By referring to competition for water and cropland as ‘land-use conflicts’, we highlight only the shortcomings of land regulatory regimes, and the discriminatory and exclusionary behaviours that may cause grievances among contending groups. There is no doubt that land is significant, but its relevance in Africa extends beyond a means of survival to being a symbolic religious tool that is revered in most African societies as a sacred link between the past, present and future (Tonah 2002; Onwuzuruigbo 2013). As such, conflicts over land use will not arise only for agricultural purposes.

Several studies have labelled these ‘resource conflicts’ (Akov 2017; Seter, Theisen, and Schilling 2018; Brottem and Mcdonnell 2020). The label of ‘resource conflict’ has also been used to describe violent conflicts over extractive resources like gold, diamonds, oil and gas in Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Congo (Mai-Bornu 2019; Marks 2019). According to Turner, so-called ‘resource conflict’ is not so much caused by the scarcity of materials, and the reactions towards such needs are mainly ‘the result of ongoing, political struggles to maintain control over fluctuating resources into the future’ (Turner 2004, 879). In other words, it is the competition to be strategically positioned to control future resources that is causing the eruption of these conflicts. As a result, it would be odd to apply this term to both conflicts, whose participants, conflict concerns and consequences are vastly different. Therefore, the label does not paint the entire picture.

In Mali’s Mopti area, the conflict resulting in deaths and destruction of property has been dubbed ‘ethnic violence’ (Benjaminsen and Ba 2021). A study conducted within the Gushiegu area of Ghana described the conflict within those communities along ethnic lines as the Fulani and Konkomba conflicts (Olaniyan 2015). The fact that a conflict is waged on ethnic lines does not always mean that ethnic diversity is at the foundation of the conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 88). These conflicts have been fought along intra-ethnic lines by those sharing the same ethnic identities (Oyeniyi 2010; Ambe-Uva 2011; Onwuzuruigbo 2013). As a result, labelling them as ‘ethnic violence’ fails to add up.

According to scholars, language, categories and labels are not neutral (Zetter 2007, 186; Crawley and Skleparis 2018; de Haas 2021; Hamlin 2021). The use of words, classifications and labels has consequences since they can confer rights on some persons while denying rights to others (Erdal and Oeppen 2018, 982). Several of the labels mentioned above are not neutral in their application. According to Hagmann, scholars in the field of environmental conflict study sometimes begin by labelling disputes as a ‘single-issue phenomenon’ before expanding their research to include non-environmental aspects (Hagmann 2005, 16). Scholars interested in conflicts involving eco-violence in the Sahel region engage in this type of labelling practice. This labelling practice contributes to their portrayal as single-issue occurrences, implying that these conflicts result from a single causal factor or single group of actors.

The term ‘eco-violence’ transcends single-issue event analysis and provides a more encompassing and valuable understanding of these conflicts for theory and further analysis. The term has the conceptual potential to group together disparate concerns into a single neutral concept capable of describing, discussing and conceptualising these conflicts without negatively labelling or politicising conflict actors, their livelihoods or their communities. Hence, we need to understand eco-violence in the context of the Sahel of Africa.

Eco-violence, the umbrella term

Experts have used ‘eco-violence’ to refer to conflicts between groups over land, water and vegetation, amongst other things (Homer-Dixon 1999; de Soysa 2002; Stoett 2012). However, this article develops a more nuanced definition of eco-violence that reflects the evolving nature of these conflicts by drawing on empirical research on the competition for access to and control of water and agricultural resources in the Sahel. This conceptualisation underscores the issues underlying these conflicts, which are entwined with the concept of eco-violence, such as the role of social and environmental injustices and the inefficiency of governmental institutions.

The neo-Malthusians and the Cornucopians are the two significant camps involved in the debates on the linkages among environmental resource scarcity, migration and conflict. The core neo-Malthusian assumptions attribute conflicts to resource shortages, population explosions, and ethnic and political tensions, among other factors, particularly in emerging nations (Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998; Verpoorten 2012, 559). The Cornucopian school of thought claims that neo-Malthusian assumptions about resource scarcity are untenable since the human mind is the ‘ultimate resource’ capable of solving resource scarcity problems through innovative technology and ingenuity (Soysa, 2020). According to the Cornucopians, resource scarcity, rather than fuelling war, will stimulate innovation, boost economic prosperity in the long term and deter violence by fostering collaboration among erstwhile adversaries (Lomborg 2003; Juul 2005; Raleigh, Jordan, and Salehyan 2008; O’Loughlin, Linke, and Witmer 2014). The assumptions of these two camps have an impact on how scholars describe and analyse eco-violence.

Etymologically, the term eco-violence has been used to describe the harm done to the environment and humans through conflicts between social groups and other actors who compete for access to and control over water and other agricultural resources (Homer-Dixon 1999; Stoett 2012; Stoett and Omrow 2021b). Eco-violence includes wilful killing of people, ecocide and ecological sabotage (Stoett and Omrow 2021a). Eco-violence has been defined as a conflict that depicts a situation ‘where people fight for survival due to environmental pressure stemming from a denuded resource base’ (de Soysa 2002, 1). Thus, it refers to conflicts over resource scarcity, and this perspective attributes causality to environmental factors. However, focusing exclusively on the environment as a source of conflict inhibits a more nuanced understanding of the complex linkages between natural resources and human behaviour (Hagmann 2005, 10).

When Rees discusses eco-violence, the primary concern lies with ecological crisis, specifically the destruction to the ecosystem caused by the economic expansion necessitated by rising market capitalism and modern societal structures (Rees 2008, 689). Eco-violence has been used in recent years to refer to ‘agential and structural violence’ that affects both the environment and humanity and may or may not occur during a conflict (Stoett and Omrow 2021b, 3); and, in particular, to refer to the illegal wildlife trade in endangered species (Stoett and Omrow 2021a). It has been suggested that most of the eco-violence literature has focused exclusively on the ‘Homer-Dixon analytic route’ – the connection between environmental shortage and armed violence – with less consideration given to the ecological effects of violent conflicts and military operations (Stoett 2012, 20). This view is consistent with research on these conflicts in the Sahel. The term ‘eco-violence’ has been used in other parts of the world to describe the conflicts over water and agricultural resources (Homer-Dixon 1999; de Soysa 2001).

Within the Sahel region, terms such as ‘eco-violence theory’ or ‘eco-violence thesis’ are frequently used to theoretically explain conflicts over water and agricultural resources. Eco-violence theory refers to a belief that environmental degradation caused by extractive activities contributes to the emergence of conflict (Okpaleke and Abraham-Dukuma 2020, 127–128). According to some scholars, the ‘eco-violence thesis’ implies that changes in socio-ecological and demographic characteristics, when combined with adverse climatic conditions, facilitate violence (Okoli and Ogayi 2018, 131). Nonetheless, the conflicts that these frameworks – ‘eco-violence theory’ or ‘eco-violence thesis’ – seek to explain are not yet widely referred to as ‘eco-violence’. However, eco-violence has been used to describe the violent conflicts caused by the scarcity of renewable resources such as water and agricultural land in the Sahel region (Ogu 2020, 44) – most notably, the intractable and violent disputes between herders and arable farmers in Nigeria (Ogu 2020, 45).

Water, crops, wood and fish supplies are the critical resources for which individuals or groups compete, and their shortage is a result of environmental scarcity (Homer-Dixon 1999). Environmental scarcity refers to the ‘scarcity of renewable resources, such as cropland, forests, river water, and fish stocks’ (Homer-Dixon 1999, 8). According to Homer-Dixon, the three sources of environmental scarcity are (1) supply-instigated scarcity, (2) demand-instigated scarcity, and (3) structural scarcity. Supply-instigated scarcity results from scarcity due to resource depletion; population explosion and over-consumption cause demand-instigated scarcity; and, finally, ‘unequal distribution’ of national resources leads to structural scarcity (Homer-Dixon 1999). Eco-violence has been linked to resource depletion, population growth and unequal resource allocation. In this scenario, eco-violence includes environmental scarcity and its consequences, population growth, and the unequal distribution of resources.

Additionally, eco-violence encompasses visible violence and its consequences and social injustice, environmental degradation, inclusive duties and the connections between people and their environment (Stoett 2012). It is critical to include environmental deterioration when discussing the idea of eco-violence; scarcity breeds conflict, and conflict wreaks havoc on the environment; such a circumstance exacerbates the shortage of resources already in existence, resulting in further conflict (Stoett 2012). Additionally, structural violence or conceptions of social injustice may be used to describe instances such as ‘resource capture’, which refers to the misallocation of limited resources to a favoured group via state laws and institutions to the disadvantage of another group (Homer-Dixon 1999). Thus, eco-violence refers to physical and structural violence perpetrated against people and the environment.

According to an extensive study on conflicts related to eco-violence in Africa’s Sahel area, these conflicts result from more considerable socioeconomic tensions and competing groups’ future resource aspirations (Turner 2004, 883). Also, ‘…if there is conflict over water, then that conflict results from a failure of politics to negotiate a settlement over the shared use of water’ (Barnett 2000, 276, emphasis is in the original). Some of the previously stated causes of eco-violence can be summarised as follows: the effects of persistent climatic conditions and their consequences for society (Omilusi 2016; Bukari, Sow, and Scheffran 2018; Ducrotoy et al. 2018); competition for opportunities and resources associated with increased agricultural investments (OECD 2010; Bukari, Sow, and Scheffran 2018); uncompensated crop damage, rape, killing of people on both sides, cattle rustling and denial of rights and access to grazing opportunities (Okoli and Atelhe 2014; Olaniyan 2015; Olaniyan, Francis, and Okeke-Uzodike 2015; Ogbette, Attama, and Okoh 2018; Sule 2021); the ineptitude of governments and availability of military-grade firearms (Ajala 2020; Ojo 2020); grievances caused by exclusionary practices – for instance, the native and non-native dichotomy (Bassett 1988; Sayne 2012; Kuusaana and Bukari 2015) and the construction and representation of people and their livelihoods with specific discriminatory frames (Chukwuma 2020; Nwankwo 2021).

A clearer understanding of eco-violence can be made based on the strength of the above-summarised causes and manifestations of eco-violence in the West African subregion. This article contends that eco-violence refers to conflicts in which competition for water and agricultural resources occurs within or between social groups or state actors, often resulting in mass murder and destruction of the environment and properties; such conflicts are exacerbated by the state’s (or states’) failure to address resource redistribution challenges, institutional failures, and environmental and social injustice. This understanding of eco-violence is based on empirical studies in the Sahel of Africa and elsewhere.

The preceding description of eco-violence touched on a few points that previous definitions of eco-violence omit. Nonetheless, it encompassed areas that extant definitions of eco-violence covered, such as the resources fought for, like water and agricultural resources (Homer-Dixon 1999; Adibe 2020; Ogu 2020). Additionally, it included factors such as social groups as competing actors (Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998; Homer-Dixon 1999; Ajala 2020) and the connection between these conflicts and resource scarcity, environmental conflict and human destruction (Homer-Dixon 1999; Rees 2008; Stoett 2012; Stoett and Omrow 2021c). Our definition builds on previous definitions by identifying state actors as potential adversaries in eco-violence (Cooley 1984; Parker 1991), stressing the severity of these conflicts, which can result in the mass murder of people (Adibe 2020; Ajala 2020; Ojo 2020); social injustices endured by the adversaries (Bassett 1988; Kuusaana and Bukari 2015; Adeoye 2017); and wanton institutional failures associated with governmental policies towards issues related to these conflicts (Adibe 2020; Ajala 2020; Sule 2021). Due to ineffective government policies and challenges posed by adverse climatic conditions and migration, among other issues, agricultural resource scarcity and its associated challenges are not managed effectively enough to avert the unprecedented level of human, material and environmental destruction currently occurring in the Sahel region. The problem is not just the environment but the politics of managing the people, resources and environment. Thus, this article proposes a broader definition of conflicts over water and agricultural resources, incorporating additional dimensions of these conflicts.

Thus, as defined above, the term ‘eco-violence’ provides a better conceptualisation of the conflicts in the Sahel between nomadic herders and sedentary farmers and a uniform name that is neutral and encompasses more dimensions associated with the conflict than simply presenting the conflict as a single-issue problem. In addition, the term eco-violence will decrease the intense attention given to the identities of the contending parties and their trade (Fulani herders and farmers) compared with the many labels used to describe the conflicts over arable land and water. Such a change will bring the broader social-ecological and political factors shaping these conflicts to bear. Thus, the actualities of the situations and circumstances that those who engage in these conflicts face – which are mass murders, violent altercations, destruction of nature and infrastructure, mass displacements of people, social injustices, resource capture, and adverse climatic conditions – will be in focus, not the identities or occupations of the competing parties.

Emerging trends of eco-violence

The changing nature of eco-violence became apparent among scholars when the effects of the synergy between some of the actors engaged in Islamic militancy and eco-violence began to manifest (Cline 2021; Nnorom 2021); the severity and frequency of eco-violence became a problematic issue in the Sahel region, particularly in Nigeria and Mali, as a result of this new trend. According to Nnorom (2021, 92), the founders of Boko Haram in Nigeria were connected to the Fulani ethnic group, a herding people that can be found throughout the West African sub-region and beyond.

This relationship between some of these non-state actors has evolved into one in which armed Fulani herders and their militia have gained access to military-grade weaponry and operational procedures comparable to those employed by the Taliban or al-Qaeda (Nnorom 2021; Zenn and Weiss 2021, 49). The collaboration between bandits and Islamic terrorists such as the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) has created a platform for the mutual exchange of technical expertise for kidnapping for ransom and extortion targeting schoolchildren, such as the kidnapping of over 200 young school girls by Boko Haram in Chibok, Borno State Nigeria (Ojewale 2021). Reports indicate that trainee fighters at Katiba Macina training camps in Mali include not only Malians but also nationals from countries such as Burkina Faso and Nigeria who were former herders and spoke Fulfulde, the Fulani ethnic group’s language (Cline 2021, 9). This trend has heightened awareness of the transnational pattern of eco-violence.

The sophistication of the assaults carried out by so-called bandits associated with the Fulani herders may indicate collaboration between these bandits and the Islamic terrorists. According to security agents and government officials in Nigeria, such bandits are primarily disgruntled former herders (Akwagyiram 2020; Oyero 2021). These bandits are after not only soft targets, but also the top echelons of Nigerian military institutions, as evidenced by the attack and kidnapping on 24 August 2021 at the Nigerian Defence Academy in Kaduna, which resulted in the deaths of two officers and the abduction of another (Musa 2021). The recent trend in Nigeria of kidnapping individuals in busloads (Achirga and George 2021; Musa 2021), as well as the attack on 26 March at the Kaduna International Airport (Nwabughiogu 2022; Reuters 2022), and the bombing of trains and the kidnapping of hundreds of train passengers over two consecutive days (Ojewale, Badiora, and Onuoha 2022), exemplify this emerging trend. After investigating the two train attacks, the Nigerian government confirmed the coordination between the so-called bandits and Boko Haram that observers had suspected for some time (Ayitogo 2022; Olaniyi 2022). The acknowledgement by the spokesperson for the federal government of Nigeria of the collaboration between the so-called bandits and Boko Haram confirms what has already been recognised as a dangerous trend that would exacerbate the insecurity situation in Nigeria and neighbouring states in the Sahel of Africa.

Between June 2011 and March 2020, reports indicate that Nigerians paid over $18 million in ransom to kidnappers (SBM Intelligence 2020). While it may appear as though only ordinary Nigerians are under siege, the Nigerian president is also overwhelmed by this insecurity, to the extent that the presidency paid approximately $50,000 in ransom to bandits to retrieve a truck-mounted 12.7-mm antiaircraft gun that posed a threat to his aircraft (Parkinson and Hinshaw 2021). The increasing acquisition of armed drones by non-state actors in Africa, particularly in the Sahel, to support insurgent and terrorist operations (Olumba 2022), indicates that it may not be long until social groups involved in eco-violence begin using armed drones. Although reports suggest that Fulani bandits have begun using drones for surveillance and intelligence gathering in Nigeria (Olugbemi 2021), their acquisition and use of armed drones, akin to Boko Haram’s use of armed drones against the Nigerian army, has yet to be confirmed. However, it is uncertain whether their cooperation with Boko Haram will result in them using armed drones to conduct their operations, although this is a possibility if their revenue expands and the cost of the armed drone decreases. If they are unable to obtain armed drones, it is believed that things may reach a point where they will install improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on commercial drones, thereby weaponising the drones for violent purposes.

Conclusion

The article engages the practice of labelling conflict between farmers and herders in the Sahel areas with a variety of primordial identities or other applicable terms and advocates using an umbrella word – eco-violence – to label and describe these conflicts. In general, the article contends that such an approach – ascribing several labels to a particular conflict – distracts attention away from other components of the conflict. Additionally, this practice is exacerbated by the way these disputes are conceptualised as having single-issue causal factors. Furthermore, this article contributes to our knowledge of eco-violence in the Sahel area by underscoring empirical evidence, some of which relates to intricate parts of the concept, and aligning them into its conceptualisation.

The article makes a case for the conflicts over water and agricultural resources, which have been given various labels, to be called eco-violence, a neutral concept that lacks the ambiguity and politicisation that those other labels enjoy. We think that if researchers interested in conflicts over water and agricultural resources in Africa’s Sahel region respond to our appeal, it will deepen the description and knowledge of these conflicts, which will be helpful for theoretical analysis and practice. Hopefully, the ideas discussed in this article may generate additional conversation in this area. A further investigation into how this labelling practice may have influenced the various theories and methods used in studies on eco-violence in the Sahel region may be carried out in future studies.

Acknowledgements

Special thanks to Dr Thomas Stubbs, for his comments on an earlier version of this paper that were immensely helpful, and for his support. Many thanks to the journal’s editors, two anonymous reviewers, and Dr Kaat Smets, Dr Chijioke Uba, Dr Nnamdi Ekeanyanwu and Greg Leurs.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Ezenwa E. Olumba

Ezenwa Olumba is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway, University of London. His teaching and research interests lie at the intersection of politics and migration. His geographical expertise is within Africa, mainly the West African sub-region. He holds a BA in international relations from Rhine-Waal University of Applied Sciences in Kleve, Germany, and a master’s degree in international relations from Royal Holloway, University of London.

Bernard U. Nwosu

Bernard U. Nwosu, otherwise known as Ben, holds a PhD in political science from Waikato, New Zealand. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Development Studies of the University of Nigeria and a Senior Lecturer of Political Science. His research focuses on democratisation, civil society, conflict and public policy. His most recent book, Civil Society and Democracy in Nigeria: A Theoretical Approach, was published in July 2021 by Routledge.

Francis N. Okpaleke

Francis Okpaleke holds a PhD in international relations and security studies from the University of Waikato. He is currently the External Engagement Manager at an international not-for-profit based in Auckland, where he leads the policy, advocacy and regulatory efforts that bring better outcomes for people experiencing unmanageable debt and poverty. His research interests include drones, liberal security studies, climate policy and security, and environmental politics. His work has been featured in the Journal of Strategic Security, Sustainability, Energy Research and Social Science, Environmental Policy and Governance and other outlets. His latest book project (with Palgrave Macmillan) is entitled Drones and US Grand Strategy in Global Politics (2022).

Rowland Chukwuma Okoli

Rowland Chukwuma Okoli is a Lecturer of Political Science at Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Anambra State, Nigeria. He obtained a PhD in political science (with a specialisation in political economy) from the University of Nigeria (UNN), an MSc from UNN, and a BSc from the University of Abuja. His research interests include but are not limited to civil society, conflicts and social movements in Africa. He also serves as a Research Consultant, providing technical assistance to organisations implementing projects in conflict-affected areas across Nigeria. He has published articles in reputable journals and presented papers at respected conferences.

Notes

1 Neo-pastoralism is a new system of cattle ownership and management in which the actual owners of the cattle hire paid nomadic herders to manage the cattle on their behalf, for profit-making and to conceal illicit funds; it involves the use of assault rifles and other military-grade weapons to protect the herds (Ajala 2020, 2050).