Deterring Nonstate Terrorist Groups: The Case of Hizballah

Abstract

In the months before the “Second Lebanon War” of 2006, Israeli policy did not prevent Hizbullah from taking actions that Israel considered highly unacceptable and ultimately resulted in the Israeli decision to conduct military operations against Hizbullah's power base in Lebanon. However, this does not vindicate the conventional wisdom that Israeli deterrence of Hizbullah failed in a simple, unambiguous fashion. Rather, Israeli deterrence signals were not clear and Hizbullah did not understand that it was crossing “red lines” that would result in Israel undertaking high-intensity military operations in Lebanon. This paper explores the deterrence relationship between Israel and Hizbullah, with particular reference to the 2006 conflict and its impact on that relationship.

Notes

1. Mohammad Fanush to al-Manar, 18 January, 2002, Hasan Nassrallah to al-Majala (Saudi Arabia), 24 March, 2004, Hasan Nassrallah to al-Mostaqbal (Lebanon), 31 December 2000.

2. One representative of the IRGC/al-Qods force and one representative of the Iranian embassy in Beirut.

3. Headed by Hashem Safi al-Din.

4. Nassrallah rarely refers to Moghniya, though he has denied the claim that Jawad Nour al-Din is a cover name for Moghniya.

5. A recent expression of this cult is the emphasis on Nassrallah during and after the last Lebanon war. During the war, he was almost alone among the Hizballah leadership who appeared in the media. The dramaturgy of his hiding during the war and his “disappearance” until the mass rally that the organization held (22 September) was staged to arouse associations with the “Hidden Imam.” The name that he chose for the war itself, al-intissar al-illahi (The Divine Victory), derives from the Arabic root of his own name, Nassr-Allah (Victory of God).

6. Interview with Brig. Gen (ret.) Yossef Kuperwasser, former Deputy Head of MI, 10 September 2006.

7. Hizballah's arsenal includes: 122mm Katyusha (range 20 km), 240 mm Fajr-3, (range 40 km) and Fajr-5, (range 72 km) and Zelzal-2 rockets (210 km and payload of 600 kg). Other elements that were used by Hizballah to augment this image included: AA missiles SA-7 and SA-14, a naval unit, CS–802 coast-to-sea missiles, ultra-light planes, and a mini-RPV that the organization demonstrated and succeeded in flying into Israel (8 November 2004) loaded with a camera (Hizballah propaganda exploited this feat to show that the organization has ways to collect information on Israeli targets and could potentially load explosives on the RPV instead of a camera).

8. The Hizballah modus operandi was based on forming a forward command post, manning forward observation posts by senior commanders of the organization, and employing artillery to support the attack. The Hizballah teams were specialized (mining, explosive devices, antitank, etc.).

9. During the fighting in July 2006, Israel dropped fliers calling on the civilians to leave. Hizballah fighters prevented Shiites from leaving their homes (with success mainly in the main Hizballah-dominated villages), thus using them as human shields.

10. These first attacks were the October 23, 1983 attack on the Marine compound in Beirut that killed 241 Americans and 56 French troops and the November 1982 attack on the Israeli compound in Tyre. On Hizballah's pride in this method, see Hasan Nassrallah to al-Manar, 25 May, 2006.

11. al-Sharq al-Awsat, 18 February, 2001, al-Ahad (Lebanon), 23 February 2001.

12. The most salient of these instances included, first, a crossborder attack near Kibbutz Metsubah in which six Israelis were killed. The al-Aqsa Brigades of Fatah issued a communiqué taking responsibility, but the assessment in the IDF was that the terrorists were Palestinians who were trained and directed by Hizballah and infiltrated from Lebanon. Hizballah pointedly refused to “confirm or deny” its involvement in the attack, but is “proud” of its support of the Palestinians. Second, on 2 August 2003 a senior Hizballah activist, Ali Hussein Saleh, was killed by a car bomb. Hizballah accused Israel and the next day fired three rounds of anti-aircraft shells in the air over Israeli towns along the border. Hizballah claimed that the rounds had been fired against Israeli planes which had crossed the border. This was the beginning of an escalation that resulted in Hizballah rocket fire into the Golan and the death of an Israeli from the anti-aircraft fire (10 August).

13. al-Safir, 1 July, 2006.

14. According to Israeli security sources.

15. The Santorini was captured on 6 May 2001 after having been involved in three previous smuggling attempts by the PFLP-GC from Tripoli (November 2000), by Hizballah from Jiyah beach south of Beirut (April 2001), and by the PFLP-GC from Tripoli (May 2001). Various weapons were found aboard the boat, including dozens of barrels filled with Katyusha rockets, antiaircraft (Strela) and antitank missiles, mortars, small arms, and ammunition.

16. On the early morning of 3 January 2002 the Israel Defense Forces seized a ship called Karine A, carrying 50 tons of weapons and ammunition for the Palestinian Authority. A naval commando force seized the ship's crew some 500 km off the Israeli coast. The ship was carrying a variety of weaponry, including short- and long-range katyusha rockets, antitank missiles (Low and Sagger), mortars, mines, explosives, sniper rifles, shotguns, and more.

17. A number of cases were uncovered, the most important ones being: In July 2002, a group of Israeli Arab drug dealers from Nazareth and Ghajar, who were suspected of transferring to hostile elements in Lebanon computer programs, maps, other objects, and classified intelligence documents in exchange for drugs and weapons. In September 2002, ten Israeli citizens, residents of the Galilee, were arrested on suspicion of providing intelligence to Hizbullah in exchange for drugs and money. The principal detainee was IDF Lt.-Col. Omar al-Hayeb from Beit Zarzir, who provided Hizballah with information on the deployment of IDF units in the area around the Shabaa Farms, maps of the North, information on Israeli military officers and Israeli military planning. Other cases included the 24 January 2003 arrest of a network of Hizballah agents which included Israeli drug dealers and Israeli Arabs and the arrest of Nissim Netser, an Israeli of Lebanese origin who procured intelligence material (maps, etc.) for Hizballah. Details from the Information Center for Intelligence and Terror in Gelilot.

18. Hussein Maqdad was a Hizballah operative who entered Israel with a foreign passport and was wounded in his hotel room in East Jerusalem while preparing a bomb in 1996.

19. Steven Smirk was a German citizen who converted to Islam and was recruited by Hizballah while in Lebanon. He was sent to Israel to perpetrate a suicide attack and arrested in November 1997.

20. On 5 January 2001, a British-Lebanese citizen named Jihad Shouman was arrested on suspicion that he was sent to Israel to perpetrate a terrorist attack on behalf of Hizballah. In his hotel room a large sum of money was found, along with a skullcap like that worn by religious Jews, a timer, and three cellular phones. Shuman was born in Sierra Leone of Lebanese parents but inherited British citizenship from his father. He was recruited to Hizballah during a visit to Lebanon. His recruitment and training were completed during visits to his handlers in Malaysia. Finally, he was sent to London to prepare for his visit to Israel. He was supposed to have dug up explosives, which were cached near Mt. Scopus in Jerusalem, but was arrested while attempting to find the cache, tried, sentenced, and jailed.

21. Fawzi Ayoub was arrested in Israel in June 2002. He entered Israel from a European country carrying a false American passport, and checked into a hotel in downtown Jerusalem. A number of days after arriving he traveled to Hebron, where he was arrested by the Palestinians. During his stay in Israel, he met with another activist who accompanied him and assisted him on his mission. The two were instructed by their operators abroad to retrieve weapons from a hiding place and use them to perpetrate an attack. Ayoub had been a member of the External Security apparatus of Imad Moghniya, Hassan Nassrallah's deputy for military affairs.

22. There is no doubt regarding the responsibility of Hizballah and Iran for the two Buenos Aires attacks. Yousuf Aljouni and Abu al-Foul, two of the Hizballah operatives who were involved in this attempt were arrested in Jordan for smuggling weapons to Palestinian terrorists in 2001. The suicide bomber in the AMIA attack was a member of Hizballah, Ibrahim Hussein Berri, who came to Argentina a few days before the attack and made farewell calls to his family in Lebanon before the attack. According to the information that has accumulated since then, the planning of both attacks in Buenos Aires was assigned to the “External Security” apparatus of Imad Moghniya. On the eve of the attack there was a steep increase in communication between the Iranian embassy in Buenos Aires and Tehran. The involvement of Hizballah in the attack on the US military base in Khobar (Saudi Arabia) reflected the same trend.

23. From discussions with a number of former senior Israeli intelligence officers.

24. Private communication with Maj. Gen. Yaacov Amidror.

25. Private communication with Shabtai Shavit.

26. A phenomenon which transpires from the Hizballah indoctrination documents found in southern Lebanon.

27. Operation Accountability (din ve-heshbon) took place from 25–31 July 1993. The concept behind the operation was to induce indirect deterrence through massive artillery, air, and naval fire around Lebanese civilian targets that would cause massive flight of Lebanese refugees to the north. Israeli bombing destroyed Lebanese infrastructure and civilian targets, such as major electricity stations and bridges. Accountability was the result of the Israeli understanding that direct deterrence would not yield results in the case of Hizballah, and hence the only option was to generate indirect deterrence through the host state, Lebanon. This, it was believed, could be achieved because economic damage due to destruction of Lebanese infrastructure would bring the international actors that were heavily invested in the reconstruction of Lebanon to prevent future outbreaks; mounting pressure of the refugees from the South who flooded Beirut would force the government to take action; and the Shiite population of the South would rebel against Hizballah for having brought about the Israeli reaction. It was clear, therefore, that targeting Hizballah targets alone would not achieve the goal and Israel had to run the tightrope between massive air and artillery attacks that would create an overwhelming refugee problem for the Lebanese government, on one hand, and, on the other hand, humanitarian consideration so as not to be seen as deliberately targeting civilian targets. The operation ended with a set of unwritten “understandings” brokered by the U.S. These stipulated that both sides would refrain from attacking civilians. Israel's hope that the destruction of infrastructure and the pressure of refugees would galvanize the Lebanese government into restraining Hizballah turned out to be unfounded. The “public opinion” of the refugees had little impact on the Lebanese government, and the latter had no real leverage over Hizballah. The understanding of Accountability resulted in Hizballah restraint in not targeting Israeli targets inside Israel, but effectively constrained Israeli deterrence by prohibiting Israel from retaliating against Hizballah in civilian areas. Thus Hizballah could, under the cover of the understandings, continue to attack Israeli military targets, while Israel had few Hizballah military targets at which to strike.

28. Operation Grapes of Wrath (Invei Za'am) began on 11 April 1996 and lasted 16 days. The goal of the operation was to cause increasing damage that would force large numbers of refugees to move to the North and put pressure on both the Hizballah leadership and the Lebanese government. The Israeli Air Force attacked rocket launchers, Hizballah installations, and personnel, as well as civilian infrastructure (houses, bridges, and the Beirut electric power stations), while the Israeli Navy blockaded the ports of Lebanon South of Beirut. Hizballah retaliated with massive rocket fire on Israeli population centers along the border. The military action was accompanied by intensive psychological warfare from both sides, urging the residents of south Lebanon and northern Israel to flee the area. An estimated 300,000 Lebanese fled north, and an estimated 30,000 Israelis fled from the Lebanese border to the south. The operation ended abruptly in the wake of a misfire of an Israeli artillery shell, which fell in the midst of a UN camp in Kafar Qana (18 April) that had taken in large numbers of refugees.

29. Interviews with Israeli policymakers and intelligence officers, Prof. Moshe Arens, former Heads of Mossad, Ephraim Halevy, General Danny Yatom, et alia.

30. A tactic that was referred to derisively by Nassrallah as the Israelis staying in their “cages.”

31. See Tishrin (Syria), 1–4 July 2001.

32. One interesting example was the accidental shelling of an elementary school in Arab Salim by SLA artillery, wounding twenty-four children, while Israeli and Syrian delegations were meeting at Shepherdstown. Such an event would have automatically brought a barrage of rockets on Northern Israel. In this case, Israel apologized and Hizballah announced that it would not retaliate. There is no doubt that Hizballah's restraint in this case was due to Syrian pressure.

33. Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (New York: 2004), p. 232–233.

34. The offer was made during the deliberations with the UN over demarcation of the border. Private communication.

35. Nasrallah himself admitted at one time that he had never had a personal, face-to-face meeting with Hafez al-Asad. al-Manar TV, June 10, 2001.

36. IDF spokesman. http://www1.idf.il/DOVER/site/mainpage.asp?sl=EN&id=7&docid=54350&Pos=1&last=0&bScope=False

37. This is a pre-Islamic (Jahili) term, which is a part of the Arab set of values transferred to Islam, and refers to male honor endowed upon one's family, tribe, and people.

38. He is described as effeminate and incapable.

39. Presented in a speech that Nassrallah gave in Bint Jubeil on 26 May 2000, after the Israeli withdrawal from the Security Zone.

40. Examples of the image of Israel as “confused”: Deputy SG of Hizballah, Naim Qassem after an Israeli APC was hit by a IED in Lebanon (17 October 1995): Israel will not retaliate because it is in a state of confusion; Hizballah analysis after a AT missile attack on 16 February 2001, al-Ahad, 23 February, 2001. al-Intiqad, 6 July 2001, in the wake of the attack in Matzuva (12 March 2002) al-Intiqad, 15 March, 2002, al-Intiqad, 29 March 2002.

41. al-Intiqad, 1 August 2003.

42. For example the mini-RPV that infiltrated Israeli airspace in November 2004.

43. Marvin Kalb, “The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006: The Media as a Weapon in Asymmetrical Conflict,” John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Faculty Research Working Paper Series, RWP07-012, February 2007, pp. 4–5.

44. During 2005 and 2006 there were a number of attempts by Hizballah to abduct Israeli soldiers on the border. These were disrupted until the successful attack in July 2006. Israeli Military Intelligence indicated in its annual assessment that Hizballah was not deterred from these attempts by the fear of Israeli retaliation and that one of the likely scenarios for escalation was success of such an attempt. Lecture by Brig. Gen (ret.) Yossef Kuperwasser at the International Institute for Counter–Terrorism (ICT) in Herzliya, Israel, 10 September 2006.

45. In a few cases when Palestinian organizations attempted to infiltrate the border without coordination with Hizballah, the latter took steps to prevent them, and clarified that the role of the Palestinians is to attack Israel from “inside” whereas the border with Lebanon is the prerogative of the “Lebanese Resistance” (i.e. Hizballah).

46. This opinion was voiced by a number of senior intelligence and military officers interviewed in the course of this study.