Exploring the preference for bilateral aid: Gulf oil states’ aid to Yemen

Abstract

This article delves into the significant role played by the five Arab Gulf oil states in global development and humanitarian aid efforts. It also acknowledges the criticism they face for their preference for bilateral and earmarked aid, with allegations of political motivations. Focusing on Yemen as a case study, the research explores the motivations and effectiveness of Gulf states’ aid preferences. Using a qualitative approach from 30 semi-structured in-depth interviews and a comprehensive literature review, the study takes three distinct research directions, examining how Gulf donor countries strategically employ bilateral aid in conflict running, how they use bilateral aid to forge and strengthen geopolitical alliances within the region, and the complexities associated with multilateral aid channels in Yemen. In providing insights into the motivations and strategies of Gulf countries in their aid policies, this research contributes to discussions on aid delivery and maximising impact in conflict-affected areas.

Keywords:

• Bilateral
• multilateral
• aid
• Yemen
• Gulf

Introduction

The Gulf oil states Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman to some extent, have emerged as influential players in global humanitarian aid due to their abundant resources. While these nations have participated in certain multilateral development initiatives over the past decade, their predominant aid strategy remains bilateral. Based on data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2023) for Gulf donor countries, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait consistently exhibit a strong inclination towards bilateral aid, with percentages ranging from 100% in certain years to a low of 63%. Among them, Kuwait emerges as the foremost proponent of bilateral assistance, followed by the UAE, Qatar, and, to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabia, which maintains the highest commitment to multilateral aid among the four. In 2020, over 85% of their official development assistance to Yemen was delivered bilaterally, reflecting their preference for this approach (Ziadah 2019). This study looks into the often-overlooked role of Gulf oil states in foreign aid allocation, with a particular emphasis on their involvement in Yemen since the onset of the conflict in 2015, marked by the Saudi-led coalition intervention in March of that year. While examining their overall donation approach, the paper specifically focuses on aid post their involvement, recognising that their engagement extends beyond aid to encompass political and military dimensions. Despite their substantial financial contributions to aid agencies, Gulf states have remained relatively understudied in the existing academic literature (Fejerskov, Lundsgaarde, and Cold-Ravnkilde 2017; Momani 2013). This study builds upon the premise that Gulf states strategically employ foreign aid to further their national interests, as emphasised by Tok (2015). In line with the broader literature on aid allocation, which highlights the geopolitical, economic, and security motivations of both Western and non-Western donors (Dandashly and Kourtelis 2023; Elayah 2016, 2023), Gulf states align with this trend. They tailor their aid allocation practices, focusing on considerations related to the pursuit of regional influence and addressing conflicts in the form of debt forgiveness and aid (Shushan and Marcoux 2011). In recognition of previous research on the role of Gulf states in aid provision and their debut, this study seeks to fill a notable gap in the literature. It conducts a focused examination of their aid activities in the context of the Yemeni conflict, in which they are actively engaged. In this context, bilateral aid emerges not merely as a form of assistance but as a strategic tool for creating, reinforcing internal ties and partnerships, and actively shaping the trajectory of the conflict.

The study also highlights that complexities in multilateral aid channels may offer opportunities for bilateral donors to divert foreign aid for their national interests. These complexities involve potential delays, increased costs, and the risk of aid diversion (Gulrajani and Calleja 2021). Bureaucratic processes within multilateral organisations can hinder efficient aid delivery and sometimes lead to issues like aid diversion (Milner 2006). These challenges and vulnerabilities within multilateral aid systems create chances for bilateral donors to prioritise their interests over the aid’s intended beneficiaries (OECD 2020). This research provides a nuanced exploration of the strategic motivations and dynamics behind Gulf states’ foreign aid allocation. Focusing on their activities in Yemen during the ongoing conflict, the study addresses an area of international aid that has received limited scholarly attention. It contributes to a deeper understanding of their roles and strategies in complex humanitarian contexts.

This study begins by establishing the theoretical foundation, emphasising the strategic use of bilateral and multichannel aid for national interests, such as conflict ruling and survival and geopolitical alliances. It then delves into the significant role of Gulf oil states in international aid, particularly their involvement in the Yemeni conflict, underscoring the importance of understanding their motivations. The research approach, outlined in the third section, combines quantitative aid report analysis, qualitative interviews, and various data sources. The fourth section unveils key findings regarding aid allocation dynamics, motivations, challenges in multilateral channels, and strategic bilateral aid deployment. Finally, the conclusion provides a concise summary of the study’s outcomes and offers recommendations based on its findings.

Exploring the theoretical framework: bilateral aid and multichannel aid in foreign assistance

The literature extensively examines foreign aid, addressing donor motivations, recipient impacts, aid delivery methods, and overall effectiveness (Elayah, Gaber, and Fenttiman 2022; Ussher et al. 2021; Svensson 2003; Hoeffler and Outram 2011; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Bermeo 2011). Bilateral aid, according to the OECD, involves direct assistance from donors to recipients, sometimes channelled indirectly through non-governmental organisations (NGOs; Findley, Milner, and Nielson 2017). It fosters closer donor–recipient relationships and can enhance development outcomes in line with donors’ strategic interests (Alesina and Dollar 2000). In contrast, multichannel aid, as defined by the OECD, involves multiple intermediaries, including international organisations and regional development banks. This approach encourages engagement, coordination, resource pooling, knowledge sharing and cooperation among aid stakeholders (Cassimon et al. 2013).

The debate on aid efficiency persists, with proponents of multichannel aid advocating for improved impact and systemic change through enhanced collaboration (Masud and Yontcheva 2005). However, the proliferation of multilateral organisations can hinder effectiveness (OECD 2020). Verdier (2008) emphasises financial diversity and specialised expertise in multilateral aid. Yet political influences also shape multilateral aid flows (Younas 2008), challenging the notion of their inherent efficiency and apoliticism (Gulrajani 2016). This study investigates the reasons behind donor states’ preference for bilateral aid, factoring in national interests and geopolitical alliances. It also considers the limitations of multichannel aid, including potential political influences that may undermine its effectiveness (Elayah 2016; Gulrajani 2016).

Our theoretical framework includes three primary research directions: first, the use of aid by donor states to advance their national interests, particularly in conflict management and control; second, the utilisation of aid to establish and strengthen geopolitical alliances and enhance their image; and, third, an examination of the challenges associated with multilateral aid delivery channels, often cited by donors to justify their continued use of bilateral aid for their national interests (Bearce and Tirone 2010). This framework provides a structured and comprehensive perspective, highlighting how donor nations skilfully employ bilateral aid as a versatile and strategic instrument. Their focus is two-fold: managing conflicts while preventing the complete disintegration of a recipient country and safeguarding their national interests (Gulrajani and Calleja 2021).

Bilateral aid in conflict zones serves a dual purpose. It acts as a lifeline, delivering essential humanitarian assistance to address urgent issues such as food shortages, limited healthcare access, and community displacement (Macrae and Zwi 1992; Delputte and Söderbaum 2012). Simultaneously, it functions as a strategic instrument for donor countries to foster influence and control within the conflict-ridden nation (Hilhorst 2013; Goodhand 2002). This highlights the active role of donor nations in shaping and prolonging conflicts by employing a blend of political and humanitarian strategies (Moyo 2009). Donor countries, through deliberate bilateral aid use, not only respond to immediate crises but also actively shape conflict dynamics and maintain governance structures within embroiled nations (Minear 2019).

In line with this perspective, donors strategically employ bilateral aid as a powerful tool to shape and strengthen geopolitical alliances (Milner and Tingley 2013). Targeted assistance allows donors to influence regional and global power dynamics, promoting stability in their immediate vicinity and beyond (Mavrotas and Villanger 2006). Bilateral aid serves as a diplomatic instrument through which donor countries strategically align with nations of significance, fostering alliances that advance their political and economic interests (McEwan and Mawdsley 2012). This positions donors as pivotal actors in international politics and conflict resolution (Hoffman and Weiss 2006).

Also, bilateral aid and humanitarian assistance emerge as a subset that projects soft power for donor countries. It serves as a means to build goodwill and bolster international standing, allowing donors to cultivate relationships based on trust and benevolence (Drążkiewicz 2020). Humanitarian efforts showcase donors’ commitment to addressing global crises and local conflicts, reinforcing their role as agents of positive change (Roborgh 2023). This multifaceted approach highlights the complex interplay between humanitarian assistance, geopolitical strategy, and the diplomatic positioning of donor countries on the international stage (Bouvier 2009).

Donors strategically utilise foreign aid to address various challenges and considerations that extend beyond the complexities associated with multichannel aid delivery. These factors significantly influence their preferences and decision-making processes (Herold et al. 2021). One primary challenge donor countries face when engaging with multilateral organisations is the intricate bureaucratic processes inherent in such institutions (Knill et al. 2019; Margulis 2021). These complexities can lead to delayed aid delivery and reduced flexibility in responding to evolving needs on the ground, as navigating layers of administrative approvals and paperwork can result in delays (Ege 2020; Easterly and Williamson 2011).

Bureaucratic intricacies can hinder the efficient allocation of resources, particularly in crisis situations, leading donors to seek alternative avenues for more efficient and timely aid distribution. In some cases, donors use these complexities as a justification to continue providing aid through bilateral channels, thereby maintaining control over conflicts in recipient countries (Margulis 2021; Ghosh and Kharas 2011). Donor countries face challenges with multilateral organisations, grappling with complex bureaucratic processes, corruption risks, and high delivery costs (Easterly and Williamson 2011). It’s crucial to highlight that bilateral aid offers specific advantages in addressing these concerns. Donor countries often contend with concerns about corruption in aid distribution, diverting resources from intended beneficiaries (Ghosh and Kharas 2011). Despite the persistence of institutionalised grand corruption risks in bilateral aid (Dávid-Barrett et al. 2020), the complexities associated with navigating bureaucratic processes and the potential for multilevel corruption in longer indirect delivery methods, involving numerous intermediaries, increase corruption risks, making transparency and accountability challenging (Hancock 1989). Nonetheless, these challenges are often mitigated in bilateral aid compared to the multilateral context.

Bilateral aid facilitates more direct and focused interactions between donor and recipient countries, reducing the number of intermediaries. Moreover, the streamlined nature of bilateral aid may result in lower delivery costs compared to the multilateral approach, as multiple organisations and intermediaries consume a significant portion of the allocated aid budget in administrative and operational expenses (Martens 2005; McCormick 2008). Despite the ongoing risk of aid diversion due to corruption in bilateral aid, the direct and targeted nature of these arrangements often enables a more effective oversight mechanism. These challenges may prompt donor countries to opt for bilateral aid channels to circumvent complexities, reduce delivery costs, and mitigate corruption risks. While multilateral organisations play a vital role in global development, donors must carefully consider these factors, especially in conflict-affected regions where timely and targeted assistance is crucial (Gulrajani 2017).

Overall, bilateral aid has its own advantages for donors, particularly closer donor–recipient relations, greater control over expenditure, higher efficiency and flexibility in delivery, and direct strategic alignment with donors’ interests. On the other hand, it poses challenges related to potential aid diversion due to receiver corruption as well as limited collaboration and resource pooling. The choice between bilateral and multichannel aid depends on the specific priorities and considerations of donor countries, especially in conflict-affected countries. Utilising the outlined theoretical directions, our research aims to investigate the motivations of Gulf oil donor countries, the impact of aid strategies on the Yemeni conflict, and the associated challenges and advantages of various aid delivery mechanisms. This research agenda promises valuable insights into donor motivations and aid effectiveness, offering nuanced understandings of conflict-affected regions.

Setting the context: Gulf oil state and the war in Yemen

The Yemen conflict began in 2014 when Houthi rebels seized the capital of Yemen, prompting military involvement by Gulf oil states, led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE (Elayah 2022). This coalition actively supports the Yemeni government against the rebels, exerting a significant influence on the conflict’s trajectory (Ahram 2023). The essence of this support is that Gulf states aim to shape Yemen conflict outcomes to ensure regional stability, in addition to protecting and advancing their national and security interests, given Yemen’s geographical proximity or shared border with all Gulf states. Yemen’s strategic importance, particularly its geostrategic location, is critical to maritime routes like the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, a crucial pathway for energy supply, making it pivotal for Gulf states (Świętek 2017). Furthermore, the Yemeni conflict is embedded in broader regional rivalries, with Gulf states supporting the Yemeni legitimate government to counterbalance Iranian influence in the Middle East, turning Yemen into a proxy battleground in this wider struggle (Elayah and Fenttiman 2021). Among all Gulf states, Saudi Arabia and the UAE specifically reflect their intention to exert influence and safeguard regional interests (Elayah and Fenttiman 2021).

This conflict has precipitated a dire humanitarian crisis (Sowers and Weinthal 2021). Over 29 million Yemenis, or 80% of the population, require aid, and 20.5 million lack access to clean water and sanitation (Maletta 2021). Nearly 6 million people have been displaced; half of Yemen’s health facilities are non-functional, severely limiting medical care; and malnutrition has led to 53.2% of children suffering from stunted growth (Tandon and Vishwanath 2020).

Gulf oil states extend humanitarian aid to alleviate Yemen’s suffering, but their strategies are shaped by larger geopolitical goals (Al-Mezaini 2017). These states employ multifaceted aid strategies, utilising aid for diplomacy, political influence and conflict management (Elkahlout and Milton 2023). Their approach encompasses humanitarian relief, reconstruction support and diplomatic negotiations (Arif and Aldosary 2023). Understanding this context is vital for comprehending the Gulf states’ involvement in Yemen and the factors influencing their aid strategies, including national interests, regional alliances and complex conflict dynamics.

Gulf states have traditionally favoured a bilateral approach in their foreign policy, extending beyond aid to encompass strategic decisions and economic policies (Nonneman 2011). This approach is characterised by a personalised and often secretive system, with decision-making concentrated in ruling families (Baabood 2003). However, concerns have been raised regarding transparency and inclusivity in decision-making processes. The preference for bilateralism in Gulf states’ foreign policy is rooted in their desire to maintain control, customise engagements, and directly pursue national interests, including addressing geopolitical and security concerns (Harmáček, Opršal, and Vítová 2022). Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE stand out for their significant aid contributions and active regional involvement, setting them apart from their counterparts (Watanabe 2016; Almeziani 2021).

Recent developments have seen Gulf states redirecting aid flows through multilateral channels, signalling a strategic shift in approach, particularly by the UAE (Momani and Ennis 2012). This shift aims to utilise financial resources as a tool to drive reforms in global governance, with a focus on securing a more influential voice in organisations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF; Sherwood 2016). The transition towards multilateral aid channels responds to international pressures and acknowledges the evolving global landscape (Young 2017). It also addresses concerns related to potential aid misuse for purposes linked to supporting terrorism (Elkahlout 2020). While Gulf states are expanding their engagement with multilateral aid, they continue bilateral activities. This multifaceted approach demonstrates their commitment to strategic flexibility, enabling effective pursuit of national interests across various aid delivery mechanisms.

Methodology, data collection and collection of literary sources

We employed a qualitative approach, conducting 30 semi-structured interviews with various stakeholder groups including Gulf bilateral donors (N = 10), Yemeni government officials (N = 5), international bilateral donors (N = 4), international multilateral donors (N = 8), and major local NGOs (N = 3), as shown in Table 1. These interviews aimed to comprehensively understand the dynamics of bilateral and multilateral aid in Yemen. Involving participants from diverse backgrounds and roles provided a multifaceted perspective on the subject. All participants were provided with explicit details about the objectives of the conducted research project, and their consent to publish data from the interviews was obtained orally through a well-informed interview procedure. To ensure confidentiality, certain positions, which could potentially reveal the identity of their respective owners, have been deliberately omitted from Table 1. This qualitative methodology and data collection strategy facilitated an in-depth exploration of the issues surrounding bilateral and multilateral aid in Yemen.

Table 1. Overview of interview sample.

Type	Organisation	Position/title	Interview medium	Date of interview	Code	Total number
Gulf donors	Ministry of foreign affairs (Qatar) Qatar Charity Qatar Charity Yemen office Qatar Red Crescent Consultative Assembly (Qatar) Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development Oman Charitable Organization King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre Saudi Development and Reconstruction Program for Yemen UAE International Development Cooperation	International cooperation coordinator Project manger Relief and international development division Member	In person In person Video conference In person In person Video conference Video conference Video conference Video conference Video conference	28 October 2023 19 October 2023 04 November 2023 20 October 2023 26 October 2023 16 October 2023 05 November 2023 29 October 2023 11 October 2023 07 November 2023	GBD-QA 1 GBD-QA 2 GBD-QA 3 GBD-QA 4 GBD-QA 5 GBD-KU 6 GBD-OM 7 GBD-KSA 8 GBD-KSA 9 GBD-UAE 10	10
International bilateral donors	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit CARE Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs Oxfam	Humanitarian project manager	Video conference Video conference Video conference Video conference	07 November 2023 04 November 2023 10 October 2023 23 October 2023	IBD-DE 1 IBD-US 2 IBD-DU 3 IBD-UK 4	4
International multilateral donors	Food and Agriculture Organization Yemen United Nations Sana’a office World Bank Yemen United Nations Development Programme Yemen World Food Programme Yemen United Nations regional office	Food security and agriculture cluster Emergency response project coordinator Partnership officer International Bank for Reconstruction and Development projects’ consultant Sustainable development unit MEAL unit Partnership officer Coordination specialist	Video conference Video conference Video conference Video conference Video conference Video conference Video conference Video conference	14 November 2023 01 November 2023 08 November 2023 27 October 2023 26 October 2023 02 October 2023 05 October 2023 09 October 2023	IMD-UN 1 IMD-UN 2 IMD-UN 3 IMD-WB 4 IMD-UN 5 IMD-UN 6 IMD-UN 7 IMD-UN 8	8
Major NGOs (Yemen)	NFDHR YFCA SOUL		Video conference Video conference Video conference	03 November 2023 24 October 2023 25 October 2023	NGO-YE 1 NGO-YE 2 NGO-YE 3	3
Government officials (Yemen)	Ministry of planning and international cooperation Ministry of education Ministry of foreign affairs Presidential Council	Bilateral cooperation unit Planning and liaison specialist Advisor Ex-minister of foreign affairs Member of Presidential Council	Video conference Video conference Video conference Video conference Video conference	30 October 2023 01 October 2023 12 October 2023 13 October 2023 15 October 2023	G-YE 1 G-YE 2 G-YE 3 G-YE 4 G-YE 5	5

To address the complexities of multilateral aid delivery channels, we investigate multilateral organisations, NGOs and Yemeni officials through interviews and by a thorough analysis of secondary data from various sources. This study integrates primary interview data with insights from academic studies, think tank reports, and publications by multilateral organisations. The selection of 19 secondary sources is based on specific criteria. Firstly, these sources are selected from after 2015, marking Gulf countries’ active involvement in the Yemen war. The second criterion is that each source must explicitly discuss Gulf countries’ aid to Yemen. This ensures that despite the study’s specific scope and limited time frame, every selected source contributes significantly to understanding the drivers behind Gulf countries’ preference for aid, aids in the assessment of effectiveness, and provides a comprehensive view of the dynamics surrounding Gulf oil states’ aid to Yemen. By transparently detailing our selection process, we aim to enhance the reliability and comparability of both primary and secondary data, contributing to a more robust analysis of the multifaceted aspects of the subject.

Yemen is chosen as a case study, enabling an in-depth examination of donor behaviour from 2015 to 2022. Selecting Yemen as the focal point of this case study, particularly during the onset of the Saudi-led intervention in 2015, offers a unique window for examining the humanitarian actions of Gulf oil states during a conflict they are actively engage in. This period witnessed diverse roles played by the Gulf oil countries, ranging from mediators like Oman to instigators and participants in the conflict like Saudi and UAE. The study is further enriched by the researchers’ intimate familiarity with the intricacies of the region.

Findings and discussion

The involvement of Gulf oil countries in humanitarian aid to Yemen, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, has been significant but also contentious due to their direct involvement in the conflict. Table 2 estimates bilateral aid from these countries to Yemen between 2016 and 2022. They have provided various forms of aid to Yemen since 2015, but the actual volume varies among countries due to differing time frames, aid types and delivery methods.

Table 2. Gulf oil countries’ aid to Yemen between 2016 and 2022.

No.	Donor	Funds (in USD)	Link
1	Saudi Arabia	6,880,317,650	https://data.ksrelief.org/Projects/Search
2	UAE	5,353,194,211	https://www.mofa.gov.ae/ar-ae/The-Ministry/UAE-International-Development-Cooperation/Annual-Foreign-Aid-Report
3	QATAR	85,219,637	https://fts.unocha.org/donors/87/summary/2021
4	Kuwait	443,248,357	https://fts.unocha.org/donor-grouped/4849/summary/2021
5	Oman^a	800,000	https://www.donate.om/DonationsPortal/Report/Summary_Report.aspx?csrt=2784573074218297895

^a Oman data is only available from 2018 to 2022.

Their engagement is influenced by a myriad of factors including political, security, and strategic considerations, alongside underlying interests and conflicts. In the findings section, we explore Gulf countries’ inclination towards bilateral aid through two theoretical lenses: firstly, the strategic utilisation for geopolitical alliances and advancing national interests; and, secondly, the justification of this preference by highlighting bureaucratic complexities in multilateral channels, such as delays and higher costs. Simultaneously, these countries engage in multilateral aid, aiming to improve their international image, particularly in response to criticisms of their heavy reliance on bilateral and direct engagement in the conflict. This dual-theoretical approach provides a comprehensive understanding of Gulf countries’ humanitarian strategies in Yemen, unravelling the intricacies of their aid decisions within a complex geopolitical context.

Strategic bilateral aid: forging geopolitical alliances and advancing national interests in conflict running

By strategically channelling bilateral aid to key actors, Gulf countries actively seek to shape the trajectory of the Yemeni conflict on multiple fronts, forging alliances that safeguard their respective interests. This deliberate allocation of aid serves as a tool to exert influence over various factions, effectively moulding the political and security landscape in their favour. As pointed out by IMD-UN 2 and 3,¹ Gulf countries leverage their financial contributions to Yemen to wield influence over the balance of power, emboldening specific Yemeni factions aligned with their objectives.

In the landscape of Gulf nations’ involvement in the Yemeni conflict, Saudi Arabia and the UAE stand out as influential actors, actively supporting armed groups and leveraging substantial bilateral aid to pursue distinct national interests. Their roles involve a more direct and assertive approach. In contrast, Qatar, Oman and Kuwait engage in the conflict to a lesser degree, preferring a more discreet utilisation of aid. They employ it as a tool to exert influence and maintain a nuanced role in the Yemeni dynamics, notably differing from the more overt involvement of Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Saudi Arabia and UAE

Despite escalating concerns about potential misuse, Saudi officials persist in their unwavering commitment to humanitarian assistance, refraining from re-evaluating their approach or engaging in discussions about the wisdom of the ongoing conflict. According to an NGO interviewee, the aid provided by Saudi Arabia serves a dual purpose: ‘It’s not just about helping; it’s about advancing their national interests’.² This acknowledgement underscores a nuanced dynamic where humanitarian aid may be strategically employed, transcending its traditional altruistic role. Adding to this complexity, reports raise alarm bells about the potential repurposing of humanitarian aid for military use, thereby raising critical questions about resource allocation (Ziadah 2019; Riedel 2020). This multifaceted scenario is further illuminated by the use of humanitarian rhetoric to justify military intervention, reflecting a discernible trend of adopting Western methods, particularly in deploying ‘war on terror’ language. This deliberate use of diverse justifications not only camouflages legal ambiguities but also enhances international acceptance (Buys and Garwood-Gowers 2019).

Insights from interviews, particularly from NGO-YE sources,³ shed light on Saudi Arabia’s strategic objectives in the region, which pivot around regional rivalry and countering Iran. Humanitarian assistance, in this context, serves as a convenient narrative for Saudi Arabia, as highlighted by these interviews and as shown by Ziadah (2019). Notably, despite the prolonged duration of the conflict and criticism directed towards Saudi Arabia, particularly regarding the Yemeni death toll and the lack of progress in conflict resolution during the initial years of their intervention, Saudi officials have refrained from responding to questions or re-evaluating their strategy. Instead, they have consistently emphasised their commitment to humanitarian aid (Riedel 2020). This approach is aimed at preserving their international image and aligning with advancing their national interests while running the conflict.

This intricate web of insights underscores a persistent concern regarding the potential misuse of humanitarian aid by the Saudi-led coalition, revealing a complex dynamic where aid might not exclusively serve humanitarian purposes but is, rather, employed strategically within the intricate tapestry of the ongoing conflict.⁴

UAE has played a significant role in the Yemeni conflict, empowering new actors such as the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and the National Resistance Movement, reshaping the dynamics of control in certain parts of Yemen. NGO-YE1⁵ highlighted the transformative impact of the UAE’s support for these local groups, showcasing a strategic manoeuvre that has fundamentally altered the Yemeni conflict, which aligns with the discussion of UAE involvement in Yemen by Brehony (2020). Emiratis actively took charge of recruitment, training and financing of Security Belt Forces, a militia associated with the STC opposing the internationally recognised government, seeking to influence local leadership appointments and extend its control in the southern governorates (Juneau 2023). The substantial financial contributions of the UAE, totalling approximately $5.9 billion between 2015 and 2019, have shifted power dynamics, further fragmenting the Yemeni landscape, as emphasised by IMD-UN experts.⁶

These transformations, resulting from the UAE’s involvement, have introduced fragmentation within the coalition, leading to a proxy war scenario between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, each supporting conflicting local factions.⁷ This has fundamentally altered the dynamics of the Yemeni conflict, creating a complex web of competing actors. In terms of aid, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have collectively provided substantial financial support through bilateral agreements, amounting to $15.7 billion, with a focus on supporting entities aligned with the UAE’s interests.⁸ However, concerns about transparency and effectiveness of aid distribution have been raised by experts, with reports indicating the misuse of aid for political objectives and corruption within local factions, hindering the intended impact and perpetuating the conflict.⁹ The conflicting interests and objectives of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, driven by their support for different local factions, have turned the Yemeni conflict into a proxy war.¹⁰ The power struggle between their respective proxies on the ground further prolongs the conflict. These dynamics collectively highlight the instrumental role of aid in perpetuating the conflict rather than facilitating its resolution.

Adding the allocation of bilateral aid by both Saudi Arabia and the UAE has resulted in duplication and competition in certain regions of Yemen. Rather than a coordinated effort, these donor countries have operated independently, each with its own agenda. This competition for influence exacerbates the conflict, as the Yemeni factions become pawns in the broader regional rivalry, which has contributed to the continuation of the fighting.¹¹ Moreover, the UAE’s unilateral actions, such as establishing military infrastructure on Socotra Island without the approval of the Yemeni government, have further complicated the situation.¹² The UAE tends to focus its assistance on areas controlled by the STC, while Saudi Arabia provides aid through the legitimate government, resulting in overlapping aid efforts and insufficient support in other regions. Northern provinces under Houthi control have seen minimal assistance from bilateral agreements, as the Houthi movement restricts direct aid delivery and insists on channelling it through the United Nations (UN).¹³

Qatar, Kuwait and Oman

Baabood and Baabood (2020) shed light on the distinctive roles of Qatar and Oman in providing aid during the crisis. The 2017 Qatar blockade crisis brought the matter of the Muslim Brotherhood to the forefront of regional tensions, with Gulf countries accusing Qatar of supporting the designated terrorist organisation. The Houthi rebels strategically expressed sympathy towards Qatar, exacerbating existing divisions within the coalition. Critics alleged that Qatar aimed to expand its influence in Yemen by establishing connections with the Houthi rebels while also supporting the Islah party, which is perceived as a Muslim Brotherhood faction in Yemen. Reports suggested that Qatar provided $21 million in aid for Houthi-controlled areas and reconstruction in Saada province, funds purportedly redirected to support Houthi forces (Vuković and Martin 2022).

Qatar’s media outlets, particularly al-Jazeera, intensified their criticism of coalition members and military operations in Yemen, contributing to heightened tensions within the coalition. Qatar strategically employed its influence in Yemen to hinder the Saudi-led coalition’s military activities by maintaining relationships with both the Houthi rebels and the Islah faction. Following the blockade imposed on Qatar, concerns surfaced regarding its support for the Houthis, raising questions about the utilisation of funds intended for humanitarian aid in rebel-controlled areas and the potential diversion of these funds to finance Houthi military endeavours. This intricate web of geopolitical manoeuvres underscores the instrumental role of aid in shaping not only the conflict’s dynamics but also the alliances and tensions within the broader coalition.

Kuwait’s aid contributions are closely tied to its foreign policy objectives, which include national security, promoting Arabism, and promoting Islam. Unlike other small donors that actively pursue similar objectives, Kuwait maintains a low-profile foreign policy and avoids taking sides in armed conflicts (Dandashly and Kourtelis 2023). Ulrichsen (2021) showed Kuwait’s engagement in Yemen as a facilitator and coordinator of aid efforts, leveraging institutions like the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development; However, despite Kuwait’s previous use of aid as a foreign policy tool, it faced setbacks when some major recipients of Kuwaiti aid, including Jordan, Sudan, Yemen, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, either supported Saddam Hussein or chose to remain neutral during Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Kuwait foreign policy, however, remains neutral towards Yemen – just like Oman.

Oman does not possess the same financial capabilities as the rest of the Gulf states and relied on aid from foreign partners, including the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Despite this limitation, Oman served as a conduit for the delivery of crucial foreign aid into Yemen, facilitating the provision of much-needed resources (Al-Monitor 2020). The Oman Charitable Organization (OCO) focused its efforts on delivering humanitarian assistance in the al-Mahra and Hadramaut regions of Yemen, which are the closest to their border (Baabood and Baabood 2020). Their active involvement included the evacuation of injured Yemenis to Muscat, the capital city of Oman.

The Gulf countries have strategically employed bilateral aid as a tool to forge geopolitical partnerships and enhance their influence in Yemen. This approach serves multiple objectives, including consolidating their regional standing and improving their image in a complex and protracted conflict. Gulf countries perceive Yemen as a critical arena for geopolitical competition and influence within the Arabian Peninsula. Yemen holds strategic significance for Gulf nations that produce oil due to its geographical location and control over the Bab El-Mandeb Strait, a critical waterway for global energy trade.¹⁴ To further their regional ambitions, they have provided extensive bilateral aid to different Yemeni factions, seeking to create regional and international alliances with actors who align with their interests. These alliances extend their reach and leverage in the region, bolstering their strategic standing.

By strategically allocating bilateral aid to key actors, Gulf countries aim to influence the course of the conflict and secure allies who can safeguard their interests in Yemen. They employ this tool to gain leverage over various factions and mould the political and security landscape to their advantage. In 2012, the Gulf countries pledged a gradual delivery of $7.9 billion to Yemen for developmental projects and fuel supplies, and the current Saudi-led military operation in Yemen is a response to the mounting fears in the Gulf region regarding the destabilising consequences of the Houthi rebels, who are supported by Iran, seizing power and creating turmoil within Yemen and along the Saudi–Yemeni border (Isaac 2015). Gulf countries made pledges of billions of dollars at donor conferences before 2012; however, these funds have been largely disbursed, leading to frustration and a lack of progress in implementing projects on the ground (Burke 2012).

The ongoing conflict in Yemen has drawn international attention, accompanied by allegations of humanitarian crises and human rights violations. In this context, Gulf nations, particularly the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and UAE, strategically employ bilateral aid to safeguard their international reputation. According to IMD-UN 5, Gulf countries utilise aid as a dual-purpose tool for advancing their strategic interests and enhancing their image, positioning themselves as both humanitarian actors and geopolitical players.¹⁵ These countries effectively employ humanitarian rhetoric to frame their involvement in Yemen. By presenting their aid as crucial for addressing the severe humanitarian crisis, they gain international acceptance, despite legal ambiguities regarding their military interventions. G-YE 4 highlighted how Gulf officials emphasise their commitment to humanitarian assistance in diplomatic discussions, which resonates with international norms and helps justify their actions in Yemen.¹⁶ The provision of humanitarian aid is a strategic approach for Gulf nations to deflect international criticism over their Yemen involvement. Their active participation in humanitarian efforts creates a counter-narrative emphasising their dedication to alleviating Yemeni suffering, as noted by IMD-UN 8.¹⁷ While there may be strategic interests at play, it is essential to recognise that Gulf nations genuinely provide vital aid to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, achieving a balance between strategic objectives and humanitarian responsibilities, according to NGO-YE 2.¹⁸ Gulf countries employ humanitarian rhetoric, multilateral engagement, and a real commitment to addressing suffering to establish themselves as humanitarian actors in Yemen. This strategic positioning is crucial for managing international perceptions, legitimising their actions, and advancing their geopolitical objectives while addressing the complex humanitarian crisis in the region.

Complexities in multilateral aid channels can lead to delays, higher costs, and potential diversion of aid from intended recipients

The preference for bilateral aid over multilateral aid highlights a conscious decision by GCC donor countries. Despite acknowledged issues with multilateral aid, including corruption and lack of transparency, these nations prioritise bilateral channels due to their perceived control and targeted impact, aligning with their strategic interests. While these nations use the complexities in multilateral aid channels as justification for their bilateral preference,¹⁹ they still engage in multilateral aid to some extent to enhance or maintain their international image, especially in response to previous concerns regarding terrorism (Elkahlout 2020), and their involvement in the war and humanitarian crisis in Yemen. Gulf governments defend this reliance, emphasising the avoidance of imposing external agendas on Yemen and promoting a flexible Khaleeji funding approach tailored to Yemen’s specific needs (Rouis 2010; Tok and D’Alessandro, 2017). It is important to note that not all Gulf countries view multilateral aid as part of their conflict resolution and survival agenda.

Some Gulf donors, like Kuwait, engage in multilateral aid to enhance their international recognition. For instance, Elkahlout (2020) highlighted Kuwait’s preference for multilateral aid channelled through UN agencies. This approach is driven by the desire to be associated with the international community, and Kuwait’s substantial contributions to UN agencies aim to boost their exposure and international standing (Elkahlout 2020). An interviewee shared, when asked about the reasons behind collaboration with multichannel organisations, that ‘I’m responsible for the international programmes, and sometimes you need an external support as a door and an eye opener for you’.²⁰ This indicates a motive for more exposure and external support, suggesting that working with multichannel organisations can provide valuable perspectives and opportunities for international programmes. Another interviewee stated ‘We don’t provide humanitarian aid in exchange for a political interest … However, it has a positive impact on our image in the long term’,²¹ noting that while the primary objective is not political, there is an acknowledgment that humanitarian aid can have a positive long-term impact on the donor’s image.

Despite the fact that bilateral aid has become a part of the war game in Yemen for some Gulf states, it is not immune to the real challenges and flaws found in multilateral organisations, as argued by many we interviewed and supported by numerous studies conducted in this regard (see eg Elayah, Gaber, and Fenttiman 2022; Ussher et al. 2021; Svensson 2003; Elayah 2016, Hoeffler and Outram 2011; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Bermeo 2011). The tendency of Gulf donors when it comes to avoiding multilateral channelling of aid comes from their sensitivity to the complexity of collaborating with multiple donors. Bilateral aid channels have emerged as a viable and efficient alternative to navigate the often intricate and bureaucratic complexities associated with multilateralism. By establishing direct bilateral relationships, donor countries can bypass the time-consuming decision-making processes and intricate negotiations commonly found within multilateral organisations. This approach allows for a more streamlined and expedited allocation of resources, enabling decisions to be made and implemented with greater efficiency and effectiveness. In an interview, a Gulf international organisation staff member shared that

We have very close cooperation with the international organisation and particularly UN agencies, not only about funding but coordination and sharing of information; however, in some cases when we are approached by partner, we say no. Because it is a very long process. It is not a simple decision because if we go into a partnership, it would not be easy and it is time consuming.²²

This insight highlights the sensitivity of Gulf donors and their reluctance to collaborate with a wide array of partners and donors.

The ‘Khaleeji mode of funding’, as defined by Tok and D’Alessandro (2017), emphasises south-to-south cooperation among Gulf donors, aiming for equal mutual benefits and stronger connections. This approach differs significantly from the traditional practices of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), with the Khaleeji mode of financing prioritising infrastructure development, water, sanitation and energy projects, in contrast to DAC’s emphasis on governance improvement, education and health services (Chandran and Cooper 2015; Tok and D’Alessandro, 2017).

The lack of transparency in Gulf financing initiatives, in contrast to the DAC framework, raises accountability concerns for projects and outcomes (Harmáček, Opršal, and Vítová 2022). The Gulf’s new and underdeveloped humanitarian culture contributes to challenges in mentoring and evaluation.²³ The nature of multilateral aid, requiring comprehensive documentation and adherence to international standards, may not align with Gulf cultural practices (Tok 2015). Despite this, Gulf donors prefer bilateral aid for greater control and flexibility, appealing to their regional and geopolitical considerations. They often lack clarity and transparency in funding practices, with a significant portion of aid coming directly from businessmen and sheiks (‘90% to 95% of the donations’²⁴), further complicating documentation and reporting processes (Harmáček, Opršal, and Vítová 2022). Gulf donors prioritise project execution and detailed progress reports through ‘media coverage/documentation’ instead of adhering to a standard structure, emphasising flexibility.²⁵ From their point of view, the complexity of multilateral organisations’ bureaucratic processes can lead to unfavourable consequences not only for Gulf donor participation but also on the ground. These consequences include delays, increased costs and a higher risk of aid misallocation due to potential inefficiencies or corruption (Harmáček, Opršal, and Vítová 2022).

An interviewee from a major Yemeni NGO shared that

There is a significant problem in unifying the standards between the beneficiaries, donors, and the implementing agencies, which sometimes leads to delays in approvals and difficulties in measuring the intervention’s impact and responsiveness and sometimes results in the cancellation of certain activities.²⁶

This underscores a significant problem in multilateral humanitarian efforts compared to Gulf direct humanitarian aid. It highlights delays, measurement difficulties and even project cancellations due to a lack of standardised procedures and criteria among beneficiaries, donors and implementing agencies.

The head of the UN’s World Food Programme (WFP) has made a strong appeal to Saudi Arabia, urging them to fully fund the aid appeal for Yemen to the WFP (Aljazeera 2017). This call comes in light of Saudi Arabia’s involvement in fuelling the conflict in Yemen. The statement emphasises the need for accountability of KSA as the cause of the humanitarian crisis. The message from the head of the WFP can be seen as a form of pressure on Saudi Arabia to engage in a multichannel approach to providing aid, moving away from solely relying on bilateral assistance. In recent years, the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre (KSrelief) has already shown some willingness to diversify its aid provision, by donating $338 million to the WFP over the past four years. This amount should be contrasted with the $1.5 billion provided bilaterally during the same period, indicating a potential shift in Saudi Arabia’s aid strategy (KSrelief 2023).

In the year 2021 alone, Yemen received a substantial amount of financial assistance, with a significant portion, approximately $1.18 billion, directed specifically towards the WFP. This demonstrates the high priority placed on addressing the urgent food security needs in Yemen. However, it is important to note that a significant portion of the funds allocated to the WFP is absorbed by operational costs. According to the WFP official website, approximately 40% of the funding designated for the WFP is utilised for operational expenses before reaching the implementation partners on the ground (World Food Programme n.d.). This assertion is reinforced by an interview with the former Minister of Foreign Affairs in Yemen. He shared that

A substantial portion of the multichannel funding is being squandered due to exorbitant operational costs – about 45% – resulting in minimal tangible impact on the ground. Conversely, the Gulf bilateral aid like the one from KSrelief has demonstrated remarkable effectiveness, with clearly visible and meaningful contributions to the development and improvement of the situation on the ground.²⁷

The amount of aid reaching the ground from WFP almost matches the $400 million provided by KSrelief bilaterally to food security programmes in 2021 in Yemen. While the allocation of substantial funds to Yemen is of great importance, due to its massive need, the operational costs incurred by the WFP pose challenges in delivering aid efficiently.

Conclusion

This article explores the intricate landscape of aid distribution in Yemen, unveiling concerns related to favouritism, geopolitical interests, and the instrumental use of humanitarian rhetoric to legitimise military actions. At its core lies the strategic allocation of bilateral aid by Gulf countries, with a focus on Saudi Arabia and the UAE, actively shaping the trajectory of the Yemeni conflict. This deliberate allocation of aid emerges as a potent tool, effectively influencing various factions and sculpting the political and security terrain to align with the interests of Gulf nations. The UAE’s substantial role in empowering local actors, notably the STC and the National Resistance Movement, has introduced a layer of complexity. This has given rise to a proxy war scenario between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, exacerbating the conflict and prolonging the humanitarian crisis. The article underscores the conflicting interests of Gulf nations, each supporting different factions, thereby transforming the Yemeni conflict into a geopolitical battleground. The competition and duplication of aid efforts between Saudi Arabia and the UAE not only hinder coordination but also contribute to the protraction of the conflict, prompting concerns about the potential misuse of humanitarian aid for military purposes. The article further delves into the roles of Qatar, Oman and Kuwait, and their distinct aid strategies. Qatar’s involvement is framed within the context of geopolitical manoeuvres within the coalition. Kuwait, while assuming a coordinating role, faces challenges aligning aid with its foreign policy objectives. Oman, constrained by limited financial capabilities, acts as a conduit for aid delivery, focusing on specific regions near its border.

Central to the narrative is the strategic deployment of humanitarian aid by Gulf nations to forge alliances, bolster their international image and justify their actions in Yemen. The dual-purpose nature of aid, serving both strategic interests and humanitarian responsibilities, is acknowledged. The ‘Khaleeji mode of funding’, emphasising south-to-south cooperation, deviates from traditional international practices, prioritising specific development areas. However, concerns are raised about transparency and accountability in Gulf-funded projects, which often lack visibility and adherence to international standards associated with multilateral aid initiatives. While bilateral aid is lauded for its efficiency, we acknowledge that it is not immune to the challenges and flaws found in multilateral organisations. The reluctance of Gulf donors to engage in multilateral aid is rooted in their sensitivity to collaborating with multiple donors, emphasising streamlined decision-making processes and direct relationships for efficient resource allocation.

The call for transparency, accountability and a coordinated multichannel approach gains significance given the challenges posed by both bilateral and multilateral aid. The pressure on Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, to diversify aid provision suggests a recognition of the limitations associated with solely relying on bilateral assistance. Despite substantial financial assistance directed towards Yemen, concerns about the efficiency of aid delivery arise, particularly in multilateral aid where operational costs absorb a significant portion of allocated funds. Therefore, this article advocates for transparency, accountability and cooperation among all involved parties. It underscores the necessity for an impartial, needs-based approach to aid delivery. The proposed alternative of cash assistance is suggested to address challenges in aid distribution, geopolitical interests and governance issues. Acknowledging limitations in real-time data availability, the article encourages future research focusing on in-depth field studies and interviews to deepen our understanding of aid distribution dynamics and the impact of different forms of aid in conflict-affected regions.

The complexities surrounding multilateral aid channels in Yemen have led GCC donor countries to favour bilateral aid consciously. A balanced approach that combines the advantages of both bilateral and multilateral aid, prioritising transparency, accountability and coordination, is deemed essential for resolving the Yemeni conflict and effectively mitigating the humanitarian crisis. Challenges in obtaining real-time data and the dynamics of cash assistance in conflict zones necessitate future research to enhance our understanding of aid distribution and its long-term impact on local economies and livelihoods in Yemen.

Data availability statement

Due to the nature of the research, supporting data is not available.

Disclosure statement

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Additional information

Funding

Open Access funding was provided by the Qatar National Library.

Notes on contributors

Moosa Elayah

Moosa Elayah is Associate Professor at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies. With a PhD from Leiden University the Netherlands, he excels in international development administration, peacebuilding and conflict studies. His expertise lies in understanding complex societal challenges, and he has made significant contributions through research, policy development and leadership roles. His academic journey spans renowned institutions, and his work encompasses civil society roles during war, participatory development, and challenges of humanitarian aid in conflict zones. His influence extends internationally, focusing on conflict transformation, NGO management and youth engagement, positioning him as a key figure in effective governance and peacebuilding.

Hasan Al-Awami

Hasan Al-Awami is a dedicated researcher specialising in public administration, currently affiliated with the Department of Public Administration at the School of Economics, Administration, and Public Policy at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies. With a keen interest in governance, policy analysis, and public sector reform, he brings a wealth of knowledge and expertise to his academic pursuits. He actively engages in research and collaborative endeavours aimed at shaping the next generation of public administrators and policymakers.

Notes

1 Video Conference Interview, IMD-UN 2, 5.

2 Video Conference Interview, NGO-YE 4.

3 Video Conference Interviews, NGO-YE 4, IMD-UN 2, 3 and IBD-UK 4.

4 Video Conference Interviews, NGO-YE 1, 2, 3, IMD-UN 2, 3, 5,6, 7, IMD-WB 4 and IBD-DU 3.

5 Video Conference Interview, IMD-UN 2, 5

6 Video Conference Interview, NGO-YE 1.

7 Personal Interviews, GBD-QA 1, 5.

8 Video Conference Interview, GBD-KSA 9 and GBD-UAE 10.

9 Video Conference Interview, IMD-UN 1 and G-YE 1.

10 Video Conference Interview, IBD-DU 3.

11 Video Conference Interview, NGO-YE 1.

12 Video Conference Interview, NGO-YE 3.

13 Video Conference Interview, IMD-UN 5.

14 Video Conference Interview, IMD-UN 3.

15 Video Conference Interview, IMD-UN 5.

16 Video Conference Interview, G-YE 4.

17 Video Conference Interview, IMD-UN 8.

18 Video Conference Interview, NGO-YE 2.

19 Personal Interview, GBD-QA 1.

20 Video Conference Interview, GBD-KU 6. It is worth emphasising that in Kuwait’s case, their engagement with multilateral aid isn’t related to their role in the Yemeni conflict but rather focused on enhancing the international humanitarian image and not a war image in the case of KSA and UAE of the country on the global stage.

21 Personal Interview, GBD-QA 2.

22 Personal Interview, GBD-QA 1.

23 Video Conference Interview, IMD-UN 3.

24 Personal Interview, GBD-QA 3

25 Video Conference Interview, GBD-QA3.

26 Video Conference Interview, NGO-YE 2.

27 Video Conference Interview, G-YE 4.