Legitimacy-seeking: China’s statements and actions on combating climate change

Abstract

This paper proposes a conceptual and analytical framework of states’ legitimacy-seeking to comprehensively investigate the motivation behind China’s climate and environment policy. While previous research has largely overlooked political factors that underlie China’s climate policy, this paper argues that these factors are crucial in understanding China’s policy changes, which are evident at both domestic and international levels. By examining sources such as government documents, leaders’ speeches and authoritative literature, this study contends that China’s climate change initiatives are part of a broader effort to enhance domestic and international legitimacy. The issue of climate change has become highly politicised in China under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, and it serves as a crucial test of the ruling party and the state’s capacity to govern effectively. As such, legitimacy-seeking is the key driver that links China’s domestic measures and international commitments.

Keywords:

• China
• legitimacy-seeking
• climate change
• Xi Jinping
• global governance
• international order

Introduction

In recent years, China has taken a positive stance and even assumed a leading role in tackling climate change. Since the Paris Climate Conference, it has been recognised more frequently as a more responsible actor in climate change governance. Its commitment to combat global warming had remained steadfast even during the COVID-19 pandemic, when China’s economic growth faced severe challenges. For instance, during the 2020 United Nations (UN) General Assembly, Chinese President Xi Jinping declared that China would strive to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. These efforts have earned China recognition as a responsible global actor in climate change governance. For instance, the Climate Change Performance Index (Climate Change Performance Index 2020), a monitoring index jointly published by three institutions, ranks China 11th in its annual report. However, China has not always been proactive in tackling climate change and was once considered an irresponsible actor in this regard (Hilton and Kerr 2017, 49). This paper examines China’s shift in attitude towards climate change and seeks to investigate what drives China’s domestic and international commitments to combat climate change with a firm determination. To do so, this study proposes a conceptual-analytical framework of legitimacy-seeking and investigates the circumstances under which China will actively participate in global governance.

The existing literature on China and global climate change has extensively discussed China’s role in mitigating climate change (Garnaut 2014; Cai and Li 2018; Hilton and Kerr 2017). While there have been descriptive perspectives, there have also been debates about China’s motivations for tackling the climate crisis. The scholarship on this critical issue has yielded inconsistent and sometimes conflicting analyses. Scholars who approach this question from an international perspective believe China’s policy shift is a response to external pressure to fulfil great powers’ responsibilities (Kopra 2018; Qi et al. 2008). Conversely, other studies identify domestic concerns such as the demand for renewable energy, the smog problem, and economic restructuring as the primary drivers for China’s climate policy (Economy 2019, 153–160; Hilton and Kerr 2017, 51; Ploberger 2013, 1029).

While the existing literature offers valuable insights into the factors that drive shifts in China’s climate change policies, a clear analytical framework is needed to sufficiently explain China’s domestic and international policymaking considerations. Therefore, they cannot address some of the significant puzzles surrounding this paper’s research question. For instance, it remains to be seen under what conditions China is willing to sacrifice its economic growth to appease external pressure and take on more international responsibilities. Additionally, the Chinese government must balance significant policy issues such as air quality and economic development, which sometimes conflict. Researchers expect a systematic framework to examine the Chinese government’s behaviour patterns regarding these issues. Last, how does the Chinese public perceive climate change, and how are the two issues of climate change and air pollution interconnected? These are critical questions that require comprehensive and nuanced analyses.

Since 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping has been educating his comrades that ‘there is a lot of politics’ (这里面有很大的政治) in protecting the environment and advocating a low-carbon lifestyle (Study Times 2016). Following this clue, this paper proposes a conceptual-analytical framework of states’ legitimacy-seeking to fill the gap in the existing research on China and climate change. This study argues that China’s engagement in climate change mitigation is driven by the government’s efforts to enhance its legitimacy both domestically and internationally. Furthermore, by conducting a two-level analysis of how China seeks to increase its legitimacy through prioritising environmental protection and combating climate change, this paper posits that legitimacy-seeking is the crucial factor motivating China’s policymaking decisions. Moreover, this framework sheds light on the broader debate on when China will integrate into or challenge the West-dominated international order. Legitimacy-seeking is a critical factor behind climate policies and offers insights into China’s behaviours regarding territorial disputes, international trade, financing and its response to the COVID pandemic.

The article proceeds as follows. In the first section, we explore the necessity for states, particularly authoritarian ones, to seek domestic and international legitimacy. We also examine the complex relationship between the two types of legitimacy and the state’s priorities, which is crucial for understanding China’s international behaviours. Next, we provide detailed analyses of China’s shift to positive attitudes and policies in responding to climate change in the past ten years. We investigate how the need to enhance domestic and international legitimacy has played a critical role in these policy changes. In the last section, we focus on the Chinese paramount leader Xi Jinping, analysing how his perception of legitimacy has been influencing China’s climate policies. Finally, we conclude by re-evaluating the legitimacy-seeking framework and discussing recent developments in China’s domestic and international climate policies.

Domestic and international legitimacy-seeking of states

Having domestic legitimacy means that the subjects have a belief in the rightness of a state and the oughtness of their obedience to the commands (Barker 1990, 11). ‘Rightness’ includes both factual correctness and moral justice. It is critical for legitimacy, as Dahl and Lindblom (1953, 114) have claimed, ‘Control is legitimate to the extent that it is approved or regarded as “right”.’ Meanwhile, a belief in rightness alone is not enough to establish legitimacy because even if some people recognise the state’s rightness, they may not obey it. Therefore, belief in rightness is only necessary for domestic legitimacy. A belief in the oughtness of obedience means subjects’ recognition of their moral or ethical obligation to obey the rules and policies of a state. The belief in oughtness usually builds based on a belief in rightness, and these two dimensions of belief constitute domestic legitimacy. People’s support for ruling the country grants domestic legitimacy to the political party and government. Although the domestic legitimacy of the Communist Party of China (CPC) has received significant academic attention, there has been a lack of focus on the second dimension: international legitimacy. To fill this gap, this article presents a two-level (domestic-international) analytical framework to examine policymaking logic in China.

For established democracies, domestic legitimacy largely derives from elections. In comparison, authoritarian governments rely on complex sources to legitimise their rule and maintain public obedience. While state power like police forces can enforce compliance, relying solely on them is not sufficient to guarantee continued governance and can leave the regime vulnerable to challenges from within or mass public unrest (Weatherley 2007, 1). State power cannot be persistently established based on power rule but needs to be recognised and obeyed by the people (Zhou 2017, 15). Therefore, if a regime seeks to secure long-term stability, it must have the support and perceived legitimacy of the population it governs (Weatherley 2007, 1). This was reflected in China’s relaxation of the strict ‘Zero-COVID’ policy in late 2022. The Chinese government needed to change its stringent epidemic prevention measures that could no longer contain the spread of the virus, when some prevention measures faced widespread public discontent and protests.

The prevailing discussion of authoritarian regime legitimacy centres around performance legitimacy, which assumes that the ruling party or leader can improve public living standards by offering domestic public goods through effective policies. Environmental sustainability is considered a critical component of providing public goods. The Chinese government also seeks legitimacy through charismatic and legal-rational authorities. Still, performance legitimacy is paramount for younger generations of leaders without experiences in revolutionary movements during China’s Anti-Japanese War and Civil War. In addition to performance legitimacy, nationalist legitimacy is the other crucial element of the Chinese government’s overall legitimacy. With China’s economic growth slowing and international tensions heightening, nationalism increasingly shapes the government’s foreign policy decisions. The government’s assertive actions in foreign-related disputes have garnered popular support. However, when faced with tensions between performance and nationalist legitimacy, the Chinese government must weigh the significance of both and carefully craft its policies.

In addition to domestic legitimacy, scholars in international studies have introduced the concept of international legitimacy. Martin Wight (1977, 153) defines international legitimacy as ‘the collective judgement of international society about rightful membership of the family of nations’, and to some extent, it refers to ‘moral acceptability to the remainder of international society’ (1972, 1). While there has yet to be a consensus on the role of morality, norms and rules in international relations, their binding force has grown since the end of World War II. The international level of the legitimacy-seeking framework focuses on the international legitimacy of states to explain their external behaviours, rather than emphasising the legitimacy and authority of international institutions (Hurd 1999).

States and other actors in international society engage in comprehensive legitimisation strategies to demonstrate the legitimacy of their activities or actions (Clark 2005, 2). International legitimacy is important for the international reputation and status of global powers. Even great powers require international legitimacy for their foreign policies and international behaviours to be accepted by other states. As Hedley Bull (1980, 437) explains, ‘To say that a state is a great power is to say not merely that it is a member of the club of powers that are in the front rank in terms of military strength, but also that it regards itself, and is regarded by other members of the society of states, as having special rights and duties’. To achieve international legitimacy, a state must, at a minimum, comply with universally recognised international rules, such as the UN Charter. If a state can also provide public goods or solve global challenges, this can increase its international legitimacy.

This research defines legitimacy-seeking as the efforts of a government or dominant party to enhance the legitimacy of its domestic rule and rightful international membership and leadership. States are motivated to secure domestic and international legitimacy to ensure internal social and political stability as well as external recognition and respect. The two types of legitimacy are closely intertwined. Domestic legitimacy possesses an essential international aspect because a government and its people require international recognition that can boost the domestic legitimacy of authoritarian regimes (Clark 2005, 5). However, domestic legitimacy and international legitimacy are only sometimes aligned because a country’s national interests may conflict with external expectations. An instance is territorial and maritime disputes. One government’s actions to defend its national interests increase domestic legitimacy but may bring criticism from its neighbours.

When domestic legitimacy and international legitimacy converge, China has a stronger incentive to integrate its domestic and international policies and to participate in global governance. Weiss and Wallace (2021, 644–646) highlight that authoritarian regimes are highly motivated to address international issues that align with their domestic priorities. In cases where there is a conflict between domestic and international legitimacy, the state tends to prioritise maintaining its domestic legitimacy, particularly when an issue may threaten the stability of the country and the regime. However, if a policy can significantly increase international legitimacy with minimal negative domestic impact, the government is more likely to adopt it. The following sections of this paper will discuss how China’s need to improve domestic and international legitimacy has influenced its efforts to address climate change constructively.

From resistance to aspiration: seeking international legitimacy for China’s leadership

China accounts for 29% of the world’s carbon dioxide emissions, more than double the amount produced by the United States, the world’s second-biggest emitter (Union of Concerned Scientists 2022). Despite this, China’s integration into the West-dominated climate governance system had been slow and arduous. China’s 2011 White Paper on climate change stated its contribution during the 2009 Copenhagen Conference and emphasised the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’,¹ insisting on the historical responsibilities of developed countries in reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and offering financial and technological assistance to developing countries (Information Office 2011). However, Western academics and media outlets heavily criticised China’s stance during the Copenhagen Conference. China’s policies were even interpreted as resistant to fulfilling its responsibilities in addressing climate change (Hilton and Kerr 2017, 49; Gong 2011, 159–162). Such suspicion was further reinforced when China claimed that imposing additional GHG reduction obligations on developing countries was unreasonable.

From the late 2000s onwards, China has sought to assuage the concerns of neighbouring countries by suggesting that its rise will be peaceful and non-hostile (Glaser and Medeiros 2007, 293–298). Despite this, China’s refusal to commit to a greenhouse gas reduction timetable and rejection of national performance monitoring during the Copenhagen Conference was perceived as evidence of its increasingly assertive diplomacy (Johnston 2013, 14). This stance was seen by some as a threat to international cooperation on climate change, contributing to the negative portrayal of China’s rise and its global image (Swaine 2010; Christensen 2011). Against this backdrop, China’s long-term interests were not well-served by this perception of assertiveness, which has made China’s rise be viewed and presented negatively.

China’s stance on climate change also conflicted with the interests of those developing countries most affected by rising temperatures and sea levels. This international image undermined China’s reputation and relationships with other countries, particularly Western countries and some island nations, calling into question China’s narrative of being a ‘responsible power’ and ‘representing the interests of the third world and developing countries’. Additionally, China faced pressure from the West, with the European Union in 2009 urging China to be part of the solution rather than being a part of the problem during the Copenhagen Conference (France 24 2009). Sino-EU relations remain an influential factor in China’s climate policy, with French diplomatic efforts credited as one reason for China’s cooperation in the Paris Agreement (Hilton and Kerr 2017, 54).

Furthermore, pressure from the US during the Obama administration prompted China’s engagement in addressing the climate crisis. In November 2014, China and the US jointly announced their intention to combat climate change, with China acknowledging its critical role in addressing the issue and committing to achieving a peak in CO₂ emissions around 2030. This set the stage for China to play a more positive role in the 2015 Paris Climate Conference, where it celebrated the resulting agreement as a milestone in global climate governance with greater legal force. Following the Paris Conference, China’s central authorities moved quickly to issue and implement nationwide emissions peak commitments. The 13th five-year plan for the country introduced a suite of domestic environmental policies to fulfil its promise (National Development and Reform Commission 2016).

While international pressure played a crucial role in pushing China to address climate change and improve its global image, it is simplistic to view China’s policies as solely reactive. Ultimately, it was China’s choice to act on global warming. As early as 2014, Xi Jinping emphasised that China’s policies towards climate change were ‘not because the others asked us to do so, but we choose to do so’ (Ren 2014). It has become increasingly apparent that China seeks to portray itself as a leading power in global governance and to have a positive global image. An example is China’s unwavering support for the Paris Agreement despite the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw the US from the accord. China remained committed to the multilateral agreement in narrative and practice, even though it had an opportunity to back out of the agreement.

In a historic declaration made in September 2020, Xi Jinping announced China’s commitment to achieving carbon neutrality by 2060, which is a significant milestone considering that the European Union and Japan aim to achieve the same goal by 2050, only ten years ahead of China. Therefore, the 2060 goal presents a considerably challenging task for the country, given its current reliance on coal-dominated energy and rising carbon emissions. The goal is widely considered ambitious, particularly given the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and the European Union’s decreased climate ambition. China’s commitment to this goal is seen as a significant step and adds to its international legitimacy. This surprising declaration to the international community is clearly not explained by ‘responding to international pressure’.

China’s commitment to addressing climate change, as shown through actions and statements following Xi Jinping’s announcement, reflects its ambition to enhance international legitimacy and play a larger role in global climate governance. For instance, in September 2021, Xi Jinping announced that China would support green and low-carbon energy development in developing countries and cease financing coal power plants outside China. This move has created opportunities for greater cooperation between China and countries affected by the climate crisis, including island states like Fiji and Maldives. Collaborations on new energy and climate governance initiatives with these countries were launched. Furthermore, the establishment of the China-Pacific Island Countries Climate Action Cooperation Centre has been praised by the Secretary-General of the Pacific Islands Forum, Henry Puna, during then-Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to the South Pacific in 2022 (China Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 2022a), showing that China’s high-profile actions in climate change have been recognised by the global south.

Against this backdrop, it is evident why China has actively promoted various slogans and initiatives since Xi Jinping ascended to power in 2012. Such slogans can potentially enhance China’s discourse power in global governance. The most prominent among these slogans is ‘A Community of Shared Future for Mankind’ (人类命运共同体), which was introduced in 2012 when Xi took office and incorporated into the CPC’s party constitution in 2017. This strategic narrative serves as the guiding principle for China to tackle global challenges and gain global leadership (Yang 2021, 299–313). Among the most pressing challenges facing humankind today, climate change must take precedence as a priority for constructing a community of shared future. Failing to actively participate in efforts to address this problem, or prioritising short-term economic gains over environmental policies, would severely undermine the credibility and appeal of this slogan. Such actions could even undermine China’s extensive efforts to build trust in the international community.

Additionally, Western countries and scholars have levied criticisms against China regarding maritime security, human rights, international trade and intellectual property. As Xiaoyu Pu (2016, 120–121) points out, many Chinese actions do not conform to the norms of the liberal international order. China is unwilling to compromise on issues that are essential to its core interests, and it therefore prefers to be seen as an important power that is ‘different but legitimate’. In this context, climate change is a convergence point for China’s national interests and those of other powers. China can enhance its normative legitimacy in the international community by engaging in climate change governance. This will improve its credibility and reputation, especially in light of controversies surrounding its controversial actions in other areas.

In April 2021, China and the US announced a joint pledge to collaborate urgently to address the climate crisis (US Department of States 2021a). During COP 26 in Glasgow, the two countries released a comprehensive joint declaration that detailed precise cooperative measures to address the climate crisis over the next decade (US Department of States 2021b). Climate change later remains one of the few areas where China and the US have achieved positive outcomes in negotiations since President Biden took office. Additionally, since climate change avoids significant ideological conflicts, it has become a prominent issue for China to lead. Therefore, China’s commitment to addressing climate change is not just a response to international pressure, but it also serves as a crucial component of China’s efforts to enhance its international legitimacy. It helps build an image of China as a responsible power of the international community and a supporter of multilateralism.

Not merely an economic issue: seeking domestic legitimacy by protecting the environment

Despite concerns over international obligations and recognition, addressing climate change is primarily based on domestic considerations. The Chinese government faces the tasks of economic growth, environmental preservation and climate change mitigation. Put differently, China’s performance legitimacy is derived from both its economic growth and its ability to offer public goods, such as a healthy environment. Rapid economic development since Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening up has resulted in China’s heavy reliance on energy imports, the primary reason for its energy security concerns. According to Zou (2021), a prominent expert in China’s climate policymaking circles, China’s goals of reducing GHG emissions and achieving carbon neutrality are essential for promoting sustainable economic growth and improving environmental quality.

Promoting renewable and low-carbon energy is a strategic approach to achieving the government’s GHG emission reduction targets. Despite China’s move towards clean energy, coal and petroleum still account for 57.7% and 18.9%, respectively, of the country’s total energy consumption in 2019 (Information Office 2020). China has invested heavily in renewable energy to address this issue, achieving manufacturing advantages in this field. For instance, China is the world’s leading supplier of solar panels, accounting for 80% of global production (Rapoza 2021). China also prioritises research, development, production and use of solar power and electric vehicles. Considering the large number of cars already on the roads and the high demand for automobiles among the Chinese population, promoting new energy vehicles and replacing older automobiles will help reduce China’s dependence on oil imports and facilitate the growth of its electric vehicle industry. One example is that the Chinese government’s attractive investment policy and substantial domestic market have continually attracted Tesla to invest heavily in Shanghai.

In addition to economic calculations, societal and bottom-up pressures drive China’s green transformation. Evidence suggests that the Chinese public is increasingly conscious of and supportive of global efforts to tackle the climate crisis. Academic research has investigated the level of concern that the Chinese public has about climate change. According to Liu et al. (2020, 16–18), while the general population in China may express relatively lower levels of concern about climate change compared to Western countries, specific demographic groups, such as the younger generation, women and residents of more developed regions, exhibit higher levels of concern. This growing interest and engagement among these groups, particularly the younger generation, indicate the potential for increased Chinese public involvement in addressing the climate crisis.

Undoubtedly, the bottom-up social pressure and awareness primarily stem from China’s severe air pollution problem, leading to the nationwide ‘war on pollution’. This effort significantly contributes to China’s climate policies, due to the environmental and public health challenges by burning coal and petroleum, including vast amounts of CO₂, the primary GHG, SO₂ and other particulate matter. A survey conducted by the China Centre for Climate Change Communication in 2017 revealed that most ordinary Chinese citizens were aware of the connection between China’s air pollution and climate change. Concerns about climate change were closely intertwined with air pollution, with 94.4% of respondents believing climate change exists, 79.8% expressing concerns and over 90% supporting current policies to address it. As per the survey, 72.6% of the respondents thought climate change and air pollution were interrelated, and another 14.3% believed climate change would result in air pollution. Air pollution was the most worrying consequence of climate change for Chinese people compared to natural disasters such as droughts and flooding. About 95.1% of the survey respondents claimed that climate change would lead to an increased occurrence of air pollution in the absence of countermeasures over the next two decades (China Center for Climate Change Communication 2017).

Initially, ordinary Chinese people were unaware of the risks posed by air pollutants. Prior to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, four American cyclists wearing masks due to air quality concerns caused outrage among the Chinese public, who saw it as a political insult, leading to the four cyclists apologising. As one cyclist remarked to the media, ‘Had I known it was going to be perceived as an insult, I wouldn’t have done it’ (Charles 2008). However, just two years later, PM2.5 (particles with a diameter below 2.5 micrometres) and air pollution gradually became hot topics of discussion in China, catalysed by public concern. The sale of pollution masks surged, with people realising their effectiveness in mitigating the effects of smog inhalation (Li 2014). In Beijing, wearing masks became commonplace during severe air pollution. In 2017, one Chinese netizen reflected on the 2008 ‘mask incident’, ‘I also used to think that these athletes were hypocritical. I feel ashamed of myself now, and it was my ignorance that made me indignant for no reason’.²

Following the public’s increased awareness of the severe consequences of air pollution, dissatisfaction escalated and garnered the attention of state-controlled media and environmental agencies. However, it took several years before the government took concrete actions to integrate PM2.5 data into China’s air quality index. A professor from the Party School of the CPC Central Committee stated that publishing PM2.5 data is not a technological or financial issue. The real problem is that ‘once the particulate index is revised, the official data may make the government look bad…it requires courage to do so’ (Guo 2013). The reluctance to publish air pollution data at the time indicated that the Chinese government was concerned that it might damage its image as a competent authority and harm its domestic legitimacy.

China’s sources of domestic legitimacy differ from its Western counterpart, raising the question of how much public opinion affects policymaking. Before 2008, environmental protests in China had limited influence, as they were primarily driven by local concerns (Sun and Zhao 2008; Hess 2013). The authorities could quell the unrest by cancelling proposed chemical industry projects, closing heavily polluting factories, or punishing local officials to maintain the Chinese government’s domestic legitimacy. However, public outcry about air quality gradually intensified across the country after 2008. Qingzhi Xun, a Peking University expert studying Xi Jinping’s thoughts, warned that environmental protection has become a significant political issue, which could affect people’s faith in socialism and the nation’s vision for the future. Consequently, the CPC must take a high-profile political stance to accomplish its political mission from the political height of its ruling goals and power consolidation (Xun 2018).

In authoritarian states, the top leadership must give enough weight to large-scale public opinion because it directly affects their legitimacy, regime security and personal safety (Weiss 2013, 5). After the 18th Party Congress in 2012, the new Chinese leadership and the Communist Party could no longer ignore the mounting social pressure and worries about air pollution. Both the elites and the general public expressed widespread dissatisfaction. Recognising this, then-Premier Li Keqiang, who also headed the Leading Small Group on Climate Change, Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction, publicly acknowledged the government’s shortcomings in this area. He pledged to tackle the issue with ‘iron fist enforcement and iron face accountability’ in the future (Zhu 2013).

The significant bottom-up social pressure and the growing attention of leaders to the issue of air pollution prompted the environmental agencies to finally include PM2.5 data in China’s air quality index. Starting in 2013, Chinese citizens could access the PM2.5 data for 74 major cities, and over time, the data became available for most miniature cities and counties as well. Apart from data accessibility, the Chinese government has invested substantial amounts in promoting sustainable energy sources such as solar power and hydropower, and new environmental policies and laws have been implemented more effectively. Furthermore, specific and effective measures have been taken in major cities and economic centres, such as shutting down small industrial enterprises with low-energy efficiency and banning straw burning in rural areas. It is doubtful that China’s environmental policies, especially those related to air pollution, would have been such a priority without public pressure.

As China introduced positive measures to tackle environmental issues, it became increasingly concerned about controlling public mobilisation due to fears that environmental protests might dampen their domestic legitimacy and threaten political stability. The documentary ‘Under the Dome’, which focussed on China’s smog problem, triggered a widespread discussion about air pollution in China in early 2015, contributing to heightened dissatisfaction among the Chinese population (Steinhardt and Wu 2016, 77). Not surprisingly, it was later censored, and the producer was subjected to criticism by the media and climate change sceptics. When faced with questions from society, China’s state-controlled press pointed to the ‘Great Smog of London’ as a historical example to present smog as a natural side-effect of industrialisation and economic development (Li and Svarverud 2018, 357–358).

Such narratives and practices reflect the Chinese government’s anxiety regarding the growing influence of liberal ‘opinion leaders’ and the risks of social control. The government is concerned that expressions of indignation may undermine people’s support for the Communist Party and erode its legitimacy. Consequently, it seeks to control any event that might significantly influence large-scale public discourse. Additionally, there is direct evidence that the CPC considers climate change to be vital to its ability to govern. On March 15, 2021, Xi Jinping held a high-level meeting where he declared the integration of global warming objectives into the overall layout of building an ecological civilisation. Thus, combating climate change is now formally included in the broader task of protecting the environment and ecology. The meeting acknowledged that ‘Peaking carbon emissions and achieving carbon neutrality is a tough battle, and it is also a major test of the party’s capabilities in governing the country’ (Xinhua 2021). By making this statement, tackling climate change has been listed as an indicator to assess the CPC’s ruling capability, confirming that the Chinese government’s principal reason for pursuing climate change is to maintain its domestic legitimacy and power.

‘There is a lot of politics’: Xi Jinping’s concerns over the legitimacy

Policy preferences of leaders are a crucial variable in foreign policy analysis as every individual has personalised values and images that influence policy outcomes. These beliefs and images act as ‘cognitive filters’, which affect the perception of international and domestic affairs (Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell 2016, 61–66). Compared to Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping is considered more dominant in China’s decision-making process. Therefore, assessing China’s evolving policies necessitates an examination of Xi’s personal attributes. Therefore, it is essential to investigate Xi Jinping’s role when examining China’s legitimacy-seeking efforts behind climate policy decisions.

China’s climate change policy has generally demonstrated consistency, but the period after 2012 saw a significant shift. The Hu-Wen administration had already begun paying close attention to environmental and climate problems. In 2007, China established the Leading Small Group on Climate Change, Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction, a group of high-level officials responsible for shaping the country’s climate and environmental policies. However, economic development was a higher priority. Chinese leaders are faced with a paradox in addressing climate change: on the one hand, mitigating climate change requires sacrificing short-term economic growth with potential negative impacts on state legitimacy; on the other hand, business-as-usual can also undermine its legitimacy as a nation committed to environmental protection (Marks 2010, 985).

China’s effective plans, measures and policies to combat climate change and air pollution were not introduced until 2012, when Xi Jinping was elected General Secretary of the CPC. The concept of ‘Beautiful China’ was introduced at the Eighteenth National Congress of the CPC, guiding China’s climate change policy (Hu 2012). The idea of ecological civilisation was presented and added as one of the guiding principles for China’s development in the Chinese constitution (Xi 2020, 359). Since then, the Chinese government has implemented measures to increase energy efficiency and reduce reliance on coal, while adopting a more responsible approach to global warming. While discussing China’s economic situation in April 2013, Xi Jinping emphasised the necessity of protecting the environment,

‘If we continued this mode of backward development, what would happen even if our GDP were doubled? I am afraid the resources and environment will not be able to bear it at all… People’s happiness has been greatly reduced, and even strong dissatisfaction will come up. What kind of situation will that be? Therefore, in terms of constructing ecological civilisation, protecting of ecological environment, and advocating green and low-carbon lifestyles, we cannot merely regard them as an economic issue. There is a lot of politics’ (Study Times 2016).

China’s increased emphasis on environmental protection is closely linked to Xi Jinping’s long-term commitment and policy preferences on this issue. According to Xi himself, the youthful experiences of witnessing ecological damage in the Loess Plateau have deeply influenced him, leading him to focus on environmental protection (Xi 2019). These words are not empty rhetoric, and policies in his career record support his claim. For instance, ‘Green Hills and Clear Waters are Gold and Silver Mountains’,³ commonly known as the ‘two mountains theory’, is one of China’s most widely disseminated street slogans today. As early as 2005, when China lacked the adequate environmental governance, Xi Jinping, then the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee Secretary, put forward this slogan. During his tenure in Zhejiang Province from 2002 to 2007, Xi published 14 articles dealing specifically with environmental governance issues, such as the ‘two mountains theory’ in Zhejiang Daily (Xi 2007, 1–8). His articles comprehensively outlined his ideas on transforming economic development models and the relationship between economic growth and environmental governance (Xi 2007, 1–8, 153, 186–187, 223–224).

As the most well-known book series published under Xi’s name, the collection of his speeches, Xi Jinping: The Governance of China, includes a dedicated chapter on climate change and environmental issues. Furthermore, he has convened numerous high-level meetings to convey his thoughts and build consensus among governmental agencies. During a Politburo joint study session on May 24, 2013, Xi urged his colleagues, ‘We must fully understand the importance of enforcing ecological red lines. Any violations regarding environmental protection will be punished…We will establish an accountability system and call to account officials whose ill-judged decisions have caused serious ecological damage’ (Xi 2014, 207–212). The background of Xi’s words was that in the past, local officials prioritised economic development above all else, often neglecting the environmental cost of obsolete industries. Following his instructions, a lifelong liability accounting mechanism was established, obligating local officials to consider the long-term environmental costs of developing high-polluting and greenhouse gas-emitting industries.

Xi Jinping has also emphasised the importance of environmental protection by releasing the economic growth requirement for local officials in provinces with high pollution or fragile ecology, at least rhetorically. For instance, Hebei Province is well-known for its steel industry and severe air pollution. During a discussion with Hebei’s leaders in September 2013 regarding the air quality issue, Xi Jinping acknowledged that the situation had severely impacted people’s health and the party and government’s image. Xi pointed out that if they did not resolve the problem, ‘we will not be able to account for history and the people’. He pledged to reward the local officials if Hebei could resolve the air pollution problem, even if it harmed their GDP ranking (Jia 2017). Xi has also instructed the leaders of Qinghai Province and Tibet Autonomous Region to prioritise ecological and environmental protection, despite relatively low economic development compared to other Eastern provinces.

Many of China’s domestic and international commitments to addressing environmental issues and climate change are closely linked to Xi Jinping’s evaluation of the CPC’s domestic legitimacy. When he took office in 2012, the Chinese regime faced numerous challenges and a crisis of legitimacy (Baranovitch 2021, 249–265). Xi Jinping recognised that China’s development stage differed significantly from previous years. He believed that China had already resolved the food and clothing problem in a previous stage of development, and the new situation required him to address environmental issues (Xi 2017, 392). In other words, while the CPC’s previous performance legitimacy came primarily from economic growth, Xi Jinping believes that improving environmental quality is also necessary for domestic legitimacy. Xi proposes that the strategy of building a Beautiful China could be combined with ‘supply-side structural reforms’(供给侧改革), and this would in turn help to develop China’s green and low-carbon economy (Xi 2020, 367–368). He has also repeatedly emphasised that building an ecological civilisation would greatly benefit future generations, and governments at all levels and society should take this principle seriously.

Xi Jinping has stressed the significance of protecting the ecology and environment, recognising that enhancing the environment will mitigate potential risks for the CPC. At the same time, continuing contamination could threaten the Communist Party’s rule of China. The book Xi Jinping’s China Renaissance, published in 2016 with the support and promotion from the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee, contends that from the perspective of a ruling party’s leader, Xi’s aspiration to achieve ecological civilisation is not simply an expedient gesture of compromise to international pressure or domestic economic transformation. Instead, such efforts aim to ‘win people’s hearts’, which is critical for the party’s ruling position and survival (Study Times 2016). In other words, social dissatisfaction caused by environmental problems will make people lose faith in the CPC and China’s political system, ultimately leading to regime collapse. Therefore, the strong sense of danger regarding these issues aligns with numerous campaigns Xi has proposed within and outside the party, such as the ‘Mass Line’ education campaign beginning in 2013 and the ‘Learning Party History’ education campaign beginning in February 2021. The primary goal of these campaigns is to urge Communist Party members to ‘remember the original heart and mission’ (不忘初心, 牢记使命) to serve the people, safeguard the party’s vitality and achieve the country’s renaissance.

Official Chinese sources further corroborate the legitimacy-seeking framework’s argument that domestic concerns, followed by international considerations, are the primary driving factor behind China’s engagement in global governance. On 12 October 2015, Xi Jinping outlined China’s strategy for global governance during a joint study session of the Central Politburo. Xi stated that China’s primary motivation for participating in global governance is to achieve its ‘Two Centenary Goals’⁴ and realise the China Dream of national rejuvenation. In addition to prioritising domestic legitimacy, Xi has used China’s contribution to addressing climate change to enhance its international legitimacy. Xi understands the importance of states working through international institutions in today’s world. He referred to international institutions as effective tools for coordinating international relations and managing conflicting interests, emphasising that great power conflicts through war and colonisation had become outdated (People’s Daily 2015). This high-level conference indicates that under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China aims to play a more significant role in shaping global governance, and climate change is one area in which China can achieve its objectives. Moreover, China’s contribution to global governance should align with its national interests.

The issue of climate change serves as a juncture where China’s efforts to legitimise itself in both domestic and international realms intersect. After Paris Agreement, China consistently characterises its climate change policies as evidence of taking international responsibility. Additionally, Xi Jinping has repeatedly raised awareness among domestic officials about the significance of addressing global warming. During the National Conference on Ecology and Environmental Protection in 2018, Xi listed deepening international cooperation among the six essential principles guiding China’s efforts to foster an ‘ecological civilisation’. He issued directives with a sense of aspiration,

‘We should deeply participate in global environmental governance and enhance our voice and influence in the global environmental governance system. We should actively lead the direction of international order reform and offer solutions for world environmental protection and sustainable development. We should adhere to environmental friendliness and lead international cooperation in tackling climate change’ (Xi 2019).

Following Xi Jinping’s announcement that China plans to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060, he spoke at the Leaders’ Summit on Climate hosted by the US on 22 April 2021, calling for the international community to create ‘A Community of Life for Man and Nature’ (人与自然生命共同体), raising a new concept and slogan that explicitly links humanity and nature. Through calls for the international community to exhibit ‘unprecedented ambition and action’, as well as to ‘act with a sense of responsibility and unity’, Xi aims to increase China’s ‘discourse power’ and position China as a forerunner in global environmental governance and multilateralism.

In sum, as China’s paramount leader, Xi Jinping’s personal preference for environmental governance has pushed the renewal of China’s climate change policy since 2012. As the legitimacy-seeking framework explains, the positive changes in China’s climate policies have benefitted from Xi’s understanding of the congruence between domestic and international legitimacy. With climate change as a significant issue during his tenure, Xi sees protecting the environment and addressing global warming as an opportunity to gain both domestic and international legitimacy for China. Consequently, the Chinese government has been establishing more aspirational climate change targets and taking more concrete measures, to resolve its domestic legitimacy crisis and boost its international reputation and leadership.

Conclusion

China’s climate change policy is driven by the pursuit of both domestic and international legitimacy. Domestically, the government and the ruling party aim to enhance their governing capabilities and offer public goods including a healthy ecology and environment, aligning with long-term objectives like the ‘Two Centenary Goals’ and the notion of ecological civilisation. Reframing the economic model towards low-carbon and technology-driven innovation supports environmental governance initiatives and the sustainable development of the economy. Additionally, growing public awareness of severe environmental pollution within China links environmental policy with social control. When the party and state’s performance legitimacy is at risk concerning the air quality, environmental issues can take on greater priority, resulting in more efficient policies implemented with a strong sense of purpose. Concurrently, China aspires to lead global governance and reform the international order in its favour. Its proactive efforts to mitigate and adapt to global warming will likely enhance its reputation abroad, boosting its international legitimacy and the appeal of slogans such as ‘A Community of Shared Future for Mankind’.

It is pertinent to highlight recent developments in China’s climate change policies to explore the validity of the legitimacy-seeking framework further. At the domestic level, the 20th Party Congress report in 2022 emphasises a ‘planned, step-by-step’ approach to achieving the carbon peak.⁵ This move seems to indicate that China is scaling back its response to climate change. However, this development is primarily the effect of some local officials’ radical measures, such as electricity rationing and cessation of heating, to reduce the use of traditional energy sources. Such measures have disrupted the regular economic order and people’s daily lives, which has brought widespread public complaints. Moreover, China’s economic development has taken a hit due to the COVID-19 pandemic, compelling the government to mitigate the impact of climate change measures on the economy. Despite this, the party and state have not eased its energy efficiency and emissions reduction requirements in the report, proposing several tasks and measures to facilitate the shift towards clean and low-carbon energy sources, emphasising adherence to carbon peak and carbon neutral targets. This seeming contradiction suggests that even amidst the pandemic’s economic challenges, the CPC wants to achieve its strategic objectives in combating climate change with minimal economic cost. In other words, the Chinese government is striving to balance economic growth and environmental quality to safeguard its domestic performance legitimacy.

At the international level, China suspended the dialogue with the US on climate change cooperation in response to US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022. This decision, driven by China’s prioritisation of domestic legitimacy, could potentially harm its international legitimacy on climate change. However, China has not imposed significant penalties on climate change cooperation with other countries. China’s Vice Foreign Minister stated that the suspension was only a response to Pelosi’s visit and not intended to punish the world. By reiterating China’s commitment to international cooperation on the climate crisis, China again emphasised its positive stance on the issue and its willingness to work with the global community (MFA 2022b). The repeated statements indicated China’s awareness of the potential damage to its international legitimacy if it was perceived as shirking its responsibilities. Furthermore, after the Xi-Biden meeting in Bali on 14 November 2022, climate cooperation talks between the US and China were rapidly resumed at COP27, helping to restore China’s image on climate change. Therefore, China’s actions in August 2022 concerning climate change might be more symbolic than substantive, primarily intended to satisfy domestic audiences to safeguard nationalist legitimacy and demonstrate China’s determination to assert its claim over Taiwan, rather than weakening China’s commitment to addressing climate change.

Although the legitimacy-seeking framework may not offer an exhaustive explanation for China’s policymaking, this paper presents a unitary and relatively complete picture of the fundamental reasons behind China’s motivation to combat climate change. Scholars of Chinese politics and foreign policies seek to uncover factors leading to China’s participation in or challenge to Western-dominated international order. The legitimacy-seeking framework provides a useful analytical approach that merits further exploration in future research. As noted earlier, domestic legitimacy usually takes priority over international legitimacy, and hence many of China’s controversial practices internationally can be attributed to a desire for domestic legitimacy. The divergent demands for legitimacy across various historical periods also clarify the changes in Chinese diplomacy. For instance, after embarking on reforms and opening up, China actively integrated itself into the existing international order to further the central task of economic development. After 2012, with the rise of nationalist sentiments, China prioritised promoting international order reform and adopted a tough stance on territorial disputes and trade frictions. Regarding international collaborations that enhance domestic legitimacy, such as UN peacekeeping missions, infrastructure development, people-to-people and cultural exchanges, China is willing to make contributions to enhance its international legitimacy. Combating climate change is a typical focal point where the Chinese government’s political interests intersect with the international community’s needs.

Acknowledgements

We thank the journal’s anonymous reviewers, editors, and the chairs and participants of the session Elite networks, the climate crisis and the global crisis of (neo-) liberal order at the 14th Pan-European Conference on International Relations organised by the European International Studies Association (EISA) for their helpful comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Chenchao Lian

Chenchao Lian (corresponding author) is a DPhil (PhD) candidate in International Relations at the University of Oxford. He has research experience in China’s research institutions and think tanks. His research focuses on Chinese politics and foreign policy, maritime issues, and global governance, and he has published in several academic journals and media covering these topics.

Jinhong Li

Jinhong Li is a graduate student in political science at Duke University. He was also a research assistant at the Centre for Advanced International Studies of the University of Nottingham Ningbo China. His research focuses on climate policy and China in international relations.

Notes

1 It is important to clarify that China continues to uphold this principle, although China has mentioned it less frequently after the Paris Conference. Moreover, China has no longer used this principle to avoid commitment to internationally binding emission targets since the Paris Conference.

2 More interesting details of netizens’ discussions can be viewed at https://tieba.baidu.com/p/4928180050, accessed on 12 August 2022.

3 Also translated as ‘Lucid waters and lush mountains are invaluable assets.’

4 The first goal is to achieve a comprehensively moderate prosperous society, doubling China’s 2010 GDP and per capita income by the CPC’s centenary in 2021. The second goal is to build China into a modern socialist country, reaching the level of moderately developed countries by the time the People’s Republic of China’s centenary in 2049.

5 This means that public and private sectors in China should not simply abandon traditional fossil energy sources in the absence of enough alternative new energy sources, because it could negatively impact economic growth and daily lives of ordinary people.