Broadening perspectives on inclusive peacemaking: the case of the UN mediation in Syria

Abstract

Civil society inclusion has become a widely accepted norm in international peacemaking. Scholars have analysed the impact of inclusion on mediation effectiveness, mediators’ rationales for broadening participation, and the different modalities to include civil society actors. Drawing on the concept of the ‘agency of the governed’ in norms research, this article examines the inclusion norm from the perspective of civil society actors. It conducts a case study of the United Nations (UN) mediation in Syria based on 41 interviews gathered between 2018 and 2020. The article shows how Syrian civil society actors perceived inclusion and compares these views to the dominant international narratives on inclusion. It demonstrates that the link between inclusion and effectiveness is conditional, and that inclusion risks – under certain conditions – to lower legitimacy, disempower civil society, and entrench conflict lines. The article thereby nuances arguments about how inclusion leads to effectiveness by broadening the perspectives on inclusive peacemaking. It has crucial practical implications because mediators may decide on whether and how to design inclusive processes, but civil society actors ultimately determine the effectiveness of such inclusion attempts.

Keywords:

• Peacemaking
• inclusion
• civil society
• United Nations
• Syria

Introduction

Inclusion has become a widely accepted standard in peacemaking. Enshrined in the United Nations (UN) Guidance on Effective Mediation adopted in 2012, it is defined as the ‘extent and manner in which the views and needs of conflict parties and other stakeholders are represented and integrated into the process and outcome of a mediation effort’ (United Nations 2012). While the term ‘other stakeholders’ is not further specified, it has often come to refer to civil society actors. Indeed, their inclusion has become a norm, as both the discourse and practice of mediation indicate the need to broaden participation in peace processes beyond the belligerents (Turner 2021).¹ Authors commonly define civil society as voluntary and as distinct from the state and political parties (Belloni 2001; Jessop et al. 2008; Pouligny 2005). This article acknowledges the context-specificity of civil society and the importance of avoiding essentialisms (Anheier and Nuno 2002, 191). Civil society actors are diverse and not all civil society action is formalised in an NGO but it can also be more loosely coordinated in associations or initiatives (Fischer 2011; Orjuela 2003; Pouligny 2005). For these reasons, the article will refer to civil society actors, rather than organisations in the following.

The diffusion of the civil society inclusion norm has been accompanied by a surge in research on the topic. The literature focuses on three main areas. First, it analyses the link between civil society inclusion and the effectiveness of peace processes (Krause, Krause, and Bränfors 2018; Nilsson 2012; Orjuela 2003; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008). Second, scholars study mediators’ rationales and conditions to include civil society (Bell 2019; Elfversson and Nilsson 2022; Hirblinger and Landau 2020; Lanz 2011). Third, research investigates different modalities of inclusion (Eschmann and Nilsson 2022; Nilsson et al. 2020; Paffenholz 2014a). While the literature has been burgeoning, most contributions focus on the perspectives of mediators in terms of why and how they should include civil society. While some recent research takes into account views beyond those of mediators (Cuhadar 2020; Zanker 2018; Hellmüller, 2020), the perspectives of civil society actors themselves remain relatively understudied.

This article therefore contributes to the existing literature by analysing the inclusion norm from the perspective of civil society actors. To do so, it draws on the norms literature and particularly its concept of the ‘agency of the governed’, which invites scholars to change their focus from seeing domestic actors as receivers of norms to considering them as contesters, translators, and appropriators of norms (Deitelhoff and Zimmermann 2019; Krook and True 2012; Wiener 2014). The article conducts such a change: Based on an in-depth case study of civil society inclusion in the UN mediation in Syria, it uncovers how civil society actors perceived inclusion and compares these views with the three most cited rationales of international mediators for inclusion: legitimacy, empowerment, and relationship transformation (Hirblinger and Landau 2020). The article shows that these three rationales are based on specific assumptions that may not always be shared by civil society actors. Indeed, while many Syrian civil society actors agreed in principle with the three rationales, the article demonstrates that they are conditional in that inclusion can also lower legitimacy, disempower civil society, and entrench conflict lines. The article thereby nuances arguments about the link between inclusion and effectiveness by broadening the perspectives on inclusive peacemaking.

The article makes two contributions. First, based on a thorough review of the literature on inclusion, it broadens the voices heard in academic discussions on the topic. While civil society actors regularly make public statements, their perspectives have not been systematically integrated into the study of inclusive peacemaking. However, the article shows that if their views are not considered, international mediators who design inclusive processes risk working at cross-purposes with their main stated rationales. Second, the article contributes to the norms literature by providing empirical evidence of how civil society actors shape norms in a particular domain. It thereby helps overcome a strict division of global and domestic spheres of norm diffusion and shifts the focus towards perceptions of norms, rather than specific discourses and actions. The article also has important practical implications because while mediators may decide on whether and how to design inclusive processes, civil society actors ultimately determine the effectiveness of such inclusion attempts.

Theoretical framework

Inclusion norm

The diffusion of the civil society inclusion norm is closely related to the ‘local turn’ in peace research (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013). In the mid-2000s, scholars increasingly called for more attention to the agency of local actors in promoting peace and criticised existing peacebuilding approaches for being top-down (Björkdahl et al. 2014; Mac Ginty 2008; Richmond and Mitchell 2012). Civil society actors became considered as representatives of popular views and thus as intermediaries between international peacebuilding actors and the broader local population in a conflict setting (Donais 2012; Lederach 1997).

This growing attention to civil society actors influenced mediation policy and practice. At the policy level, several international organisations have underlined the importance of civil society actors in their guidance documents (e.g. Accord and African Union 2014; European External Action Service 2012; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 2014). The above-mentioned UN Guidance on Effective Mediation, for instance, includes inclusivity as one of eight fundamentals for effective mediation (United Nations 2012). Moreover, inclusion has also been a recurrent topic of policy briefs and reports (Carl 2019; Gruner and Larsson 2016; Paffenholz 2014a; Rausch and Luu 2017; Von Burg 2015).

At the practice level, mediation processes have become more inclusive. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, for instance, civil society actors were included in all the sub-working groups during the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (2002-2003). In Kenya, the mediation team addressing the post-election crisis (2007-2008) consulted civil society organisations and received inputs from them. In the framework of the peace process in Colombia (2012-2016), civil society actors participated in thematic forums and presented their insights at the negotiations. Even though exclusive mediation processes still exist, and inclusion often remains indirect, mediators who do not include civil society actors increasingly justify themselves, which points to their acknowledgment that they are transgressing a norm. In Syria, for instance, the first and the second UN Special Envoys, Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi, both led seemingly exclusive mediation processes that mainly focused on the disputants and their regional and international allies. However, they justified this focus by pointing to the urgent need to stop the violence and referred to more inclusive parallel or subsequent processes (Hellmüller 2019). So even in mediation processes that do not explicitly include civil society actors, the mediators acknowledge the importance of broadening participation beyond the belligerents.

Inclusion literature

The above shows the diffusion of the inclusion norm in policy and practice. This trend has been accompanied by a surge in research on inclusion. The literature has focused on three main aspects: effectiveness, rationales, and modalities. A first set of authors analyses how civil society inclusion relates to mediation effectiveness (Bell and O’Rourke 2007; Belloni 2001; Orjuela 2003). Some scholars point to a potential negative correlation between inclusion and effectiveness putting forward two main concerns. First, that increasing the number of actors prolongs peace negotiations since a compromise is easier found amongst a lower number of persons (Cunningham 2013; Kanol 2015; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008, 13, 21-3). Second, that there is a need for exclusion and confidentiality in some phases of a mediation process to allow disputants to explore options that may not find their constituencies’ immediate approval (McClintock and Nahimana 2008). However, most contributions on inclusion indicate a positive impact on mediation effectiveness. The most advanced study in this regard is by Nilsson (2012) who shows a positive correlation between civil society participation and the durability of peace. Authors attribute this to the fact that civil society actors bring knowledge, increase transparency and accountability, and contribute to societal cohesion (Barnes 2002; Bell and O’Rourke 2007; Jessop et al. 2008).

A second set of authors explores rationales for inclusion. Scholars analyse both the pragmatic and normative motivations for inclusion, thereby putting decisions for or against inclusion in context (Lanz 2011; Zanker 2018). Hirblinger and Landau (2020), for instance, examine the rationales that underline how the included actors are framed in research, policy, and practice. They then show how different framings of ‘the included’ lead to tensions in how inclusion is operationalised. Bell (2019) points to similar challenges demonstrating how development, peacebuilding, and human rights actors differently understand inclusion based on competing rationales. Some authors also focus on specific motivations for inclusion, such as Mendes (2019) who analyses representation as one rationale.

A third set of authors focuses on how inclusion can be operationalised through different design modalities. Paffenholz (2014b) presents nine models for inclusion ranging from direct representation, observation, and consultative forums to public decision-making and mass action. By showing a variety of design options, she helped overcome an often-reproduced binary between inclusion and exclusion. Other authors analyse specific forms of inclusion. For instance, Bell and O’Rourke (2007) focus on consultative mechanisms, Dudouet (2017) and Nilsson et al. (2020) inquire into how civil resistance and mass action influence peacemaking, while Amaral (2019) examines the use of referendums in peace processes.

The above shows that most studies focus on inclusion from the viewpoint of international mediators in terms of how they can enhance the effectiveness of the peace process, what rationales they have, and how they can design inclusive processes.² While the broader literature on civil society actors has long underlined their agency (Aeby 2016; Khalaf 2015; Lorch 2017; Vogel 2016), their views remain relatively understudied when it comes to inclusive peacemaking.³ This article complements existing research by presenting an in-depth empirical study on how civil society actors perceive inclusion and how these perceptions compare to the dominant international narratives on inclusion. It thereby uncovers important discrepancies between mediators’ and civil society actors’ views that may eventually impact the effectiveness of inclusion attempts.

Agency of the governed

To analyse civil society perspectives on inclusion, I draw on the concept of the ‘agency of the governed’ in the norms literature (Draude 2018; Zimmermann, Deitelhoff, and Lesch 2017). The concept was introduced in the so-called second wave of norms research. After years of focusing on norms diffusing in an assumed unilateral pathway from global to domestic actors, scholars pointed to the agency of those at the supposed receiving end of norm diffusion (Acharya 2004, 2009; Bloomfield 2016; Krook and True 2012; Wiener 2004, 2014). They called for a change of focus away from seeing domestic actors as mere receivers of norms towards considering them as contesters, translators, and appropriators of norms and they suggested to analyse the ‘interactions between the global and the local’ (Draude 2018, 577-78; Zwingel 2017, 675). This heralded a shift of focus in the norms literature regarding both the actors and the actions.

Concerning the actors, the ‘agency of the governed’ concept allows for a fine-grained account of a diverse set of stakeholders beyond international ones. It does not generalise domestic actors as ‘norm-followers’ (Wiener 2017, 710), but considers them as bearers of agency. This change is important for the inclusion literature that has treated civil society largely as ‘objects’ of inclusion attempts, rather than as active ‘subjects’ in shaping the norm (Hellmüller 2020b). What is more, civil society actors are often assigned to the so-called ‘local’ sphere and international actors to the so-called ‘global’ sphere. This is despite the fact that civil society actors being included in a peace process, which represents a global forum, shape the global discourse on inclusion. However, this role is not acknowledged in the literature, partly because even norms research often still focuses on domestic actors’ reactive behaviour and its consequences on local norm implementation (Draude 2018; Zimmermann 2017). The term ‘the governed’ may further contribute to this view, as it somewhat presupposes an asymmetric power position of domestic actors. Yet, civil society actors act and react in the global sphere and thereby shape global standards. Based on this insight, the article seeks to contribute to overcoming a strict distinction between the ‘global’ and the ‘local’ as they are fluid with actors transcending different spheres (Zimmermann, Deitelhoff, and Lesch 2017).

Regarding the actions, the ‘agency of the governed’ concept allows to overcome a dichotomous view between norm adoption and rejection. It enables a focus on the ‘intermediate spaces’ in which ‘global standards, their meanings and their functionality’ are produced (Draude 2018, 578). The manifold ways in which civil society actors engage with the inclusion norm have not been sufficiently discussed in the literature. Broadening the discursive space on the content of the inclusion norm to include civil society perspectives is important to uncover potential areas of contestation. While previous norms research has mostly focused on discourse or actions (Birkholz, Scherf, and Schroeder 2017), this article takes a step back and analyses perceptions. Of course, perceptions are closely intertwined with discourses and actions, but a better understanding of how a norm is perceived in the first place is needed to understand how it eventually unfolds.

Methodological framework

Case study

The article focuses on the case study of civil society inclusion in the UN mediation in Syria. Since 2012, the UN has appointed four mediators: Kofi Annan (2012), Lakhdar Brahimi (2012-2014), Staffan de Mistura (2014-2018), and Geir Pedersen (since 2019). While they all underlined the importance of civil society inclusion, de Mistura institutionalised it in the framework of the Intra-Syrian Talks that consisted of nine rounds of proximity talks between the Syrian government and opposition in Geneva from January 2016 to January 2018.⁴ As part of these talks, de Mistura created the Civil Society Support Room (CSSR), a space for civil society actors to meet during rounds of negotiations.⁵ This institutionalisation makes Syria a particularly valid case to study perceptions of inclusion as it enables the gathering of insights around the well-defined inclusion mechanism of the CSSR over two years from 2016 to 2018.

To be sure, every peace process comes with its particularities. For Syria, three contextual factors are particularly relevant. First, violence was very high with 32,595 battle-related deaths in the year 2016 when the CSSR was created (Davies, Pettersson, and Öberg 2022). This made the context not very conducive to inclusion, as the mediator’s preoccupation was to broker at least a partial ceasefire to reduce violence. Second, both belligerents were sceptical about including civil society. The autocratic government did not see any need for democratic legitimisation and claimed to be the sole representative of the Syrian population (Daher 2018). The opposition groups saw themselves as the political embodiment of the popular uprising and feared that civil society inclusion could dilute their influence (Hellmüller 2020a). Third, the belligerents, and particularly the Syrian government, were not ready to substantively engage in political negotiations and inclusion thus happened against the background of a stalling peace process.

These contextual factors impact the generalisability of the Syrian case study to other peace processes, as it may be more straightforward when violence is less intense, the belligerents favour inclusion, and the peace process moves towards a negotiated solution. However, the Syrian case highlights the importance of considering civil society perceptions as it nuances the dominant international narratives of the inclusion norm.

Data

The case study is based on 41 in-depth qualitative interviews and an analysis of policy documents. I conducted interviews with Syrian civil society actors and analysed their public statements and reports. Moreover, I draw on interviews conducted with members of the mediation team and experts. I identified the respondents based on theoretical sampling, meaning that I approached those likely to provide the most information-rich source of data (Birks and Mills 2011, 11). I was mostly interested in civil society actors who had participated in the CSSR (81%), but I also interviewed some who had not been included (19%). I aimed at hearing voices from different geographical regions as the views on the process may differ based on their places of residence/origin. Most respondents were based in Beirut or Gaziantep, while some also lived in Syria (Damascus, Homs, Idlib, Jaramana, Latakia) or in other cities (Berlin, Erbil, Istanbul, London). I conducted all interviews between 2018 and 2020 in either English or Arabic. For interviews in Arabic, I had help from interpreters. I took notes during all interviews and recorded them if participants consented. I triangulated all data to cross-validate the findings and stopped interviewing when additional data no longer brought new information and existing data were already sufficiently confirmed (Baxter and Jack 2015, 556; Birks and Mills 2011, 10; Thies 2002, 357). All interviews were anonymised to protect the respondents. The list of interviews is available in Appendix 1.

I analysed the interviews with MaxQDA. I proceeded in two steps. First, I used the constant comparison method drawing on a grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1994). This means that I built codes and categories based on the data itself and then constantly compared new data to the existing ones (Birks and Mills 2011, 11). Thereby, I inductively built the analysis presented in this article (Yin 2009, 141-4). Second, I complemented this inductive approach with a deductive one in which I compared the main perceptions that emerged from civil society actors with dominant international narratives on inclusion as presented in the literature. This combination of induction and deduction enabled an analysis that is firmly grounded in the data while at the same time being systematically embedded in the literature.

Empirical analysis

The empirical part of the article first presents a short overview of civil society inclusion in the UN mediation in Syria. It then outlines civil society perspectives on inclusion and examines how they compare to dominant narratives in the international mediation discourse.

Inclusion in the UN mediation in Syria

Before the armed conflict, civil society in Syria existed mainly in the form of charities and organisations under government control (Alzoubi 2015, 1; Khalaf 2015, 44). The 1958 Association Law stated that the foundation of any civil society association needed approval from the security services.⁶ When Bashar al-Assad came to power in 2000, there were no more than 550 legally registered associations in Syria (Ruiz de Elvira 2013, 2). During the time of the Damascus spring in the early 2000s (Brownlee 2015, 37), the government sought to revive civil society and supported the creation of several government-related NGOs. They operated both ‘as an element of the facade that portrayed the Syrian president as a moderniser and reformist and as a lease valve for the West’s willingness to support Syrian civil society’ (Khalaf, Ramadan, and Stolleis 2014, 8).

Civil society in Syria exponentially grew after the beginning of the Syrian armed conflict in 2011. While 1,047 organisations were registered in Syria between 1958 and 2010, their number at least doubled in the first six years of the war (Alzoubi 2017, 1). New civil society groups initially emerged to coordinate the protest movements and many of them subsequently worked on humanitarian and service delivery issues (Abo Naser et al. 2016, 17-25; Khalaf 2015, 49; Milani et al. 2016, 12-5). While a large number of NGOs were set up, many civil society actors also worked more informally (Alzoubi 2017, 2015, 1; Khalaf, Ramadan, and Stolleis 2014, 9). In parallel, government-created associations continued to operate (Khalaf, Ramadan, and Stolleis 2014, 9).

Acknowledging their important role, the Office of the Special Envoy for Syria (OSE) led by the third UN Special Envoy on Syria, Staffan de Mistura, created the CSSR in 2016, as mentioned above. In this framework, civil society actors travelled to Geneva during rounds of talks and exchanged amongst themselves and with the mediation team (Turkmani and Theros 2019).⁷

Civil society perspectives

As mentioned above, scholars have studied rationales for inclusion by analysing why mediators decide to design inclusive peace processes. The most extensive study on rationales for inclusion was conducted by Hirblinger and Landau (2020). Focusing on the UN, they identified three main rationales for inclusion: build the legitimacy of the peace process, empower specific actors, and transform relationships. In the following, I analyse how Syrian civil society actors perceived these three rationales and with what influence on the outcomes of inclusion.

Legitimacy

A first rationale for mediators to include civil society is to build legitimacy based on the assumption that hearing more voices will increase ownership of the process and the ensuing peace agreement (Hirblinger and Landau 2020, 307-8; United Nations 2012, 11). The legitimacy narrative was present in the Syrian peace process. De Mistura mentioned for instance that ‘I count on [civil society’s] commitment to the political process, sense of citizenship, and real contact with the real problems on the ground and their own insights and ideas in order to strengthen our ongoing mediation efforts’.⁸ The assumed link between inclusion and legitimacy revolves around two aspects. First, the idea that civil society actors bring specific knowledge on local needs that makes the peace process more relevant for the broader population. Second, civil society participation is assumed to make the peace process more transparent (Nilsson 2012; Zanker 2014).

Syrian civil society actors shared the view that their presence could enhance the legitimacy of the peace process. In a statement published in 2017, 169 Syrian civil society organisations called on the OSE to ‘draw from the legitimacy and unique contribution of Syrian civil society to ensure a sustainable political agreement for Syria’.⁹ However, their perceptions on the link between inclusion and legitimacy differed from the dominant international narratives.

First, in terms of the knowledge that civil society actors could bring on local needs, the OSE regularly met with them, even between official rounds of talks, to gather information on the humanitarian situation but also various thematic issues relevant to the talks.¹⁰ Civil society actors appreciated this role. They mentioned in an online statement that ‘from the onset of the Geneva talks we have pressed for an active role in shaping the process given our links to the ground’.¹¹ As one interlocutor said, ‘we know our communities and we know what kind of procedures we need for a process that is approved by the communities’.¹² Despite this appreciation, they regretted that they shared information rather than knowledge.¹³ To change that, they would have needed to prepare, but since the political process dictated the timing of the meetings, they were often invited on very short notice and did not receive an agenda beforehand due to political sensitivities.¹⁴ Moreover, the exact composition of the invited group changed in every round, as the OSE wanted to give as many civil society actors as possible a chance to participate, which rendered it difficult to build on previous discussions and develop substantive inputs over time.¹⁵ Some organisations even declined the invitation to a CSSR meeting in December 2017 referring to the fact that the discussions were not thorough enough to allow for substantive engagement.¹⁶ These circumstances led to a situation in which civil society actors felt unable to influence agenda-setting as the overall topics of discussion were imposed on them.¹⁷ They felt ‘attached to, but not part of the process’¹⁸ leaving an impression that ‘their opinions aren’t really being channelled to the process itself’.¹⁹ While they understood that the political process had priority, they often questioned their own influence in terms of the knowledge they were able to share.²⁰

Second, in terms of the increased transparency of negotiations that comes with inclusion, Syrian civil society actors held workshops and conveyed the information gathered in Geneva to their networks.²¹ However, this was challenging as most of the discussions and even process-related issues were confidential due to political sensitivities. As one respondent mentioned: ‘This is one of the main issues … that there is no transparency with the political process. So even for the CSSR, we didn’t have good access to the political process to get at least some updates’.²² Civil society actors acknowledged the need for confidentiality, but still wished for a certain level of transparency. As one interviewee put it: ‘I do understand that the OSE has a lot of secret meetings and there is involvement of international stakeholders who want things to be … under the surface. But on the other hand, we have the right as Syrians, … we have the right to know’.²³ Transparency was not only a challenge regarding the political process, but also the CSSR itself. Information about the CSSR could not always be shared transparently as some civil society actors faced security risks by participating (Hellmüller and Zahar 2018, 4).²⁴ But at the same time, the mere existence of the CSSR created expectations for information-sharing. As a respondent mentioned, ‘there should be a sort of process to share information. … Sometimes there is a newsletter that is coming, people are sharing it. But it’s also exclusive of a number of people’.²⁵ Based on consultations with more than 250 Syrian organisations, a Syrian civil society platform recommended that ‘the content and process of discussions [be shared] periodically and transparently’ and that the OSE should ‘publish periodic reports about outcomes during and after every meeting’.²⁶ Civil society actors underlined that otherwise, actors not invited to the CSSR grew suspicious about it: ‘the people who did not participate, see it as a mystery room [because] we didn’t have a communication channel’.²⁷ Some civil society actors also faced criticism from their networks for attending meetings that seemingly produced no tangible outputs.²⁸

The above shows that the dominant international narratives of how inclusion leads to legitimacy needs to be nuanced. From a civil society perspective, inclusion is only positively correlated to legitimacy if knowledge is shared in a systematic and meaningful way and communication channels are clearly defined to ensure that transparency is indeed increased. Most importantly, inclusion may even delegitimise civil society actors in the eyes of their constituencies when they cannot demonstrate their contribution to the peace process. This shows that a simplistic view of the link between inclusion and legitimacy may backfire and lead to contestation from the very actors supposed to legitimise the process.

Empowerment

A second rationale of international mediators for civil society inclusion is to empower those actors considered as having suffered the most from the conflict or as being champions for peace (Hirblinger and Landau 2020, 308). This narrative was also present in the CSSR where a frequently mentioned motivation for civil society inclusion was that their space needed to be protected and enlarged.²⁹ As de Mistura mentioned, ‘I commend Syrian civil society for raising their voices’³⁰ and ‘we looked for respected civil society representatives [to be included] who could somehow represent the many Syrians who are not political affiliates but still deserve a stake in their future’.³¹

Yet, from a Syrian civil society perspective, framing inclusion as empowerment brought two main challenges, as mentioned in interviews. First, the persons who participated came to be seen not just as individual civil society actors, but as representatives of the broader Syrian society. They reportedly had to justify their role after each CSSR meeting.³² As one interviewee mentioned, she was always asked whom she represented.³³ Some civil society actors established mechanisms to select representatives for the CSSR or held consultations before CSSR meetings to ensure they conveyed the views of a broader range of actors (Hellmüller and Zahar 2018). As one woman said, ‘I must do advocacy not only for women in Idlib, no I must do advocacy for each woman in all of Syria’.³⁴ However, others did not claim representation and underlined that they only spoke on their own behalf, as they did ‘not have the representation mandate’.³⁵ Many civil society respondents underlined that such a representation mandate was problematic, as they felt locked into homogenising categories, which overlooked their diversity.³⁶ As one respondent said:

Somehow everybody was shoehorned into one category, sort of like saying ‘all of you now are civil society, all of you are going to hear, to challenge both sides, and to come up with a new narrative, a civil society narrative’. And shoehorning civil society into one narrative is just as dangerous as not representing civil society at all because civil society is very complex and does not have a single vision. They have different ideological points of view. They have different perspectives on the conflict. They have different roles and mandates.³⁷

The representation expectation also risked to enhance friction amongst civil society actors.³⁸ As one respondent mentioned, ‘it created a sense of elite with the usual suspects … always ‘jumping around’, which made it easier to target some people’.³⁹ Thus, the empowerment rationale obscured diversity and created fragmentation amongst some civil society actors.

Second, the empowerment rationale also came with an expectation that civil society actors would hold the conflict parties accountable, especially if they stall the process.⁴⁰ Yet, this was not straightforward in the CSSR. On the one hand, many civil society actors were aligned with a belligerent group and were thus not willing or able to apply equal pressure on the parties. Some civil society actors declined attendance in the CSSR due to political considerations.⁴¹ As one respondent recounted, ‘some of them felt that being present there is delegitimizing the side they are supporting’.⁴² On the other hand, civil society actors’ access to the belligerents was difficult. As mentioned above, the disputants were opposed to the CSSR as they feared a loss of their own influence (Daher 2018).⁴³ As a respondent said, ‘the Syrian government is not willing to negotiate [with civil society] because negotiating [means] that they will give something. And … the opposition [is opposed to civil society inclusion too] because they thought that they are now in competition with a wider range of Syrians’.⁴⁴ This disapproval rendered the circulation of information, let alone direct meetings, between the delegations and CSSR participants impossible and left the expected civil society role to increase the parties’ accountability unfulfilled.⁴⁵

The above shows that the empowerment rationale needs to be nuanced. Inclusion is only empowering if the issue of representation does not put civil society actors into fixed categories and their role is decoupled from pressuring the belligerents. Indeed, it may have a potential disempowering effect if it creates false expectations in civil society actors’ roles.

Relationship transformation

A third rationale of international mediators to include civil society is to transform relationships. In that perspective, bringing civil society actors together is expected to reshape antagonistic relationships and build social cohesion (Hirblinger and Landau 2020, 309). This element was present in the CSSR.⁴⁶ De Mistura mentioned that ‘despite their differences, they were Syrian civil society, they displayed a genuine commitment to dialogue and a spirit of negotiation that I hope can be replicated in the formal negotiations’.⁴⁷ Civil society interviewees also recounted how prejudices between different actors were deconstructed and how discussions about issues of joint concern, such as medical or education services, helped them foreground their common interests rather than their differences.⁴⁸ As one interviewee stated, CSSR participants were ‘trying to see the commonalities that they can build upon’.⁴⁹

Despite this general agreement, the transformation rationale was contested by civil society actors regarding two main aspects. First, they mentioned that social transformation was always based on a certain narrative of what conflict lines needed to be overcome. In the framework of the CSSR, this produced a binary categorisation of civil society actors according to whether they were ‘close to the opposition’ or ‘close to the government’.⁵⁰ Respondents had the impression that for each CSSR meeting, the OSE put them into these two boxes to make sure they had equal representation – what one respondent called ‘headcount inclusion’.⁵¹ However, this projected one particular conflict line onto the CSSR which, as one respondent mentioned, ‘is not entirely untrue, but it amplifies one aspect and they put you in boxes’.⁵² In other words, they ‘officialize the way of thinking to say that civil society is divided along the confrontation lines between opposition and regime’⁵³ while ‘civil society can argue and discuss according to lines of being conservative or being liberal, being more secular or more religious, and many others’.⁵⁴ Civil society actors also started thinking in these schemes themselves. They for instance accused the OSE when they felt that the CSSR group present in a meeting was not ‘balanced’ in terms of opposition-close and government-close ­participants.⁵⁵ As one respondent mentioned, ‘we did not think about this . . . before, but when it was done to us, we started to think in the same way’.⁵⁶

Second, many civil society actors felt that the transformation rationale also led to an expectation to find consensus.⁵⁷ However, as one interlocutor stated:

Civil society does not have to be united, from my point of view. It will never be united. And that’s the sort of thinking that created … more problems. At the end of the day, civil society are part of Syrian communities and Syrian communities are divided today, so it’s very normal to see fragmentations and different opinions.⁵⁸

Indeed, the pressure to reach consensus was criticised by many. As one respondent said: ‘I wholeheartedly disagree with this idea about coming to a consensus’.⁵⁹ In some cases, reaching a consensus on politically sensitive matters was outright impossible as civil society actors faced security concerns.⁶⁰ Thus, the pressure for joint outcome documents meant that CSSR participants sometimes had to dilute statements to the point of them becoming almost content-void.⁶¹ If not, they faced heavy backlash. For instance, after a civil society statement published in 2018, which was explicit on some politically sensitive points, the signatories faced personal insults and even death threats.⁶²

The above shows that the relationship transformation rationale also needs to be nuanced. From a Syrian civil society perspective, increasing social cohesion through inclusion may be possible if the conflict is appreciated in its complexity and a focus on commonalities is encouraged but not pushed for. If, however, civil society actors are first categorised according to a simplistic reading of the conflict and then expected to find consensus, it risks worsening social relationships by creating more fragmentation than cohesion.

Conclusion

This article examined the civil society inclusion norm from the perspective of civil society actors and compared their views to the dominant narratives present in the international mediation discourse. It shows that while the inclusion norm has taken a largely positive connotation in both practice and research, the link between inclusion on the one hand and legitimacy, empowerment, and relationship transformation on the other hand needs to be nuanced. More specifically, the article demonstrates that while the interviewed civil society actors did not contest the three rationales per se, they are conditional. First, the analysis shows that inclusion is only positively correlated to legitimacy if knowledge is shared in a systematic and meaningful way and communication channels are clearly defined to ensure transparency. If they cannot show how they contribute to the process, it may delegitimise the included civil society actors. Second, the article reveals that inclusion is only empowering if representation does not imply fixed categorisations of civil society actors that obscures their diversity, and their role is dissociated from pressuring the belligerents. If it creates false expectations, however, it can also be deeply disempowering. Third, the article depicts that inclusion may positively transform relationships, if the conflict is not reduced to a single fault line and a focus on commonalities is encouraged but not forced. If, however, civil society actors are first categorised according to a simplistic reading of the conflict and then pressured into finding consensus, it may create more fragmentation than cohesion. Overall, the article nuances arguments about the link between inclusion and effectiveness by broadening perspectives on inclusive peacemaking.

The article’s case study of the UN mediation in Syria has limitations due to the particularities of the case: inclusion took place against the backdrop of high levels of violence, with belligerents opposed to inclusion, and in an overall stalling political process. This means that some of the challenges faced by Syrian civil society actors may be different in other cases. For instance, increasing the legitimacy of a peace process or transforming relationships through inclusion may be more straightforward in contexts with lower levels of violence and mediation processes that are moving towards a peace agreement. Studies on how the three dominant international rationales for inclusion relate to civil society perspectives in other contexts could further test the generalisability of the argument made in this article.

Overall, however, the article broadens the voices heard in academic discussions on inclusion based on a thorough review of the existing literature and shows how civil society actors shape a particular norm. It reveals that international mediators may work at cross-purposes with their own stated rationales if they do not take civil society perspectives into account when designing their inclusion mechanism. Indeed, while mediators may decide on whether and how to include civil society, it is the perceptions of civil society actors themselves that will eventually determine if their inclusion is effective or not.

Acknowledgements

The author thanks all the interviewees for having shared their insights. The author is also grateful to Flavia Keller and Marie Holch as well as two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on this article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This research has been supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation.

Notes on contributors

Sara Hellmüller

Sara Hellmüller is Senior Researcher at the Centre for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich. Prior to joining ETH Zurich, Sara was SNSF Assistant Professor at the Geneva Graduate Institute and Visiting Scholar at Oxford University. Before that, she was Senior Researcher at swisspeace and a Lecturer at the University of Basel and held visiting positions at the University of Montreal (Canada), Columbia University (US), and the University of Bunia (DR Congo). Sara’s research focuses on peace processes, particularly UN peace missions in various world orders, the role of norms in peace promotion, local and international peacebuilding (especially in Syria and DR Congo), as well as knowledge production on peace and conflict. She has over a decade of ­experience conducting research in conflict-affected contexts and has spent more than a year in eastern DR Congo.

Notes

1 Scholars habitually define norms as inter-subjective understandings regarding the proper behavior of actors in a given context (Klotz 1995, 451; Onuf 1989, 79).

2 An exception is Cuhadar (2020) who analyses opposition to inclusion, but she locates resistance mostly in the existing power holders, rebel groups, or broader society.

3 An exception is Zanker (2014), but she exclusively focuses on civil society views on legitimate representation.

4 Talks took place in Geneva in January-February 2016, March 2016, April 2016, February-March 2017, March 2017, May 2017, July 2017, and November-December 2017 and exceptionally in Vienna in January 2018.

5 The CSSR still exists but changed its role after the discontinuation of the Intra-Syrian Talks.

6 Available at: http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Syria/93-1958-En.pdf, consulted 10.10.2023.

7 See https://cssrweb.org/en/about-the-cssr/, consulted 10.10.2023.

8 Briefing to UN Security Council by Staffan de Mistura, 27.11.2017, New York: UN.

9 Save Our Syria, 02.08.2017, http://www.saveoursyria.org/letter-to-un-special-envoy-from-civil-society.html, consulted 10.10.2023.

10 Interviews: civil society actors (#1) 26.06.2018, (#2) 27.06.2018, (#6) 28.06.2018, (#13) 31.07.2018.

11 Save Our Syria, 02.08.2017, http://www.saveoursyria.org/letter-to-un-special-envoy-from-civil-society.html, consulted 10.10.2023.

12 Interview: civil society actor (#3) 27.06.2018.

13 Interviews: civil society actors (#11) 27.07.2018, (#17) 02.08.2018, (#22) 10.08.2018, (#32) 30.08.2018.

14 Interviews: civil society actors (#3) 27.06.2018, (#15) 02.08.2018, (#32) 30.08.2018; mediation team member (#28) 17.08.2018.

15 Interviews: civil society actors (#2) 27.06.2018, (#10) 26.07.2018, (#14) 02.08.2018, (#19) 06.08.2018.

16 Statement by Syrian human rights organizations, 28.11.17, https://www.stj-sy.com/en/view/337, consulted 10.10.2023.

17 Interviews: civil society actors (#11) 27.07.2018, (#15) 02.08.2018, (#17) 02.08.2018, (#32) 30.08.2018.

18 Interview: civil society actor (#11) 27.07.2018.

19 Interview: mediation team member (#36) 11.12.2018.

20 Interviews: civil society actors (#17) 02.08.2018, (#22) 10.08.2018, (#32) 30.08.2018.

21 Interviews: civil society actors (#1) 26.06.2018, (#4) 27.06.2018, (#13) 31.07.2018.

22 Interview: civil society actor (#7) 28.06.2018.

23 Interview: civil society actor (#7) 28.06.2018.

24 Interviews: civil society actors (#4) 27.06.2018, (#11) 27.07.2018.

25 Interview: civil society actor (#11) 27.07.2018.

26 Syrian Civil Platform, 15.08.16, http://www.scplatform.net/en/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Civil-society-participation-in-the-political-process-1.pdf, consulted 10.10.2023.

27 Interview: civil society actor (#3) 27.06.2018.

28 Interviews: civil society actors (#17) 02.08.2018, (#32) 30.08.2018.

29 Interviews: civil society actors (#1) 26.06.2018, (#23) 13.08.2018; mediation team member (#34) 27.11.2018.

30 Briefing to the UN Security Council by Staffan de Mistura, 18.09.2018.

31 Briefing to the UN Security Council by Staffan de Mistura, 17.10.2018.

32 Interviews: civil society actors (#3) 27.06.2018; (#6) 28.06.2018; (#14) 02.08.2018.

33 Interview: civil society actor (#3) 27.06.2018.

34 Interview: civil society actor (#4) 27.06.2018.

35 Interview: civil society actor (#14) 02.08.2018.

36 Interviews: civil society actors (#3) 27.06.2018; (#6) 28.06.2018; (#14) 02.08.2018, (#15) 02.08.2018.

37 Interview: civil society actor (#14) 02.08.2018.

38 Interviews: civil society actors (#14) 02.08.2018, (#17) 02.08.2018; expert (#31) 24.08.2018; mediation team members (#35) 04.12.2018, (#36) 11.12.2018.

39 Interview: civil society actor (#2) 27.06.2018.

40 The voices missing from Syria’s peace talks, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2017/3/23/the-voices-missing-from-syrias-peace-talks, consulted 10.10.2023. See also Interviews: civil society actors (#6) 28.06.2018, (#7) 28.06.2018, (#12) 30.07.2018, (#14) 02.08.2018, (#16) 02.08.2018, (#23) 13.08.2018.

41 Interviews: civil society actors (#10) 26.07.2018, (#11) 27.07.2018.

42 Interview: civil society actor (#10) 26.07.2018.

43 Interviews: civil society actors (#7) 28.06.2018, (#17) 02.08.2018.

44 Interview: civil society actor (#7) 28.06.2018.

45 Interview: civil society actor (#7) 28.06.2018.

46 Interview: civil society actor (#16) 02.08.2018.

47 Briefing to the UN Security Council by Staffan de Mistura, 16.05.2018.

48 Interviews: civil society actors (#2) 27.06.2018, (#6) 28.06.2018, (#7) 28.06.2018, (#12) 30.07.2018, (#14) 02.08.2018, (#16) 02.08.2018, (#29) 17.08.2018, (#30) 24.08.2018, (#32) 30.08.2018.

49 Interview: civil society actor (#16) 02.08.2018.

50 Interviews: civil society actors (#2) 27.06.2018, (#3) 27.06.2018, (#12) 30.07.2018; expert (#24) 13.08.2018; mediation team member (#36) 11.12.2018.

51 Interview: civil society actor (#3) 27.06.2018.

52 Interview: civil society actor (#2) 27.06.2018.

53 Interview: civil society actor (#12) 30.07.2018.

54 Interview: civil society actor (#12) 30.07.2018.

55 Interview: mediation team member (#36) 11.12.2018.

56 Interview: civil society actor (#3) 27.06.2018.

57 Interviews: civil society actors (#14) 02.08.2018, (#15) 02.08.2018, (#16) 02.08.2018, (#23) 13.08.2018; mediation team member (#36) 11.12.2018.

58 Interview: civil society actor (#11) 27.07.2018.

59 Interview: civil society actor (#6) 28.06.2018.

60 Interviews: civil society actors (#6) 28.06.2018, (#15) 02.08.2018.

61 Interviews: civil society actors (#6) 28.06.2018, (#7) 28.06.2018, (#9) 29.06.2018; mediation team member (#36) 11.12.2018.

62 Interviews: civil society actors (#1) 26.06.2018, (#4) 27.06.2018, (#6) 28.06.2018, (#7) 28.06.2018, (#14) 02.08.2018.