The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Model for Future International Collaboration

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The interviews and any related written communications conducted for this study were on a not-for-attribution basis. Therefore, insights and information included here gained solely through one or more of these interviews or personal communications are attributed simply to “interview(s)” or “personal communication(s).” Information included in this study is, to the extent possible, current as of June 15, 2009. This article is drawn from The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Model for Future International Collaboration (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2009). For an unabridged copy of this article, please see http://www.nipp.org/National%Institute%20Press/Current%20Publications/Currentpublications.html

Notes

1. For example, in the third Nixon–Kennedy Presidential Debate on October 13, 1960, then-Senator Kennedy said: “There are indications because of new inventions, that 10, 15, or 20 nations will have a nuclear capacity, including Red China, by the end of the Presidential office in 1964. This is extremely serious.” As quoted in JFK on Nuclear Weapons and Non-Proliferation (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 17, 2003).

2. India conducted its first acknowledged test of a nuclear weapon in May 1998. It tested a fission device in May 1974, but claimed that was a peaceful nuclear explosion.

3. The United States, United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China.

4. International Atomic Energy Agency, NPT Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: Overview of Status: Current Status as of 19 May 2009, available at www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/nptstatus_overview.html. The 26 nonadherents include: eight that have signed safeguards agreements, but not yet brought them into force (Andorra, Benin, Cape Verde, Gabon, Mauritania, Montenegro, Sierra Leone, and Togo); six that have not signed draft agreements approved by the IAEA Board of Governors (Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, and Timor-Leste); and twelve that have not submitted draft agreements to the Board of Governors (Angola, Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Micronesia, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, and Vanuatu.)

5. International Atomic Energy Agency, Strengthened Safeguards Systems: Status of Additional Protocols, available at www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html.

6. United Nations Office at Geneva, Disarmament: Membership of the Biological Weapons Convention, available at www.unog.ch. The signatories that have not ratified the BWC are: Burundi, Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Guyana, Haiti, Liberia, Malawi, Myanmar, Nepal, Somalia, Syria, and Tanzania. The nonmembers are: Andorra, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Guinea, Israel, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Niue, Samoa, and Tuvalu.

7. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Technical Secretariat, Note by the Technical Secretariat: Status of Participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention as at 21 May 2009, Office of the Legal Adviser, S/768/2009, May 27, 2009. The two states that have signed but not ratified are Israel and Myanmar. The five that have not signed or acceded are Angola, Egypt, North Korea, Somalia, and Syria.

8. Paul K. Kerr, “Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends,” CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008), p. 16.

9. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, “Director-General Addressed the 12th International Chemical Weapons Demilitarisation Conference,” OPCW News, 21/2009, May 27, 2009, available at www.opcw.org.

10. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

11. Kerr, p. 18.

12. Note by the President of the Security Council, United Nations Security Council, S/23500, January 31, 1992.

13. United Nations Security Council Resolution 825 (1993), May 11, 1993.

14. Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1994/64, November 4, 1994.

15. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “President Bush Addresses United Nations General Assembly,” September 23, 2003, available at georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003-09/20030923-4.html. The previous paragraph in the President's speech addressed PSI, reinforcing the link between the Initiative and the proposed UNSCR: “We're also improving our capability to interdict lethal materials in transit. Through our Proliferation Security Initiative, 11 nations are preparing to search planes and ships, trains and trucks carrying suspect cargo, and to seize weapons or missile shipments that raise proliferation concerns. These nations have agreed on a set of interdiction principles, consistent with legal—current legal authorities. And we're working to expand the Proliferation Security Initiative to other countries. We're determined to keep the world's most destructive weapons away from all our shores, and out of the hands of our common enemies.”

16. UNSCR 1696, July 31, 2006, referenced Chapter VII, but under Article 40 rather than a stronger one. Article 40 provides: “In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.”

17. UNSCR 1696, July 31, 2006; UNSCR 1737, December 27, 2006; UNSCR 1747, March 24, 2007; UNSCR 1803, March 3, 2008. The most recent resolution, UNSCR 1835, September 27, 2008, reaffirms—but does not add to—the earlier ones.

18. Article 41 provides: “The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communications, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”

19. International Atomic Energy Agency, Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General, GOV/2009/8, February 19, 2009, derestricted March 4, 2009.

20. International Atomic Energy Agency, Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General, GOV/2009/35, June 5, 2009, derestricted June 17, 2009.

21. United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2009/7, April 13, 2009.

22. United Nations Department of Public Information, News and Media Division, New York, Security Council Committee Determines Items, Designates Entities Subject to Measures Imposed in Resolution 1718 (2006), SC/9642, April 24, 2009.

23. Joe Lauria, “U.N. Panel Sets Sanctions on 3 North Korean Firms Over Rocket Launch,” The Wall Street Journal, April 24, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124062234518255419.html.

24. Colum Lynch, “U.S. Imposes Tough New Sanctions on North Korea,” The Washington Post, June 12, 2009, available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/12.

25. See discussion of the 2005 SUA Protocol in chapter 3 of this article.

26. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1874 (2009), S/RES/1874(2009), June 12, 2009.

27. The number of nuclear warheads left on Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Kazakhstani territory after the end of the Soviet Union in December 1991 was each larger than the estimated nuclear arsenals of China, France, and the United Kingdom combined.

28. The G-8 are: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States. Russia formally joined the group in 1997.

29. “Report on the G8 Global Partnership,” G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit, July 8, 2008.

30. In a February 2004 speech at the National Defense University, President Bush said: “… as a result of the G-8 Summit in 2002, we agreed to provide $ 20 billion over 10 years—half of it from the United States—to support such programs. We should expand this cooperation elsewhere in the world. We will retain [sic] WMD scientists and technicians in countries like Iraq and Libya. We will help nations end the use of weapons-grade uranium in research reactors. I urge more nations to contribute to these efforts. The nations of the world must do all we can to secure and eliminate nuclear and chemical and biological and radiological materials.” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD: Remarks by the President on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, Fort Lesley J. McNair—National Defense University, Washington, D.C.,” February 11, 2004.

31. G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit Leaders Declaration, July 8, 2008.

32. As quoted in White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by National Security Advisor Stephen J. Hadley. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by National Security Advisor Stephen J. Hadley at the Proliferation Security Initiative Fifth Anniversary Senior Level Meeting, Washington Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C., May 28, 2008, available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/05/print/20080528-3.html.

33. Deputy Director of National Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January to 31 December 2007, pp. 6–7.

34. Kerr, pp. 17–18.

35. Deputy Director of National Intelligence, p. 7.

36. Loc. cit.

37. Ibid., p. 8.

38. Loc. cit.

39. According to press reports, the unclassified strategy document is based on a classified September 2002 National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD). See, for example, The Washington Times, January 31, 2003.

40. White House Office of the Press Secretary, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002, p. 2.

41. Interview, June 2009. PCCs in the George W. Bush administration were the Assistant Secretary–level groups involving all concerned agencies on separate regional and functional national security issues. Most proliferation issues fell under a single Proliferation Strategy (later Counterproliferation Strategy) PCC; it was unusual for a separate PCC to be devoted to just one proliferation subject. There is no publicly available information as to whether the Obama administration has maintained a dedicated Assistant Secretary–level group (now called Interagency Policy Committee [IPC]) on interdiction.

42. The discussion here of the So San interdiction and its aftermath is based heavily on: Brian Knowlton, “Ship Allowed to Take North Korea SCUDS on to Yemeni Port: US Frees Freighter Carrying Missiles,” International Herald Tribune, December 12, 2003; Robert Marquand and Peter Force, “The Unprecedented Seizure Monday of a Ship Carrying North Korean Missiles Highlights US Preemption Doctrine,” December 12, 2002, available from www.csmonitor.com; and William Safire, “Bush's Stumble: The So San Affair,” The New York Times, December 19, 2002.

43. White House Spokesman Ari Fleischer, as quoted in Knowlton, op. cit.

44. As quoted in Marquand and Force.

45. The White House, President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President to the People of Poland, Wawel Royal Castle, Krakow, Poland, Office of the Press Secretary, May 31, available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/release/2003/05/print/20030531-3.html.

46. Interview, December 2008.

47. Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

48. Six of the eleven original PSI members are in the G-8 eight in the European Union and nine in NATO (the remaining two are close bilateral allies of the United States).

49. “Chairman's Statement at the First Meeting,” U.S. Department of State, available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/115302.htm

50. “Chairman's Statement at the Second Meeting,” loc. cit.

51. Loc. cit.

52. “Chairman's Conclusions at the Fourth Meeting” loc. cit.

53. Past participation data as reported in the concluding statements from the PSI plenary meetings, available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/115302.htm, and http://www.state.gov/t/isn/115495.htm. Current participation data available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/C27732.htm

54. Interview, May 2009.

55. Wade Boese, “Interdiction Initiative Successes Assessed,” Arms Control Today, vol. 38 (July/August 2008).

56. Kurt Achin, “South Korea Counters North's Nuclear Test by Joining Arms Interdiction Initiative,” VOA News, 26 May 2009. See also “South Korea Joins PSI, North Irate,” UPI.com, May 27, 2009, available at www.upi.com/Top_News/2009/05/27/S-Korea-joins-PSI-North-irate/UPI-37271243404462/

57. “Washington Declaration for Fifth Anniversary Senior-Level Meeting,” at U.S. Department of State, available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/115495.htm

58. “Chairman's Statement at the Fifth Meeting,” loc. cit.

59. See, for example, Mark J. Valencia, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Glass Half-Full,” Arms Control Today, vol. 37, no. 5, (June 2007).

60. Although the phrase “Core Group” is used here, neither the phrase nor the concept ever had official standing.

61. Personal communication, May 2009.

62. Interviews, December 2008.

63. “I propose that the work of the Proliferation Security Initiative be expanded to address more than shipments and transfers. Building on the tools we've developed to fight terrorists, we can take direct action against proliferation networks. We need greater cooperation not just among intelligence and military services, but in law enforcement, as well. PSI participants and other willing nations should use the Interpol and all other means to bring to justice those who traffic in deadly weapons, to shut down their laws, to seize their materials, to freeze their assets.” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD: Remarks by the President on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, Fort Lesley J. McNair–National Defense University, Washington, D.C.,” February 11, 2004.

64. “Chairman's Statement at the Fifth Meeting,” loc. cit.

65. Interviews, December 2008.

66. See list of the OEG meetings and workshops at U.S. Department of State, “Calendar of Events,” available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/C277001.htm

67. “Chairman's Conclusions at the Fourth Meeting,” loc. cit.

68. For lists of PSI exercises, see U.S. Department of State, available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27700.htm, and Government of Canada, available at http://www.proliferationsecurity.info/exercises.html

69. An Australian government fact sheet about Exercise PACIFIC PROTECTOR 06 is typical in its description of national participation, naming a few states but leaving the majority anonymous: “Twenty PSI countries attended the exercise and an additional 15 countries participated in a concurrent PSI outreach program. ADF [Australia Defence Forces] and Customs personnel and assets participated in the exercise, as well as personnel and assets from Japan, NZ [New Zealand], Singapore, UK, and the US.” Australian Government, Department of Defence, “Proliferation Security Initiative: Exercise Pacific Protector 06 Overview,” available at www.defence.gov.au/psi/expp06.htm.

70. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Remarks on the Second Anniversary of the Proliferation Security Initiative, Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Benjamin Franklin Room, Washington, DC, May 31, 2005, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/46951.htm.

71. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Proliferation Security Initiative, John Rood, Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Foreign Press Center Roundtable Briefing, Washington, DC, May 27, 2008, available at http://2002-2009-fpc.state.gov/105206.htm.

72. Interview, April 2009.

73. Boese, “Interdiction Initiative Successes Assessed.”

74. Interview, December 2008.

75. Robert G. Joseph, Countering WMD: The Libyan Experience, Fairfax, VA (National Institute Press), especially pp. 40–41. President George W. Bush gave the first official public description of the BBC China interdiction in his February 12, 2004 speech at NDU, previously cited.

76. Interview, December 2008.

77. Eben Kaplan, “Preventing Ballistic Surprises,” Council on Foreign Relations Daily Analysis, July 10, 2006.

78. Wade Boese, “Key U.S. Interdiction Initiative Claim Misrepresented,” Arms Control Today, vol. 35 (July–August 2005).

79. Interview, January 2009.

80. Personal Communication, February 2009.

81. Interviews, December 2008.

82. “Washington Declaration for Fifth Anniversary Senior-Level Meeting,” loc. cit.

83. See chapter 5 of this article for a fuller discussion of FATF history and activities.

84. International Maritime Organization, International Conference on the Revision of the SUA Treaties, Adoption of the Final Act and Any Instruments, Recommendations and Resolutions Resulting from the Work of the Conference: Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, LEG/CONF.15/21, November 1, 2005.

85. Summary of Status of Conventions as at 31 May 2009, available from http://www.imo.org.

86. Michael Kourteff, “Status of the Proliferation Security Initiative,” United States–Morocco International Transshipment Conference, Tangiers, Morocco, 20 to 22 May 2008, Day 1—Plenary, p. 3.

87. “ICAO Aviation Safety, Security and Facilitation Website,” http://www.icao/int/atb/avsec.

88. “Washington Declaration for Fifth Anniversary Senior-Level Meeting,” loc. cit.

89. “Chairman's Conclusions at the Fourth Meeting,” loc. cit.

90. The following states have flags of convenience: Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba (NL), Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda (UK), Burma, Cambodia, Canary Islands (Spain), Cayman Islands (UK), Cook Islands (NZ), Cyprus, German International Ship Register (GIS), Gibraltar (UK), Honduras, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands (US), Mauritius, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, St. Vincent, Sri Lanka, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.

91. U.S. Department of State, “Ship Boarding Agreements,” available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c277333.htm

92. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic, for immediate release, April 5, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered.html.

93. “It's… an easy task to be here in light of the President's speech on Sunday because he really did set the tone, and it allows me to be able to come here and to say a little bit more in detail about where the President seeks to go and what our objectives are over the coming years, but broadly within the framework that he set out.” Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, Deputy Secretary of State James B. Steinberg, Monday, April 6, 2009, Transcript by Federal News Service, Washington, D.C., available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/nppcon2009.

94. Ibid.

95. This development is discussed more fully later in this article.

96. Interview, June 2009.

97. United States Southern Command News Release, “34 Nations Meet in Miami To Discuss WMD Trafficking Prevention,” May 13, 2009.

98. Interview, June 2009.

99. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Press Secretary on the Republic of Korea's Endorsement of the Proliferation Security Initiative, May 26, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-by-the-Press-Secretary-on-the-Republic-of-Korea-Endorsement-of-the-Proliferation-Security-Initiative.

100. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Readout of the President's Call with Republic of Korea President Lee Myung-bak, May 25, 2009, available at www.whitehouse/gov/the_press_office/Readout-of-the-Presidents-Call-with-Republic-of-Korea-President-Lee-Myung-bak.

101. The members of the High-Level Panel were: Anand Panyarachun (Thailand, Chair); Robert Badinter (France); Joao Baena Soares (Brazil); Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway); Mary Chinery Hesse (Ghana); Gareth Evans (Australia); David Hannay (United Kingdom); Enrique Iglesias (Uruguay); Amre Moussa (Egypt); Satish Nambiar (India); Sadako Ogata (Japan); Yevgeny Primakov (Russia); Qian Qiqian (China); Salim Salim (Tanzania); Nafis Sadik (Pakistan); and Brent Scowcroft (United States).

102. United Nations, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2004, p. 45.

103. The Secretary-General, United Nations, “Keynote address to the Closing Plenary of the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security,” Madrid, March 10, 2005, available at http://summit.clubmadrid.org/keynotes/a-global-strategy-for-fighting-terrorism.html.

104. The Category A Bioterrorism Agents/Diseases are anthrax, botulism, plague, smallpox, tularemia, and viral hemorrhagic fevers. CDC defines Category A as “organisms that pose a risk to national security because they: can be easily disseminated or transmitted from person to person; result in high mortality rates and have the potential for major public health impact; might cause public panic and social disruption; and require special action for public health preparedness.” available at www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist-category.asp.

105. One former senior U.S. government official has identified shortfalls in partner capacity-building as an important area in which PSI has thus far failed to fulfill its promise. Interview, February 2009.

106. Committee on Strengthening and Expanding the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, Committee on International Security and Arms Control Policy and Global Affairs, National Academy of Sciences, Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction, Washington, DC (The National Academies Press), 2009, p. 70. This change was also recommended in Ashton B. Carter and Robert G. Joseph, Review Panel on Future Directions for Defense Threat Reduction Agency Missions and Capabilities to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction: Report, March 2008, available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18307/review_panel_on_future_directions_for_defense_threat_reduction_agency_capabilities_to_combat_weapons_of_mass_destruction.html.

107. Valencia, “The Proliferation Security Initiative.”

108. See list of OEG meetings and chairs at U.S. Department of State, “Calendar of Events.”

109. Interview, December 2008.

110. Section 1821(a), P.L. 100-53.

111. Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and South Africa.

112. Those states include: Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba (NL), Barbados, Bermuda (UK), Burma, Cambodia, Canary Islands (Spain), Cayman Islands (UK), Cook Islands (NZ), Cyprus, Germany, Gibraltar (UK), Honduras, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Netherlands Antilles, St. Vincent, Sri Lanka, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.

113. The other states that have brought the amended SUA (but not its protocol) into force are neither PSI participants nor major powers: Cook Islands, and Saint Kitts and Nevis. Source: Status of Conventions, 28 February 2009, at http://www.imo.org.

114. “Washington Declaration for 5th Anniversary Senior-Level Meeting,” in Appendix D.

115. Joel A. Doolin, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Cornerstone of a New International Norm,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2006, p. 12. Article 110 of UNCLOS specifies the conditions under which a warship or military aircraft may board a foreign ship on the high seas, as follows:

Article 110 Right of visit

1 Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, other than a ship entitled to complete immunity in accordance with articles 95 and 96, is not justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that:

1. the ship is engaged in piracy;

2. the ship is engaged in the slave trade;

3. the ship is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag State of the warship has jurisdiction under article 109;

4. the ship is without nationality; or

5. though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship. …

4 These provisions apply mutatis mutandis to military aircraft.

116. Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously recommended advice and consent to ratification in March 2004, the treaty has not yet come before the full Senate.

117. Doolin, “The Proliferation Security Initiative.”

118. Valencia, “The Proliferation Security Initiative.”

119. Text of UNSCR 1540.

120. Interview, December 2008.

121. Jean-Francois Rischard, “Global Issues Networks: Desperate Times Deserve Innovative Measures,” The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2002–03, vol. 26(1). The article is drawn from: J. F. Rischard, High Noon: 20 Global Problems, 20 Years to Solve Them (New York: Basic Books, 2002).

122. Rischard, p. 17.

123. Rischard lists the following global issues. He makes clear that the list is not necessarily definitive. Issues involving the global commons:

• Global warming

• Biodiversity and ecosystem losses

• Fisheries depletion

• Deforestation

• Water deficits

• Maritime safety and pollution

Issues whose size and urgency require a global commitment:

• Massive step-up in the fight against poverty

• Peacekeeping, conflict prevention, combating terrorism

• Education for all

• Global infections [sic] diseases

• Digital divide

• Natural disaster prevention and mitigation

Issues needing a global regulatory approach:

• Reinventing taxation for the twenty-first century

• Biotechnology rules

• Global financial architecture

• Illegal drugs

• Trade, investment, and competition rules

• Intellectual property rights

• E-commerce rules

• International labor and migration rules.

124. Rischard, p. 20.

125. Rischard, pp. 17–18.

126. Rischard, p. 24.

127. Rischard, pp. 29–31.

128. Interviews, February 2009, March 2009.

129. However, the discussion below on “Combating Biological Weapons Proliferation and Promoting Public Health” relates to one important category of disaster response: responding to naturally occurring epidemic disease as well as deliberate biological weapons attack.

130. Interview, April 2009.

131. Media Note, Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, July 25, 2006, U.S.–Russia Joint Fact Sheet on the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/69016.htm.

132. Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The IAEA attended the meeting as an observer.

133. Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, November 20, 2006, Statement of Principles for the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, available at www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/76358.htm.

134. Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, November 20, 2006, Terms of Reference for Implementation and Assessment, available at www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/76421.htm.

135. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Media Note: The 2009 Plenary Meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, The Hague, The Netherlands, 16–17 June 2009, PRN: 2009/592, June 15, 2009, available at www.state/gov/r/pa/prs/2009/06a/124723.htm.

136. The Plan of Work as of February 12, 2007 listed the following planned and recommended activities for 2007 and 2008:

• Australia—Asia-Pacific Seminar on Combating Nuclear Terrorism, May 2007

• Canada—Workshop on Securing Radioactive Sources, Spring 2008

• France—Workshop on Research and development of New Means of Detection of Nuclear Materials and Radioactive substances, end of 2008

• Germany—Workshop on the Functioning of a National Register of Highly Radioactive Sources, 3rd or 4th quarter 2007

• Japan—Expert Seminar on the Promotion of Accession to the International Counter-Terrorism Conventions and Protocols, March 2007

• Morocco—Regional Outreach Meeting for West African and Arabic Countries, 4th quarter 2007 or 1st quarter 2008

• Morocco—Workshop on Prevention of Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear or Radioactive Materials, 4th quarter 2007

• Morocco—Workshop on Emergency Response and Mitigation in Case of Malevolent Acts Involving Use of Radioactive Materials, 2nd quarter 2008

• Russia—Conference on Cooperation of Intelligence, Security and Law Enforcement Services in the Field of Detection, Prevention and Investigation of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 3rd quarter 2007

• Russia—Workshop on Best Practices to Ensure Security of Nuclear Materials within the Framework of the International Center on Uranium Enrichment, July-August 2007

• Turkey—Workshop on Information Sharing for Preventing Assistance to Nuclear Terrorism Activities, 4th quarter 2008

• United Kingdom—Workshop on Collaborative Measures to Combat Nuclear Smuggling, July 2007

• United States—Global Initiative Law Enforcement Conference, June 2007

• United States—Three Workshops on Development of a Global Nuclear Detection Architecture Guidelines Document, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd quarters 2007

• United States—Global Initiative Radiological Search Procedures and Training Workshop, 4th quarter 2007

• United States—Four Seminars on Global Initiative Nuclear Commodity Identification Training, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quarters 2007

• United States—Workshop on Remote Detection of Radiological Materials, 4th quarter 2007

• United States—Conference on Establishing a Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Information Portal, September 2007.

Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna, Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Plan of Work (as of 12 February 2007), available at www.rusmission.org/iaea/6.

137. Media Note, Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, April 15, 2008, Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Launches Exercise Planning Efforts, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/apr/103564.htm.

138. Fact Sheet, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, June 17, 2008, Fourth Meeting of the Global Initiative, Madrid, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/106194.htm.

139. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD: Remarks by the President on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, Fort Lesley J. McNair—National Defense University, Washington, D.C.,” February 11, 2004.

140. The contributors, in addition to NTI are: United States ($50 million); European Union ($32 million), United Arab Emirates ($10 million), Kuwait ($10 million), and Norway ($5 million). See Nuclear Threat Initiative, NTI/IAEA Fuel Bank Hits $100 Million Milestone: Kuwaiti Contribution Fulfills Buffett Monetary Condition, Thursday, March 5, 2009.

141. For a detailed discussion of the Russian proposal, see Anya Loukianova, Issue Brief: The International Uranium Enrichment Center at Angarsk: A Step Towards Assured Fuel Supply?, November 2008, available at www.nti.org/e_research/e3_93.html.

142. The White House, President George W. Bush, Office of the Press Secretary, Declaration on Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation: Joint Actions, July 3, 2007 at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/07/print/20070703.html

143. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Statement on U.S.–Russia 123 Agreement: Statement by Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Washington, DC, September 8, 2008, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/09/109256.htm.

144. Interview, March 2009.

145. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Joint Statement by President Dmitriy Medvedev of the Russian Federation and President Barack Obama of the United States of America, for immediate release, April 1, 2009, available at www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint-Statement-byPresident-Dmitriy-Medvedev-and-President-Barack-Obama-of-the-United-States-of-America/.

146. Mary Alice Hayward, Establishing the International Framework to Deter Development of Weapons Technology amidst the Global Nuclear Renaissance: Remarks at Exchange Monitor Conference, Washington, DC, December 3, 2008, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/112879.htm.

147. World Health Organization, Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response, available at www.who.int/csr/en/.

148. Center for Biosecurity, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, Global Disease Surveillance Response: Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN), available at www.upmc-biosecurity.org.

149. World Health Organization, Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network-GOARN: Partnership in Outbreak Response, no date.

150. Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (Geneva, November 19–December 7, 2001 and November 11–22, 2002), Final Document, BWC/CONF.V/17, Geneva, 2002, pp. 3–4.

151. Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (Geneva, November 20–December 8, 2006), Final Document, BWC/CONF.VI/6, Geneva, 2006, p. 19.

152. National Research Council of the National Academies, Committee on Prevention of Proliferation of Biological Weapons in States Beyond the Former Soviet Union, Office for Central Europe and Eurasia Development, Security, and Cooperation Policy and Global Affairs, Countering Biological Threats: Challenges for the Department of Defense's Nonproliferation Programs beyond the Former Soviet Union, (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press), 2009, p. 1.

153. Ibid., p. 129.

154. Admiral Michael G. Mullen, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, “Keynote Address: A Global Network of Nations for a Free and Secure Maritime Commons,” in John B. Hattendorf, ed., Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium: Report of the Proceedings, 19–23 September 2005, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 2006, p. 6 and passim.

155. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The National Strategy for Maritime Security, September 2005, p. 14.

156. U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Coast Guard, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, October 2007.

157. Admiral Michael G. Mullen, Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy, The U.S. Navy Beyond Iraq—Sea Power for a New Era, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, April 3, 2007, pp. 10–11.

158. Initiative on Security and Globalization Effects, Naval Postgraduate School, Global Maritime Partnerships (GMP), available at www.sagecenter.net/node/9.

159. Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, and the United States.

160. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Anti-Smuggling Conference—Final Communiqué (16/03/2009), available at www.fco.gov.uk/en/newsroom/latest-news.

161. U.S. Department of State, Media Note, Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC, U.S.-Israel Sign Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Prevention of the Supply of Arms and Related Materials to Terrorist Groups, January 16, 2009, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/01/115022.htm.

162. “Text of U.S.–Israel Agreement To End Gaza Arms Smuggling,” Haaretz Service, 17 January 2009, available at http://www.haaretz.com.

163. Kim McLaughlin, “Ways To Stop Gaza Arms Smuggling Aired at Meeting,” Reuters, 5 February 2009, available at www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L5794298.htm.

164. Personal communication, June 2009.

165. Financial Action Task Force, FATF Membership Policy, February 2008, available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org

166. Financial Action Task Force, NCCT Initiative, available at www.fatf-gafi.org.

167. Financial Action Task Force, FATF-XX Events under the Brazilian Presidency, 1 July 2008–30 June 2009 (as at January 2009), available at www.fatf-gafi.org.

168. The “Special Recommendations … commit members to:

• Take immediate steps to ratify and implement the relevant United Nations instruments.

• Criminalize the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist organizations.

• Freeze and confiscate terrorist assets.

• Report suspicious transactions linked to terrorism.

• Provide the widest possible range of assistance to other countries' law enforcement and regulatory authorities for terrorist financing investigations.

• Impose anti-money laundering requirements on alternative remittance systems.

• Strengthen customer identification measures in international and domestic wire transfers.

• Ensure that entities, in particular non-profit organizations, cannot be misused to finance terrorism.”

Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, “FATF Cracks Down on Terrorist Financing,” Washington, October 31, 2001, FATF Press Releases, available at www.fatf-gafi.org.

169. Loc. cit.

170. Financial Action Task Force, Proliferation Financing Report, June 18, 2008, available at www.fatf-gafi.org. Project team members were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United Nations, and United States.

171. The bulk of the June 2007 guidance concerned not the study of potential counterproliferation measures, but implementation of the financial sanctions and prohibitions in UNSCRs 1718, 1737, and 1747 on Iran and North Korea. Still, it took the FATF several months to develop the guidance on UNSCRs 1718 and 1737, both of which passed in 2007. The FATF issued further guidance on the financial prohibitions of UNSCR 1737 in October 2007. Financial Action Task Force, Guidance Regarding the Implementation of Financial Provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolutions to Counter the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, June 29, 2007; and Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Guidance Regarding the Implementation of Activity-Based Financial Prohibitions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737, October 12, 2007; both available at www.fatf-gafi.org.

172. Ibid., pp. 47–48.

173. Ibid., pp. 47–50.

174. Financial Action Task Force, FATF Revised Mandate 2008–2012, April 12, 2008, available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org.

175. See chapter one of this article, section on “United Nations and WMD proliferation,” for a discussion of UNSCR 1803, and the other UNSC Resolutions against Iran's nuclear program.

176. Thus, FATF work against terrorist finance merits very high scores on all four of Rischard's criteria for global issues network success: speed; redefining legitimacy on a global scale; diversity; and compatibility with traditional institutions. But its work thus far against proliferation has earned low scores.

177. World Association of Nuclear Operators, Key Events in WANO's History, available at www.wano.org.uk.

178. World Association of Nuclear Operators, WANO Review 2007, p. 16.

179. The ordinary members are from: Argentina, Armenia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Cuba, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Lithuania, Mexico, Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States.

180. World Association of Nuclear Operators, WANO Review 2007, p. 17.

181. Ibid., p. 6; and John Ales, World Association of Nuclear Operators: ATOMCON, Moscow 2008, Slide 10.

182. World Association of Nuclear Operators, WANO Review 2007, p. 8.

183. Ibid., p. 11.

184. Ibid., p. 12.

185. For safety and reliability data, see World Association of Nuclear Operators, WANO Review 2007, and Ales, World Association of Nuclear Operators.

186. Perhaps at least in part because of its complex organization, WANO would win low marks for Rischard's “speed” criterion at its inception, but now responds quickly when nuclear power plant management or operation issues arise. Within its very specific community, WANO also merits high scores for diversity, redefining global legitimacy, and compatibility with traditional institutions. Although it may seem inappropriate to describe as diverse an organization composed exclusively of nuclear power plant operators, WANO's membership covers the full range of plant designs and completely diverse, sometimes antithetical, political systems.

187. World Institute for Nuclear Security, The World Institute for Nuclear Security: Frequently Asked Questions, available at www.wins.org/faq.htm.

188. Ibid.

189. Ibid.

190. Ibid.

191. World Institute for Nuclear Security, Members' Code of Conduct and Confidentiality, available at www.wins.org/doc/pdf/WINS_code_of_conduct.pdf.

192. In the interim, WINS merits a failing grade for Rischard's speed criterion and, consequently, a near zero for his three other criteria.