Same-Sex Marriage and the Boundaries of Diversity: Will Marriage and Family Therapy Remain Inclusive of Religious and Social Conservatives?

Abstract

The expanding legalization of same-sex marriage in the Western World may pose significant challenges for the relationship between many religious and socially conservative marriage and family therapists and their professional associations. In the present analysis, I look to the field of moral psychology, particularly Haidt's Moral Foundations Theory, to provide greater clarity regarding the nature of this tension and a resultant tightening of the boundaries of acceptable diversity that could ensue. I then outline some concerning indicators from mental health associations relative to their potential willingness to tolerate conservative perspectives in meaningful ways and identify some specific areas of possible tension for conservative therapists trying to integrate their deeply held moral values into ethical practice with same-sex couples, with a specific reference to the viability of “conscience clauses” and values-based referrals. I conclude with some recommendations through which the field of marriage and family therapy can reduce the potential for conflicts and thereby reassure these clinicians that they continue to be welcomed even if their vision of marriage differs from that which is formally endorsed by their professional associations.

KEYWORDS:

• conscience clauses
• same-sex marriage
• therapy
• values conflict

Notes

Although Blankenhorn has recently ended his opposition to same-sex marriage, it is also true that he explicitly refused to recant any of his prior analysis of the history and meaning of marriage as an institution (Blankenhorn, 2012).

Using linguistic analysis adapted from Graham et al. (2009), I conducted frequency counts of terms within the McGeorge and Carlson (2011) article related to the moral foundations. Most frequently used were the terms individual (31 times), group (14), oppression (9), benefit (6), and discrimin[ate] (5). Consistent with Graham et al.'s findings, the words group and individual were used mostly to reject the foundational concerns of ingroup loyalty and group solidarity (e.g., “dominant socially sanctioned group”). Oppression is a term evocative of the liberty/oppression foundation with implied endorsement of equality understood in terms of rights and justice. Benefit and discriminate are terms that emanate from the harm/care and fairness/cheating foundations, respectively. Thus, McGeorge and Carlson's article appears to be strongly imbued with an emphasis on the individual foundations, which Haidt (2012) observed tends to be the dominant moral language of the political left. There was a general absence of terms that either recognized or affirmed the value of any binding foundations.

It is worth noting that the one exception to the “two strikes and you're out” policy appears to be referrals surrounding end-of-life issues and assisted suicide (Kaplan, 2014). This makes perfect sense from a MoFT perspective, in that the harm/care moral intuition appears prominently activated in this matter and liberal ACA leaders can therefore understand and empathize with the conflict. Such empathy and consideration by professional leadership unfortunately seems much less likely to occur with conflicts that derive primarily from activation of the binding moral intuitions of religious and social conservatives (Haidt & Graham, 2007).

Indeed, one reviewer of this article for another major marriage and family journal commented that, “Acting on one's conscience means not expecting special tolerance but accepting the penalties a possibly unjust society or organization may impose for non-conformance … [Gandi and Martin Luther King, Jr.] did not ask for special treatment. They took the penalties and suffered.” A second reviewer concluded, “ … I assert that those who adhere to prejudices such as racism, homophobia and sexism and are not open to being challenged and working to eradicate them have no business being therapists … ” In spite of the fact that conscience protections need not be all-or-nothing, winner-take-all accommodations, the clear implication of these statements is that religious and conservative marriage and family therapists should expect no gestures of tolerance in this area but rather be prepared to suffer the professional consequences of their beliefs.

Haidt (2012) discussed this concern with individual and institutional confirmation bias within an MoFT framework: “In the same way, each individual reasoner is really good at one thing: finding evidence to support the position he or she already holds, usually for intuitive reasons … This is why it's so important to have intellectual and ideological diversity within any group or institution whose goal is to find truth (such as an intelligence agency or a community of scientists) or to produce good public policy (such as a legislature or advisor board)” (p. 90).

It is important to be clear that my attention to the issue of nonmonogamy or polyandry in sexual minority relationships rather than a broader focus on sexual behavior such as adultery within the general population is entirely premised on the current legal and professional climate in which religious and other conservative therapists increasingly find themselves. Certainly heterosexual adultery is a greater destabilizing threat to the vast majority of marriages that currently exist. However, I have found no evidence that a marital therapist who chose on moral grounds to refer rather than work with a married heterosexual couple negotiating outside sexual agreements or simply seeking to recover from a sexual affair is at any risk of ethical censure, loss of licensure, or being deemed unfit to earn their graduate degree. Such a referral is not considered to be directed at the entire class of heterosexual persons but rather made in consideration of specific behavioral activities and treatment goals felt to be morally problematic. This is the opposite of what often appears to be assumed by the professional associations when the practice of marriage and family therapy involves same-sex married couples. Should this differential standard of ethical and clinical practice someday disappear, then there would be ample reason for me to broaden the scope of my treatment of this subject matter.