Post-war reconstruction, policy transfer and the World Bank: the case of Afghanistan's National Solidarity Programme

Abstract

This article investigates the role of the World Bank as an agent of international policy transfer in post-war reconstruction and development. A heuristic method which integrates policy transfer network theory, participant observation and implementation analysis is developed and then used to map the process of policy-oriented learning underpinning the emergence and development of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's National Solidarity Programme (NSP). Drawing on the findings of a mid-term evaluation conducted by the authors for the World Bank it reveals that initial World Bank funding of the NSP was opportunistic; a voluntary form of policy transfer emerged from a cohesive policy transfer network which mainly drew lessons from the Kecamatan Development Project (KDP) in Indonesia, leading to the development of a culturally insensitive model of community-driven development; but due to the technocratic expertise of key indigenous actors and the technical support of facilitating partners, these elements of the programme were successfully mitigated during operational delivery. It concludes that ‘Rational’ lesson-drawing which avoids the ‘learning paradox’ – learning that leads to inappropriate transfer – can be successful. In other words, lesson-drawing can be a progressive learning activity, but only if the programme is culturally assimilated through comprehensive evaluation and piloting, builds on existing organisational strengths and is transferred by high-quality indigenous knowledge elites. Local solutions must be found to local problems which deliver public value in terms of direct social or economic benefits to the citizenry. Indeed, although development outcomes have been less than impressive, the NSP has delivered significant gains to the Afghan people with regard to institution-building and social solidarity at the national and community levels.

Keywords:

• Afghanistan
• conflict transformation
• good governance
• institution building
• legitimacy

Notes

1. See Evans (2009b) for a broad discussion and Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, 2000) for an alternative approach.

2. Dr Ashraf Ghani (1949–2008): MA in Peasant Studies, PhD Anthropology (John Hopkins University, 1983–1991); Fulbright Scholar (1985); World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes Russia, India and China (1991–2001); Special adviser to the UN (Bonn Agreement, 2001–2002); AIA Finance Minister (2002–2004); Chancellor Kabul University (2004–2008); Chair, Institute for State Effectiveness; co-author of ‘Fixing Failed States’ (Ghani and Lockhart 2008). Ghani had long been a champion of pro-poor rural development. His academic research at John Hopkins University in the USA had focused on the role of state-building and state transformation in development. Notably, he had worked for the World Bank for much of the 1990s and after the fall of the Taliban became a Special Advisor to the UN responsible for helping Lakhdar Brahimi prepare the Bonn Agreement which ultimately transferred power to the AIA.

3. Scott Guggenheim: MA in Peasant Studies (1983–1985); World Bank Social Development Specialist since 1991 (including Colombia and Cambodia); key architect of the Kecamatan Development Programme (1997–2003); Senior World Bank Social Development Advisor.

4. See Independent Evaluation Group (2005).

5. See Note (4).

6. Hanif Atmar: MA Post-war Recovery Studies, York (1992–1994); Programme Manager, Norwegian Afghanistan Committee (1994–2000); Deputy Director, International Rescue Committee (2000–2002); AIA Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (2002–2006); Education (2006–2008); Interior (2008). Ehsan Zia: Norwegian Afghanistan Committee, German Afghan Foundation (GAF), Norwegian Church Aid (1994–1999); MA Post-war Recovery Studies, York (1999–2000); Policy Advisor, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (2002–2004); Deputy Minister of Programmes (2004–2006); MRRD (since 2006). Clare Lockhart: Legal background; member of the World Bank's Social Policy and Strategy Unit from 1997 to 2002 focusing on Indonesia and Russia; legal adviser for the Bonn Agreement (2001–2002); World Bank Advisor to the Afghanistan Government on Strategy and Programmes, 2002–2005; Director of the Institute for State Effectiveness (since 2005), Overseas Development Institute Fellow (since 2006); co-author of ‘Fixing Failed States’ (Ghani and Lockhart 2008).

7. Hanif Atmar (personal interview, 14 Nov 2006).

8. See Independent Evaluation Group (2005).

9. See: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/EXTEAPREGTOPSOCDEV/0,,contentMDK:20477526~pagePK:34004173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:502940,00.html [Accessed 15 April 2009].

10. The CDD Group at the World Bank works to improve understanding of CDD approaches and their role in poverty reduction.

11. Unless otherwise stated, the interview data presented in this section is derived from Barakat et al. (2006).

12. In addition, we were asked to prescribe changes required to the NSP in Phase 2 and to consider the role of CDCs in future governance and build indigenous monitoring and evaluation capacity.

13. Scott Guggenheim, Senior World Bank Social Development Advisor, personal interview, 7 October 2007.

14. Unless otherwise stated, the interview data presented in this section is derived from Barakat et al. (2006).