Accountability and the design of an anticorruption agency in a parliamentary democracy

Abstract

This article explores the institutional requirements of accountability for an anticorruption agency in a parliamentary democracy. It suggests that approaching public accountability as ‘the satisfaction of legitimate expectations about the use of discretion’ is useful in understanding or designing an accountability regime for such a powerful agency requiring independence from the executive. The approach facilitates identification of a variety of stakeholders and a range of institutional means by which their legitimate expectations may be satisfied. Despite the recognition, in consequence, of multiple agents and channels of accountability, parliament must remain central to the accountability regime and can achieve this through an appropriately designed oversight committee. Examination of a selected Australian agency, the Western Australian Corruption and Crime Commission, provides support for these propositions. Particular controversies involving this agency are used to demonstrate the requirements of a parliamentary oversight committee, and that independent review of determinations of misconduct, as well as appropriately regulated public hearings where there is a strong public interest in matters under investigation, are important elements of public accountability for an anticorruption agency.

Keywords:

• accountability
• anticorruption agency
• integrity
• corruption
• parliamentary oversight

Notes on contributor

Bruce Stone is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Western Australia. He has had a long-term research interest in governmental accountability and parliament and has published on various aspects of these subjects.

Notes

1. The agency is established under the Corruption and Crime Commission Act 2003 (WA).

2. These include powers to summon witnesses and issue a warrant for the arrest of a witness who ignores a summons, to prohibit those providing evidence or appearing before it from disclosing these facts, to examine on oath, to detain a person or impose conditions on his release, to conduct covert operations involving otherwise illegal behavior such as controlled operations and integrity testing, to use assumed identities, (if authorized by judicial warrant) to make use of surveillance devices and intercept telecommunications, and to conduct public investigations.

3. The person appointed Commissioner, in whom the powers and functions of the agency are vested, must be qualified to be a Supreme Court judge and his/her appointment must be approved by both major party blocs and the parliamentary committee established to oversee the agency. The Commissioner is not subject to direction and can be removed from office only by an address from both houses of parliament.

4. The CCC Act refers to ‘examinations’ rather than ‘hearings,’ apparently in order to underline the fact that the CCC is not a judicial body. That usage is followed here.

5. That public examinations are not required and are initiated wholly at the discretion of the CCC does weaken their association with accountability as defined above. Thus, in their current form, they might more accurately be described as ‘quasi-accountability’ mechanisms.

6. Cox v Corruption and Crime Commission 2008 WASCA [Western Australian Supreme Court, Court of Appeal] 199.

7. As part of major revisions to Queensland's enabling legislation in July 2014, the Parliamentary Commissioner gained some ability to act on his/her own initiative. In these changes the anticorruption agency also underwent a name change and is now known as the Crime and Corruption Commission.

8. According to the Chairman of the CMC, interviewed by the JSC, a CMC report sets out ‘the evidence uncovered by the CMC's investigation, together, if appropriate, with a recommendation that prosecution proceedings or disciplinary action should be considered’ (JSC 2009, 49).

9. The CCC's reported tests of the public interest seem relevant, if insufficiently formalized. These are separately identified as the number of people affected (CCC 2012, 1) and the seriousness of the allegations, whether the alleged practices are widespread, and whether they are occur frequently (35).