Ethiopia’s 1984/85 famine and the Red Terror Trials

Abstract

Processes of justice and accountability have long overlooked the death and suffering resulting from famines. This article examines how various domestic and international actors involved in the Red Terror Trials (1992–2010) framed the 1984–1985 famine in Ethiopia and what explains the absence of famine-related cases from the trials. Based on archival sources and interviews, the article discusses how the Red Terror Trials offered an opportunity to prosecute famine-related cases. The study shows, however, that despite the framing of the famine as ‘political’ and an act of crime by various actors, the Red Terror Trials were silent about the famine. One explanation is the difficulty of establishing a legal case based on famine-related casualties, coupled with a lack of incentive as there were already enough criminal cases to prosecute former Dergue regime officials. The complicated political history of the famine and its causes, which might implicate various domestic and international actors and not just the Dergue officials, can also explain the absence of the famine-related cases from the trials.

Keywords:

• Famine
• mass starvation
• transitional justice
• Ethiopia
• Red Terror Trials

Introduction

The declining trend in famine cases over the past four decades has shown signs of reversal recently. Since the 2011 Somalia famine, we have seen alarming signs of famine and famine-like conditions in South Sudan, Yemen, Syria, Nigeria, Madagascar and Ethiopia. Armed conflicts, climate change and, more recently, the economic downturn exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic are major factors behind this alarming trend (FSIN and Global Network Against Food Crises 2021). According to the 2022 report on global food crisis, in 2021 around 193 million people were in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above)¹ conditions in 53 countries, an increase of 40 million people from the previous year.²

Parallelly, the study of famines as starvation crimes has attracted growing attention from scholars. Despite ‘faltering scholarly interest’ in famine research (Rubin 2019, 1634), recent studies have focussed on framing famines as ‘crimes’ (De Waal 2018a; Conley and De Waal 2019) and as the subject of international law (Defalco 2016; Luciano 2021). The study of famines as crimes that require the establishment of responsibility and accountability is rooted in the argument that they are preventable acts of commission or omission (Tyner 2018). Parashar and Orjuela (2021) argue that famines need to be conceptualised as violence, rather than as byproducts of ‘real’ political violence such as wars. Famines, however, are largely overlooked in processes of justice and accountability; despite some attempts, persons responsible have not been prosecuted or sentenced for famine crimes (Defalco 2016).

To address political violence, mass atrocities and gross human rights abuses, transitional justice (TJ) has, particularly after the Cold War, emerged as a global norm and set of mechanisms (Nagy 2008). Broadly, TJ refers to policies and practices (trials, truth commissions, restitution, etc.) aimed at bringing justice and reconciliation (Sriram 2007). The role of various actors in TJ processes is central in shaping the process and its outcomes and has been the subject of much scholarly work. Some studies map and discuss the various ways that actors attempt to ‘drive’ or ‘spoil’ justice (Skaar and Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2013a; Sriram 2013; Huyse 1995). To gain an in-depth understanding, other studies have focussed on particular actors (for example, the state, civil society or the diaspora) (Backer 2003; Orjuela 2003, 2018). Yet attempts by TJ actors to either seek or escape justice and legal accountability for famine and starvation crimes are rarely studied. Looking at Ethiopia’s 1992–2010 TJ process and attempt to prosecute former Dergue regime officials, this article investigates how various actors of the Red Terror Trials framed Ethiopia’s 1984–1985 famine and what explains the absence of famine-related cases from the trials.

By doing so, the article contributes to famine research and TJ studies on Ethiopia and more broadly in Africa. The analysis is guided by scholarly work on ‘drivers of justice’ (Skaar and Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2013a) and ‘spoilers of justice’ (Sriram 2013). The study will thus also feed into ongoing actor-oriented discussions in TJ, its blind spots, and the expansion of TJ to encompass different forms of violence.

In the next section, I provide a brief description of the Ethiopian context. A conceptual discussion follows, arguing for the framing of famines as violence. The analytical framework used for this study, i.e. drivers and spoilers of justice, is also introduced. Next follows a note on the methods employed and materials used. Some empirical data about actors involved in the Red Terror Trials are presented thereafter. The analytical discussion is presented in three sections dealing with (1) the context of the Red Terror Trials vis-à-vis famine-related cases; (2) silencing of the famine-related cases under the Red Terror Trials; and (3) a discussion on what explains this silence. The conclusions identify three main takeaways from the study.

The Dergue regime, famine and the Red Terror Trials of Ethiopia

Although the 1984–1985 famine gained extensive global attention due wide media coverage, Ethiopia has experienced several famine and famine-like situations both historically and recently. Zewde (1976), for instance, documents the occurrence of more than 10 major famines between 1540 and 1742. The most disastrous and well-recorded famine, referred to as the kifu qen (evil days), was the 1888–1892 famine that is believed to have killed a third of the total population of Ethiopia (Pankhurst 1966). Another disastrous famine was the 1972–1974 Wollo famine in north-eastern Ethiopia (Sen 1982). Although mainly attributable to widespread drought, the Wollo famine is historically significant as it was accompanied by the 1974 revolution and the ultimate overthrow of the monarchy by the military group called the Dergue, led by Colonel Mengistu Hailemariam (Mesfin 1984; Talton 2014).

The famine of 1984–1985 claimed between 600,000 and one million lives, internally displaced 2.5 million people, and left 400,000 refugees (Africa Watch 1991; Wolde Giorgis 1989). It was one of the worst disasters in recent memory, caused by a combination of drought and war. When drought swept across the Horn of Africa and Sahel region during the early and mid-1980s, Ethiopia under the Provisional Military Administration Council (also known as the Dergue) was in the middle of a civil war, mainly with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (Hailu 1985; Africa Watch 1991). Additionally, the Dergue regime failed to respond to the crisis, partly because of its preoccupation with the 10th anniversary of the revolution, while aid agencies and donor countries were caught up in Cold War politics (Wolde Giorgis 1989; Smith 1987). The Dergue administration made some efforts to alleviate death and suffering, however. Its Relief and Rehabilitation Commission undertook massive work related to information management, logistics mobilisation and coordination of relief agencies (Adugna 2014). Large-scale resettlement and villagisation programmes were also undertaken by the government (1984–1986) as a response to the famine. The programme resettled around 300,000 people, but is believed to have resulted in the death of around 33,000 to 50,000 people due to starvation, disease and exhaustion (see Rahmato 1988; Africa Watch 1991).

The Dergue regime fell in 1991 after almost two decades of civil war, leading to the ascent to power of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of four ethnic-based liberation movements. Subsequently, a Special Prosecutor Office (SPO) was established in 1992 with the mandate to investigate and prosecute gross human rights abuses and crimes committed by the Dergue regime (1974–1991) (Tiba 2007; Tessema 2018). This Dergue period included, besides the civil war and the famine, the Red Terror (Qey Shibir) period, which refers to the government’s violent urban counter-insurgency against political groups (Zewde 2009). The trials, referred to as the Red Terror Trials, started in 1994, and were largely focussed on the Red Terror and to some extent the civil war. In addition to prosecution and the corollary mandate of recording the Dergue regime’s crimes given to the prosecutor, the TJ process also involved the lustration of Dergue officials and the restitution of private properties (Tronvoll, Schaefer, and Aneme (2009b). The lustration entailed curtailing of the civil and political rights of the former Dergue regime and its Workers Party officials, while Proclamation 110/95 of 1995 provided legal grounds for restitution of private property (such as dwelling houses, manufacturing plants, dairy farms, vehicles, etc.) that were confiscated by the Dergue regime as part of its Socialist/Marxist programme.

The politics of the 1984–1985 famine and relief operations remain a source of debate. Kissi (2005) broadly identifies two strands of interpretation in the literature, one focussed on the Dergue’s failure to respond and their use of starvation as a military strategy and the other highlighting the rebel forces’ use of relief aid for military purposes together with the support given to the rebels by the interventions of Western countries. Studies on the Red Terror Trials concentrate on legal proceedings and human rights dimensions of the trials, and to some extent on the political process (Tessema 2018; Reta 2017; Aneme 2006; Tronvoll, Schaefer, and Alemu 2009a). Interestingly, the special prosecutor had initially assigned an investigation team to look into cases related to the blocking of food aid and the resettlement programme (Vaughan 2009; Mayfield 1995). However, none of the Dergue officials were prosecuted on grounds of the famine or the resettlement programme (see Tessema 2018 for the list of charges). This article furthers the discussion on the Red Terror Trials by focussing on the absence of the famine from the trial-based TJ process.

Famines as violence

Our understanding of famines has changed over time, reflecting evolving interpretations of their causes. This spans from the earlier Malthusian notion of famines as nature’s way of levelling population growth to Amartya Sen’s ‘entitlement’ theory that refutes the Malthusian theory by centring food access (as opposed to food availability) (Watkins and Menken 1985). More recent works focus on political failure and armed conflicts as main causes of famines (Devereux 2000). Conley and De Waal (2019) conceptualise famines as ‘mass starvation crimes’ perpetrated by leaders to serve one or more of nine objectives: (1) extermination or genocide; (2) control through weakening a population; (3) gaining territorial control; (4) flushing out a population; (5) punishment; (6) material extraction or theft; (7) extreme exploitation; (8) war provisioning; and (9) comprehensive societal transformation (Conley and De Waal 2019). These changes in understanding famines reflect both the evolving nature of famines themselves through time (see De Waal 2018a for the different periods of famines in world history) and a growing understanding of the complex socio-economic-political forces driving famines.

How we understand and name famines and mass starvations is crucial, especially in relation to discussions about accountability, responsibility and justice more broadly. The large-scale death and suffering of famines are usually framed as ‘humanitarian catastrophes’, ‘disasters’ and ‘emergencies’ (Edkins 2007; Parashar and Orjuela 2021). Despite the growing understanding of famines as political, preventable, manmade acts of commission or omission (Tyner 2018), they are usually not conceptually framed as violence. The scholarly focus on direct forms of violence like wars and genocides on the one hand and an obsession with abstract theoretical, philosophical discussions or the ‘fetishization of abstraction’ (Persaud and Kumarakulasingam 2019, 199; Parashar and Orjuela 2021) on the other can explain the exclusion of famine suffering and deaths from the conceptual construct of violence.

The condition of famine overlaps with closely related problems such as poverty, food insecurity, hunger and malnutrition. However, scholars argue that famines are unique in the sense that they are extreme situations, marked by excess death in a short period (Rubin 2019; De Waal 2018a; Defalco 2016; Gráda 2007; Devereux 2000). Moreover, famines can be prevented also in the poorest countries, even if food insecurity, hunger or poverty is not eradicated (Devereux 2009). Conceptualising famines as violence is essential to move beyond the language of ‘humanitarian catastrophes’, ‘disasters’ and ‘emergencies’ and start locating famines and mass starvations in processes and studies of accountability and justice. While the overlapping and complex problems of hunger, poverty and food insecurity can also be conceptualised as violence, this study is limited to the study of famine as a distinct condition.

Drivers and spoilers of justice

The initiation, process and outcome of TJ processes are to a large extent shaped by the role various actors play. Early studies on TJ focussed on understanding the interests and motives of ‘elite’ actors. Only recently have the roles and interests of a more diverse set of actors been systematically studied (Skaar and Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2013b). In this article, the ‘drivers of justice’ (Skaar and Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2013a) and ‘spoilers of justice’ (Sriram 2013) conceptual frameworks are used to evaluate how various actors involved in the Red Terror Trials framed the 1984–1985 famine of Ethiopia and what explains the absence of the famine-related cases from the trials.

The ‘drivers of justice’ framework adopts a systematic approach to understand the strategies deployed by various actors to pursue their interests and goals in a TJ process. By making a broad distinction between domestic and international actors, Skaar and Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2013a) distinguish four steps to guide the study of actors in a TJ process: (1) identify relevant actors; (2) examine their preferences, capabilities and norms; (3) identify environmental constraints under which they operate; and (4) observe changes longitudinally. In addition to focussing on actors as agents in a TJ process, the framework also allows us to incorporate the structural conditions shaping actors’ preferences, policies and strategies in our analysis. This is done by considering the ‘national’ and ‘global’ time or context during which the TJ process is taking place. The ‘drivers of justice’ framework is employed as the main analytical tool in this study to map the multiple actors of the Red Terror Trials, their preferences, the environment they operated in and how their interests and strategies changed through time in relation to the 1984–1985 Ethiopian famine.

To complement this framework, I employ the ideas of Sriram (2013), who draws specific attention to ‘spoilers of justice’. She argues that the ‘drivers of justice’ framework serves as a broader tool to map out actors and study their interests and preferences, with a focus on ‘drivers’, as the name also suggests. The ‘spoilers of justice’ framework, conversely, draws our attention to specific actors ‘who are able to halt, slow, alter, or even pervert justice processes; why they do so and how they design their resistance to such processes’ (Sriram 2013,  248). Accordingly, five main conditions and features explaining, shaping and affecting the decisions and choices of spoilers are identified by Sriram (2013):

Actors who are responsible for serious offences are likely to ‘spoil’ justice. Some actors might be vulnerable to charges of serious offences, which makes them want to ‘spoil’ a TJ process or part thereof. Several spoilers can join together to form strong resistance to a TJ process and maintain a relative power by way of their networking. The presence or absence of strong normative and/or material goals and incentives (social, political, economic, and justice) relative to accountability can also explain why and how some actors become ‘spoilers’. Having a respected status (and prestige) or the lacking it (especially in relation to their constituency) is another condition that explains ‘spoilers’ choices and decisions.

It is important to note that the ‘drivers’ vs ‘spoilers’ distinction is not static. For Skaar and Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2013a), time is a key dimension along which different actors change their motives. Sriram (2013), on the other hand, underscores that ‘spoiler’ actors can pursue accountability and be ‘drivers’ of certain aspects of a TJ process. This can be done for various reasons including as a strategy to enable them to ‘spoil’ other aspects of the same process. Thus, it is important to recognise and study the dynamics of actors as ‘drivers’ and ‘spoilers’ over time and across the various aspects of the TJ process.

Methods and materials³

This article builds mainly on data gathered from documents and interviews, analysed through thematic analysis with the aim to build a rich and in-depth understanding of the case. The ‘drivers of justice’ analytical framework (Skaar and Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2013a) is used as a methodological guide to broadly classify actors into domestic and international and study their strategies, interests and policy priorities, and to observe changes over time. The study is primarily confined to the period of the Red Terror Trials, starting with the 1992 proclamation for the establishment of the special prosecutor and ending with the publication of the SPO’s final report in 2010. However, the study also refers to data outside of this time frame to understand the dynamic nature of how the actors changed their policies, strategies and framings related to the famine over time.

Official reports, biographies/memoirs of senior government officials, case files (court proceedings), legal documents (proclamations, constitution), political party manifestos, reports by organisations, etc. were used as archival sources. Through the snowballing technique, five semi-structured interviews were conducted in 2021 over the telephone/internet. The interviewees were individuals with close knowledge of the Red Terror Trials and the famine as former employees of the SPO, the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, a domestic civil society organisation, and an international aid agency. In 2022, an additional six in-person semi-structured interviews were conducted with former SPO officials, senior Dergue regime officials and retired senior officials of the EPRDF. Research articles and books on the Red Terror Trial, especially those published while the SPO was functional and when it was possible to access primary sources that are now unavailable, are also used.

The material used for the study is limited due to three main challenges: (1) difficulty accessing much of the Red Terror Trial archives from the former SPO (periodic reports, proposals, etc.) as they were transferred to the National Intelligence and Security Service which does not allow access to them; (2) difficulty accessing key individuals and documents from the TPLF due to the current political crisis and conflict in Ethiopia; and (3) difficulty conducting fieldwork due to travel restrictions associated with Covid-19. However, important archival data including documents written in Amharic were gathered with the help of a research assistant, and some interviews were conducted over the telephone/internet. Due to the difficulty in gathering sufficient data on all actors, more attention was paid to the former and new regimes domestically, while the study of international actors mostly relied on sources from the US government and civil society organisations like Human Rights Watch. If it is someday available, further research on this topic could make use of the currently inaccessible data (archives, interviews) to look deeper into the details of the decision-making process of the SPO that left famine-related cases out of the trial process.

Domestic and international actors of the Red Terror Trials

During the Red Terror Trial process that started in 1992, a range of actors played different and sometimes contradictory roles. Skaar and Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2013a) distinguish between domestic and international actors in a TJ process, with various sets of actors under each. The military Dergue regime ruling Ethiopia from 1974 to 1991, in this regard, is the former regime whose officials and military leaders were prosecuted under the Red Terror Trials. The SPO, established in 1992 and reporting directly to the Prime Minister, was an organ of the new government – mandated to investigate and prosecute former Dergue officials.⁴ Over a period of 17 years, the Office prosecuted more than 5000 former Dergue regime civil, military and security officials (Special Prosecutor Office 2010). The police, the courts and the Public Defenders’ Office were the main actors within the new government apparatus (Tessema 2018).

Inter Africa Group, a domestic civil society organisation, played a prominent role by setting up a project office for following up on, monitoring, and reporting about the trials. The Red Terror Victims’ Families Association was another civil society actor that played a key role as it worked closely with the SPO during the investigation, and later set up the Red Terror Martyrs Museum in Addis Ababa (Tessema 2018; Vaughan 2009). The landscape of political parties changed with the political dynamics of the country through the Red Terror Trials period. The EPRDF, however – the coalition that overthrew the Dergue regime – remained in power during the transition period and beyond (Kefale 2011).

Among international actors, the governments of the US, UK, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Canada and Ireland played significant roles during the trials through financing and capacity building, including providing technical expertise and material support. International non-governmental organisations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch were notable for their advocacy, research, and reporting. The Carter Center was another international actor carrying out important capacity-building activities. From the international epistemic community, the International Center for Transitional Justice, and the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team (Equipo Argentino de Antropología Forense, EAAF) were prominent in providing expertise (Vaughan 2009).

The Red Terror Trials as victor’s justice

Many post-conflict trials are examples of ‘victor’s justice’. The legitimacy of such trials is usually questioned for being ‘nothing more than an elegant path for the victorious parties to take vengeance at their former enemies’ (Ben-Nun 2019, 8). The Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals and to some extent the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have been cited as examples (Peskin 2005). The Red Terror Trials of Ethiopia were also characterised as ‘victor’s justice’ (Tessema 2018; Legide 2021; Interviews with A and B, March 2021).

The fall of the Dergue regime in 1991 was preceded by the London Conference of May 1991, which was a failed attempt by the US to broker a deal between the rebel forces and the government (De Waal 1992). With former leader Mengistu Hailemariam fleeing to Zimbabwe, rebel forces took control over the capital without any resistance (Tessema 2018). The transition period, which started with the July 1991 Conference, was dominated by disagreements between the EPRDF and the Oromo Liberation Front regarding areas of control, elections and representation in the government. That culminated with the Oromo Liberation Front exiting the transitional government and resorting to armed struggle again (Gudina 2004), thus paving the way for a consolidation of state power under the EPRDF coalition. The fact that the Dergue regime had collapsed and that there had been no successful negotiations, and the subsequent consolidation of state power under the EPRDF, allowed the new regime to initiate a TJ process without significant contestation.

The Red Terror Trials did not face significant resistance from either domestic or international actors, except some challenges that effectively did not change the scope and nature of the TJ process. Despite scholarly debates on alternative restorative justice approaches and appeals of some of the accused seeking apology and reconciliation, the Red Terror Trials as a TJ process were mainly a process of retributive justice (Aneme 2006; Tronvoll, Schaefer, and Aneme 2009b). According to former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, the choice of a criminal prosecution strategy had been envisioned already during the armed struggle (Tronvoll, Schaefer, and Aneme 2009b). The necessity of prosecuting Dergue officials was also emphasised by the SPO as emanating from domestic and international law.⁵

Other notable challenges with the trial include the long delay of the whole process, along with lengthy pre-trial detentions without charges (i.e. habeas corpus), attracting criticism from human rights organisations, donor countries and the defendants themselves (Elgesem and Aneme 2009; Africa Watch 1994). Moreover, genocide charges based on Article 281(a) and (c) of the Ethiopian Penal Code used a broader definition of ‘genocide’ (going beyond the 1948 Genocide Convention definition) to protect political, ethnic, racial and religious groups (Tessema 2018). These charges were objected to by the defendants themselves (Aneme 2009; Interviews with F and G, July 2022) and also attracted criticism from parties in the political opposition.⁶ Despite the debates and criticism from various actors, the challenges and issues surrounding the Red Terror Trials did not result in any significant change in the scope and outcome of the trials, including in relation to the prospect of prosecuting former Dergue officials for cases related to the 1984–1985 famine.

Global and national contexts (Skaar and Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2013a) during the trials are also important. Civil society organisations, the media and multiparty politics were not yet fully developed (Rahmato 2004), while the political space was dominated by the radical transformation of the country to a multi-ethnic federation (Young 1996) and the secession of Eritrea (Haile 1994). Internationally, the post-Cold War ‘third wave of democratisation’ was sweeping through Africa (Nur 2015). International support for the new government focussed on ensuring liberalisation, democratisation and related policies (Interview with E, July 2021). It is also pertinent that there were not many similar experiences to learn from, at least not in the African context. Asked about possibilities of other forms of TJ mechanisms, then Prime Minister Meles Zenawi (cited in Tronvoll, Schaefer, and Aneme 2009b) said ‘we didn’t think of [a] truth and reconciliation commission. In any case, there was no such experience at the time’. A former staff at the SPO also confided that, at the time, they did not understand the trials as a TJ process (Interview with C, March 2021).

Silencing the famine in the Red Terror Trials

The Red Terror Trials offered an opportunity for prosecution of famine-related cases. But how was the famine framed or viewed by actors involved in the TJ process? The framing of famines is essential for discussions of responsibility and accountability. Here, I discuss various actors’ framing of the 1984–1985 famine, while also observing the dynamics between different actors in the process.

The 1984–1985 famine as a ‘political’ and ‘criminal’ act

The 1984–1985 famine of Ethiopia has been a subject of political discussion both during the famine period and afterwards. Beyond a ‘political’ framing, we also observe that former rebel groups and the new regime in the post-1991 period framed the famine as a criminal act. The ‘political’ framing was reflected during the 1994 high-level symposium marking the 10-year commemoration of the 1984–1985 famine. The symposium, titled ‘Famine in Ethiopia: Learning from the Past to Prepare for the Future’, was organised by the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission together with the United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Africa and Inter-Africa Group, and was attended by more than 400 participants from various line ministries, diplomatic missions, local and international non-governmental organisations, the press, regional/local government, the private sector and UN agencies. The conference proceeding published at the end of the symposium reads (Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, 1995):

the technical and managerial aspects of famine response should not be allowed to obscure or indeed replace a frank analysis of the political dimensions of famine disasters, especially in the contexts of warfare, genocide and/or ethnic conflict […]. pp. 7 It is at the same time necessary to move […] to a strategy of empowering the people to prevent famine through political accountability of all actors to the people of Ethiopia in recognition of their fundamental political, economic, and human rights. pp. 9

The statement underlines the political dimensions of both the causes and the relief operation during famines. More importantly, it proposes political accountability of all actors as a strategy to prevent famines. While the statement does not clarify what this political accountability specifically entails, it is clear how the symposium centred around the ‘political’ framing of famines for which ‘accountability’ of actors is essentially tied to people’s ‘fundamental political, economic, and human rights’.

The TPLF in particular was vocal in framing the 1984–1985 famine as a political phenomenon and an act of crime. In an interview published in the party’s official newsletter, Meles Zenawi, TPLF’s former leader, accused the Dergue regime of ‘using food aid as a weapon in its attempt to starve the people into submission’ (Tigray People’s Liberation Front 1990). A co-founder of TPLF, Aregawi Berhe, also argued that the famine was not simply a policy failure, but the ‘Dergue’s logic of war’ (Berhe 2009, 164). This has been the main way of framing the famine by the political parties that made up the new regime (Interviews with J and K, July 2022).

Attempts by the SPO to investigate cases related to food aid and resettlement programmes (Enyew 2010; Mayfield 1995; Vaughan 2009) indicate that the famine was viewed by the government as part of the Dergue regime’s crimes and human rights abuses, at least initially. In a 1994 letter sent to the UN Human Rights Commission regarding the work of the SPO, the Ethiopian transitional government stated that:

[the Dergue regime’s] counter-insurgency strategies involved forcibly relocating hundreds of thousands of rural people and cutting food supplies to insurgent areas. These military policies were instrumental in creating famine and the former Government used relief supplies as weapons to further its war aims.⁷

This letter further states that ‘[t]he Transitional Government of Ethiopia is aware of its obligations concerning the duty to prosecute the systematic violations of human rights and the grave breaches of humanitarian law’ (4, emphasis added). A 1994 report prepared by the SPO listing the Dergue regime’s crimes, including the statement that ‘[t]he forced resettlement program consisted of moving hundreds of thousands of peasants from the north of the country to the south. Originally dubbed a famine relief program, we have evidence of the political nature of the relocation’ (Special Prosecutor Office 1994, 3), further reiterates the government’s view of the famine as a criminal act. Also included in this report is the section ‘Sentencing System’ referring to the Ethiopian Penal Code with a list of crimes and the corresponding sentencing they carry, which includes ‘10 years to life’ for ‘jeopardizing defence/famine’. Article 27 (Jeopardizing Defensive Power of the State, Distress or Famine) of the Special Penal Code of 1974 (cited in Africa Watch 1991, 105-106) states:

(1) Whosoever intentionally by commission or omission directly or indirectly with culpable negligence commits any prejudicial act leading to the consequence of weakening the defensive power of the State or being aware of such a fact fails to do whatever in his capability or creates within the country a grave state of misery, want or famine, epidemic or epizootic disease or distress, especially by improperly hiding or hoarding, destroying or preventing the transport or distribution of grain, foodstuffs or provisions, or remedies or products necessary to the life and health of man or domestic animals, or where the occurrence of any imminent danger of distress or famine having shown a sign, fails to do whatever in his power to control it, is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from ten years to life, and where the offence was intentional and where death has occurred or many lives have perished the penalty may be death.

Together, this indicates, at least initially, the existence of a plan to prosecute and sentence former Dergue officials for crimes related to the 1984–1985 famine based on the available penal code of the country.

Two broadly distinct approaches to the famine and the responsibility of the former regime can be distinguished. First, it is noted that the Dergue’s relatively autonomous Relief and Rehabilitation Commission had pressed the government through early warning signals, and later demanded additional resources for relief work, and reached out to international aid agencies with information and pleas for aid (Wolde Giorgis 1989). Despite leniency and delays, the Dergue government did not deny the famine, although they rejected accusations that it was intentional.⁸ According to the Dergue regime, the West had worsened the famine and manipulated relief operations to undermine the Ethiopian government by supporting and legitimising Eritrean and Tigray rebel groups.⁹ Mengistu Hailemariam, in his May Day speech in Addis Ababa, accused the West: ‘[t]hey vilify and oppose all our positive efforts against famine and pretend to sympathize with our people …’.¹⁰ Thus, the famine and the associated relief operations were framed, though in different ways, as highly political processes by the former and the new regime alike. While for the former regime it was seen as political mainly in a global context, for the rebel group-turned-new regime the famine was framed as political mainly in relation to domestic politics.

Not only domestic actors viewed the famine as a political process. In his 1985 speech, then US President Ronald Reagan, while signing a proclamation for the Human Rights Day, said ‘[i]n Ethiopia a Marxist government has used famine to punish large segments of its own population’.¹¹ US National Security Council representative Fred Waterings, in a US committee working on food crisis in Africa, reportedly influenced the committee’s decision to delay food aid to Ethiopia by arguing that ‘since the famine was the creation of [the Ethiopian] Government it should take care of its own mess’ (quoted in Bello 1990, 114). Similar ‘political’ framings of the famine by the US government can also be seen in, for instance, the US General Accounting Office report¹² evaluating the US response to the famine and the US Agency for International Development (USAID)’s 1998 evaluation report¹³ of food aid to Ethiopia.

Also, other state and non-state international actors understood the famine as political. For instance, the UK’s relationship with the Dergue regime, like that of the US, was not friendly. Archival documents¹⁴ such as internal memos and letters between UK’s Prime Minister Office, Defense Ministry, and Foreign and Commonwealth offices, which were made public in 2015, attest to the government’s dilemma of providing relief aid while wishing to influence the policy of the ‘detestable’ regime in Addis Ababa. Human Rights Watch/Africa (Africa Watch), in its widely referenced reports Evil Days: 30 Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia (1991) and Ethiopia: Reckoning Under the Law (1994), details how the Dergue regime used the famine and resettlement programme as military and political instruments.

The Red Terror Trials and the 1984–1985 famine

International and domestic actors’ views on the famine as a political process, of either omission or commission, were prominent outside of the trials. These actors were, however, silent about famine-related cases during the trials. Charges filed against the Dergue’s senior officials Mengistu Hailemariam et al.¹⁵ mention neither the forced resettlement nor the food aid cases. Available estimates indicate around 500,000–600,000 famine fatalities (Africa Watch 1991), or even as high as one million (Wolde Giorgis 1989). Comparatively, estimates for deaths during the Red Terror crackdown on political groups range between 10,000 and 60,000 with some estimates pushing it to 150,000 (Tessema 2018). Despite such a contrast, the trials were silent about the famine and related cases, something that can also be observed in the 2010 final report of the SPO.

The silence of the Dergue officials about the famine during the trials is self-evident as they were not criminally charged for famine cases. Their silence about the famine can also be broadly observed outside of the trial context, from various autobiographies/memoirs. For instance, then President Colonel Mengistu Hailemariam’s two-volume autobiography (2012 and 2016) titled Tiglachin [Our Struggle] provides detailed accounts of the Revolution, the military operations and to some extent the economic and social development efforts of the regime, but leaves out the famine and the resettlement programme completely. While there has been increased interest in and more publications in recent years about the Dergue period,¹⁶ most of this keeps ‘silent’ about the famine.

The silence of international actors on the famine during the trials is also recognisable. For example, the famine and resettlement programme were central in the 1994 Human Rights Watch report Ethiopia: Reckoning Under the Law, which details the prosecutor’s work, and compiles crimes and human rights abuses of the Dergue regime. However, subsequent reports¹⁷ from the organisation regarding the trials, which critique the due process of law, remain silent on the absence of famine-related cases from the trials. There is no indication that the various countries that provided large-scale technical and financial support to the SPO attempted to or called for an expansion of the scope of the prosecution to cover famine-related cases as had originally been proposed by the prosecutor. Rather, as an interview (October 2021) reveals, these donor countries, eager to support the transition process, had other priorities including liberalisation and democratisation of Ethiopia.

What explains the neglect of the famine under the Red Terror Trials?

The initial structuring of the investigation by the special prosecutor, comprising teams on the food aid blockade and resettlement programmes, suggested the possibility of prosecuting Dergue officials for famine-related cases. With no significant contestation and with a clear framing of the famine as ‘political’ and a crime, the trials offered an opportunity for the government to prosecute former officials for famine-related cases. As one former staff member (Interview with D, June 2021) of the SPO said:

I do not know if it was a political decision or if it was an administrative decision by the chiefs of the office that it was not feasible to go ahead with the case; that I am not sure. But there were enough things that could have made a case … So, even if I do not know why, how this was not reflected in the charges, what I know is that it was taken seriously during investigation. Especially with document evidence, I remember that there was good document evidence.

Despite the possibility of establishing criminal cases, based on available, albeit limited, evidence on the famine, the prosecutor did not file charges. Here I discuss possible conditions explaining the absence of famine-related cases from the trials.

More work, limited resources, absence of incentives

The presence or absence of material and/or normative incentives is an important condition that can explain why actors ‘spoil’ a TJ process or aspects of it (Sriram 2013). Actors in a TJ process make decisions and choices on strategies and preferences based on, among other factors, the incentives they perceive that they have. During the Red Terror Trials, there was an absence of normative incentives, coupled with limitations in available materials and resources, which potentially explains the lack of action on famine cases. The SPO was given two mandates:¹⁸

To establish for public knowledge and for posterity a historical record of the abuses of the Mengistu regime.

To bring those criminally responsible for human rights violations and/or corruption to justice.

The Mengistu regime, mentioned in the proclamation, covers a period of 17 years. As one interviewee pointed out, ‘the prosecutor office was drowning … it was coming from every part of the country; witness testimony, documentation, rooms and rooms of forensic evidence …’ (Interview with E, July 2021). Adding to this, another interviewee said:

the cases were long-term cases. It had no time limit … all cases were being reviewed covering the whole period of the Dergue … [the office] did not have the human power… The investigation was not limited to the higher official levels only; it went down to the lowest level. (Interview with D, June 2021)

The special prosecutor was undertaking a huge assignment with limited resources. During the 17 years of trials, 5119 people were prosecuted, of whom 3583 were found guilty and sentenced. For this, 16,107 people were brought in as witnesses, and 15,214 documents were filed as evidence (see appendix table II of Special Prosecutor Office 2010). In fact, the prosecutor claimed that it ‘has ten times more evidence than needed to successfully prosecute several of the detained and many of the exiles for serious criminal offences’ (Special Prosecutor Office 1994, 2).

Another problem was the difficulty of finding legally valid evidence pertaining to the famine and the resettlement programme. A former staff member of the SPO who worked on the team concerned with the food aid and resettlement programme said:

with regards to the resettlement and related things, I myself have investigated documents but there was a weakness on witness evidence. For instance, the case of the Red Terror was enriched by witness evidence. For example, if there is a dead person, then there is a family of that person … or there is someone who was imprisoned together, etc. The other one [resettlement and food aid cases] was more document-based rather than human witnesses … I remember that was one weakness. (Interview with D, June 2021)

The national context at the time, with low institutional capacity, lack of expertise in the area, and a desire to urgently move on from the past (Vaughan 2009; Interview with E, July 2021), was another important factor. De Waal (2018b) argued that ‘[t]he main reason was that the laws prohibiting starvation are complicated and untried … Prosecutors in … Addis Ababa preferred simpler routes to getting guilty verdicts and stuck with direct responsibility for violent killings’. With an adequate evidence base to charge Dergue officials for other crimes, arguably, under the circumstances and with the challenges faced, there were no incentives for the SPO and the new regime more broadly to proceed with the prosecution for famine cases.

International actors supporting the transitional government in general and the Red Terror Trials specifically did not raise concerns about the absence of famine cases in the trials. As Sriram (2013) points out, incentives that explain actors’ choices and decisions during a TJ process can be normative. It is important to note that at the time of the Red Terror Trials, the international normative framework regarding famine and starvation crimes was not as developed as it is currently. For instance, the 2018 UN Resolution 2417¹⁹ recognising the relationship between armed conflicts and famines, and the 2019 Amendment²⁰ to the Rome Statute recognising the use of starvation in non-international armed conflicts as a war crime, are more recent developments. Instead, the normative and policy priorities of the international actors at the time were liberalisation, democratisation and decentralisation (Interview with E, October 2021).

Complicated causes, complicated accountability

An actor’s choice to ‘spoil’ a TJ process or aspects of it can also be explained through the actor’s responsibility and/or vulnerability to accountability for serious offences (Sriram 2013). Actors bearing responsibility for serious offences tend to either ‘categorically resist’ a TJ process or resist aspects of the process affecting them (Sriram 2013). Likewise, actors who are vulnerable to charges can become ‘spoilers’. They can be vulnerable based on their relative ‘political, military, or economic power, or local networks of protection’ (Sriram 2013). Here, it is important to look at the famine period and the role of various actors in relation to how they may have been responsible for famine crimes.

Even if the TPLF/EPRDF-led government and the SPO specifically indicated that the Dergue regime was responsible for the 1984–1985 famine, a closer look at the famine period shows how other actors might also be complicit. A report that was published in 2017 (Plaut 2017) and a 2010 BBC report²¹ shed light on the TPLF’s use of famine relief aid for military purposes. This is also documented by a 1985 US government intelligence assessment report titled Ethiopia: Political and Security Impact of the Drought²² (6):

The northern insurgent organizations, for their part, have also been using the famine and relief efforts for their own purposes … Some funds that insurgent organizations are raising for relief operations, as a result of increased world publicity, are almost certainly being diverted for military purposes.

In fact, the famine was a pivotal period for TPLF which had so far maintained only a small number of fighters and military capacity. The famine and the Dergue’s response were instrumental for TPLF’s political gains, and for expanding and strengthening its social base. More importantly, TPLF diverted much of the relief aid to build up its military capability, significantly contributing to the ultimate fall of the Dergue regime shortly after the famine (De Waal 1992; Joireman 1997). This gave the post-1991 government incentives to not pursue famine-related cases during the Red Terror Trials, to avoid shedding light on and instigating scrutiny of these issues.

Similar observations can also be made about the US and UK governments, the main foreign states supporting the transitional period and the Red Terror Trials. Cold War politics were significant in how these governments engaged in relief efforts at the time of the famine (Broich 2017; Smith 1987). Famine relief operations were highly politicised, to the extent that the two governments used the relief operations to support insurgents to overthrow the Marxist Dergue regime.²³ This historical context of the famine, which might imply a level of responsibility on part of these governments, may explain their ‘silence’ about the famine during the trials.

Actors’ incentives and responsibility for serious offences and their vulnerability to charges are relevant to explain why famine-related cases were not used as a basis for prosecution during the Red Terror Trials. While these concepts by Sriram (2013) are mainly applied in contexts of a negotiated TJ process, it is important to consider how they can be relevant in ‘victor’s justice’ contexts like that of the Red Terror Trials. The Ethiopian case also allows us to consider how actors that are the main ‘drivers of justice’, in broad terms, can be ‘spoilers’ of certain aspects of the TJ process, in this case the prosecution of famine-related crimes.

Conclusion

The resurgence of famines and famine-like situations in recent years is attracting increased attention from scholars and policymakers, not least with regard to accountability. This study offers insight into one of the most disastrous famines of the twentieth century, and how it was neglected during a process aimed at accountability and justice. By doing so, the article contributes to a largely ignored area in famine research and TJ studies. Besides looking at famines as violence, this study employed two complementary theoretical frameworks, on ‘drivers of justice’ (Skaar and Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2013a) and ‘spoilers of justice’ (Sriram 2013), to analyse the various actors involved during the 1992–2010 Red Terror Trials in Ethiopia. The resulting discussion focussed on how the highly politicised famine of 1984–1985 was ‘silenced’ during the TJ process that can be characterised as ‘victor’s justice’, possibly due to actors’ lack of material and/or normative incentives, their responsibility for serious offences and vulnerability to charges, or the interplay of these factors.

The study has three main takeaways. First, the famine and the related resettlement programme resulted in significantly greater human suffering and death than other crimes for which Dergue officials were prosecuted. The neglect of the famine in processes of accountability and justice, particularly in a ‘victor’s justice’ context that offered an opportunity for justice without significant contestation, aligns with the impression that famine deaths and sufferings are often ignored or downplayed. Second, as famines become more and more associated with armed conflicts, especially in Africa, their political dimension also intertwines with that of the armed conflicts and their regional and global dimensions. As such, accountability and justice processes for famine-related cases are shaped by not only domestic but also international actors. Lastly, actors pushing for justice and accountability in transitional contexts, including ‘victors’ who pursue ‘justice’, can implicitly and/or explicitly spoil aspects of a TJ process. Continued normative, policy and scholarly efforts to conceptualise famines as violence that warrants criminal accountability and justice will be needed to deter similar ‘spoiler’ effects in the future.

Disclosure statement

The author reports no conflicts of interest.

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by grants from the Swedish Research Council, The Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography, and Donationsnämndens stipendier.

Notes on contributors

Fisseha Fantahun Tefera

Fisseha Fantahun Tefera is a PhD candidate in Peace and Development Research at the School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg. He is currently working within the research project ‘Famines as Mass Atrocities: Reconsidering Violence, Memory and Justice in Relation to Hunger’. He has a background in development studies (MSc) from Lund University and in political science and international relations (BA) from Addis Ababa University. His research interests include politics of development, transitional justice, and memory politics in Africa through a critical, Africanist approach.

Notes

1 The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC/CH) is a system of classifying the ­severity of chronic food insecurity, from Phase 1 (minimum/none) to Phase 5 (catastrophe/famine). See https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/ipc-overview-and-classification-system/ipc-chronic-­food-insecurity-classification/en/

2 GNAFC/FSIN 2022, The Global Report on Food Crises 2022. Available at https://www.wfp.org/publications/global-report-food-crises-2022

3 The research follows the ethical regulations and guidelines of my institution, including when it comes to informed consent.

4 Proclamation No. 22/92, Proclamation for the establishment of the Special Prosecutor’s Office, 1992, Negarit Gazeta, Addis Ababa.

5 See ‘Letter dated 94/01/28 from the Permanent Representative of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights.’ Available at https://undocs.org/en/E/CN.4/1994/103

6 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qNbGGT15_7w

7 See ‘Letter dated 94/01/28 from the Permanent Representative of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights’, p. 3. Available at https://undocs.org/en/E/CN.4/1994/103

8 See Ambassador Birhanu Dinka’s interview. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C2NzrBCizDY

9 See Mengistu’s interview. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hltKrT_5q08

10 Harden, Blaine. 1985. “West Wages ‘Psychological Warfare,’ Ethiopian Leader Charges.” The Washington Post, 2 May 1985. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1985/05/02/west-wages-psychological-warfare-ethiopian-leader-charges/1e593abb-adf5-4eee-9de4-b8dbeef4ec8e/

11 Available at https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/remarks-signing-bill-rights-day-and-human-rights-day-and-week-proclamation-0

12 Available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/nsiad-85-65.pdf

13 Available at https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABY241.pdf

14 Available at https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C14568616

15 The SPO v Colonel Mengistu et al., Charge, SPO Criminal File 401/94, October 1994.

16 See https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2017/12/07/why-ethiopians-are-nostalgic-for-a-murderous-marxist-regime

17 See Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1996 – Ethiopia, 1 January 1996. Available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a8af34.html; and

Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1998 – Ethiopia, 1 January 1998. Available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a8af24.html

18 Proclamation No. 22/92, Proclamation for the Establishment of the Special Prosecutor’s Office, 1992, Negarit Gazeta, Addis Ababa.

19 UNSC Res. 2417, May 2018.

20 World Peace Foundation, ‘Starvation: Vital Amendment to the Rome Statute Unanimously Passes’, 6 December 2019. Available at https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2019/12/06/starvation-vital-amendment-to-the-rome-statute-unanimously-passes/

21 Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8535189.stm

22 Available at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000819230.pdf

23 Available at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00965R000100120117-2.pdf and https://talkinghumanities.blogs.sas.ac.uk/2018/02/06/british-plots-to-overthrow-the-ethiopian-government-during-the-1984-85-famine/