Gulf responses to Syrian refugee arrivals in Lebanon: narratives of legitimisation

Abstract

This paper focuses on Gulf states’ responses to Syrian arrivals in Lebanon since 2011. It explores the dynamics of aid governance of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. Among the international donor community and scholars, a widespread narrative stigmatises Gulf humanitarian donorship as being the result of Gulf states’ strategic choices. In the particular case of Lebanon, this narrative posits that they have been using aid to support Syrian opposition groups and to promote political alliances. With a constructivist perspective, this paper assesses the existence of alternative narratives discrediting these claims. By looking at the everyday experiences of humanitarian professionals in Lebanon, it analyses discursive narratives of legitimisation taking shape at the field level, among observers and participants of Gulf interventions, and challenges conventional narratives on Gulf donorship as purely politically motivated. The research has revealed a narrative of religious humanitarianism legitimising Gulf support by presenting it as the result of a moral necessity; legitimisation through identification with legitimate symbols such as ‘the local’; and ‘pragmatic’ legitimisation praising their visibility on the field and their concrete efficiency.

Keywords:

• Gulf states
• legitimacy
• refugee governance
• Lebanon
• humanitarianism

Acknowledgements

I thank Hanaa Almoaibed, Mohammad Yaghi, Silvia Colombo and Layla Ali, the organisers of the Workshop on ‘Foreign Aid and the Gulf States’ of the 2021 Gulf Research Meeting, and the other participants, as well the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful recommendations.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 See, for instance, Ben Hubbard, “Wealthy Gulf Nations Are Criticised for Tepid Response to Syrian Refugee Crisis,” New York Times, 5 September 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/06/world/gulf-monarchies-bristle-at-criticism-over-response-to-syrian-refugee-crisis.html; or Luay Al-Khatteeb, ‘The Gulf States Should Do More for Syrian Refugees’, Brookings, 30 September 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/09/30/the-gulf-states-should-do-more-for-syrian-refugees/.

In response, the Saudi Foreign Ministry claimed that ‘Saudi Arabia has hosted around 2.5 million Syrians since the beginning of the crisis’, while the UAE government stated that the country had provided residency permits to more than 100,000 Syrians since 2011 (de Bel-Air 2015, 3). If Syrians were indeed allowed to migrate to Gulf countries through visas for family reunification and work permits, these statements cannot be sustained by available demographic data (de Bel-Air 2015, 13).

2 On Qatar’s commitment towards Syrian refugees, see “Qatar Renews Commitment to Supporting Palestinian, Syrian Peoples,” MOFA, 11 September 2018, https://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-news/details/2018/09/11/qatar-renews-commitment-to-supporting-palestinian-syrian-peoples; “Qatar Announces Contribution of $100 Million to Alleviate the Suffering of Syrian People,” MOFA, 13 March 2019, https://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-news/details/2019/03/14/qatar-announces-contribution-of-$100-million-to-alleviate-the-suffering-of-syrian-people.

Regarding Kuwait’s commitment, see “Kuwait Continues Humanitarian Aid to Brotherly, Friendly Countries,” 16 April 2022, https://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=3035353&Language=en.

Regarding Saudi Arabia’s commitment, see “Saudi Arabia Received 2.5 Million Syrians Since Beginning of Conflict,” 11 September 2015, https://www.saudiembassy.net/press-release/saudi-arabia-received-25-million-syrians-beginning-conflict. Regarding the UAE’s commitment, see “Lebanese Official Praises UAE’s Role in Helping Syrian Refugees”, 16 May 2017, https://www.mofaic.gov.ae/en/MediaHub/News/years/2017/5/16/16-05-2017-UAE-Displaced-Syrians.

3 The UN estimates that Gulf donors and NGOs’ contributions to the Syrian crisis amounted to 910.3 million USD in 2018 alone (UNHCR 2019, Gulf Report).

4 See OCHA Financial Tracking Service (2020), Lebanon, https://fts.unocha.org/countries/124/donors/2020?order=total_funding&sort=desc

5 They do not participate in the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan.

6 Skype interview with a representative of GIZ (the German international cooperation agency), February 2020.

7 The Doha Agreement signed on 21 May 2008 put an end to a year-and-a-half conflict between rival Lebanese factions, in particular Hezbollah and the governmental majority.

8 For instance, interview with representatives of a European embassy, Beirut, January 2020, and with a French state representative, Paris, February 2020; interview with a representative of EEAS, Brussels, February 2020.

9 Interview with a member of Tripoli municipal council, Beirut, October 2019.

10 Interview with a representative of Al Fares, Arsaal, January 2020.

11 He added that the word ‘Islamic’ in their organisations’ name had probably also been viewed with suspicion.

12 Interview with a former representative of the Qatari Red Crescent, Arsaal, November 2019; interview with a representative of URDA, December 2019.

13 Skype interview with a representative of GIZ, February 2020.

14 Interview with a representative of Islamic Relief, Beirut, January 2020.

15 Interview with the director of Thiqah charity, Tripoli, November 2019.

16 Interview with a representative of URDA, December 2019.

17 Interview with the director of Thiqah charity, Tripoli, November 2019.

18 Skype interview with a representative of GIZ, February 2020.

19 Interview with the director of a charity, Tripoli, November 2019.

20 Interview with a representative of Islamic Relief, Beirut, January 2020.

21 Interview with a representative of the Palestinian Red Crescent, Saïda, January 2020.

22 Interview with a representative of the Palestinian Red Crescent, Saïda, January 2020.

23 In saying so, he gave a universalist worldview to his religious discourse.

24 Interview with the director of the Islamic Medical Association, Tripoli, January 2020.

25 Interview with a representative of the UAE embassy, January 2020.

26 Interview with a representative of Dar el Fatwa, January 2020.

27 Interview with a representative of Dar el Fatwa, January 2020.

28 Interview with a representative of Islamic Relief, Beirut, January 2020.

29 For instance, interview with the director of the Islamic Medical Association, Tripoli, January 2020.

30 Interview with the director of the Islamic Medical Association, Tripoli, January 2020.

31 Interview with the director of Thiqah charity, Tripoli, November 2019.

32 Interview with the director of the Islamic Medical Association, Tripoli, January 2020.

33 Interview with a representative of URDA, November 2019; interview with a representative of Banin, 26 October 2020; interview with a representative of URDA, December 2019.

34 Interview with a former representative of the Qatari Red Crescent, Arsaal, November 2019.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Clothilde Facon

Clothilde Facon is a PhD candidate in Political Sociology at the University Sorbonne Paris Nord. Her research interest revolves around the dialectic between depoliticisation and repoliticisation of foreign aid in Lebanon, with a particular focus on responses to Syrian arrivals, and using a comparative approach between Western and Gulf donors. She also focuses on the interaction between humanitarian and security governance.