Counterfactual thinking and anticipated emotions enhance performance in computer skills training

Abstract

The present study examined the relationship between novice learners' counterfactual thinking (i.e. generating ‘what if’ and ‘if only’ thoughts) about their initial training experience with a computer application and subsequent improvement in task performance. The role of anticipated emotions towards goal attainment in task performance was also assessed. Undergraduate students (N = 42) with minimal experience in using computer spreadsheets underwent basic training in using Microsoft Excel. All participants were assessed on their anticipated positive and negative emotions regarding goal attainment at the outset. After completing their first task, participants allocated to a counterfactual condition received instructions to generate counterfactual thoughts regarding their initial task performance, whereas participants in a control condition did not. The counterfactual group showed only marginally greater improvement in task performance (measured by task completion time and accuracy) than the control group. However, we also found that positive anticipated emotions were associated with improvement in task performance but for the counterfactual group only. Our data have implications for incorporating counterfactual thinking into information technology skills training to enhance learning outcomes for novice learners.

Keywords:

• counterfactual thinking
• anticipated emotions
• information technology training

Acknowledgement

The authors wish to thank Danielle Stockwell for assisting with data collection.

Notes

We tested 58 participants in total (33 in the counterfactual condition and 25 in the control condition). However, data from 14 participants (11 participants from the counterfactual condition and 3 participants from the control condition) were incomplete and had to be excluded prior to data analysis. Two further participants (one from each of the counterfactual and control conditions) were tested but excluded from data analysis. Their solution procedures, as shown in their Camtasia recordings, clearly suggested that they had sufficient previous experience using Excel (one participant used pre-programmed formulae and the other used advanced formatting tools during the task). Of the 11 participants from the counterfactual condition whose data were incomplete and excluded, six were excluded because they failed to follow task instructions in the first experimental task (Task 1) and their data therefore could not be coded; one failed to follow instructions in the second experimental task (Task 2); two had missing data on Task 1; and two had missing data on Task 2. For the three participants from the control condition whose data were excluded, one was given a faulty spreadsheet for Task 1 due to technical error; one failed to follow instructions in Task 2 and his/her data therefore could not be coded and the Camtasia file for one participant's Task 2 was not saved due to technical error and his/her data therefore could not be coded. Given that the majority of these exclusions were due to problems related to participants' behaviour in Task 1 (i.e. before participants were presented with the counterfactual or control task), it was not the case that our experimental manipulations resulted in more participants from the counterfactual condition to be excluded. The final sample included 21 participants in each condition.

The purpose of including the second worksheet was to prevent individual differences in participants' ability to memorise the procedures learned in the training phase to affect their experimental task performance.

Due to the exclusion of some participants (see Note 1), the number of participants allowed to sign up to later testing sessions had to be varied to maintain the same number of participants in the counterfactual and control conditions in our final sample.

The second experimental task was unexpected because people are more likely to spontaneously generate upward counterfactuals if they expect to come across a similar event again (Markman et al. 1993). In as much as the filler task for the control condition was set up to prevent spontaneous counterfactual thinking in participants from the control condition, we additionally refrained from informing participants from either condition earlier about the second experimental task. This was done as a further safeguard against counterfactual thoughts from occurring naturally in participants in the control condition.

A preliminary analysis showed that task order did not affect participants' performance scores.

It may be argued that the opportunity for participants in the counterfactual condition to reflect on their initial experimental task performance (via writing a description of their task performance) was instrumental to their subsequent greater improvement in task performance. Note, however, that in prior research that included a ‘reflection only’ control condition, it has been demonstrated that greater intentions to engage in success-facilitating behaviour in future do not arise if one simply reflects on a performance-oriented experience without also thinking counterfactually about it (Roese 1994, Experiment 2).