Has social care performance in England improved? An analysis of performance ratings across social services organisations

Abstract

Performance measurement in the English public sector has been implemented in a top-down manner. This regime, comprising centralised targets, public reporting of data and the use of rewards and penalties, has been driven by central government and is intended to hold agencies to account for their performance and regulate their behaviour. This article examines whether the operation of this regime has resulted in improved performance for social care organisations. In England, social care organisations have broadly improved their performance over time in composite (‘star’) ratings and with generally higher ratings across individual indicators, with noteworthy improvement across key threshold indicators (measures which councils must perform well on to obtain a good summary rating). This improvement contrasts with a fairly static picture in Northern Ireland. These improvements may reflect a host of factors other than the incentives created by centralised targets and measures. Data show, for example, that external characteristics of English councils influence their being reported as ‘poor performers’.

The rate of improvement may reflect the incentives inherent in the English performance system. Incentives promoting the achievement of specific targets may have influenced the behaviour of local managers responsible for performance in this sector. However, further information from local organisations is required to more fully explicate the relevant factors that may influence reported performance. The evidence reported does, however, point to the beneficial effects (at least for the regulator) of centrally set measures. It is uncertain whether more recent moves away from this target regime in England, towards the development of local indicators and ‘individual incentive’ regulation will likewise offer the appropriate inducements for performance improvement.

Keywords:

• incentives
• local authorities
• performance measurement
• regulation
• social care

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank members of the North West Performance Leads group in social services in England, and in particular David Burnham, for their helpful advice and assistance with the wider project from which the data here relates. We also thank Gary Bennett of the Northern Ireland Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety for making available the data on delayed discharges. PSSRU also receives funding from the English Department of Health, and the views expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Health, the ESRC or other funding bodies.

Notes

1. These measures are available on the Dr Foster Intelligence site at http://www.drfoster.co.uk/localGovernment/kigs.asp.

2. Key Indicators of Personal Social Services for Northern Ireland available at: http://www.dhsspsni.gov.uk/statistics_and_research-cib-key_indicators.

3. The FSS is calculated in order to reflect the spending needs of an authority. The formula takes into account information regarding the demographic, social and physical features of each authority to produce an assessment of financial need and replaces the previous Standard Spending Assessment.