Diffusion and policy transfer in armed UAV proliferation: the cases of Italy and Germany

ABSTRACT

In a 2015 policy change, the U.S. State Department released guidelines governing the sale of armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to other countries, and several export agreements were signed shortly later. While considerable scholarly effort has been devoted to the impact or consequences of UAV proliferation, few studies have analyzed the actual diffusion process. This article applies the insights from both diffusion theory and policy transfer to examine the various diffusion mechanisms while using the experiences from Italy and Germany to illustrate distinct cases policy convergence and divergence, respectively. While the competition mechanism is typically constrained to policy adopting jurisdictions, evidence on armed UAV diffusion suggests policy transfer decisions can also hinge on competition among exporting jurisdictions. Consequently, we seek to point attention to the interaction between diffusion mechanisms (such as competition) and various domestic conditions, demonstrating that diffusion is neither apolitical nor necessarily neutral in character.

KEYWORDS:

• Drone
• UAV export
• diffusion theory
• policy transfer
• policy convergence

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Stephen Ceccoli is the P.K. Seidman Professor of Political Economy in the Department of International Studies at Rhodes College. His research interests include comparative public policy and comparative public opinion.

Matthew Crosston is Full-Time Associate Professor in the Department of Security and Global Studies at American Public University. His research interests include military affairs, intelligence studies and post-Soviet studies.

ORCID

Stephen Ceccoli http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3789-061X

Notes

1 UAV's, also referred to as remotely piloted aircraft, or more colloquially as drones, have also been described as “the world's first airborne sniper rifle” (Woods 2015, xiii).

2 Nation-states are not the only entities to acquire and deploy such weapons. New America (2017) reports that three non-state actors, Hezbollah, Hamas, and ISIS, have used armed UAVs in combat.

3 http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/israel-sells-heron-uavs-to-india-01476/

4 The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) dates back to 1987, remains a voluntary arrangement (not a treaty), and aims “to limit the proliferation of missiles and missile technology,” including UAVs. Its members are those unlikely to conduct lethal UAV attacks against the will of the American government (or at least without tacit American approval) or in a manner inconsistent with the principles for proper use.

5 UAV exports, along with all defense-related exports, are concurrently governed by several American laws, regulations, and policies including the Arms Export Control Act, the Foreign Assistance Act, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, the Export Administration Regulations (for commercial UAVs), and the Conventional Arms Transfer Policy. The Obama Administration's rationale for UAV exports was established in the 2014 Presidential Policy Directive 27 (PPD-27), which oversees the export of conventional weapons among other things (Office of the Press Secretary, The White House 2015).

6 In October 2016 44 countries joined the U.S. in issuing the “Joint Declaration for the Export and Subsequent Use of Armed or Strike-Enabled UAVs.” The Joint Declaration includes a provision for the “importance of engaging in the responsible export of armed or strike-enabled UAVs in line with existing relevant international arms control and disarmament norms.” The Joint Declaration also asserts that the export of armed UAVs should take “into account the potential recipient country's history regarding adherence to its relevant international obligations and commitments.”

7 Widely employed “internal determinants” models include the multiple streams approach, punctuated equilibrium theory, and the advocacy coalition framework. On the basis of an internal determinants logic, Fuhrmann and Horowitz (2017) empirically analyze “interest based” and “capacity based” arguments as explanations for UAV proliferation.

8 See reviews by Evans (2009), Knill (2005), Marsh and Sharman (2009), and Newmark (2002) for detailed discussions of the complementary nature of policy diffusion and policy transfer.

9 For a discussion of the international security consequences of drone proliferation, see Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann (2016) and Zenko and Kreps (2014).

10 In practical terms, other research design strategies such as most similar systems and most different systems may be less appropriate here. We thank an anonymous reviewer for making this point.

11 UAVs now account for approximately 10% of Israel's military exports (Sherwood 2013).

12 A related competition involves the complementary munitions delivered by UAVs, such as the Chinese-made AR-1 /HJ-10 anti-tank missile, a laser-guided missile (akin to U.S. Hellfire missile) produced specifically for UAVs.