Why is Light Rail Starting to Dominate Bus Rapid Transit Yet Again?

Almost weekly, we see proposals to build light rail in many cities, and Australian cities are no exception. It is also quite marked how absent any serious consideration of bus rapid transit (BRT) as an alternative is. The old chestnut of emotional ideology is resurfacing as part of the ongoing debate on choice vs. blind commitment (Hensher & Waters, 1994; Hensher, 2007). The latter is winning out in a growing number of Australian cities, most recently Sydney, Canberra, the Gold Coast and Newcastle, with serious rumblings in Hobart. What is the logic? It seems to start with the assumption that trains are sexy and buses are boring, and that light rail offers a much better value for money than BRT. However, in almost all cases, where there has been a detailed benefit-cost analysis of light rail, there appears to be an almost token gesture to consider, but reject, BRT. The value for money proposition should deliver the best outcome for society regardless of whether it is rail or bus based, in their light and heavy configuration.

The question on which is better, less expensive, etc. must depend on the unique city characteristics (demand mainly) and choice of Right of Way, but must at least be put to the test rather than ignored or effectively sidestepped by a very light assessment and rejection.

Public transport (PT) modes serve many roles in cities throughout the world. We see different elements of PT in each city; some having the full complement of bus in mixed traffic, bus in dedicated road environments, light rail in mixed traffic or a dedicated corridor, and heavy rail. Despite the plea for a rational debate on the role of alternative PT modes, to ensure that the service levels offered represent best value for money and deliver on key criteria such as connectivity, frequency and visibility within a network, there is often great resistance to some options on essentially ideological and emotional grounds. There is a strong sense of imagery conditioning modal preferences for LRT without a full appreciation of the equivalent or better benefits that might flow from the frequently less-favoured BRT (Hensher, Ho, & Mulley, 2015).

Part of the problem may appear to be a perception that any PT option associated with the word ‘bus’ (I have suggested that BRT be renamed as Dedicated Corridor Rapid Transit (DCRT)) conjures up images of noisy polluting buses in mixed traffic congestion; yet BRT can, if designed appropriately to serve the market with relevance (just as LRT should), deliver a service that is equivalent or better than LRT and/or heavy rail where the evidence can show a clear and strong case of delivering relevant service levels (with a focus on service capacity and not vehicle capacity), with built-in growth prospects, that competes very favourably with the cost outlays of rail solutions.

A recent national poll undertaken by the Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies at the University of Sydney found that when individuals were asked to choose between the development of a 30 km rail corridor or 300 km of dedicated bus lanes for the same cost, around 60% nationwide preferred a rail corridor. Queensland and South Australia had a slightly higher number of participants supporting dedicated bus lanes (44% compared to 40%), which relates to findings from other research (e.g. Hensher et al., 2015) that residents with experience of dedicated bus systems tend to be slightly more in favour of such a system, whereas those lacking this experience tend to default to the sexier looking light rail systems. Those states with fast bus systems in dedicated corridors (South Australia and Queensland) recognise how much they can contribute.

Although the predominant focus of traveller behaviour research has been on studying the choice of mode for specific trips, a growing challenge is to understand why stakeholders (i.e. the community at large) in specific geographical jurisdictions, when asked, overwhelmingly support one PT mode over another, regardless of whether they use specific modes. In order to inform policy and to provide a framework for the promotion of BRT where it is applicable, there is a need to systematically identify the extent of community support or otherwise for BRT as a specific PT ‘solution’. Too often, policy-makers pushed by politicians and the media, commission studies that pre-select the modal solution (which is increasingly rail) and reject without evidence the possibility that another option such as BRT might provide considerably a better value for money given an appropriate level of service, in terms of frequency, connectivity and travel times.¹

The quote below is drawn from a report on a proposal for LRT in Sydney (rather than a report on identifying appropriate PT) that was prepared to support the case for LRT:.

We also considered introducing Bus Rapid Transit between Circular Quay and UNSW [University of NSW]. In our investigations, we assumed the bus alternative would serve the same corridor and travel in dedicated lanes with high capacity ‘bendy’ buses. However, as one ‘bendy’ bus carries only one-third as many passengers as a light rail vehicle, more buses would need to run to meet the same demand. Investigations showed a bus alternative would not cater for the same level of demand as light rail — offering just two thirds of the capacity in comparable traffic conditions. In addition, forecast commuter numbers were much lower — about half. The bus alternative would not reduce traffic congestion to the same extent as light rail. The bus alternative would not sufficiently overcome the key challenges facing the CBD to University of NSW corridor, including: Removing buses from the CBD to improve amenity and reduce congestion, Providing sufficient network capacity to cater to future growth and network extensions, Improving commuter experience through restructuring the public transport network, Catalysing urban renewal. Light rail was therefore recommended as the preferred solution for the CBD to University of NSW corridor. (New South Wales Government, 2012, p. 25)

The statement fails to understand the important distinction between service capacity and vehicle capacity, and the opportunities to offer higher frequency with lower vehicle capacity, resulting in higher service capacity. On Sunday 4 October 2015 George Street (the main thoroughfare in Sydney where LRT will be introduced) was closed to all buses, and bus services rerouted to other adjacent streets. Although in the first few days, the transition of bus services created minimal disruption to passengers, when the light rail is in place (in three years time), some bus services will be removed with the consequent need for many passengers from the north, east and south having to make an additional modal transfer. The transfer could have been avoided by converting George St into a BRT corridor with efficient stop points all along the road so as to eliminate bunching and delay, as well as enabling journey continuation to a final destination. On the same service that now will have to be serviced by an interchange.

In terms of evidence on service capacity, Brisbane's BRT system runs 200 buses per hour carrying 9000 persons per hour (pph) at the peak load point, although one corridor has achieved over 14 000 passenger trips in the peak, while Ottawa's BRT carries 10 000 pph at the peak load point. Pittsburgh has been running 96 buses per hour at the peak load point on the east busway. The associated passenger volume is 3700 pph. Available data show that BRT operating on an exclusive lane has a demonstrated one way capacity of 25 000 pph and a theoretical capacity well above 50 000 pph (although close to this has been achieved in Bogota).

There is growing evidence around the world, in origin–destination density contexts similar to locations proposed for light rail, that a dedicated BRT system (i.e. road infrastructure dedicated to buses only like in Brisbane, Curitiba, Bogota, Pittsburgh, Ottawa, etc.) can carry the same number of people as light rail for one-third of the cost. It is flexible, it is as permanent as light rail, and it can have the image of light rail (rather than image of boring buses) if planned properly. The USA General Accounting Office (2001) audit of BRT and light rail in six US cities found that the capital cost per mile for LRT compared to BRT in its own lane was 260% more costly. Comparisons with BRT on street or on a high occupancy vehicle lanes are not useful and have been excluded. Given the lower costs of running BRT in many jurisdictions, for institutional and maintenance reasons, the case to not even consider BRT is unacceptable.

The greatest challenge is in identifying the extent of the presence of LRT prejudice. Knowing the extent of this bias is crucial in setting a challenge on how we break the emotional ideological cycle of a commitment to rail regardless of the benefits of bus-based systems. It is important too that BRT prejudice does not become a habit and there are now some very useful suggestions on breaking the habit cycle (Schwanen, Banister, & Anable, 2012) and a growing literature on nudging as a way of effecting positive community change. The focus of a sustained effort to neutralise emotional ideology (a tough call) requires more than simply identifying traveller preferences; it requires practical solutions for all stakeholders interested in making change in our urban areas — the transport industry itself, retailers and advertising companies, the media, lobby groups, employers and non-transport government agencies and departments — whose practices contribute to the collective sense-making and normative coding of different forms of mobility.

In summary, buses, especially bus-based transitway systems are arguably better value for money, and if designed properly, can have the essential characteristic of permanence and visibility claimed to be important to attract property development along the route which is compatible with medium to high-density corridor mobility. To achieve this, however, the bus industry in many countries needs a ‘wake-up’ call. All I ask is that bus-based and rail-based systems are treated equally in an assessment of their merits, rather than judged on some pretext that is shrouded in emotion and modal bias.

Acknowledgements

The comments of David Banister, Moshe Givoni and Michael Browne are appreciated.

Notes

1. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eXNXm6uW1ME for an excellent example of what happened in Portland Oregon, by John Charles, President and CEO of Cascade Policy Institute who reveals the failure of Light Rail in comparison to Bus Rapid Transit. See also Victoria, Vancouver debate at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2L-tLcoXd2Q.