India and the Balakot airstrike: Reflections beyond hard power

Abstract

This article argues that while India’s Balakot airstrike garnered popular attention as a hardline military approach, the role of soft power, which was very much part of it, received little or scant regard. Moving away from the popular view of the Balakot airstrike as a hard power-oriented military approach, taking a nuanced look at it from the soft power and strategic narrative vantage point, this exegesis explores both the hard and soft dimensions of power employed as means to advance India’s aims and ends. In doing so, this examination finds the strike as a smart power strategy.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my Doctoral Supervisor Prof. Vasanthi Srinivasan for her valuable comments and my friend Ms. Sayani Malakar for a fruitful discussion on the topic which greatly improved the paper.

Notes

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Muhsin Puthan Purayil

Muhsin Puthan Purayil is a doctoral candidate in Political Science at University of Hyderabad, India. His research has appeared in the Columbia Journal of International Affairs (JIA), Israel Affairs, Global Change, Peace & Security, Asian Affairs, Journal of Migration Affairs, and The Diplomat.