Saadya Gaon and Maimonides on the Logic and Limits of Legal Inference in Context of the Karaite-Rabbanite Controversy

Abstract

Saadya Gaon (882 – 942), one of the outstanding Rabbis in the period of the Geonim, rejected the legitimacy of legal inference, as part of his polemics with his contemporary Karaite scholars. The paper analyzes Saadya's stance regarding the logical basis of legal inference, and shows that Saadya's distinction between reason and revelation in the domain of legal inference is only in regard to the ‘illah– the factor that connects the case with its law. The rationality of the commandments, on the other hand, is based according to Saadya upon the manfa‘ah– the utility of the commandments, and hence Saadya's religious doctrine turns out to be coherent and consistent. Maimonides (1138–1204), who was one of the most important figures in the Jewish scholarly world in the Middle Ages, adopted the Aristotelian concept of dialectics in order to facilitate his theory of Jewish legal argumentation. Unlike Saadya, Maimonides saw inferences in the realm of the law as legitimate. His position can be considered an inclination towards the Karaite ideology according to which reason must be the ruler in the realm of the law. Nevertheless, Maimonides' stance deviates from that of Karaites in a crucial point: according to Maimonides, only authorized institutions are qualified to use legal inference. Since the Talmud, according to Maimonides, represents the teachings of the rabbinical authorized institutions, its legal instructions must be followed. The article describes Maimonides' position regarding legal and Talmudic inferences, and shows that Maimonides' inclination towards the Karaite theory remains within the limits of the Rabbanite ideology.

Notes

On the rationalistic aspects of the religious thinking of these two scholars; see ben-Shammai 1977 (Vol. 1, pp. 8 – 35), and cf. ben-Shammai 1992 (pp. 11 – 26), Lasker 2008 (pp. 18 – 22).

The Arabic source with a Hébrew translation was published by Zucker 1971 /1972. Saadya dealt with the rejection of legal inference also in other works, e.g. his introduction to his Commentary on the Pentateuch and the beginning of his Commentary on Leviticus. See Zucker 1955/1956 (pp. 342–343), idem 1984 (pp. 188–189).

On the Thirteen Principles; see Mielziner 1968 (pp. 126–176), Strack 1969 (p. 95), Stemberger 1996 (pp. 20–22).

This opinion was expressed by Saadya in the beginning of his unpublished Commentary on Leviticus. See Zucker 1955/1956 (p. 376).

The tendency to compare the methods of deducing legal knowledge with the methods of deducing scientific one, is apparent also in the writings of al-Qirqisānī. See idem 1940 (Vol. 2, pp. 351–354). In the fourteenth century, however, the tendency to compare Jewish legal principles with scientific ones can be seen in the writings of Jewish Rabbanite philosophers. For a bold attempt to analyze Talmudic methods of inference by the use of Aristotelian logic in the fourteenth century; see Ravitsky 2009a .

The passage was translated from ben-Shammai 1977 (Vol. 1, p. 89).

The passage was translated from ibn ‘Ezra 1975 (pp. 204–205). On Saadya's scholarship in the Aristotelian Organon; see Stroumsa 2002 (pp. 27–28).

This interpretation was expressed by Zucker 1984 (intro. p. 21).

A survey of the theological stances of the anbalite and the āhirite can be found in Hourani 1985 (pp. 270–276).

On the terms mutakallim and kalām (theology); see van Ess 1970 (pp. 21–50). On the influence of Islamic theology on Saadya Gaon; see ben-Shammai 1997 (p. 129), Stroumsa 2003 (76 ff.).

See Saadya 1948 (p. 141). For further analysis of Saadya's distinction between the two kinds of precepts; see ben-Shammai 1971/72 .

On the Mu‘tazilite ethical views and legal thinking of ‘Abd al-Jabbar; see Hourani 1971 .

On the concept of ‘illah in Islamic jurisprudent; see Brunschvig 1970 (pp. 16–19), van Ess 1970 (pp. 35–42), Zysow 1984 (pp. 282–287).

For further analysis of this subject; see Ravitsky 2009b .

See Maimonides 1995 (pp. 11–12). For the Arabic source; see Šailat 1992 (p. 328).

On the attribution of this treatise to Maimonides; see Cohen 2004 (p. 420 no. 15), Hasnawi 2004 (pp. 69–73), Davidson 2005 (pp. 313–322).

Efros 1966 (Arabic section, p. 23).

See Ravitsky 2010 (pp. 67–69). Indeed, Maimonides used dialectics in several discussions in his religious thought, regardless of the syllogistic or non-syllogistic structure of the arguments. See Hyman 1989 .

See Maimonides 1963 (part 2, p. 364).

See the analysis of the concept of the topos in Slomkowski 1997 (pp. 9–42).

For further elaboration on this subject; see Ravitsky 2004 (pp. 197–224).

The distinction is apparent for example in the writings of al-Fārābī and Thomas Aquinas. See Aquinas 1970 (introduction, p. 8), Zonta 1992 (p. 13), and cf. the sources that were analyzed by Kraemer 2000 (pp. 115–117).

Cf. Lasker 2008 (p. 163).

Maimonides 1962 (p. 58r).

See, for example, the famous epistle by Sahal ben Malia the Karaite, published in Pinsker 1860 (pp. 33–34). On the Karaite individualism and its historical background; cf. Baron 1957 (pp. 212–213, 230–232).

For a discussion on Maimonides' obligation to the Talmudic sources and his use of them; see Blidstein 1990 .

See Maimonides 1949 (p. 138), and cf. Ravitsky 2007 (pp. 207–209).

For a survey of Maimonides' political thought and its institutional aspects; see Kreisel 1999 (pp. 1–61), especially ibid pp. 16–29.

See Berman 1974 .

Walzer 1985 (pp. 250–252). On al-Fārābīi s political thought; cf. Mahdi 1963.

This argument was developed in Ravitsky 2008 , and cf. Kreisel 1999 (p. 17).

See Maimonides' description of the streaming of Jewish law and the compilation of the Mišnah and Talmud in Maimonides 1962 (pp. 1v–4v), and cf. the comprehensive description in Maimonides 1995 (pp. 7–12, 34–83).