Incredibility of India's massive retaliation: An appraisal on capability, cost, and intention

ABSTRACT

William W. Kaufmann assessed the efficacy of the United States' strategy of massive retaliation, introduced in January 1954 by then Secretary of State John F. Dulles, on three areas: capability, cost, and intention. Having established parity between New Delhi's current interpretation of massive retaliation and that of Dulles in 1954, this article applies Kaufmann's framework to gauge the credibility of India's strategy of massive retaliation. Taking cognizance of current developments in India–Pakistan relations and of India's evolving strategic priorities, this article argues that conditions neither exist nor could be created for massive retaliation to be a credible strategy of nuclear deterrence for India.

Notes

1. Recently conducted surgical strikes by India have led some to speculate otherwise. Detailed assessment of the nature of surgical strikes and their effects capture their difference from conventional attacks. This article examines the effects of surgical strikes on deterrence stability between India and Pakistan in the subsequent sections.

2. “Watch Ajit Doval Say if Pakistan Does ‘One Mumbai’ It May Lose Balochistan,” Scroll, January 6, 2016, video.scroll.in/801447/watch-ajit-doval-say-if-pakistan-does-one-mumbai-it-may-lose-balochistan (accessed January 26, 2017). For an assessment of India's options and its ability to implement them, see George Perkovich and Toby Dalton, Not War, Not Peace? Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border Terrorism (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2016).

3. The Cold Start doctrine is essentially an operational plan proposed by the Indian army in 2004. It is designed to make a rapid and limited penetration into Pakistani territory to punish Pakistan for terror attacks or proxy war and is not proposed to be of a scale that either would threaten Pakistan's survival or be seen as crossing the traditional nuclear threshold of Pakistan. In response, Pakistan introduced TNWs that lowered its nuclear threshold to a level that made the employment of CSD difficult for India. The aim of CSD is to reorganize the three large strike corps of India into eight smaller battle groups. For more, see Arka Biswas, “Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Deconstructing India's Doctrinal Response,” Strategic Analysis 39, no. 6 (2015): 683–86.

4. “Army Chief Bipin Rawat Defends Operation ‘Cold Start,’ Asserts Future Wars Will Be Short, Intense,” India Today, January 13, 2017, www.indialivetoday.com/army-chief-bipin-rawat-defends-operation-cold-start-asserts-future-wars-will-be-short-intense/97259.html (accessed January 26, 2017).

5. Praveen Swami, “Gen. Padmanabhan Mulls Over Lessons of Operation Parakram,” The Hindu, February 6, 2004, www.thehindu.com/2004/02/06/stories/2004020604461200.htm (accessed January 26, 2017).

6. Andrew Glass, “Dulles Says U.S. to Rely on Massive Nuclear Retaliation, January 12, 1954,” Politico, January 12, 2016, www.politico.com/story/2016/01/this-day-in-politics-state-department-nuclear-retaliation-1954-217456 (accessed January 26, 2017).

7. William W. Kaufmann, The Requirements of Deterrence (Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1954).

8. Arka Biswas, “Could India's Bold Nuclear War Plan Survive a Clash with Pakistan?” The National Interest, December 5, 2016, nationalinterest.org/feature/could-indias-bold-nuclear-war-plan-survive-clash-pakistan-18625 (accessed January 26, 2017).

9. Samuel F. Wells, Jr., “The Origins of Massive Retaliation,” Political Science Quarterly 96, no. 1 (1981): 31–52.

10. “Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Progress in Operationalizing India's Nuclear Doctrine,” last modified January 4, 2003, pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html. This argument was made by a retired senior Indian government official in a personal interview with the author.

11. Balraj Nagal, “India's Nuclear Strategy to Deter: Massive Retaliation to Cause Unacceptable Damage,” CLAWS Journal 9, no.2 (2015): 8–9.

12. Shyam Saran, “Is India's Nuclear Deterrent Credible?” (speech given at the India Habitat Centre, New Delhi, April 24, 2013), www.armscontrolwonk.com/files/2013/05/Final-Is-Indias-Nuclear-Deterrent-Credible-rev1-2-1-3.pdf(accessed January 26, 2017).

13. Manoj Joshi, “The Credibility of India's Nuclear Deterrent,” in Deterrence Instability & Nuclear Weapons in South Asia, edited by Michael Krepon et al. (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2015), 43–68.

14. Saran, “Is India's Deterrent Credible,” 16.

15. Ibid.

16. Biswas, “Could India's Bold.”

17. Kaufmann, The Requirements of Deterrence, 6.

18. Ibid., 7.

19. Ibid.

20. For more on the requirements of massive retaliation strategy based on the interpretation of it being a threat of destroying population centers, see Richard A. Brody, “Deterrence Strategies: An Annotated Bibliography,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 4, no. 4 (1960): 444.

21. Buddhi Kota Subba Rao, “The H-Bomb Issue is Crucial,” Frontline 15, no. 12 (1998), http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1512/15120260.htm.

22. Raj Chengappa, “Is India's H-Bomb a Dud?” India Today, October 12, 1998, indiatoday.intoday.in/story/research-by-western-scientists-contest-indias-claims-of-successfully-testing-an-h-bomb/1/265076.html (accessed January 26, 2017). There were a few international seismologists who estimated the test to be of yield 43 KT, which was closer to the yield estimates claimed by the Indian government in 1998 (Jack F. Evernden, “Estimation of Yields of Underground Explosions with Emphasis on Recent Indian and Pakistani Explosions,” Physics and Society 27, no. 4 [1998]: 10–11).

23. For more, see the post, and comments to it, by Jeffrey Lewis, “India's H-Bomb Revisited,” Arms Control Wonk, August 27, 2009, www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/202445/indias-h-bomb-revisited/ (accessed January 27, 2017).

24. Sachin Parashar, “Pokhran II Not Fully Successful: Scientist,” The Times of India, August 27, 2009, timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Pokhran-II-not-fully-successful-Scientist/articleshow/4938610.cms (accessed January 26, 2017).

25. K. Santhanam and Ashok Parthasarathi, “Pokhran-II Thermonuclear Test, a Failure,” The Hindu, September 17, 2009, www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/Pokhran-II-thermonuclear-test-a-failure/article13736892.ece (accessed January 26, 2017).

26. Rama Lakshmi, “Key Indian Figures Call for New Nuclear Tests Despite Deal with U.S.,” Washington Post, October 5, 2009, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/04/AR2009100402865.html (accessed January 27, 2017).

27. Manoj Joshi, “H-Bomb Failure Demands that We Re-Write Our Nuclear Strategy and Doctrine,” Mail Today, September 19, 2009, http://mjoshi.blogspot.in/2009/09/h-bomb-failure-demands-that-we-re-write.html.

28. In May 2016, India submitted a note to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) affirming its adherence to the guidelines of the NSG. See IAEA, “Communication Received from the Permanent Mission of India to the International Atomic Energy Agency Regarding Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology and the Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology—INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1/Add. 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2/Add.1,” last modified May 9, 2016, www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc254r12p1a1-infcirc254r9p2a1_0.pdf. Though membership application did not require India to emphasize its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, commitment not to conduct tests has featured as one of the conditions for a country that is not a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) for it to be admitted into NSG. For details of the discussion on India's membership application to NSG, see The Wire Staff “New Draft Proposal on NSG Membership Unlikely to Please India,” The Wire, December 29, 2016, thewire.in/90403/nsg-membership-nuclear-testing/ (accessed January 27, 2017).

29. Shubhajit Roy, “Civil Nuclear Deal: India's Commitment to Moratorium Serious, Credible, Says Foreign Secretary,” The Indian Express, December 13, 2015, indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/civil-nuclear-deal-indias-commitment-to-moratorium-serious-credible-says-foreign-secretary/ (accessed January 27, 2017). For the text of the agreement between India and Japan on civil nuclear cooperation, see “Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of India for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Japan, www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000202920.pdf (accessed January 27, 2017).

30. For the text of the note, see “Note on Views and Understanding,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Japan, www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000202921.pdf (accessed January 27, 2017.

31. Press Trust of India, “Termination Clause in Civil Nuclear Deal with Japan Not Binding on India,” The Indian Express, November 13, 2016, indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/termination-clause-in-civil-nuclear-deal-with-japan-not-binding-on-india-4373078/ (accessed January 27, 2017).

32. “Agreement Between Japan and India,” 12.

33. For more on the debate on India's membership to the NSG, see Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and Arka Biswas, Locating India within the Global Non-Proliferation Architecture: Prospects, Challenges and Opportunities (New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, 2016), 21–30.

34. For arguments from India in favor of it signing the CTBT, see R. Rajaraman, “It Is Time India Signs the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,” The Wire, January 6, 2017, thewire.in/94539/india-nuclear-test-ban-treaty/ (accessed January 28, 2017).

35. In a letter sent to the members of the NSG, a group of 18 “nuclear non-proliferation experts” protested against bending rules for admission of India into the NSG. For the text of the letter, see “Experts Call on Nuclear Suppliers Group Not to Bend the Rules,” Arms Control Association, www.armscontrol.org/print/7517 (accessed January 28, 2017).

36. India has signed civil nuclear cooperation agreements with several members of the NSG, and all of these agreements were signed in recognition and acknowledgment of India's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. For a detailed list of countries, and for the nature and scope of civil nuclear cooperation, see “Nuclear Power in India,” last modified December 28, 2016, www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/india.aspx.

37. Kaufmann, The Requirements of Deterrence, 7.

38. Ibid., 8.

39. Gregory W. Pedlow, “The Evolution of NATO Strategy, 1949–1969,” in NATO Strategy Documents: 1949–1969, edited by Gregory W. Pedlow (Brussels: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1997), xvi–xviii.

40. Kaufmann, The Requirements of Deterrence, 9.

41. Elizabeth Whitfield, “Fuzzy Math on Indian Nuclear Weapons,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 19, 2016, thebulletin.org/fuzzy-math-indian-nuclear-weapons9343 (accessed January 28, 2017).

42. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Indian Nuclear Forces, 2015,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1, 2015, thebulletin.org/2015/september/indian-nuclear-forces-20158728 (accessed January 28, 2017); Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2015,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1, 2015, thebulletin.org/2015/november/pakistani-nuclear-forces-20158845 (accessed January 28, 2017).

43. Joseph V Micallef, “The Other Bomb: Pakistan's Dangerous Nuclear Strategy,” The Huffington Post, February 10, 2016, www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-v-micallef/the-other-bomb-pakistans_b_9180504.html (accessed January 28, 2017).

44. Kaufmann, The Requirements of Deterrence, 8.

45. “Target Terror: India Strikes across LoC,” The Hindu, September 29, 2016, www.thehindu.com/news/national/Target-terror-India-strikes-across-LoC/article15006525.ece (accessed January 28, 2017).

46. Devirupa Mitra, “As India Announces ‘Surgical Strikes’ and Pakistan Denies Claim, US Cautions on Escalation,” The Wire, September 30, 2016, thewire.in/69652/india-loc-pakistan-dgmo/ (accessed January 28, 2017).

47. Prasun Sonwalkar, Sutirtho Patranobis, and Yashwant Raj, “How World Powers Reacted to Indian Army's Strikes across LoC,” Hindustan Times, September 29, 2016, www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/how-world-powers-reacted-to-indian-army-s-strikes-against-militants-across-loc/story-ZYYJL2KO0t2Rokz3u6qWqO.html (accessed January 28, 2017). Also see Vivek Chadha et al., “Uri, Surgical Strikes and International Reactions,” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, October 4, 2016, http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/uri-surgical-strikes-and-international-reactions_041016.

48. For detailed assessment of such claims, see Ali Ahmed, “The Future of Full Spectrum Deterrence,” Centre for Land Warfare Studies, October 16, 2016, www.claws.in/1651/the-future-of-full-spectrum-deterrence-ali-ahmed.html; and Kunal Singh, “The Lines to Breach, the Restraints to Observe,” Live Mint, November 25, 2016, www.livemint.com/Politics/Ol3xCWU7oEbGyLCA0lOiZJ/The-lines-to-breach-the-restraints-to-observe.html (accessed January 28, 2017).

49. For text of the Indian Army's press statement on surgical strikes, see “Surgical Strikes: Full text of Indian Army DGMO Lt Gen Ranbir Singh's Press Conference,” The Indian Express, September 29, 2016, indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/pakistan-infiltration-attempts-indian-army-surgical-strikes-line-of-control-jammu-and-kashmir-uri-poonch-pok-3055874/ (accessed January 28, 2017). For details of the surgical strike as reported in the media, see “4 Hours, Choppers and 38 Kills: How India Avenged the Uri Attack,” The Economic Times, September 29, 2016, economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/army-conducted-surgical-strikes-on-terror-launch-pads-on-loc-significant-casualties-caused-dgmo/articleshow/54579855.cms (accessed January 28, 2017).

50. IANS, “Surgical Strikes Were Conducted Thrice during UPA Rule: Congress,” The Times of India, October 4, 2016, timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/Surgical-strikes-were-conducted-thrice-during-UPA-rule-Congress/articleshow/54681797.cms (accessed January 28, 2017).

51. Saran, “Is India's Deterrent Credible.”

52. Ibid., 7–9.

53. Ibid., 15–16.

54. Satish Chandra, “Revisiting India's Nuclear Doctrine: Is It Necessary?” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, April 30, 2014, www.idsa.in/issuebrief/RevisitingIndiasNuclearDoctrine_schandra_300414.

55. For details of criticism of Dulles's formulation of massive retaliation, see Louise L. Gerson, John Foster Dulles (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1976), 147–51; Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1973), 199–201; and Wells, “The Origins of Massive Retaliation,” 35.

56. Kaufmann, The Requirements of Deterrence, 10.

57. Toby Dalton and George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Options and Escalation Dominance (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016), 12.

58. P. R. Chari, “India's Nuclear Doctrine: Stirrings of Change,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 4, 2014, carnegieendowment.org/2014/06/04/india-s-nuclear-doctrine-stirrings-of-change.

59. Chari, “India's Nuclear Doctrine.”

60. Bharat Karnad, “India's Nuclear Amateurism,” The New Indian Express, June 28, 2013, www.newindianexpress.com/opinions/2013/jun/28/Indias-nuclear-amateurism-491261.html (accessed January 28, 2017).

61. Biswas, “Could India's Bold.”

62. Gurmeet Kanwal, “What Will Happen if India–Pakistan Break into a Nuclear War,” Daily-O, October 7, 2016, www.dailyo.in/politics/nuclear-war-india-pakistan-ties-tnws-pathankot-uri-attack/story/1/13284.html (accessed January 28, 2017).

63. Ibid., emphasis added.

64. Ibid.

65. “Clarifying India's Nascent Nuclear Doctrine: An Interview with Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh,” last modified December 1, 1999, www.armscontrol.org/print/585.

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Arka Biswas

Arka Biswas ([email protected]) is an associate fellow at the Strategic Studies Programme of the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. He is currently pursuing projects on the credibility of India's nuclear doctrine and on impact of asymmetric warfare on deterrence-stability in South Asia. He has been a visiting fellow at the Stimson Center, Washington, DC. He is a physics graduate and has a master's degree in international relations from the University of Bristol. His work has appeared in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,, Foreign Policy, The National Interest, and Strategic Analysis, among others.