New Zealand’s grand strategic options as the room for hedging continues to shrink

Abstract

Since at least the last decade, New Zealand has been employing something of an asymmetrical alignment hedge of the US and China, aligning itself with the US strategically and with China economically. Such a strategy remains the perceived optimal foreign policy in Wellington. However, as Sino-American relations continue to deteriorate and the Indo-Pacific super-region becomes more geopolitically tense, the room for hedging is shrinking, making New Zealand’s putative strategy potentially untenable. This article assesses the changing geopolitical situation New Zealand finds itself in and assesses other potential strategic options– namely, non-alignment, balance or bandwagon, and zigzagging.

Notes

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Nicholas Ross Smith

Nicholas Ross Smith ([email protected]) is an adjunct fellow at the University of Canterbury’s National Center for Research on Europe. His research coalesces around the regional implications of great power competition, with a particular interest in European Union, Russian, and Chinese foreign policies. He is the author of two books and numerous journal articles, including articles in The Journal of Politics, Global Policy, and International Relations.