The United States and Barbary Piracy, 1783–1805

Abstract

The United States waged war from 1801 to 1805 to compel the Islamic regency of Tripoli—what might be called a quasistate—to cease piracy (privateering) against American merchant ships in the Mediterranean, and to release Americans held captive. The Jefferson administration and its officials on the scene employed steadily escalating political-military measures against Tripoli, but the threshold of pressure necessary to alter the regency's behavior proved much greater than anticipated. The United States—as much by accident as design—finally succeeded by threatening the Pasha of Tripoli's larger strategic ambitions. The U.S. experience with the Barbary regencies provides considerable grounds for reflection on the enduring requirements for deterrence of non- or quasistate actors. The United States must properly estimate the level of effort required to deter or coerce quasistates motivated by nontangible factors such as honor, prestige, or religious obligation—and especially by a sense of grievance. Judicious U.S. threats or forceful military operations can alter the balance of motivations, causing the quasistate's leadership to recognize that self-interest and survival depend on coming to an accommodation. But the “tipping point” for effective coercion/deterrence may be considerably higher than the United States, or even the quasistate, originally calculated.

Notes

1. Kola Folayan, Tripoli During the Reign of Yusuf Quaramanli (Ile-Ife, Nigeria: University of Ife Press, 1979), p. 43.

2. To simplify matters, this text generally includes Morocco in the discussion of the “regencies.” American officials did not treat its sovereign status differently from that of Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers.

3. The precise relationship between the Porte and the various regencies is very much a matter of scholarly dispute. For an argument about the importance of the relationship in the case of Algiers, and a recent review of the literature, see Tal Shuval, “The Ottoman Algerian Elite and its Ideology,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 32 (2000): 323–44.

4. For contrasting discussions of the Barbary “pirates,” compare Ray W. Irwin, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers, 1776–1816 (New York: Russell and Russell, 1910), pp. 1–19, and Gardner W. Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1905) pp. 1–2; on the one hand Syed Z. Abedin, In Defense of Freedom: America's First Foreign War, A New Look at U.S.-Barbary Relations, 1776–1816, PhD. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1974, pp. xxxiv–xxxviii, 14–45, and Daniel Panzac, Barbary Corsairs: The End of a Legend, 1800–1820 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005), pp. 1–43, on the other.

5. John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, 31 July 1786, Lester D. Cappon, ed., The Adams-Jefferson Letters (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959), p. 146.

6. Cited by Allen, pp. 52–2.

7. Panzac, pp. 56–7.

8. Cited by Allen, p. 26. See also Irwin, p. 106.

9. Thomas Jefferson, “Report on American Trade in the Mediterranean,” 28 December 1790, in Julian P. Boyd, ed., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), vol. 18: 423; and preceding Editorial Note. Hereafter referred to as PTJ.

10. Payments in Western treaties with the Barbary States were typically dominated in Spanish dollars, but Congressional and U.S. government documents usually do not make clear to which sort of “dollars” they are referring. To avoid confusion I have used the figure given by U.S. officials. They do indicate the order of magnitude of the transaction.

11. See text and citations, Irwin, pp. 26–9.

12. Cited by Irwin, p. 44. This paragraph is based on Irwin, chapter 3.

13. Adams to John Jay, 17 February 1786, 20 February 1786, 22 February 1786, Charles Francis Adams, ed., Works of John Adams (Boston: Little, Brown, 1853), vol. 8: 372, 373, 379; Adams to Jefferson, 3 July 1786, Letters of Adams and Jefferson, p. 129; Allen, p. 33.

14. Adams to John Jay, 15 December 1784, Works of John Adams, 8: 218.

15. Adams to Jefferson, 31 July 1786, Letters of Adams and Jefferson. p. 146.

16. For the above, see the Editorial Note, PTJ, 10: 560–6.

17. Irwin, pp. 48–9.

18. Jefferson to Jones, 1 June 1792, PTJ, 24: 3–10; Irwin, pp. 56–7; Allen, pp. 45–6.

19. Irwin, pp. 59–60.

20. Congressman James Madison, an ally of Jefferson, introduced a resolution to subsidize the Portuguese in their contest with the Algerines. Irwin, pp. 63–5.

21. Irwin, pp. 80–1.

22. King to Eaton, 28 December 1800, Charles R. King, ed., The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1894), vol. 3: 355. Hereafter cited as LCRK. Irwin, pp. 80–1. Eaton suspected Famin of undercutting American interests and pursuing his own financial interests, to the point where they came to blows. Joseph Wheelan, Jefferson's War: America's First War on Terror, 1801–1805 (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2003), pp. 89–92. The treaty complicated rather than simplified American efforts to settle affairs elsewhere. A new Emperor in Morocco demanded presents and tribute, since the United States had agreed to an annuity for Algiers. American diplomats refused the latter.

23. Irwin, pp. 86–90.

24. Eaton cited in Allen, p. 64; Irwin, pp. 86–90.

25. Irwin, pp. 83–4.

26. The regencies could also find fault with a perfectly good shipment if they were searching for a pretext for war or for additional presents. American slowness in official payments was not limited to the Barbary Coast. The U.S. government often struggled to maintain its accounts with its official Bankers in Amsterdam, despite the importance of maintaining American credit in Europe.

27. Wheelan, p. 93.

28. Allen, pp. 77–84. The Sultan, or Grand Seignior, sent back a message to Algiers demanding that it declare war on France and send him a million piasters within sixty days. The Dey complied by declaring war. Bainbridge to King, 28 November 1800, LCRK, 3: 381; Irwin, pp. 92–5; Wheelan, p. 96; O'Brien to SecState, 12 May 1801, Papers of James Madison, Secretary of State Series (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1986), vol. 1: 167. Hereafter cited as PJM-SS.

29. Wheelan, p. 99; Irwin, pp. 98–100; Eaton to SecState, 8 December 1800, American State Papers: Foreign Relations (Washington, DC: Gales and Seaton, 1832), vol. II: 355. Hereafter referred to as ASPFR. The arrival of one U.S. shipment caused the Bey to divert his cruisers, which had been waiting orders to sail against the Americans, to attack the Danes instead. Eight Danish vessels were soon captured. Allen, p. 71.

30. For a discussion of Yusuf and Tripoli, see especially Folayan, chapters 1–2; Wheelan, pp. 102–3. See also the Editorial Note, PJM-SS, I: 197–9, which observes that the Americans misinterpreted the link between the regencies of Algiers and Tripoli. The changes that Tripoli was undergoing—its growing navy and political and economic independence in the area—rapidly altered the subordinate position that Tripoli had held to Algiers and Tunis throughout the eighteenth century.

31. Wheelan, pp. 102–3; Folayan, p. 7.

32. Cathcart to SecState, 18 April 1800, ASPFR, II: 350; Cathcart to SecState, 4 January 1801, ASPFR, II: 354. Cathcart had been told that Yusuf had written to the Dey about the situation; in his opinion, “if the Bashaw of Algiers peremptorily orders him to accept my offer; I think not withstanding all his bravado, that he will acquiesce.” Cathcart to SecState, 13 March 1801, PJM-SS, I: 14–15.

33. Irwin, pp. 96–8; Folayan, p. 35; Cathcart to SecState, 18 October 1800 [misdated 1801], ASPFR, II: 352.

34. It should be noted that the American consuls were themselves often bitterly at odds over personal issues and private commercial matters, conflicts that would later spill over into their relations with U.S. naval commanders. The tension between Eaton and O'Brien, for instance, was based on Eaton's belief that O'Brien had improper ties with Jewish merchants in Algiers. As merchants Cathcart and O'Brien had been captured by Algiers earlier in the 1790s and developed a dislike for each other during captivity.

35. Irwin, pp. 95, 101–2; Cathcart to SecState, 27 May 1800, ASPFR, II: 352; Allen, pp. 68–9; Eaton to SecState, 10 September 1801, PJM-SS, II: 98.

36. Eaton to SecState, 10 April 1801, PJM-SS, I: 79; Allen, pp. 68–9.

37. Humphreys to SecState, 14 April 1801, PJM-SS, I: 92.

38. John Quincy Adams to SecState, 25 June 1801, PJM-SS, I: 348–9.

39. Cathcart to SecState, 2 July 1801, PJM-SS, I: 370–2.

40. Cathcart to SecState, 2 July 1801, PJM-SS, I: 370–1

41. Cathcart to SecState, 13 March 1801, PJM-SS, I: 14–15. “Upon the whole our Peace being guaranteed by Algiers has been a service to our interests here, & I should recommend to government to continue the treaty in its present form was it not for the consideration that should we have a rupture with Algiers that Tripoli will immediately take the opportunity to break with us …”

42. William Willis to SecState, 22 April 1801, PJM-SS, I: 110–11. Robert R. Livingston, American Minister to France, wrote jokingly to the new Secretary of State, James Madison: “Novelty, & superstition may perhaps allure their statesmen. By showing them a few federal election papers I can convince them that the presidents Christianity will not stand in the way of his proselytism to the doctrine of Mahomet, & tho I would not go so far as to stipulate for his circumcision, or even for that of his grand Vizer [Madison], I shall not scruple at building a mosque at Washington provided they destroy the prisons at Algiers.” Livingston to SecState, 1 July 1801, PJM-SS, I: 368.

43. Cathcart to SecState, 25 August 1802, ASPFR, II: 700.

44. Cited by Irwin, p. 102; Wheelan, p. 100.

45. Humphreys to SecState, 10 September 1801, PJM-SS, II: 96.

46. Wheelan, p. 98; SecState to O'Brien, 17 July 1801, PJM-SS, I: 424–5.

47. The Peace Reduction Act of 1801, passed by the outgoing Congress, required that six frigates be maintained in active service. The new president decided to retain two 12-gun schooners, Enterprise and Experiment. The latter was soon sold.

48. Acting SecNav to Dale, 20 May 1801, Dudley Knox, ed., Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Barbary Powers, 1785–1807 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939–1944), vol. I: 465–7. Hereafter referred to as Naval Documents. Acting SecNav to Tom Fitzsimons, 4 June 1801, Naval Documents, I: 486; Jefferson to Hamouda Bashaw, 19 September 1801, ASPFR, I: 356; SecState to O'Brien, 21 May 1801, PJM-SS, I: 213.

49. For a good account of this strategy, see Christopher McKee, Edward Preble: A Naval Biography (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1972), pp. 87–94.

50. Jefferson to Nicholas, 11 June 1801, cited in Wheelan, pp. 110–11; Jefferson to SecState, 28 August 1801, PJM-SS, II: 71.

51. Gavino to SecState, 24 July 1801, PJM-SS, I: 530; McKee, p. 91; Eaton to SecState, 3 February 1802, PJM-SS, II: 438–9.

52. Allen, pp. 95–8; Dale to SecNav, 19 July 1801, ASPFR, II: 360.

53. Charles O. Paullin, Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers, 1778–1883 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press 1912), pp. 63–5. The precise sequence of Dale's activities is not clear. Wheelan, p. 114; Dale to Bashaw of Tripoli, 25 and 28 July 1801, Naval Documents, I: 531–3.

54. Cathcart to SecState, 10 August 1801, PJM-SS, II: 33.

55. Allen, p. 98. “I have no orders to make any attack on shore.” Dale to Rufus King, 7 February 1802, Naval Documents, II: 54. See the Cabinet discussion of war power in PJM-SS, I: 198–9.

56. O'Brien to SecState, 24 June 1801, PJM-SS, I: 346; O'Brien to SecState, 22 July 1801, PJM-SS, I: 457; Cathcart to SecState, 10 August 1801, PJM-SS, II: 33; O'Brien to SecState, 26 September 1801, PJM-SS, II: 138; Cathcart to SecState, 27 September 1801, PJM-SS, II: 141.

57. Cited by McKee, p. 93; Allen, pp. 100–1.

58. Eaton to Cathcart, 29 June 1801, Naval Documents, I: 494.

59. Eaton to SecState, 5 September 1801, PJM-SS, I: 569–70.

60. McKee, p. 94.

61. McKee; p. 94–5; SecNav to Morris, 20 April 1802, Naval Documents, II: 130; Wheelan, pp. 127–8; Madison to Cathcart, 22 August 1802, PJM-SS, III: 504–5

62. SecNav to Morris, 20 April 1802, Naval Documents, II: 130; Allen, p. 114.

63. On the firman, Kola, p. 37.

64. Madison to Cathcart, 22 August 1802; Madison to Eaton, 22 August 1802, PJM-SS, II: 505–7; SecNav to Morris, 28 August 1802, ASPFR, II: 45; Folayan, p. 37; Irwin, p. 144.

65. Wheelan, pp. 130–2, 183; Eaton to Morris, 16 October 1802, Naval Documents, II: 297; Nissen to Cathcart, 4 June 1803, Naval Documents, II: 440.

66. Folayan, pp. 38–9.

67. Wheelan, pp. 153–4; Allen, pp. 153–6; Irwin, p. 135. Wheelan, p. 153, reverses the order of the Pasha's offer as indicated in the latter two sources.

68. Wheelan, pp. 138–9; McKee, p. 113. A naval court of inquiry convened in the United States agreed with the consuls: Morris was censured for failing to display “the diligence or activity necessary to execute the important duties of his station.” Irwin, p. 129; Findings of the Court, Naval Documents, II: 528–9.

69. Eaton to Summert & Brown, 9 July 1802, Naval Documents, II: 196; Morris to SecNav, 15 October 1802, Naval Documents, II: 296ff.

70. Morris to Cathcart, 5 April 1803, cited in Irwin, pp. 126–7; Allen, p. 113; Wheelan, pp. 127–8.

71. McKee, p. 111; Paullin, pp. 65–7. Morris also had to sail to Algiers and attempt to deal with the Dey of Algiers, who objected to a consignment of $30,000 cash in place of the annual shipment of timber and other maritime stores.

72. Cited by McKee, pp. 108–9.

73. Cited by McKee, pp. 102–3.

74. Citations from McKee, pp. 103, 118.

75. Madison to Cathcart, 9 April 1803, PJM-SS, 4: 494–5; McKee, p. 129; Irwin, p. 128. Fortunately for the United States, the Bey of Tunis rejected the terms—and Cathcart as consul. He also repeated demands for a frigate. Allen, p. 133.

76. Wheelan, p. 136. A further defect of the frigates was that they were not equipped for bombarding enemy land fortifications, as only the largest (the 44-gun ships) carried long guns heavier than 18 pounders; and their carronades, although of large caliber, were not suit for assaulting fortifications. Allen, p. 137.

77. Madison to Lear, 6 June 1804, PJM-SS, 7: 287–8; Irwin, p. 142.

78. Morris, at least for the record, had considered a similar approach. He said the he had planned to deploy the squadron off Tripoli in January 1803 and attempt to burn the shipping in the harbor, but that the weather had prevented the operation. He that claimed he would have destroyed most, if not all, of the Tripolitan cruisers that spring had he been supplied rather than ordered home. At the very least, he said, the destruction of the cruisers would have prevented the molestation of American commerce for some time. Allen, pp. 119–121; McKee, p. 110; Murray Journal, 29 January 1803, Naval Documents, II: 350.

79. Preble to Henry Dearborn, 9 August 1803, cited in McKee, p. 138–9; Preble to SecNav, 9 August 1803, Naval Documents, II: 508; Preble to Smith, 16 July 1803, cited in McKee, pp. 130–1.

80. Paullin, pp. 70–2; Preble to SecNav, 17 January 1804, Naval Documents, III: 339; Preble to SecNav, 11 March 1804, Naval Documents, III: 485.

81. Cited in McKee, p. 152; Lear to Davis, 12 December 1803, Naval Documents, III: 265; Irwin, pp. 132–3; McKee, pp. 139–59. The Governor of Tangiers was eventually able to buy his way out of punishment by the emperor. McKee, p. 171.

82. Preble to SecNav, 10 December 1803, Naval Documents, III: 256–7.

83. Preble to SecNav, 11 March 1804, Naval Documents, III: 485; Irwin, p. 140, Davis to SecState, 28 December 1803, PJM-SS, 6: 238–9.

84. Allen, p. 173; Paullin, pp. 74–5; Wheelan, p. 198; Preble to Bainbridge, 12 March 1804, Naval Documents, III: 489; Irwin, p. 136. These secondary accounts differ somewhat in detail and the timing of proposals.

85. Paullin, pp. 70–72, 78–80; Irwin, p. 137; Preble to SecNav, 17 January 1804, Naval Documents, III: 339.

86. Irwin, pp. 136–138; Allen, p. 180.

87. Preble did not rule out any foreign assistance: “Would it not do for the Interest of our Country to have a Minister Plenipotentiary or Ambassador at the Ottoman Porte? Such a character might influence the Grand Seignior to guarantee our treaties with the Barbary Powers, and they would then never dare to infringe them.” Preble to SecNav, 11 March 1804, Naval Documents, III: 485.

88. Madison to Armstrong, 15 July 1804, PJM-SS, 7: 453–4; Irwin, p. 138.

89. Allen, pp. 182, 219; Irwin, p. 142; Wheelan, p. 202; Lear to Bainbridge, 28 August 1804, Naval Documents, IV: 471.

90. This account based on Allen, pp. 192–7.

91. Paullin, p. 81; Preble to Beaussier, 11 August 1804, Naval Documents, IV: 397–8.

92. Irwin, pp. 138–9; Allen, pp. 181–97, 217; Wheelan, pp. 222–4.

93. Wheelan, p. 221; Nissen to Davis, 1 September 1804, Naval Documents, IV: 495.

94. Allen, pp. 170; Wheelan, p. 202.

95. SecNav to Preble, 22 May 1804, cited in Allen, pp. 198–9.

96. SecNav to Barron, 6 June 1804, Naval Documents, IV: 152–3; Irwin, p. 157.

97. Madison to Lear, 6 June 1804, cited in Allen, p. 254; Madison to Lear, 20 April 1805, ASPFR, II: 702.

98. SecNav to Barron, 6 June 1804, ASPFR, II: 702; see also Madison to Lear, 6 June 1804, cited in Allen, pp. 254, 259; Madison to Lear, 20 April 1805, ASPFR, II: 702, said those instructions still held.

99. Allen, p. 219; Paullin, pp. 82–3.

100. Eaton to SecNav, 9 August 1805, Naval Documents, IV: 213–8.

101. Wheelan, p. 251. Hamet pledged to use the tribute of Denmark, Sweden, and the Batavian Republic to compensate the United States.

102. Wheelan, p. 245.

103. Allen, p. 248; Bainbridge to Davis, 27 January 1805, ASPFR, II: 703.

104. Lear to Madison, 5 July 1805, cited in Irwin, pp. 150–1; Bainbridge to Davis, 27 January 1805, ASPFR, II: 703; Wheelan, pp. 246, 267, 289.

105. Wheelan, p. 290ff; Barron to Eaton, 22 March 1805, cited in Allen, p. 260. See also John Quincy Adams's record of conversation with Barron the following year in Washington. “Barron says Eaton had no authority; when he learned of the commitment he decided to support him until he got to Derne with full warning that after that he must maintain himself at his own risk and on his own strength. But when he got there he was as impotent as before—utterly unable to maintain himself a moment or to be of the smallest use to us.” Charles Francis Adams, ed., Memoirs of John Quincy Adams (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1874), vol. 2: 429–30. Diary entry for 6 April 1806.

106. Eaton to SecNav, 13 February 1805, ASPFR, II: 704; Wheelan, pp. 292, 312; Allen, pp. 232, 242.

107. Wheelan, p. 273; Lear to Eaton, 6 June 1805, ASPFR, II: 715.

108. It is certainly possible that Nissen phrased Yusuf Pasha's views on the war in a way he felt most likely to promote a settlement.

109. “If in the fluctuation of Human Events, a War should break out between the two Nations; The Prisoners captured by either party shall not be made Slaves; but shall be exchanged Rank for Rank; and if there should be a deficiency on either side, it shall be made up by the payment of Five Hundred Spanish Dollars for each Captain, Three Hundred Dollars for each Mate and Supercargo and One hundred Spanish Dollars for each Seaman so wanting. And it is agreed that Prisoners shall be exchanged in twelve months from the time of their capture, and that this Exchange may be effected by any private Individual legally authorized by either of the parties.”

110. American consul George Davis succeeded in bringing about a reunion of Hamet with his family in 1807. Irwin, p. 159. In 1806, unaware of the clause, Jefferson's Cabinet had considered restoring the blockade to force the release of Hamet's family. Wheelan, p. 326.

111. Lear to Madison, ASPFR, II: 718; Various other quotes in Allen, p. 268; Paullin, pp. 92–3; Irwin, p. 161–2.

112. Cited by Paullin, p. 95; Allen, p. 269.

113. Cited by Allen, pp. 269–70.

114. Eaton to SecNav, 9 August 1805, Naval Documents, VI: 213–8. I have inserted punctuation to make Eaton's meaning clearer.

115. Cited by Allen, p. 222.

116. Jefferson to the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States, 13 January 1806, James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, volume I, part 3, available in Project Gutenburg, accessed 12 January 2007, from http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/0/8/9/10893/10893.txt

117. In Eaton's defense, the Jefferson administration and its successors demonstrated a disquieting tendency to rely on “plausible deniability”—to encourage its representatives privately to push beyond the limits of official policy and later to deny official responsibility if things went bad. The United States acquired as a result something of a reputation for encouraging foreign opposition groups—e.g., Kurds, Hungarians, and Iraqi Shiites—with at least implicit promises of political or military support that does not materialize in the end.

118. Folayan, chapters 2 and 3; and Panzac, pp. 102–32, discuss Yusuf's change of strategy after 1805.

119. Panzac, pp. 259–92.