Ceding the Ideological Battlefield to Al Qaeda: The Absence of an Effective U.S. Information Warfare Strategy

Abstract

The Bush administration ceded the ideological battlefield to Al Qaeda and affiliates in its Global War on Terror when it failed to clearly enunciate that the terrorist threat to the United States was based on the Wahhabi–Salafi–Deobandi ideological axis. The failure to define the threat by non-state, ideologically driven, actors led to an incorrect approach or strategy that relied more on conventional, kinetic, measures with limited success. The new Obama administration has a window of opportunity to rectify this and to challenge the legitimacy of this ideology in a multipronged strategy of which strategic communication would constitute a critical component.

Notes

1. Bruce Riedel, “Al Qaeda Strikes Back,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2007, p. 24.

2. Information Warfare involves reliance and management of information in order to gain a competitive advantage over an adversary. Information warfare has many components including the use of Information Operations (dissemination of disinformation, information or propaganda in order to whittle away at the enemy and its support base and/or to demoralize them); methods to undermine, de-legitimize, or distort the quality of information accessed by the enemy. IW requires the collection of continuous, and accurate, information at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. It also involves denying the adversary information collection opportunities.

3. They are called the Islamiyun, within the Arab world.

4. In Arabic, muhharibun is plural for terrorists. The widespread, and ill advised, use of the term jihadists to describe these Salafist inspired Islamic muhharibun only serves to facilitate legitimizing the actions of these groups in the eyes of the Muslim populace at worst; at best, it insults mainstream Muslims who do not view the haram (forbidden) actions of these violent Salafist-driven groups as being those of “jihadists.”

5. One can use the terms “Small Scale Combat Operations” or (SSCOs) or Low Intensity Conflict, whatever the nomenclature de jure is; arguably the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan do not reach the threshold of a Major Theater War (MTW) a la a Soviet Union or a China land war scenario.

6. For more on the need to rethink US military doctrine see Huba Wass de Czege's “Rethinking IO: Complex Operations in the Information Age,” Military Review, November–December 2008, pp. 14–26.

7. In Islam, the term jihad connotes a “struggle or effort.” There are two types of jihad: jihad al kabir (greater struggle) or jihad Al saghir (lesser struggle or war). The greater jihad involves an inner struggle than must be waged by all devout Muslims to conquer one's sinful tendencies and to be a better human being. The lesser jihad involves a physical struggle against oppression of Muslims by non-believers or tyrants and/or to target the Dar al Harb (Land of War) where the unbelievers reside.

8. Doctrine which may or may not be valid from a religiously ethical viewpoint, be it Muslim, Christian or Jewish.

9. But it seems it was only clearly defined by Ibn Tamiyya several hundred years after the death of the Prophet Muhammad.

10. Robert Taber, War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare (New York: L. Stuart, 1965).

11. US Losing Media War to al-Qaeda,” BBC News, February 17, 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4725992.stm

12. Ibid.

13. Munafiq is Arabic for “hypocrit” while mushriq means “deviant.”

14. According to the Salafists-Muwahhidun-Deobandi ideology, the “near” enemy is illegitimate rulers in Muslim lands; while the “far” enemy comprises of the non-Muslim world, especially the United States and Western Europe.

15. For a special report on Al-Qaeda's Global Media Nexus see Daniel Kimmage's “The Al-Qaeda Media Nexus: The Virtual Network Behind the Global Message,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 2008, pp. 1–22, available at http://www.rferl.org/content/pressrelease/1105999.html

16. Eben Kaplan, “Terrorists and the Internet,” Council of Foreign Relations, January 8, 2009, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/10005.

17. William B. Scott, “Information Warfare Policies Called Critical to National Security,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, vol. 145 (October 28, 1996): 60.

18. Tom Regan, “Wars of the Future … Today,” Christian Science Monitor, 24 June 1999, p. A1. For more on Information Warfare see Robert Mandel, “Information Warfare,” Security, Strategy and the Quest for Bloodless War. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), pp. 125–154.

19. Jamal al-Fadl testimony, United States vs. Osama bin Laden et al, trial transcript, Day 2, 6 February, 2001. Steven Emerson, “Trying Usama in Absentia,” Middle East Quarterly, vol. viii, no. 2 (Spring 2001), available at http://www.meforum.org/32/trying-usama-bin-ladin-in-absentia

20. The 9-11 Commission Report, July 22, 2004, Chapter 5.1.

21. As-Sahab in Arabic means “the clouds.”

22. In Islam, a fatwa refers to a religious opinion on Islamic law issued by a Muslim learned scholar. In Sunni Islam, fatwas are non-binding; whereas for the Shia, fatwas issued by a Muslim scholar are binding or non-binding depending on the status of the scholar. This is an important distinction between the two Muslim sects.

23. Statement by the “World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders” [Nass Bayan al-Jabhah al-Islamiyah al-Alamiyah li-Jihad al-Yahud wa-al-Salibiyin], al-Quds al-Arabi, February 23, 1998, p. 3, available at http://www.library/cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/groups.htm (accessed August 13, 2009)

24. Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc (New York: The Free Press, 2001), p. 95.

25. Ibid, pp. 95–99.

26. Carol Rosenburg, “Ex-U.S. Jihadists Testify at Guantánamo Terror Trial,” Miami Herald, October 29, 2008, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation/story/747589.html

27. Ellen Knickmeyer and Jonathan Finer, “Insurgent Leader Al-Zarqawi Killed in Iraq,” Washington Post, June 8, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp_dyn/content/article/2006/06/08/AR2006060800114.html

28. Daniel Kimmage and Kathleen Ridolfo, “The War of Images and Ideas: How Sunni Insurgents in Iraq and their Supporters Worldwide are using the Media,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2007, available at http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1077316.html

29. The U.S. predator attack on Pakistani soil on January 13, 2006 was repeatedly denied by the Pakistanis and Americans as being a strike by the Pakistani—and not by the American—military, which had inevitably resulted in civilian casualties.

30. Isambard Wilkinson, “Cameraman Reveals Secrets of al-Qa'eda Propaganda War,” Telegraph.co.uk, June 23, 2006, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/1522103/Cameraman-reveals-secrets-of-al-Qaeda-propaganda-war.html

31. Ibid.

32. Bill Roggio, “Bajaur: An al Qaeda Command Center,” The Long War Journal, October 26, 2006, available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/10/bajaur_an_alqaeda_co.php

33. Habibullah Khan and Brian Ross, “US Strike Killed Al Qaeda Bomb Maker,” ABC NEWS, January 18, 2006, available at http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/investigation/story?id=1517986

34. Mark Stout, Jessica Huckabey, John Schindler and Jim Lacey, The Terrorist Perspectives Project: Strategic and Operational Views of Al Qaeda and Associated Movements (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008), p.184.

35. Charles Haviland, “Afghan Civilian Deaths Inflated,” BBC News, July 11, 2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6293356.stm

36. Ibid.

37. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p. 283.

38. The Terrorist Perspectives Project, p.167.

39. Eben Kaplan, “Terrorists and the Internet,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 12, 2006, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/10005/

40. Dan Murphy and Jill Carroll, “Al Qaeda Ramps up Its Propaganda,” Christian Science Monitor, July 16, 2007, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0716/p01s03-wome.html

41. Ibid.

42. Al Qaeda's “twisted narrative” seeks to distort perceptions of fellow Muslims and non-Muslims in order to attain its strategic objectives of forcing non-Muslims out of Muslim lands and then expanding the jihad to the Dar al Harb, land of War and the unbelievers.

43. For one viewpoint/assessment of the US's approach to the “war of ideas in the Muslim world,” see Sherifa Zuhur's “Precision in the Global War on Terror: Inciting Muslims through the War of Ideas,” U.S. Army War College (April 2008): 1–119.

44. Mark Stout, Jessica Huckabey, John Schindler and Jim Lacey, The Terrorist Perspectives Project: Strategic and Operational Views of Al Qaeda and Associated Movements (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008), pp. 145–146.

45. Arabic for “Anbar Awakening.”

46. For more on the Anbar Awakening see Bill Roggio, “Anbar Rising,” Long War Journal, May 11, 2007, available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/05/anbar_rising.php

47. This suicide attack with a garbage truck occurred on September 20, 2008 just before 8 p.m., killing 53 people and injuring hundreds.

48. The suicide attackers in the explosives laden truck not only targeted the hotel in the holiest month of Islam—Ramadan—but they timed it to coincide with iftar festivities—that characterize the end of devout Muslims dawn to dusk fasting to purify their souls and thank Allah for his blessings—when they struck just after sunset. Also, they would have known that the large, and popular, hotel would be hosting hundreds of Muslim diners—mostly families—in its restaurants. Thus, the casualties would not be infidels but mostly innocent, devout, Muslim women and children.

49. Some examples of media coverage that emphasized AQAM's narrative of “striking a Western target” notwithstanding evidence to the contrary include: Carlotta Gall, “Bombing at Hotel in Pakistan Kills at Least 40,” New York Times, September 21, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/world/asia/21islamabad.html; “Official: Hotel Blast Biggest Attack in 7 yrs for Pakistan,” CNN, September 21, 2008, available at http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/09/21/pakistan.islamabad.marriott.blast/index.html; Michael Rosenwald, “Bombing is Marriott's Biggest Loss In 81 Years,” Washington Post, September 21, 2008, A20, available at http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/20/AR2008092001913.html; Bill Roggio, “Bombing at Islamabad Marriott Latest in Complex Terror Attacks, Long War Journal, September 21, 2008, available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/09/bombing_at_islamabad.php; Henry Chu and Mubashir Zaidi, “Pakistan Shaken by Deadly Blast in Capital,” Los Angeles Times, September 21, 2008, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/21/world/fg-pakistan21

50. “Militants Claim Marriott Attack,” BBC News, September 22, 2008.

51. Live coverage broadcast in Urdu on Geo TV on September 20, 2008.

52. For more from the field on US military personnel's ad hoc approaches to IO see Dale Kuehl's “Inside the Surge: 1-5 Cavalry in Ameriyah,” Small Wars Journal, October 26, 2008, available at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/06/new-paradigms-for-21st-century/

53. CONUS is the acronym for “Continental United States,” and is widely used in U.S. military circles.

54. That would be ACM for Afghanistan and AQAM for Iraq, both often used interchangeably but still irritatingly cumbersome.

55. Alternatively, the term “Neo-Kharijite” could be used, as more Muslims understand the term Kharijite (the Khwarj) than understand the relatively academic term “Muharibun.”

56. David Kilcullen, an Australian seconded to the U.S. State Department and working as the Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to the MNF-Iraq Command, published an article in the Department of State's June 2007 edition of its eJournal titled “New Paradigm for the 21st Century Conflict,” in which he advocated the adoption by the U.S. of a new lexicon in reference to the insurgents in Iraq and elsewhere in which such terms as Muharibun, etc are to be used.

57. Max Boot, “No More Jihadists,” Commentary Magazine.com, April 25, 2008, available at http://www.commentarymagazine.com/blogs/index.phpl/boot/3562 (accessed August 13, 2009)

58. Ibid. There has been some work done on this already, such as “Choosing Words Carefully: Language to Help Fight Islamic Terrorism” by Dr. Douglas Streusand and LTC Harry Tunnell, National Defense University paper, May 23, 2006; while they quote several sources themselves, the remarkable fact is the extreme reluctance of various U.S. government entities to employ such linguistic weapons.

59. The terminology to describe propaganda efforts keep changing. The traditional term “propaganda” has unfairly come to be viewed in a negative light and in some circles is considered equivalent to a four lettered word and thus must not be uttered. It is hard to keep up with the latest nomenclature for “propaganda” which is indicative of the absence of any consistent strategy to defeat AQAM's IO offensive. Recent terms to define the realm of “propaganda” but—especially Western efforts at countering AQAM's narrative—have ranged from information operations to strategic communication to strategic messaging. Each one sounding further removed from what the intended objective of the phrase itself meant.

60. This virulent ideology is derivative from a minority Sunni school of jurisprudence (Hanbali fiqh) and has different—but similar—offshoots. The Hanbali fiqh inspired movements include the Wahhabi-Salafi-Deobandi axis.

61. See Scott Wilson and Al Kamen, “Global War on Terror” is Given New Name,” Washington Post, March 25, 2009, p. A04; Christian Brose, “The War on Terror, RIP,” Foreign Policy, March 24, 2009, available at http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/03/24/the_war_on_terror_rip; “War on Terror Rebranded as Overseas Contingency Operations,” Telegraph, March 25, 2009, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/5050429/war-on-terror-rebranded-as-overseas-contingency-operation.html

62. A step forward occurred on August 6, 2009 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington thinktank, when John Brennan, head of the White House homeland security office, told the audience that the U.S. was “at war with al Qaeda.” He continued: “We are at war with its [AQ] violent extremist allies who seek to carry on al Qaeda's murderous agenda … the fight against al Qaeda and other groups was a dynamic and evolving threat and should not be called a global war.” See Jon Ward and Eli Lake, “White House: ‘War on Terrorism’ is Over: ‘Jihadist’ and ‘Global War’ No Longer Acceptable Terms,” Washington Times, August 6, 2009, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/aug/06/white-house-war-terrorism-over/?feat=home_headlines (accessed August 13, 2009)

63. The Hanbali fiqh is one of the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence. It has the smallest number of Sunni adherents who are mostly concentrated in the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and UAE)

64. The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton, July 22, 2004), pp. 374–378.

65. Ummah is Arabic for (Muslim) “community.”

66. Even a generously funded global—USIA led—public diplomacy effort would cost pennies on the dollar in comparison to costly ongoing combat operations. It would offer a variety of educational, entertainment and informational opportunities that would expose target populations to American values.

67. The very fact that similar U.S. and Western centers of learning and culture have been targeted in the past and are highly likely to be targeted in the future by AQAM is indicative of the fact that they are high value targets because of their efficacy and AQAM recognize their positive impact on the same populace they seek to propagandize and recruit from.

68. Former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, James Glassman during his—albeit brief—tenure at the State Department emphasized—as part of “Public Diplomacy 2.0”—the need to encourage indirect engagement via social networking sites like Facebook between Americans and the Muslim world. Programs such as the Alliance of Youth Movements and Democratic Video Challenge were instituted as part of a larger “war of ideas” strategy against violent extremism.

69. Mark Mazzetti and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Intelligence Advisors See Failure in Fight with Al Qaeda in Pakistan,” New York Times July 18, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/18/world/americas/18iht-18intel.6707471.html, David Rivkin, Jr and Lawrence Korb, “Should Obama Continue Bush's War on Terrorism?” Los Angeles Times, December 12, 2008, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oew-rivkin-korb12-2008dec12,0,6960743.story

70. The National Security Strategy Report was issued on 20 September 2002. It replaced such Cold War concepts as “deterrence,” for a more pre-emptive strategy against hostile states and terrorist groups.

71. For more on the “Bush Doctrine,” see Robert G. Kaufman, In the Defense of the Bush Doctrine (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2007); see also Michael Abramowitz, “Many Versions of Bush Doctrine,” Washington Post, September 13, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/09/12/ST2008091203408.html