Conventional Missions for China's Second Artillery Corps

Abstract

China's traditionally nuclear missile force has added a conventional force component with an inventory of over 1,000 short-range ballistic missiles and an emerging class of theater ballistic and ground-launched cruise missiles. This growing conventional missile force provides Beijing an operational-tactical and strategic capability in theater without the political and practical constraints associated with nuclear-armed missiles. China's emerging inventory of conventional antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) affords its military an extra employment option enhancing its layered defense posture against potential offshore threats beyond Taiwan. The military's conventional missiles, operational doctrine, and threat perceptions create conditions for China's escalation to conventional missile attacks against U.S. or allied forces and bases in Asia, including ASBM strikes against U.S. Navy aircraft carriers in any hypothetical China–Taiwan conflict. China's senior leaders would be more likely to authorize such strikes if they endorse the missile force's perceptions of a severe threat to its operations from potential U.S. electronic warfare-based information operations and joint firepower attacks.

Acknowledgments

The viewpoints and opinions expressed in this article reflect solely the author's personal views and do not represent the views of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. government agency.

Notes

1. According to Richard Fisher, a “source” told him that the first Second Artillery Corps conventional missile brigade, the 815th Regiment (Brigade) “was formed sometime in 1994” and “is subordinate to the 52nd Base located near Tunxi or Huangshan in Anhui Province.” See Richard D. Fisher, “China's Missiles Over the Taiwan Strait: A Political and Military Assessment,” in James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs, eds., Crisis in the Taiwan Strait (Washington, DC: National Defense University with American Enterprise Institute, 1997), 169. For additional early references to this unit, claiming it is located in Leping, Jianxi Province, see Dennis Engbarth, “Military Sources on Launches,” South China Morning Post, July 23, 1995, pp. 1, 6, OSC HK2307071095; and Hisahsi Fujii, “Facts Concerning China's Nuclear Forces, 2nd Artillery Corps and 09 Submarine Fleet,” Funji Kenkyu, November 1995, in FBIS-CHI-96-036, February 22, 1996, p. 35.

2. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, August 16, 2010), 66. Available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf. For the purpose of this article, the author includes the two SRBM brigades in the PLA ground force and the associated weapons and equipment inventory as a factor in assessing Second Artillery missions, even though these units are subordinate to PLA ground force commands.

3. See Mark Stokes and Ian Easton, Evolving Aerospace Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region: Implications for Stability in the Taiwan Strait and Beyond (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, May 27, 2010), 15.

4. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010, 66.

5. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2008), 2. Available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/china.html.

6. See Richard Fisher, Jr., “New Chinese Missiles Target the Greater Asian Region,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, July 24, 2007, available at http://strategy.center.net, publisher ID 165.

7. See “DF-11/M-1 (CSS-7) Short Range Ballistic Missile” data sheet, China's Defence Today, available at sinodefense.com.

8. David A. Shlapak et al., A Question of Balance: Political Context and Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Dispute (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, MG888, 2009), xv.

9. See the data sheet for “Land-Attack Cruise Missile (LACM),” last updated on May 7, 2007, available at sinodefence.com.

10. Wendell Minnick, “China Tests New Land-Attack Cruise Missile,” Defense News, September 21, 2004; Richard Fisher, “China New Strategic Cruise Missiles: From the Land, Sea, and Air,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, June 3, 2005, available at http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.71/pub_detail.asp.

11. Stokes and Easton, Evolving Aerospace Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region, 14–15.

12. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008, 24, 56.

13. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010, 2.

14. See “DF-21C/DF-25 Conventional Medium Range Ballistic Missile” data sheet, China's Defence Today, November 2008, available at sinodefence.com.

15. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010, 2; Fisher, “New Chinese Missiles Target the Greater Asian Region”; and Ted Parsons, “China Develops Anti-Ship Missile,” Jane's Defence Weekly, January 25, 2006.

16. See Jeffrey Lewis, “DF-21 Delta aka CSS-5 Mod4,” October 14, 2008, available at ArmControlWonk.com.

17. See Qiu Weizhen and Long Haiyan, “A Discussion about the Development of Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (Combat Scenario),” Modern Ships B, January 2007.

18. See Stokes and Easton, Evolving Aerospace Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region, 13.

19. Admiral Robert Willard, Commander, Pacific Command, March 2010 Testimony to Congress, available as Appendix B, in Ronald O’Rourke, Chinese Naval Modernization: Implications for the U.S. Navy, Background and Issues for Congress (Congressional Research Service, RL33153, April 9, 2010).

20. For China's assessed inventory of nuclear delivery systems, see the table on p. 66, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010. For analysis of China's nuclear force trends and developments, see pp. 34–35.

21. See for example, Will Young, “The DF-11 Strategic Ballistic Missile Guide,” Chinese Military Chronicles, August 13, 2000, available at www.plamilitary.com/armytable.html.

22. See “B611 Tactical Short-Range Ballistic Missile” data sheet, China's Defence Today, available at sinodefense.com.

23. For more on this shift in ballistic missile development priorities, see Mark A. Stokes, “The People's Liberation Army and China's Space and Missile Development: Lessons from the Past and Prospects for the Future,” in Laurie Burkitt, Andrew Scobell, and Larry M. Wortzel, eds., The Lessons of History: The Chinese People's Liberation Army at 75 (Carlisle, PA: Army War College, 2003), 211–12. The original source of this shift is described in John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, “China's Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, and Goals,” International Security, vol. 17, no. 2 (Fall 1992): 28.

24. See General Li Jijun (retired), Military Theory and War Practice (Beijing: Military Studies Dictionary, 1994), 149–57.

25. For an excellent analysis of the PLA's assessment of the combat situation between China and the former Soviet Union, and its implications for PLA force planning, see the unpublished manuscript by Dr. Bi Jianxiang, “Unlimited Means and Limited Targets: PLA Operations 1985–2000,” Carleton University. While retrospective analysis of Chinese force planning in this period is limited by the availability of original sources, this manuscript provides a solid rationale for China's developing precision-guided weapons, including SRBMs, for domestic PLA consumption rather than export purposes.

26. Huang Xuejun, ed., “Opinions on the Tactics Development of our Army in 2000,” 89–94 in Hao (first name unknown), ed., New Explorations of Tactics Development, vol. 1 (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1988), quoted in Bi, “Unlimited Means and Limited Targets,” 10.

27. Gao Rui, Academy of Military Science, “View on Tactics Development and Research,” 5–10 in Hao, ed., New Explorations of Tactics Development, quoted in Bi, “Unlimited Means and Limited Targets,” 9.

28. See Huang Hanbiao, “Explorations of Total Deep, Three-Dimensional Offensive Tactics,” 251–53 in Hao, ed., New Explorations of Tactics Development, quoted in Bi, “Unlimited Means and Limited Targets,” 10.

29. “Statement by Richard P. Lawless,” Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, Asia-Pacific, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, April 23, 2004. For an alternative assessment of the utility of this force and the threat it poses to Taiwan, see Yitzhak Shichor, “Missile Myths: China's Threat to Taiwan in Comparative Perspective,” Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies (CAPS), CAPS Papers, no. 45, August 2008.

30. See Stokes and Easton, Evolving Aerospace Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region, 11–12.

31. For an overview of these two shows of force, see Fisher, “China's Missiles over the Taiwan Strait,” 167.

32. Section Four, “Second Artillery Force,” Fundamental Artillery Tactics (Changsha: National Defense Technology University, February 2001), 295; see also General Zhang Wannian, “Using Deterrence to Defend National Security,” in Contemporary World Military Affairs and China's National Defense (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, December 1999), chapter four, section III.

33. See Toshi Yoshihara, “Chinese Missile Strategy and the U.S. Naval Presence in Japan: An Operational View From Beijing,” Naval War College Review, vol. 63, no. 3 (Summer 2010): 57, fn. 64.

34. Yao Gangning, Teaching Materials on Tactics for Combined Armed Offensive Attacks (Beijing: Academy of Military Science, May 2000).

35. Li Yuankai, chief editor, High Technology and Modern Warfare (Beijing: Military Art and Literature Press, 1998), OSC CPP20061220320004.

36. Academy of Military Science, Strategic Research Department, Science of Strategy (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2000), 347.

37. Hu Limin and Ying Fucheng, Study on Joint Firepower Warfare Theory (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2004).

38. To the best of the author's knowledge, neither the Second Artillery Corps nor any other PLA institution has published any open source reports containing analysis of this short war yet. In a PRC-owned Hong Kong economic journal, a former Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs official cited U.S. reports of Russia's forward deploying SS-21 SRBMs to positions ranging most of Georgia. See Jin Guihua, “Commenting on the War Between Russia and Georgia,” Ching Chi Tao Pao, no. 3084, August 25, 2008, pp. 32–33, OSC CPP20080827710001. Most Chinese press commentary on the Russia–Georgia conflict has focused on the relative threat posed by Russia's incursion into South Ossetia and other parts of Georgia as compared to potential U.S. missile defense deployments in Eastern Europe, the impact of this conflict on global and regional security, and the implications for Russia's military development. There is no publicly available evidence of PLA or Second Artillery Corps analysis of this case of SRBM use in short conflict. Nonetheless, the author is confident that such analysis is being conducted, based on China's analysis of various case studies of the use of missiles in modern warfare, including the case studies cited earlier. For an assessment of the political and diplomatic aspects of China's position on this conflict, see Zhu Feng, “Russia-Georgia Military Conflict: Testing China's Responsibility,” feature essay in CSIS Freeman Report, November 2008. Zhu is a professor and deputy director of Beijing University's Center for International and Strategic Studies.

39. Yu Jixun, ed., People's Liberation Army Second Artillery Corps, The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, March 2004), 29.

40. Zhou Xin and Zou Hanbing, “Issues of Second Artillery Coordination in Joint Operations,” Military Art Journal, no. 7 (July 2004): 71–74.

41. Yu, ed., Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, 69.

42. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008, 29.

43. See “Second Artillery Conventional Missile Strike Campaign,” chapter 12 in Yu, ed., Science of Second Artillery Campaigns.

44. Liu Xiaodu and Wang Xuezhong, “Reporter's Interview with Missile Brigade Commander Xie ‘Charging to Control the High Ground of Training,’” Huojianbing Bao [Rocket Forces News], October 6, 2001. Rocket Forces News is an official newspaper published by the Second Artillery's Political Department.

45. Li, chief editor, High Technology and Modern Warfare.

46. “Second Artillery Campaigns,” chapter 14 in Huang Bin, Science of Campaigns (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1999); Wang Houqing et al., On Military Campaigns (Beijing: National Defense University Press, May 2000); Yu, ed., Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, introduction and part 6, chapter 31; “Campaigns of the Second Artillery,” in Zhang Yulang, chief editor, The Science of Campaigns (Beijing: National Defense University Press, May 2006), 616– 28.

47. Zhao Xijun, ed., Coercive Deterrence Warfare: A Comprehensive Discussion of Missile Deterrence (Beijing: National Defense University Press, May 2005).

48. “Psychological Fire Support,” chapter 12, section 1 in Modern Firepower Warfare (Changsha: National Defense Science and Technology University, 2000).

49. Ibid.

50. Hu and Ying, Study on Joint Firepower Warfare Theory; Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, Science of Strategy (Zhanlue Xue) (Beijing: Strategic Research Department, Military Science Press, 2001), especially 182, 187, 347, and 407.

51. Peng and Yao, Science of Strategy 182.

52. Modern Firepower Warfare, in particular, chapter 12, “Special Fire Support,” section 1, “Psychological Fire Support.”

53. Modern Firepower Warfare.

54. Hu and Ying, Study on Joint Firepower Warfare Theory, chapter 7, section 1, “U.S. Military's ‘Surgical’-Style Joint Firepower Strikes Against Libya,” 289–94.

55. See Yu, ed., Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, chapter 12; Science of Campaigns, 1999, 2001, and 2006 versions; Fundamental Artillery Tactics; Modern Firepower Warfare; “Operational Command of Conventional Missile Forces,” and “Conventional Missile Strike Campaign,” in Chinese Military Encyclopedia, supplemental volume (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2002), p. 25; National Defense University, Campaign Theory Study Guide (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2003); Wang Xiadong and Sun Shihong, “Operational Employment of Second Artillery in Joint Firepower Strikes,” Military Art Journal (July 2004): 67–70.

56. Lu Xiangdong and Huang Wei, “Conventional Missile Strike Campaign,” in Fu Quanyou, chief editor, Chinese Military Encyclopedia, supplemental volume, p. 26.

57. See National Defense University, Campaign Theory Study Guide, question 52.

58. See Yao, Teaching Materials on Tactics. See also Liu Xinli, “Missile Strike Groups Should Be the Basis for Coordinating the Organization of Initial Comprehensive Fire Power Strike,” Military Art Journal, no. 4 (April 2003): 72–75.

59. See Li, ed., High Technology and Missile Warfare; and Fundamental Artillery Tactics.

60. The elements of the Second Artillery's perceived threat environment, for the most part, have been extracted from various sections of the Second Artillery's Science of Second Artillery Campaigns. These threat perceptions are corroborated in other documents or statements authored by the Second Artillery Headquarters or its subordinate organizations as well as individual Second Artillery officials. The author will not list all of these additional sources for lack of space. For a specific reference to the battlespace including six spectrums, see Yu, ed., Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, 64.

61. Ibid. For various references in this publication to the need to prepare to cope with nuclear intimidation during a conventional missile strike campaign, see pp. 27, 50, 73, 104, 126, 127, 168, 220, and 227. There are additional references in other PLA and Second Artillery books and journal articles.

62. Ibid. For references in this document to the enemy's reconnaissance and surveillance prowess against Chinese deployed missile forces, see pp. 52–58, 63, 70, 78, 242, 260, and 285.

63. Ibid., 242. For an additional source that identifies enemy reconnaissance operations as the Corps’ primary threat, see Wang Xueping and Huang Hei, “The Main Forms of Diversifield Security Threat,” Xuexi Shibao (Study Times), March 31, 2008, OSC CP20080409622003.

64. Yu, ed., Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, 64. For an additional source that identifies the electromagnetic threat as the second most important threats to the Corps operations, including the use of non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse bombs, see Wang and Huang, “Main Forms of Diversifield Security Threat.”

65. Yu, ed., Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, 287.

66. Specific references to a ground-based threat to land-based offensive missile force operations can be found in ibid., 92, 264, 113, 188, and 193–95 (chapter 9, section II-C). Additional examples of the Corp's perception of ground-based threat include Xi Yong, “Kan Zhen: ‘Chief Executive Officer’ of Remote Mountain Networks,” Huojianbing Bao (Rocket Forces News), August 26, 2006, p. 3; Liu Ling and Han Haifeng, “Attach Importance to Theory Research, Improve Management and Facilities, Intensify Real-Combat Drills—A Certain Base Coordinates Overall Planning for Missile Site Security Defense Construction,” Huojianbing Bao (Rocket Forces News), September 9, 2006, p. 2; Sang Linfeng, Shi Ziqiang, and Feng Jinyuan, “Building Strong Shield in Defense Forest—Sidelights of a Unit's Missile Site Survival and Defense Exercise,” Huojianbing Bao (Rocket Forces News), September 13, 2006, p. 2.

67. For recent Chinese commentary on U.S. and allied missile defense developments in the Asia-Pacific region, see “CCTV-7 Defense Review Week Discusses Purpose of Japan's Missile Defense System,” CCTV-7, November 29, 2008, OSC CPP20081201338002.

68. According to the Missile Defense Agency, a U.S. high-powered airborne laser weapon successfully destroyed a boosting liquid-fueled short-range ballistic missile in a test in February 2010. However, the Obama Administration, including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, has robustly argued for the termination of Airborne Laser program of record. In May 2010, the House Armed Services Committee added $362 million to the Obama Administration's 2011 defense authorization bill for missile defense, including $50 million for further tests of Boeing Corporation's Airborne Laser. See Jim Wolfe and David Alexander, “U.S. Successfully Tests Airborne Laser on Missile,” Reuters, February 12, 2010; and Greg Grant, “HASC Keeps Airborne Laser Alive,” May 12, 2010, available at http://www.dodbuzz.com/2010/05/12/hasc-keeps-airborne-laser-alive.

69. References to the enemy's target sets and the relative ranking of these sets can be found in Yu, ed., Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, 42, 47, 49, 70, 77–79, 93, 103, 124–26, 153–54, 161, 187, 238, 241, 260, 279, 287, and 297.

70. In researching and analyzing Second Artillery Corps doctrine and threat perceptions to complete this section, the author was unable to corroborate the “finding” of research recently completed by a RAND Corporation expert that the “development of conventional missile doctrine” in the Second Artillery Corps “is in a nascent stage and thus potentially incomplete.” In contrast, the author believes the Corps has a well-developed and thought-through doctrine for missile force operations that is directly related to an in-depth understanding of the threat posed to these operations—albeit threat perceptions that tend to exaggerate the intent of potential adversaries to attack Corps operations in crisis or wartime. The RAND expert's finding is apparently based on references in PLA literature to the lack of a “basic system of military theory” for conventional missile operations. The author suspects these references differentiate, as the PLA does, between “basic” and “applied” military theory or doctrine. If so, the present author assesses that Second Artillery Corps applied theory is robust, as evidenced by Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, whereas the Corps is probably still converting this applied theory into “basic systems of military theory” that would serve as “universal laws” for understanding missile warfare and missile force operations. For a detailed argument that Second Artillery Corps conventional missile doctrine is nascent, see Evan S. Medeiros, “Minding the Gap: Assessing the Trajectory of the PLA's Second Artillery,” in Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell, eds., Right Sizing the People's Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China's Military (Carlisle, PA: Army War College, 2007), 165–69.

71. Yu, ed., Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, 91.

72. Ibid., 76. For additional information on the Second Artillery Corps’ emphasis on maneuvering operations (jidong, which can also be translated as mobility, depending on the context), and the infrastructure support required for a maneuver strategy, see Sun Xianfu, Xia Hongqing, and Xu Yeqing, “Make the Main Artery to the Battlefield Smoother—On the Spot Report on Improvement of Diversified Support Capability of the Military Traffic System of the PLA Second Artillery Corps,” Liberation Army Daily, August 15, 2008, OSC CPP20080815710010; and Yang Ping, Bi Yiming, and Li Yanling (Second Artillery Engineering Institute, Xi'an), “Research on the System Architecture of the Decision Making System for Missile Maneuver Plan Based on Multi-Agent,” Junshi Yunchou Yu Xitong Gongcheng (Military Operations Research and Systems Engineering) (December 2006), pp. 15–19.

73. Yu, ed., Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, 182, 196, 265, 303, 309, and 311. Additional Second Artillery Corps’ references to night operations, using darkness or poor weather, or exploiting gaps in the enemy's satellite reconnaissance coverage include: Huang Chao, “Troops Exercise in Complex Electromagnetic Battle Environment,” Liberation Army Daily, January 10, 2007, OSC CPP20070111715039; “Second Artillery Corps Improves Night Launch Operations,” CCTV-7, January 9, 2008, OSC CPP20080130035001; and Liu Yang et al., “SAF Unit Busy With Training in Winter,” Liberation Army Daily, December 19, 2008, OSC CPP20081219702011.

74. Yu, ed., Science of Second Artillery Campaigns.

75. Open Source Center, Yang Yonggang, Xu Ruibin, and Feng Jinyuan, “Thick Smoke on the Drill Ground…Notes from the Rapid Maneuver Operation Drills of a Base in the Second Artillery,” Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), July 4, 2010, OSC CPP20100705708006.

76. Yu, ed., “The Main Operational Activities in the Second Artillery Conventional Missile Strike Campaign,” Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, chapter 12, section 3, 263–70.

77. For references to the need to integrate and coordination conventional and nuclear operations during a conventional missile strike campaign, see Yu, ed., Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, 48–49, 73, 99, and 168.

78. Ibid., 170.

79. Ibid., 127.

80. The quotations in this sentence and the one before it are from ibid., 232.

81. See Information Office of the State Council, China's National Defense in 2004, Xinhua, December 27, 2004, available at chinadaily.cn/china/2004-12/28/content_536119.htm; Information Office of the State Council, China's National Defense in 2006, Xinhua, December 29, 2006, available at www2.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006…/content_771191.htm; and Li Qisheng, “Effectively Raise Fighting Capability of Basic Firepower Unit,” Huojianbing Bao (Rocket Forces News), April 23, 2008.

82. Chen Haijun, Kang Fashun, and Liu Guiyang, “Second Artillery Held Training Session for Implementing the Outline for Military Training and Evaluation,” Huojianbing Bao (Rocket Forces News), September 19, 2008. For a reference to the Corps using online simulators in training, see Xia Hongqing and Zhang Rong, “Missile Defense and Offense on Monitors,” Liberation Army Daily, April 14, 2008, OSC CPP20080414710007.

83. Michael Chase, “China's Second Artillery Corps: New Trends in Force Modernization, Doctrine, and Training,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, vol. 6, no. 25 (December 19, 2006).

84. Qiu Jialiang and Kang Fashun, “Second Artillery Units Grasped Military Training in a Big Way in 2006: A Review,” Huojianbing Bao (Rocket Forces News), December 27, 2006. For illustrative examples of the Corps’ emphasis on training in a CEME, see Wei Buhong, “Merge Complex Electromagnetic Environments into Training,” Huojianbing Bao (Rocket Forces News), December 2, 2008; “Summary: PLA SAC Brigade Uses EM Counter-Interference, Network Switch in Drill,” Liberation Army Daily, February 18, 2009, OSC CPP20090223088001; and Li Honglin, Yu Juncheng, and Ma Zhongpo, “Set a Combat Field in the Gobi: Train Troops in the Autumn in Desert,” Huojianbing Bao (Rocket Forces News), October 11, 2008.

85. Ouyang Xiaohua and Liu Xiaodu, “Base Uses Preparation for Military Struggle to Guide Grassroots Construction,” Huojianbing Bao (Rocket Forces News), September 3, 2008.

86. “The Main Operational Activities in the Second Artillery Conventional Missile Strike Campaign,” in Yu, ed., Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, chapter 12, section 3, 263–70.

87. For a recent report on this Blue Army opposing force unit, see Li Yan and Zhang Xianqiu, “Previous Blue Force Commander Encounters Frequent Challenges by Blue Force, Nowadays Leads Red Force to Calmly Respond and Forge Ahead—Spectacular Scenes of Contest in Wit and Courage in Actual Combat Oriented Opposing Force Exercise at Training Base,” Huojianbing Bao (Rocket Forces News), August 12, 2008.

88. See, for example, Ren Jianqiang, Liu Zhongjiu, and Zhang Rong, “Brigade's Construction of War Theater Information Sharing System Increases Overall Battle Strength—Battle Situation of All Arms and Services Clear at One Glance: Joint Firepower Optimizes Deployment,” Huojianbing Bao (Rocket Forces News), August 29, 2008.

89. See Xiaohua and Xiaodu, “Base Uses Preparation for Military Struggle.”

90. See Chen et al., “Second Artillery Held Training Session.”

91. See Stokes and Easton, Evolving Aerospace Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region, 12.

92. See footnote 110 in Mark A. Stokes, “Chinese Ballistic Missile Forces in an Age of Global Missile Defense: Challenges and Responses,” in Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel, eds., China's Growing Military Power: Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities (Carlisle, PA: Army War College, 2002).

93. See Chen et al., “Second Artillery Held Training Session.”

94. Jing Zhiyuan and Peng Xiaofeng, “Building a Strategic Missile Force with Chinese Characteristics,” Qiushi (Seeking Truth), no. 3 (February 2009).

95. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010, 34–35.

96. This assessment is based on open-source, biographic searches on the following Second Artillery Corps leaders: Commander General Jing Zhiyuan; Political Commissar General Peng Xiaofeng; Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Wei Fenghe; Deputy Commanders Lieutenant Generals Yu Jixun, Zhang Yuting, and Wang Jiurong; Deputy Political Commissars Lieutenant Generals Cheng Baoshan, Zhang Limin, and Major General Deng Tiansheng; as well as the top commander and political commissar of the six operational Second Artillery Base Commands. Of these leaders, Major General Deng Tiansheng appears to have the most experience in the Corps’ 52nd Base, which controls the bulk of the Corps’ conventional missile brigades.

97. Key additional sources of biographic information on the current group of Second Artillery Corps leaders include “Inside Story of Top-Level Personnel Reshuffle at Second Artillery,” Duowei Xinwen (Duowei News), September 16, 2006, OSC CPP20060920701012; Zhou Jingjiong and Liu Yidao, “Second Artillery Trains First Batch of ‘Four-Capable’ Political Instructors,” Huojianbing Bao (Rocket Forces News), March 14, 2007; unofficial biography of Zhang Xiaozhong, available at http://baike.baidu.com/view/2212772.html; unofficial biography of Major General Yin Fanglong, available at http://baike.baidu.com/view/2342350.htm; He Junbo, Zhang Jun, and He Tianjin, “Engineering Design Research Institute Displays and Holds Exposition on 30 Years of Achievements,” Huojianbing Bao (Rocket Forces News), October 31, 2006; and Joint and Combined Arms Operations Under High Technology Conditions (Beijing: National Defense University, January 1997), which contains doctrinal articles by several individuals who are now senior Second Artillery Corps leaders—including Lieutenant Generals Yu Jixun, Wang Jiurong, and Zhang Limin. Liberation Army Daily articles from March 7, 1988 and December 1, 1988, respectively, indicate that Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Zhang Limin previously served as a senior official in the Corps’ Engineering Command.

98. See “Hong Kong Journal Provides Namelist of Thousands of Chinese Princelings,” Chien Shao, June 1, 2001, OSC CPP20070629710013; Chin Chien-Li, “A Critical Biography of General Peng Xiaofeng, Political Commissar of the Second Artillery Corps,” Chien Shao, December 1, 2006, OSC CPP20061215710002.

99. See National Defense University of Technology (NUDT) alumni website, www.lovenudt.com; Wu Jun, “Inside Story of Top-Level Personnel Reshuffle at Second Artillery,” Duowei Xinwen (Duowei News), September 16, 2006, OSC CPP20060920701012; and Jason Kelly, “China's Man Behind the Missiles,” Asia Times, October 4, 2007, OSC CPP20071005721005.

100. See Yao, Teaching Materials on Tactics.

101. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, ix.

102. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2007, 5.

103. See Li Xiaagdong and Zhang Wen, “A Brief Discussion of Joint Firepower Dominance,” Military Art Journal, no. 2 (1999): 11–13.

104. Guo Shunyuan, “Operational Command Decision Making by Second Artillery Corps During Joint Campaigns,” Military Art Journal, no. 6 (June 2004): 56–60.

105. Guo Shunyuan, Science of Second Artillery Compaigns. Guo is a Second Artillery Command Academy official.

106. Zhou Xin and Zou Hanbing, “Issues of Second Artillery Coordination in Joint Operations,” Military Art Journal (July 2004): 71–74.

107. Zhou Xin and Zou Hanbing, “Second Artillery Conventional Missile Strike Campaign,” 263–70.

108. For more on how to define joint fires, see “Definition of Key Terms on Joint Fires,” Integration, Control, and Definition of Joint Fires Study, vol. 2, National Defense Industrial Association, May 2003, study prepared for the Surface Warfare Division (N76) of the Chief of Naval Operations. Available from the Department of Defense's Defense Technology Information Service, www.dtic.org.

109. Wang Xiadong and Sun Shihong, “Operational Employment of Second Artillery in Joint Firepower Strikes,” Military Art Journal, no. 7 (July 2004): 67–70.

110. Zhou and Zou, “Issues of Second Artillery Coordination.”

111. Ibid.

112. Ibid.

113. See question 61, “How Joint Campaign Air Force Operations Can Be Classified?” in chapter 14, “Offensive Campaign against the Enemy's Naval Force Group,” and especially questions 213 and 219, National Defense University, Campaign Theory Study Guide. This book conveys various concepts in the NDU's Science of Campaigns (2000) document in the form of answers to questions. Science of Second Artillery Campaigns identifies six potential main actions the Corps could take against a “powerful enemy's” carrier strike groups (CSGs): firepower harassment against CSGs as well as their bases; frontal firepower deterrence, warning attacks toward the front of a carrier's core advance; flank firepower expulsion; concentrated fire assault; information assault, including missiles armed with antiradiation warhead submunitions or electromagnetic pulse submunitions; and warning through long-range firepower, to include a long-range cautionary strike. See chapter 14, “Second Artillery Conventional Missile Forces in Coordination with Land, Naval, and Air Force Campaign Operations, ‘Section III,’ Participating in Operations of Resistance Against Powerful Enemy's Intervention,” Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, 322–23.

114. For references in Campaign Theory Study Guide to the need to strike preemptively, see: chapter XIV, “Offensive Campaigns Against the Enemy's Naval Group,” question 214, “What are the Basic Requirements on Offensive Campaigns Against the Enemy's Naval Force Group,” especially sections 2, “Work Hard for Preemptive Strike,” and 3 “Combine Active Offensive with Indomitable Defense and be Prepared for Repeated Fight”; and chapter 18, “Conventional Missile Strike Campaign,” question 284, “What are the Guiding Principles for Conventional Missile Attack Campaign of the Second Artillery Force,” especially section 3, “Implement Preemptive Attack,” and question 290, “What are Included in the Implementation of Conventional Missile Attack Campaigns of the Second Artillery Force,” especially section 2, “Initial Strike.” See also page 395 in the same document. According to Evan Medeiros, RAND Corporation, “the dominant theme in these [Second Artillery Corps] writings is the offensive nature of conventional missile operations…The PLA emphasizes using conventional missiles to strike first, strike hard, strike precisely, and strike rapidly. See Medeiros, “Minding the Gap,” 167.

115. For illustrative references outlining the threat that the Second Artillery Corps perceives from its “strong enemy (the U.S.),” see the endnotes in the “Threat Environment” section above, specifically notes 53 to 61.

116. For more on Taiwan's alleged counterstrike program, see Shuai Hua-min, “Thoughts on Preventing War, Direction of Taiwan's Military Buildup, Preparation for War,” Defense Technology Monthly (March 2008), OSC CPP20080331103001; and John Tkacik, “John Tkacik on Taiwan: The Best Defense is a Good Offense,” Taipei Times, February 14, 2007, OSC CPP20070214968027.

117. See Stokes and Easton, Evolving Aerospace Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region, 27–28, endnotes 123 and 124.

118. Most analysis of Second Artillery Corps mobile missile force operations assumes that basic firepower units will quickly move critical launch equipment (i.e., Transporter-Erector-Launchers [TELs] armed with missiles and associated ground support equipment) from hiding sites to operational positions (i.e., launch sites) to fire one missile, and then depart as soon as possible to other hiding sites to avoid exposure and to reload before repeating this operational launch procedure. This approach is often referred to as “shoot and scoot” tactics or procedures. Should the Second Artillery Corps be confident that exposed basic firepower units are safe from U.S. firepower attacks, it could move a loaded missile resupply vehicle with the armed TEL when it leaves a hide site to redeploy to an operational position. This would enable the basic firepower unit to launch one missile, stay at the same basic operational position, rapidly reload the TEL with a new missile, and then fire at the same or another target—prior to moving on to another hide site. Should this approach be implemented (which might be dubbed a “shoot, shoot, and scoot” tactic), the short timeframe between the first and second launch could be used to intensify the psychological shock and pressure of the unit's firepower attack against Taiwan—which could resemble a “barrage” attack—depending on the number of basic firepower units involved in the initial attack.

119. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008, 23.

120. Ibid.

121. Office for Naval Intelligence, The People's Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics (Suitland, MD: April 2009), 27–28.