MacIntyre, rival traditions and education

Abstract

This paper critically discusses MacIntyre's thesis that education is essentially a contested concept. In order to contextualise my discussion, I discuss both whether rival educational traditions of education found in MacIntyre's work – which I refer to as instrumental and non-instrumental justifications of education – can be rationally resolved using MacIntyre's framework, and whether a shared meaning of education is possible as a result. I conclude that MacIntyre's synthesis account is problematic because the whole notion that there are rationally negotiable ways in which to compromise or harmonise opposing justifications of education found in instrumental and non-instrumental forms of education is troubling – the reason being that these are cultural disagreements about human flourishing that are not neutral-free, and due to a lack of care distinguishing between the common uses of the term ‘education’, and its looser usages to mean something like school learning that embraces a range of aims and goals that are often incompatible. In this light, it is argued that the contestability card has been unnecessarily overemphasised, and brings to our attention the complex ways in which we interpret education and what it means to be educated.

Keywords:

• MacIntyre
• traditions
• incommensurability
• contestability
• instrumental
• non-instrumental
• education

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Delivered at the Institute of Education, University of London, Spring Term, 1985.

2. MacIntyre's paper titled ‘Social structure and their threats to moral agency’ provides an excellent example of both how ‘J’ and those who inhabit a compartmentalised social and cultural order accept unquestioning structures that result in the agent becoming incapable of recognising and able to ‘pass judgement on the limitations of their judgements’ (MacIntyre, 1999a, p. 328).

3. Although the specific usage of these terms may not be prominent within contemporary public debate, it is not too hard to find commentary on key issues of education in which the dichotomy is alive and well. Indeed, these educational perspectives would appear to be in conflict with each other, not to mention incommensurable and so this leads to the logical questions: (1) Which is educationally superior? and (2) How do I determine this in an agent-neutral way?

4. Another notable example worth mentioning found in After Virtue is the ‘disquieting suggestion’ that the nature of modern moral disagreement today is incapable of being resolved because ‘we have … lost comprehension, both theoretical and practical, [of] morality’ (MacIntyre, 1981/2007, p. 2). In order to highlight the poverty of modern moral theory MacIntyre contrasts modern conceptions of morality, such as emotivism with Aristotelian conceptions of morality to demonstrate how our understanding of morality has changed to a set of incoherent rules or principles that are constantly changing. Likewise, in Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, MacIntyre (1990) sets out three rival traditions of moral enquiry which he identifies as encyclopaedia, genealogy and the Thomist tradition to demonstrate incompatibility, incommensurability and untranslatability.

5. In Whose Justice? Which Rationality? MacIntyre (1988) refers to this period as the ‘Scottish Enlightenment’.

6. An obvious example of an authorised text that has canonical status is the Bible. In most Christian communities, the Bible is considered to be the written word of God in the words of human beings that guides all matters of faith and practice.

7. The concept of communitarianism broadly includes two elements: (1) individuals who belong to a community share common ends and (2) individuals who are members of the community derive their sense of identity from belonging to the group. It is important to note that a broad range of contemporary thinkers, like MacIntyre, Taylor (1979, 1989) and Sandel (1982), are often considered to be communitarians; however, there is no common consensus to which these thinkers all subscribe to.