The third offset and nuclear weapons

ABSTRACT

Third offset technologies are represented as game changing with respect to their implications for U.S. military strategy. In general, third offset technologies as applied to the art of war will emphasize information-driven conventional weapons that are smaller, lighter, and smarter, compared to earlier generations. How will weapons and systems based on third offset technologies coexist with nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and what are the implications for deterrence and other forms of nuclear persuasion? The discussion here considers various aspects of the nuclear-third offset relationship while acknowledging that it is an open ended question for scientists, military planners and policy makers.

Notes

1. See, for example: T. X. Hammes, “Cheap Technology Will Challenge U.S. Tactical Dominance,” Joint Force Quarterly 81, 2nd Quarter (2016): 76–85; P.W. Singer and Allan Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), esp. 120–138; John R. Benedict, Jr., “Global Power Distribution and Warfighting in the 21st Century,” Joint Force Quarterly 83, 4^th Quarter (2016): 6–12; Brent D. Sadler, “Fast Followers, Learning Machines, and the Third Offset Strategy,” Joint Force Quarterly 83, 4^th Quarter (2016): 13–18; Robert Martinage, Toward a New Offset Strategy: Exploiting U.S. Long-Term Advantages to Restore U.S. Global Power Projection Capability (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2014); Martin C. Libicki, Crisis and Escalation in Cyberspace (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012), esp. 123–142; and John Arquilla, Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Transformation of the American Military (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2008), esp. pp. 109–131 and 156–181.

2. Historians, political scientists and others writing about war have produced a large literature on military revolutions and RMAs. For an overview and critique of pertinent concepts and arguments, see Colin S. Gray, Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History (London: Frank Cass, 2002), esp. Ch. 2–3 and fn. 1, p. 57.

3. William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “As U.S. Modernizes Nuclear Weapons, ‘Smaller’ Leaves Some Uneasy,” New York Times, January 11, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/12/science.html (accessed November 14, 2016).

4. For background on this issue, see: Amy F. Woolf, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 7–5700, www.crs.gov/, R41464.

5. For additional discussion on this topic, see: Andrew Futter, Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons: New Questions for Command and Control, Security and Strategy (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies [RUSI] 2016), RUSI Occasional Paper, www.rusi,org/. For Russian perspectives on cyber, see Timothy L. Thomas, Russia Military Strategy: Impacting 21st Century Reform and Geopolitics (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office [FMSO], 2015), 253–299 and 432–435. In early December, 2016, President Vladimir Putin signed an updated information security doctrine and cyber defense plan for Russia. See: Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia Updates Plan to Counter Cyberattacks and Foreign Influence,” New York Times, December 7, 2016, in Johnson's Russia List 2016 - #227 – December 7, 2016, [email protected]

6. Thomas, Russia Military Strategy: Impacting 21st Century Reform and Geopolitics, 290. Thomas also references work by David E. Hoffman, The Dead Hand (New York: Doubleday, 2009), 422, and pertinent interview research by Dr. Bruce Blair.

7. See Mark J. Lewis, Chair, Committee on Future Air Force Needs for Defense AgainstHigh-Speed Weapon Systems, High-Speed Maneuvering Weapons: A Threat to America's Global Vigilance, Reach, and Power, Unclassified Summary (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2016), www.nap.edu/, for technical assessment. See also: Bill Gertz, “Air Force: Hypersonic Missiles From China, Russia Pose Growing Danger to U.S.,” November 30, 2016, http://freebeacon.com/ (accessed December 2, 2016).

8. Rebecca Slayton, Arguments that Count: Physics, Computing, and Missile Defense, 1949–2012 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013), 220.

9. Ibid.

10. P. W. Singer and Allan Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 126–127.

11. David E. Sanger and Michael R. Gordon, “Iran Nuclear Deal Is Reached with World Powers,” New York Times, July 14, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-is-reached-with-world-powers.html (accessed July 14, 2015). See also: Lawrence Korb and Katherine Blakely, “This Deal Puts the Nuclear Genie Back in the Bottle,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Expert Commentary, July 15, 2015, http://thebulletin.org/experts-assess-iran-agreement-20158507 (accessed July 16, 2015).

12. Michael C. Horowitz, “Who'll Want Artificially Intelligent Weapons? ISIS, Democracies, or Autocracies?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 29, 2016, http://thebulletin.org/who%E2%80%99ll-want-artificially-intelligent-weapons-isis-democracies-or-autocracies9692 (accessed January 3, 2017).

13. On the Russian concept of reflexive control, see Timothy L. Thomas, Recasting the Red Star: Russia Forges Tradition and Technology through Toughness (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2011), 118–131.

14. Martinage, Toward a New Offset Strategy, v.

15. Ibid.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Stephen J. Cimbala

Stephen J. Cimbala ([email protected]) is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works in the fields of national security studies, nuclear arms control and other issues. An award winning Penn State teacher, Dr. Cimbala recently authored War Games: U.S.-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2017) and co-authored and co-edited Defending the Arsenal (New York: Routledge, 2017) with Adam B. Lowther.