ABSTRACT
What expectations about the mind do people with intellectual disabilities depart from? A dominant argument maintains that their mental dependence troubles liberal relations premised upon a myth of autonomy. By analyzing the centrality of persuasion in a home for adults with intellectual disabilities in the UK, I ask instead about the psychological assumptions made by relationships of care. Persuasion aims to cultivate, not their independence from care but rather, a recognition of their dependence upon it. Persuasive care’s repeated failure suggests an alternative answer to the question: people with intellectual disabilities are too independent-minded for this form of dependence.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Martha, her family, friends, and caregivers in L’Arche and beyond for the opportunity to learn from and discuss so much with them over many years. I would like to thank Annelieke Driessen and Francesca Mezzenzana for their illuminating papers, and our conversations about them, that decisively shaped this article. I would like also to thank Anna Zogas and three anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this piece.
Correction Statement
This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
Notes
1. This is the accepted academic term internationally, but is also referred to as ‘cognitive’, ‘developmental’, or ‘learning’ disability.
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Patrick McKearney
Patrick Mckearney is a Research Associate and Affiliated Lecturer in Social Anthropology at the University of Cambridge, working on the care that people with intellectual disabilities receive in the UK and India. He has published widely on ethics, disability, care, religion, and the mind. Address correspondence to: Department of Social Anthropology, University of Cambridge, CB2 3RF, UK. Email: [email protected]