Wilsonianism and self-determination without Wilson: United States and Estonia, 1918–1922

ABSTRACT

The article argues that in 1919 several US Peace Delegation members in Paris acted in accordance with the ideology of Wilsonian self-determination. However, US policy toward Estonia and the other Baltic states wavered between regarding them as part of eastern Europe to which national self-determination could be applied or, contrary to that, as part of a unified non-Bolshevik Russia. US economic policy and, in particular, its relief activity supported the striving for independence of the Baltic states. Wilson came to support the ‘Russia option’ for the Baltic countries in the summer of 1919. The successor Harding administration opted for the alternative.

KEYWORDS:

• Woodrow Wilson
• US recognition of the Baltic states
• Herbert Hoover
• Samuel E. Morison
• Evan E. Young
• Colby note

Traditional historiography on relations between the United States with the emerging Baltic states at the end of World War I has centered on the issue of recognition (Tarulis 1968).¹ While important, there is another issue as important – the economic policy pursued by the United States toward the Baltic countries during the post-Armistice period in Europe. Besides focusing on the above two issues, the article will explore the differences in opinion among the members of the American Peace Delegation in Paris and how that affected US policy toward Russia and the Baltic countries. During this period, the outside world came to define the eastern Baltic area as the Baltic states and, ultimately, despite the differences among the three countries, deal with the area jointly. Aid was given, an identical economic policy was followed, and then recognition was given to all Baltic states. This article will center on US relations with Estonia with the understanding that often these relations were part of a common pattern with the other two Baltic states, Latvia and Lithuania.

The background for the rise of the Baltic question was provided by World War I, the 1917 Revolutions in Russia, and the German occupation of the area. Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians experienced the events differently. Lithuania was occupied by Germany from 1915 onwards. Estonia fully experienced the 1917 Revolutions but was occupied by German forces for only nine months. Latvia’s story was the most complex, since it was split with the front line running down the middle of the country for over two years (1915 − 1918). Following the German defeat in the war, German troops withdrew from Estonia by the end of December 1918. German troops, however, remained in Latvia and Lithuania for a longer period. As a result, conditions on the ground differed among the three countries throughout 1919. This did not prevent the delegates from the three countries cooperating with each other in Paris. The aims of the three, after all, were the same. Indeed, the basic decisions by the United States in Paris were common – the giving of economic assistance through credits and nonrecognition. Herbert Hoover in his enumeration of US economic activity usually lumped the three together as the Baltic states.

Wilson and Wilsonianism

It was World War I that drew the United States into European politics and played a key role in changing American views of its foreign policy.² President Woodrow Wilson initially declared the United States to be neutral in the war. It took Germany’s decision at the end of 1916 to declare unrestricted submarine warfare for him to change his position and appear before Congress on 2 April 1917 to ask for a declaration of war. In his speech, Wilson laid out his view that the United States was entering the war in order to establish a new world order based upon democratic principles.³

Nine months later, on 8 January 1918, Wilson unveiled his plan for peace following the end of the conflict – his famous Fourteen Point proposal. Two months previously, the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of Soviet Russia, Vladimir Lenin, had issued his Decree for Peace that ultimately led to the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations with Germany and the other Central Powers. Three days prior to Wilson, British prime minister David Lloyd-George put forth his views on conditions for peace.

For the first time, an American president attempted to transform world politics in the spirit of ‘new diplomacy:’ free trade, universal disarmament, an end to secret diplomacy, freedom of the seas, and the fourteenth point, the establishment of a League of Nations that was supposed to guarantee world peace.⁴ For the first time in history, an American president presented demands for the reorganization of Europe: an independent Poland should be reconstituted, Alsace-Lorraine should be returned to France, the nationalities of Austria-Hungary should have the opportunity of autonomous development, and so on. In the sixth point that dealt with Russia, Wilson demanded that the Central Powers needed to evacuate all the Russian territory that they had occupied during the war. One of the intentions of Wilson was to interrupt the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk between the Bolsheviks and the Central Powers and restore a second front against Germany in the east. He did not show a real understanding of the actual conditions in Russia at that time (Kennan 1956, 242 − 274). Russia was simply unable to continue the war in January 1918, and its army was being demobilized. Besides that, Wilson looked upon Russia as a unitary state, unlike Austria-Hungary or the Ottoman Empire, which he always referenced as multi-ethnic empires. He did not seem to have understood that numerous ethnic groups in the Russian Empire demanded autonomy in 1917 and, by 1918, had begun to issue declarations of independence.

Wilson was kept informed on the course of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk.⁵ The result was a follow-up speech to the Fourteen Points speech on 11 February (the so-called Four Principles speech) in which he criticized the German Chancellor, Georg von Hertling, and German politics at Brest-Litovsk: ‘He does not discuss with no one else, besides the representative of Russia, how to organize the governing of the peoples and territory of the Baltic provinces.’⁶ What Wilson meant was that territorial changes needed to be preceded by negotiations in which other major states participated and that the affected people should be consulted.

Wilson propagated, in the speeches he gave in 1918, his vision of a new international order that should be constructed in accordance with legal and moral principles and not just traditional considerations of power. He noted:

National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their consent. ‘Self-determination’ is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative of action […] every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival states.⁷

Wilson had not used the phrase, ‘national self-determination,’ in his Fourteen Point speech, but he used the phrase in his February speech and in subsequent speeches. Erez Manela argues in his book, The Wilsonian Moment, that, as a result, a view spread around the world in 1918 − 1919 that Wilson was propagating the implementation of national self-determination for all the peoples in the world who were being oppressed (Manela 2007).

World War I ended in autumn 1918 when Germany’s military and political leaders realized that Germany had lost the war (Afflerbach 2022, 377 − 417). The new Chancellor, Max von Baden, proposed a ceasefire to Wilson in early October and then peace in accordance with Wilson’s conditions.⁸ After Wilson agreed to accept the German request, the leaders of the Entente gathered in Paris to formulate the conditions for a ceasefire. Wilson did not attend. Instead, he sent his personal adviser, Colonel Edward House.⁹ In Paris, House participated in meetings of the Supreme War Council with the prime ministers of the three major Allied powers, their foreign ministers, and the Entente states’ military and naval advisers (Lowry 1996).

House realized that the original Fourteen Points had in part been superseded by events or, at the very least, required explanations. As a result, he met with journalist Frank Cobb and asked him along with the secretary of the Inquiry, Walter Lippmann, to write an explanation for each of the Fourteen Points. By this time, Wilson had accepted the breakup of Austria-Hungary, thus changing Point 8 of the original. Furthermore, as he noted in his diary, House did not support maintaining the unity of Russia:

I hoped the Prime Minister would share my views as to Russia. If a great military figure should arise in Russia, she might become a menace to the world. I would like to see this great Empire fall into several states. The war, I said, would leave but two great powers in the world, Great Britain and the United States.¹⁰

House was aware of the de facto recognition given to Estonia by Britain, France, and Italy in the spring of 1918. In any case, he must have informed Cobb of his view toward Russia. The document of explanations for each of the Fourteen Points, known as the Cobb-Lippmann memorandum, changed the sixth point on Russia in a fundamental way. The explanation was in accord with the ideology of Wilsonianism:

The first question is whether Russian territory is synonymous with territory belonging to the former Russian Empire. This is clearly not so. […] What is recognized as valid for the Poles certainly have to be recognized for the Finns, the Lithuanians, the Letts, and perhaps also for the Ukrainians. This can mean nothing less than the [recognition] by the peace conference of a series of de facto Governments representing Finns, Esths, Lithuanians, Ukrainians conditional upon the calling of national assemblies for the creation of de facto governments […] the frontiers should be drawn as far as possible on ethnic lines […] The essence of the Russian problem then in the immediate future would seem to be: One, the recognition of provisional governments. Two, assistance extended to and through these governments. In any case the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest must be cancelled as palpably fraudulent.¹¹

House forwarded the memorandum by telegraph to Wilson who responded that in principle he was in agreement with the explanations.¹² Another copy was sent to the State Department where the Assistant Secretary (second-ranking position), Frank Polk, noted in penciled remarks for the sixth point: ‘To some extent I agree but the recognition of governments would tie up the whole question – it should follow or at least not precede, the question of Russia (outside of Poland) as an entirety.’¹³ Many members of the American Peace delegation, among them Herbert Hoover and Samuel Eliot Morison, were familiar with the memorandum and assumed it represented Wilson’s policy. We may note, however, that the Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, as he explained in his diary, was opposed to the principle of national self-determination that according to him represented a threat to the stability of the world order (Lansing 1921, 97). House presented the Cobb-Lippmann memorandum to the Supreme War Council, that is to the allied prime ministers and foreign ministers, as an authorized explanation of the Fourteen Points and helped spread the idea that Wilson supported the implementation of national self-determination for the peoples of the Russian Empire.

What did Wilson really think about Russia? Prior to his departure for Europe in December 1918, Wilson wrote to Lansing:

Is it feasible, in view of the present at least temporary disintegration of Russia into at least five parts, Finland, the Baltic Provinces, European Russia, Siberia, and the Ukraine, to have Russia represented at the peace table, or to admit a part of her by recognizing and receiving delegates from the Omsk government?¹⁴

In other words, before the Paris conference, Wilson was not ready to recognize the Omsk government of Admiral Kolchak (nor the Soviet government) and had doubts about Russia being able to reconstitute itself. This view, however, was not based on the principle of national self-determination.

In Paris, Wilson joined Lloyd-George in formulating the Prinkipo proposal on 22 January 1919.¹⁵ The basic idea of the Prinkipo proposal was to issue an invitation to all the parties (proclaimed governments) within the territory of the former Russian Empire to convene to discuss the ending of the Russian Civil War. Wilson, who was from the American South and had in his childhood lived through the American Civil War, should have known the difficulty of ending civil wars by compromise. Estonia and Latvia indicated their willingness to participate in order to present their aims of securing independence; Lithuania was hesitant (Fuller 1937, 49 − 50, 52 − 53, 172 − 173). The proposed Prinkipo conference never met.

The next step undertaken by the American and British officials was to send a delegation to Moscow to learn under what conditions Lenin was willing to end the Russian Civil War. In mid-March, William C. Bullitt, a State Department representative, traveled to Moscow where he met with Lenin, the Soviet Foreign Minister Georgy Chicherin, and Commissar for War Leon Trotsky, and returned with a proposal from Lenin (Bullitt 1919, 39 − 43). The basic idea was to declare a ceasefire and leave all de facto governments on the territory of the former Russian Empire in control of the territory they occupied at the time of the ceasefire. Following the ceasefire, all foreign governments needed to end their support for anti-Soviet governments.

By this time the Estonian Provisional Government was in control of the territory that it regarded as Estonia. German military units had evacuated from Estonia at the end of December 1918, and Red Army forces had been driven from Estonian territory by the end of January 1919. This was, however, not yet the case for Latvia and Lithuania. Lenin, of course, calculated that the Russian Whites, whose major effort went into organizing their militaries and not into building up permanent administrative structures, were poorly organized politically and would have disintegrated following a ceasefire. Wilson did not show any special interest in Bullitt’s visit to Moscow nor in Lenin’s proposal (Farnsworth 1967).¹⁶

Several former Russian politicians appeared in Paris during the Peace Conference: the Prime Ministers of the Russian Provisional Governments of 1917, Prince Lvov and Alexander Kerensky, the czarist Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov, and others. A more important role, however, was played by the Russian ambassadors who had been appointed by the Russian Provisional Government. Organizationally they came together to form what was called the Conférence Politique Russe (Russian Political Conference). Among them was Boris Bakhmeteff, who had been named the Russian ambassador to the United States in 1917 and represented the Russian democratic intelligentsia. In Paris, Bakhmeteff and the other Russian ambassadors worked on behalf of a restored Russia with the exception of a relatively small ethnic Poland and possibly Finland. Estonia, according to them, was to receive autonomy. According to Bakhmeteff: ‘What is generally understood in Russia under “autonomous arrangements” […] [is] the substance of self-Government which the nationalities will enjoy under the future Russian Constitution.’¹⁷ In other words, ‘autonomy’ meant provincial self-government.

A memorandum that the Conférence presented to the Peace Conference described the demands of the ‘nationalities’ as an embarrassing problem for Russia and promised fair treatment for Russia’s national minorities by the establishment of autonomy for them in a future democratic Russia.¹⁸ The implementation of national self-determination in Russia was defined as the dissection of Russia. Since a unified Russian state did not exist in 1919, the writers articulated a vision of an imagined Russia encompassing the boundaries of czarist Russia (with the few exceptions noted above). In their view, there had been no serious nationality movements in Russia which had indicated a wish to separate before the World War (except for Poland). The recent declarations, in which Russia’s nationalities demanded independence, were by-and-large directed against Bolshevism. When Bolshevism disappeared, so would the calls for national independence.¹⁹

The Inquiry and the American peace delegation

Following the entrance of the United States into the war in 1917, Wilson established, on the advice of Colonel House, a body of advisers called the ‘Inquiry’ (Gelfand 1963). The Inquiry came to consist of approximately 150 faculty members from American universities who were chosen according to their academic specialty. Their task was to prepare for the peace conference by preparing studies of possible problem areas and issues. Their analyses of European politics influenced Wilson when he wrote his Fourteen Point speech.²⁰ The majority of the Inquiry experts accompanied the American Peace Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference as advisers. One such Inquiry member was Samuel Eliot Morison, a young 31-year-old historian at Harvard University. Morison had written a long manuscript on Finland during 1918 and was brought to Paris to work in the Poland-Russia section of the US Peace Delegation that was chaired by another Harvard faculty member, Robert H. Lord (the expert on Poland). Soon after his arrival in February 1919, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were added to Morison’s duties. He was given access to all information that was sent to the American delegation on Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Morison established a good working relationship with his British counterpart, Esme Howard, and through him obtained British intelligence reports on Russia. Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian delegations in Paris interacted with him on a regular basis. At the end of 1919, Morison penned his impressions: ‘Kind out-of-water old Professor Hirn, and keen Mr. Holsti of Finland, suave Pusta, quizzical Poska and garrulous Piip of Estonia, grateful Mei(e)rovics and gloomy Groswald [Grosvalds] of Latvia, doubtful Waldemar [Voldemaras], cheery Ychas [Yčas], and honest Narouchevitz [Naraševīčus] of Lithuania.’²¹

On 24 February 1919, Morison sent one of his early memorandums to Isaiah Bowman, one of the Inquiry leaders, in which he noted that it seemed to him that Russians were not eager to fight against Bolshevism.²² Only the Estonians and the Don Cossacks were fighting. According to Morison, this showed that only groups motivated by nationalism would fight against Bolshevism. For that reason, he recommended that the United States should support the Baltic peoples and, in the end, also come to an agreement with Soviet authorities in Russia. He did not believe the Russian Whites would prevail in the Civil War and further expressed the hope that eventually more moderate Bolshevik leaders would emerge in Russia. Morison also wrote a song that was sung to the tune of a popular song of the period (‘Zip’) at social gatherings of the five members of the Poland-Russia section of the US Peace Delegation:

Good morning, Mr. Piip-Piip-Piip

Of the République Estonienne

Good morning Mr. Piip-Piip-Piip

Of the voluble and ready pen

Ashes to ashes, and dust to dust,

If the Balts don’t get you the Bolsheviks must:

Good morning, Mr. Piip-Piip

Of the République Estoni-

République Estoni-

République Estonienne.²³

Morison wrote the memorandum on the Baltic states that came up for discussion at the 9 May meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers (Fuller 1943, 655 − 658).²⁴ In this document, Morison recommended the de facto recognition of the Baltic states by all the Allies and sending aid to them. He was supported by his section head, Robert H. Lord. The recommendations were in full accord with the Cobb-Lippmann memorandum (recognize de facto and give aid). Morison’s memorandum was inadvertently introduced to the Council of Foreign Ministers by British Foreign Minister Arthur Balfour before being vetted by Secretary Lansing who rejected the idea that the United States should join Britain and France (and Italy) in extending de facto recognition to Estonia: ‘The recognition of de facto Governments in territories formerly Russian, constituted in a measure a dissection of Russia which the United States of America had carefully avoided except in the case of Finland and Poland.’²⁵

Lansing was a lawyer and he had carefully chosen his words: he was right that the United States had not officially extended de facto recognition to the Baltic states. He, however, did not mention that the United States had propagated the idea that it supported de facto recognition in the Cobb-Lippmann memorandum that Colonel House had presented at the pre-armistice conference. Since Balfour had been at the above conference, Lansing’s statement must have come as a surprise. There is no record of Lansing seeking Wilson’s opinion on the issue of de facto recognition of the Baltic states during this time. Morison, who participated as an adviser at the 9 May Foreign Ministers’ meeting, noted in his diary: ‘Am perfectly disgusted with attitude of Mr. Lansing. He is ignorant, arrogant and tactless and treats questions from the viewpoint of a small town lawyer. He defeated recognition of Estonia and unnecessarily muddled the Riga question.’²⁶

Still, we can regard the final outcome of the meeting as positive for the Baltic states. Balfour skillfully directed the meeting’s attention to economic aid to the Baltic peoples. A committee was set up under the chairmanship of Herbert Hoover. The Committee proposed to aid the Baltic states with food, clothing, and other materials.²⁷ The Foreign Ministers also decided to send a military delegation to the Baltic states and to increase pressure on German military forces to leave Latvia and Lithuania.

Hoover and the American relief administration

Herbert Hoover played a major role in organizing food aid and the feeding of nine million people in German-occupied Belgium and northern France during the war. This meant locating sources for credit to finance the purchase of food and organizing transport across the Atlantic to Britain and from there through the Netherlands to Belgium. He left the distribution of the food to Belgian and French relief organizations. Hoover was a pioneer of twentieth century large-scale humanitarian relief efforts (Nash 1988; Whyte 2017). He utilized his Belgian experience in eastern Europe (including the Baltic states) in 1919 and later in 1921–1922 in Soviet Russia.

Shortly after the American entrance into the war in April 1917, Wilson named Hoover as US Food Administrator, giving him a mandate to provide adequate food to the inhabitants of the United States, as well as for the allies during the war (Nash 1996). Hoover focused his effort on subsidizing the prices of wheat, pork, and sugar and controlling the export of food to the Allies. As World War I began to wind down, Hoover turned his attention to feeding the countries of ‘liberated Europe’ (liberated from German occupation) and prepared to extend food aid to them. Hoover placed the Baltic countries into the category of ‘liberated Europe.’

Besides humanitarian considerations, Hoover was also motivated by a desire to stop the spread of Bolshevism in Europe.²⁸ On 24 February, Congress approved an appropriation of $100 million for relief work in Europe. Well before this appropriation, Hoover had departed for Europe to take control of the distribution of food relief.²⁹ Following the appropriation of $100 million of relief credits to the liberated states in Europe, Hoover organized a new organization – the American Relief Administration (ARA) – and consolidated all food relief programs in eastern Europe under the ARA. The finances for relief came either from the $100 million appropriation by Congress for the liberated states (Poland, Baltic states, Finland, and Armenia) or from general appropriations for all allied states that included Romania, Serbia, and Czechoslovakia. Hoover next recruited a network of ARA agents to work in countries from Finland to Romania in food relief, child relief, and other economic issues. ARA agents were young American army officers who were hired by Hoover in Paris. They kept Hoover informed about conditions in most east European states. As a result, Hoover had a better understanding of the general situation in eastern Europe than any other American official of note in Paris.

At this point, Hoover needed to clarify allied policy toward the Baltic states.³⁰ Could aid on credit be given to governments that had not been recognized? On 11 April, Hoover raised the question of the status of the Baltic states in the Supreme Economic Council:

The Food Section were receiving appeals of increasing urgency from the Governments of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, and from the Allied Representatives accredited to them. They are unable to deal with these appeals until the following questions are answered. 1. Is it intended to support the existence of independent Governments in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia? […] 3. Are the Allies […] agreed that one of them would take it upon itself to aid such governments (financially, morally and materially) with the exception of sending troops.³¹

Since Hoover’s questions were ultimately political, his query was forwarded to the Council of Foreign Ministers where, as we noted earlier, Samuel Eliot Morison prepared a memorandum that answered some of Hoover’s concerns. In addition, the Baltic German coup against the Latvian government of Prime Minister Kārlis Ulmanis created another dimension to the Baltic issue (Tarulis 1968, 171 − 173). As we saw, Secretary Lansing sidetracked the political question. Still, as we noted earlier, a committee chaired by Hoover approved a six-point proposal that was then presented to the Council of Foreign Ministers.³² The foreign ministers made some changes (no one was ready to give monetary credits to the Baltic states) and forwarded the proposal to the Council of Four – to Wilson and the three prime ministers.³³

At this point, Hoover wrote a supporting letter to Wilson. The first draft was written in a very Wilsonian fashion and shows that Hoover assumed that the Cobb-Lippmann memorandum statements on the Baltic states represented Wilson’s viewpoint. In the letter that was actually sent to Wilson, Hoover emphasized the economic aid: ‘The food conditions in these [Baltic] states are simply terrible […] In many places they are putting up a good fight to try and establish their independence [from] the Moscow tyranny.’³⁴ Wilson remarked in the Council of Four: ‘Mr. Hoover proposes that we should take charge of provisioning the Baltic countries invaded by the Bolsheviks, without considering their present political status’ (Mantoux 1992 204)

Although the United States did not politically recognize the Baltic states (unlike Finland), the decision made to provide economic aid was important for the Baltic peoples in a humanitarian and political sense and served to support their efforts to establish viable states. Wilson’s approval of Hoover’s proposal came at a critical time for the Baltic states. Thanks to Hoover’s actions, Estonia was able to purchase $4.5 million worth of food on credit that was funded from the $100 million Congressional appropriation (Surface and Bland 1931, 48). The food purchased went to both the urban population in Estonia, as town inhabitants were able to obtain 10 pounds of flour a month, and to the armed forces. A second Hoover initiative, the feeding of children also began by the summer of 1919 in food kitchens in towns and through food packages sent to rural areas. This was provided as a grant (Arens 2017). The third part of American relief was provided by sales organized by the American Liquidation Commission of surplus goods in the US military warehouses that the American military did not deem worthwhile to ship back to the United States.

Wilson wrote to Judge Edwin B. Parker, who was the director of the American Liquidation Board, urging him to accept loan notes for the commodities to be sold.³⁵ Hoover noted in a later letter to Judge Parker: ‘We originally discussed with your board a plan by which you would take obligations from the various governments under relief, i.e. Belgium, Poland, Finland, Baltic States, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Armenia, Bulgaria, Greater Serbia, and Austria, for all food turned over to them.’³⁶ Hoover treated the Baltic states in his relief programs as part of eastern Europe and not of Russia. Estonia purchased US army surplus goods worth $12.3 million, Latvia – $2.6 million, and Lithuania – $4.4 million. The purchases included food, military clothing, army boots, medicines, tobacco, and other items. In all, total American relief to the Baltic states amounted to $31.7 million (circa $400 − 500 million in today’s terms) (Surface and Bland 1931, 177, 215, 218).

Almost all the goods purchased by Estonia from the American Liquidation Board went to the Estonian military. Ants Piip noted in September 1919, when, as Foreign Minister, he visited the front:

Fresh American potato purée with American pork and bread from American flour waited for us at mealtime […] Captain Schmitt, who was our guide, as well as the commander of the armored train, both praised this and remarked that without the American potato purée, it would have been hard to fight […] morale was good, the relationship with the soldiers was comradely […] the uniforms were the same, American or English.

(Piip 1930, 362–363)

These purchases meant that Estonia like almost all the other European states wound up in debt to the United States following the war (Pihlamägi 2014).

Morison and the negotiations between the Allies and Admiral Kolchak

Morison penned his thoughts on how to solve ‘the Estonian question’ in a letter written on 26 May 1919 to Secretary Lansing who added his opinion and forwarded the letter to Wilson. Morison noted that Estonia had just elected its Constituent Assembly by universal suffrage (April 1919) and that the Assembly confirmed Estonia’s declaration of independence. A request for recognition of this independence by the Peace Conference had followed. In the letter, Morison argued that Estonia was capable of existing independently, but its seaports were important for Russia, and its sea border was vital for the military defense of Russia. According to Morison, there were three options on how ‘the Estonian question’ could be resolved. The first was to regard Estonia as ‘a temporary anti-Bolshevik political organization, that could be supported because no recognized Russian government existed.’ This meant that the question should be considered an internal Russian problem. Morison noted that Russian émigrés in Paris supported this option.³⁷

Lansing also favored this option and in his letter to Wilson wrote that, in his understanding, Morison’s first option was in line with the proposal that the Council of Four had sent to Admiral Kolchak. He argued that, as a result, the question was resolved.³⁸ Lansing’s interpretation is open to question. Morison’s second option was to negotiate an autonomous status for Estonia within Russia and demand that the Russian government guarantee that autonomy by an agreement. Estonia would have its own assembly that would deal with internal Estonian questions. The third option would be to recognize Estonian independence by an international treaty and guarantee Russia certain foreign policy, economic, and security rights in Estonia. Estonia, however, would become a member of the League of Nations.

According to Morison the first option would violate basic American principles (which were also the principles of Wilsonianism). This would mean that the Allies would support Estonians as long as it was useful in the fight against Bolshevism and then push them back into the Russian fold. Morison thought that perhaps Estonians would agree to the third option and Russian ‘democrats’ to the second. There is no record of Wilson’s response, nor any sign that Wilson read the letter. It proved impossible for the members of the Estonian delegation abroad to schedule a meeting with Wilson in Paris, nor to send one of their members to the United States following the Paris Conference (Pusta 1964, 80).

In the spring of 1919, Admiral Kolchak began a military advance from Siberia toward Moscow. Kolchak had declared himself the Supreme Authority in Russia and was accepted as such by the other generals of the White forces. As a result, the Council of Four, while not fully recognizing Kolchak as the ruler of Russia, decided to continue supporting him with military aid provided he agreed to certain conditions. Among the conditions were demands for the recognition of the independence of Poland and Finland and that, once he had won the Civil War, Kolchak would schedule elections for a new Russian Constituent Assembly. Point 5 was the following:

If a solution of the relations between Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Caucasian and Transcaspian territories and Russia is not speedily reached by agreement the settlement will be made in consultation and cooperation with the League of Nations, and that until such settlement is made the Government of Russia agrees to recognize these territories as autonomous and so confirm the relations which may exist between the de facto Governments and the Allied and Associated Governments.³⁹

According to Morison, the document was ‘two-faced, and not thought through.’⁴⁰ As he noted, the wording did not suit the Russians in Paris. He wrote in his diary how Bakhmeteff reacted: ‘Bahmahtiev [sic] is just as sore with the Baltic part of the Kolchak note as if we had recognized the independence of the Baltic states.’⁴¹ The paragraph mentioned the territory of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and the de facto governments and, at least until an agreement, these territorial governments were to be recognized as autonomous by the Kolchak regime. The meaning of ‘autonomous’ used here is open to interpretation since the Baltic governments existed outside of Kolchak’s control and did not recognize his authority. Lansing’s interpretation, that the proposal was in essence the same as the first option of Morison (in other words defining the Estonian government as a provisional anti-Bolshevik organization), and that the wording of the Allied proposal would be acceptable to the Russians, was erroneous. A more accurate interpretation of the Council of Four proposal was that it left the future relations between the Baltic governments and Russia open – these relations needed to be created through negotiations with the possible assistance of the League of Nations. That, of course, did not suit the Russians in Paris.

In his answer, Kolchak’s official response rejected the recognition of Finnish independence with the argument that the question could only be decided by a Russian Constituent Assembly. On the question of the Baltic states, Kolchak’s note stated: ‘We are fully disposed at once to prepare for the solution of the questions concerning the fate of the national groups in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania […] we have every reason to believe that a prompt settlement will be made […] the Government is assuring […] the autonomy of the various nationalities.’⁴² Kolchak’s response was similar to the previous memorandum of the Conférence Politique Russe in Paris. It was based on the idea of a unified Russia and the promise of some kind of autonomy to non-Russian peoples living on the territory of Russia. All solutions or agreements needed to be ratified by a Russian Constituent Assembly where presumably the voice of a unified Russia would prevail. Neither the Allied note to Kolchak, nor the response, contributed to any negotiations or even any contacts between the Baltic governments and the Kolchak government.

The Council of Four, however, accepted Kolchak’s response and agreed to continue sending aid to his government, even though by that time Kolchak’s forces had begun to retreat. Morison now sent in his resignation letter from his position on the American Peace Delegation and also as the American representative on the Baltic Commission. In his letter he noted his reasons as: ‘Adoption by the United States Government of a Russian policy fundamentally opposed to my conception of what is practical toward Russia as a whole, and what is just toward the Baltic States with which I have been especially charged.’⁴³ Following his resignation, Morison wrote a five-part article in the British journal The New Europe on the Baltic states in which he summarized US and Allied policy in the following terms:

First, there is the desire to recognize small nations that have been given definite promises by the Allies and indefinite ones by President Wilson and the special desire to help people who have suffered and are suffering from Pangermanism and who have fought and are fighting Bolshevism. This tendency is almost completely offset by the disinclination to aid or even connive at anything that may offend the Russian Nationalists or seem to further the dismemberment of Russia.

(Morison 1919, 78)

He then returned to the United States to continue his career as a historian at Harvard University.⁴⁴

Since Bakhmeteff was unhappy with the Allied note to Kolchak, he sought a clearer explanation of American policy by requesting a close adviser of the President, Vance McCormick, to present to Wilson several written questions. McCormick carried out the request on 25 June 1919. Following a question on the recognition of the Kolchak government by the United States that Wilson answered negatively, McCormick read out the following Bakhmeteff question:

Point 5 governs the general question of other nationalities on the territory of the former Russian Empire. In full concurrence with the views of the Russian Government, the Powers are contemplating the future of these nationalities established on just and firm foundations of autonomous development […] the document appears to confirm the principle of Russian unity as a whole. Autonomous development is to be assured […] but without prejudice to the sovereignty and unity of Russia.

According to McCormick’s account: ‘Mr. McCormick consulted the President, who replied that such was his interpretation of the clauses in question.’⁴⁵

Bakhmeteff’s question was worded in accordance with the wording of Kolchak’s response: ‘Autonomous development is to be assured.’ Wilson’s response showed that he did not support the implementation of national self-determination for the Baltic peoples and saw Estonia and the other Baltic states as provisional entities whose ‘autonomy’ was to be a Russian internal affair. He showed that his criticism of German policy at Brest-Litovsk in his speech on 11 February 1918 (how to organize the ‘governance of the people of the Baltic provinces’) was not based on any serious concerns for the opinions of the Baltic peoples.

On 25 September 1919, the British extended de facto recognition to the Lithuanian government. The British had recognized Estonia and Latvia de facto earlier. On 15 October 1919 in answer to a query from the American Lithuanian National Council on US recognition, Lansing responded negatively, justifying his statement in a letter to the Assistant Secretary of State, Frank Polk, by referencing Wilson’s response to Bakhmeteff’s question. In a later letter to Morison in 1921, Lansing noted that he had been against recognition of the Baltic states all along and continued to hold that opinion in 1921.⁴⁶ In his formal reply to the Lithuanian organization, Lansing simply cited the two notes that had passed between the Council of Four and Kolchak as resolving the issue without offering any serious analysis of the notes. At a time when Admiral Kolchak had clearly lost and his forces were retreating in Siberia, Lansing argued that nonrecognition of Lithuania ‘is a logical step toward the recognition of Kolchak,’ something that had been rejected by Wilson.⁴⁷

John Spargo and the Colby memorandum

The next important document on the Wilson administration’s policymaking toward the Baltic states was the so-called ‘Colby Note.’ When Lansing resigned (12 February 1920), Wilson named an attorney, Bainbridge Colby, the next Secretary of State. In August 1920, during the Polish crisis when the Soviet Red Army advanced into Poland, the Italian ambassador to the United States wrote to the US Department of State with a query as to US policy toward Russia. The Colby Note was the answer. We may note that by this time Estonia had concluded a peace treaty with Soviet Russia (2 February 1920), as had Lithuania (12 July 1920). Latvia concluded its peace treaty shortly afterward (11 August 1920). Finland followed on 14 October 1920 and then Poland on 11 March 1921.

The author of much of the memorandum was actually John Spargo, who was an anti-Bolshevik social democrat of English origin living in the United States. Spargo, who was writing a book, Russia as an American Problem, forwarded two chapters from the book to Colby (Spargo 1920). The major thesis in the book was that the only force that could defeat Bolshevism in Russia was Russian nationalism. What united Russians was a commitment to the territorial unity of Russia. This meant that the United States should not support minority nationalities, like the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians. Spargo wrote:

Must we now acknowledge the right of Estonia, Livonia [sic], and Lithuania, with a population of some five millions of peoples, to set up exclusive sovereignty over the Baltic coast territory of the former Russian Empire, and thus deprive a hundred and fifty millions, or more from access to the ocean and its trade routes?

(Spargo 1920, 5)

In the spring of 1920, Spargo wrote an 11-page memorandum on the ‘Russian question,’ which he dispatched to Colby and also forwarded a copy to Bakhmeteff, with whom he conducted a regular correspondence, for his reaction and comments.⁴⁸ Both of them wished to influence the American government to issue a declaration of nonrecognition of the Bolshevik regime in Russia and, at the same time, show support for the unity of Russia. Spargo feared that the next president following Wilson would not support such a policy and that, as a result, it was important to issue a declaration as soon as possible while the Wilson administration was still in power.

The greater part of the Colby Note derives from the Spargo memorandum. In the paragraph written by Spargo on the Baltic issue where reference is made to Lansing’s 15 October 1919 reply to the American Lithuanian National Council, 16 words were added, and two were changed of the total of 160 words. The words added were: ‘and in its [United States’] persistent refusal to recognize the Baltic States as separate nations independent of Russia.’⁴⁹ Colby’s draft was sent to Wilson, who was still bedridden from his severe stroke but was able to make some changes and approve the whole. The above words were added by either Colby or Wilson. In any case, Colby sent the Note to the Italian ambassador and released it to the press on 9 August 1920. During the same day, Colby telephoned John Spargo with the news. Spargo, who, at the exact moment of the telephone call, was writing a letter to Bakhmeteff, added to his letter: ‘I am elated, I need hardly say. We have every reason to be content.’⁵⁰

Young’s letters and recognition by the United States

On 26 January 1921, the Allied Supreme Council gave its de jure recognition to the Baltic states, which meant that the European Great Powers, Great Britain, France, and Italy, recognized them. Following this, Evan E. Young, the U.S. Commissioner to the Baltic states, wrote a long letter in which he recommended that the United States should also recognize the Baltic states. Young argued that, while the Baltic states had committed many mistakes, they had at least created a viable order in their countries. They had conducted elections and a majority of the people supported their governments. At the same time, it was difficult to see any change in Russia. Young emphasized the danger of Bolshevism to the civilized world and noted that, similar to the United States, the Baltic states also opposed Bolshevism.⁵¹ Besides that, the other Great Powers had recognized the Baltic states, and, for that reason, the United States had no reason to delay recognition.

Young’s letter touched off a discussion inside the State Department. The longest analysis of the issue was penned by the adviser from the Office of Foreign Trade.⁵² The general tone of the analysis was negative and against recognition. The greater part of the content had been borrowed from Bakhmeteff’s arguments: that the declarations of independence by the Baltic states were directed against Bolshevism; that before November 1917 there had not been any desire for independence; that the present situation was temporary; that a new Russia would resolve the issue by an offer of federation; and that it was in the interest of the United States to have a strong Russia. An additional argument at the end referenced one of the favorite US foreign policy ideas of the time – the ‘open door’ policy. As with US policy toward China, it was regarded important that the entire Russian market would be open for American trade.

Norman Davis, the Assistant Secretary of State, in his reply, also argued against recognition.⁵³ According to him, no serious national movement had existed in the Baltic states, and declarations of independence were made only because the Baltic populations rejected Soviet power. These states could not protect themselves against superior Soviet power, and they needed the support of some other major power. Davis criticized British policy for supporting the Baltic states.

The Division of Russian Affairs sent a lengthy, fairly neutral analysis that included 3 − 4 pages of information on conditions in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and listed the countries that had already recognized the Baltic states.⁵⁴ The report noted that each of the three states was dealing at the time with economic problems. The conclusion stated that recognition would not bring any benefits to the United States.

The head of the Far Eastern Division analyzed the question of whether recognition of the Baltic states would influence Japanese politics in Siberia.⁵⁵ In his conclusion, he discounted the impact of recognition and argued that Japan would act in accordance with its own interests.

Boris Bakhmeteff wrote at least two letters to members of the State Department during this time and repeated several arguments that he had made earlier against recognition.⁵⁶ According to him, Russia was living through a temporary trauma that would end with the collapse of Bolshevism and establishment of democracy. He again noted: one should not take Baltic national movements seriously; before 1917 the Baltic peoples only desired the autonomy that Russian democracy was willing to grant them; and the proclamations of independence were made only for the purpose of fighting Bolshevism.

Evan Young sent a second, more important letter in April 1922.⁵⁷ By that time the Baltic states had been accepted as members of the League of Nations. As Young mentioned in his letter, the Baltic states had by now existed for 2–3 years and, despite difficult circumstances, had been able to build up a state order. They were, like the United States, anti-Bolshevik. What was new in Young’s letter was his criticism of arguments that had been presented since 1919 against recognition, especially by Bakhmeteff. First, he dealt with the contention that Bolshevism would not last long in Russia, and a more normal order would be installed, which the recognition of the Baltic states would hinder. Young believed that the situation in Russia would not change in the near future, and even if Bolshevism collapsed it would take Russia a long time to establish a stable order. Furthermore, he did not think that Russian émigrés would play an important role in Russia’s future ever again. This meant that their views were their personal ones and no longer reflected Russia’s future prospectives. In Young’s view, Russia needed to find her own way, and the Baltic states existed separately of Russia and Russia’s destiny. Young described in his letter contacts with persons who had brought fresh information on the situation in Russia. He had the opportunity in the Baltic states to gain direct information on conditions in Soviet Russia. This was an opportunity that was lacking for persons in Paris or Washington. The following year (1923) Young was called to Washington where he became the head of the new Eastern Europe Division in the State Department. According to Loy Henderson: ‘Young brought into the Division Kelley, Packer, and me, all of whom, while deeply interested in Russia, Poland, and Finland, also had a knowledge based on personal experience of the people and problems of the Baltic States’ (Henderson 1986, 157). Since there were no diplomatic relations with Russia, the Russia Division was, as a result, eliminated. The Latvian capital, Riga, became the site where the State Department began to train a cadre of ‘Russia’ experts (George F. Kennan, Charles Bohlen, Loy Henderson, and others) and gather information on the Soviet Union.

Following Young’s second letter, on 1 May 1922, the then Division of Russian Affairs summarized the pro-and contra-arguments on recognition on one page.⁵⁸ Arguments in favor were: it followed the principle of self-determination of peoples; the other major powers had recognized them as had the League of Nations; and the states were stable. Arguments against were: recognition would contradict the idea of the unity of Russia; there were no economic benefits for the United States; it raised the question of the future of other parts of Russia. The head of the Russia Division, D. W. Poole, wrote in his letter that, as had been the case in 1921, he favored recognition. He also noted in his letter:

Mr. Hoover brought this question up with me in private conversation recently. He said that he thought we should have recognized these states a year or two ago but that in his opinion it would be unwise to do so at the present time because such action would precipitate the whole Russian Question.⁵⁹

The problem was the Genoa conference in April 1922. Several other persons mentioned that it was necessary to wait for the end of the conference to separate the recognition of the Baltic states from the Russia question.

This time developments worked out differently than in 1921. We may also note that Bakhmeteff announced his resignation from his ambassadorial position on 25 April 1922. Young’s letter and the other opinions were forwarded to Assistant Secretary William Phillips who wrote that he favored recognition and forwarded Young’s letter to the Secretary of State, Charles H. Hughes.⁶⁰ In July, Hughes wrote a letter in favor of recognition to President Warren Harding and stated his agreement with Young that it was now possible to view the Baltic states separately from Russia (Henderson 1986, 154–155).⁶¹ In other words, the Baltic question should be decided on its own merits. Of the letter’s four pages, three were devoted to the Baltic states, the fourth page contained a recommendation to also recognize Albania. We can conclude that Hughes had decided that recognition would help normalize American relations with the European states. President Harding replied in a letter also dated 24 July that he agreed with both recommendations (Baltic states and Albania).⁶² The official declaration of recognition of the Baltic states was issued on 28 July 1922.

It should be kept in mind that Secretary Hughes and President Harding could have decided the question in the negative. Here, we need to pay attention to the lobbying efforts that involved demonstrations, letters to newspapers and contacts with members of Congress by the Baltic (especially Lithuanian) communities in the United States. The high point of these efforts was the presentation of a petition on recognition with a million signatures (135 bound volumes) that was presented to President Harding on Memorial Day in 1921 (Tarulis 1968, 343 − 345).

Conclusion

When Wilson came to Paris in 1918 to negotiate a peace treaty he had to deal with concrete questions (MacMillan 2002; Tooze 2014). Here Wilson limited his application of the principle of self-determination to peoples in Ottoman Turkey, Austria-Hungary, and Germany – countries that had lost the war. Russia was a country about which Wilson’s knowledge was weak, and he lacked a clear picture of the processes at work during the Revolution and civil war. He rejected both a return to a czarist Russia as well as the Bolshevik alternative, and in the end was unable to develop a realistic policy. Wilson supported the resurrection of an independent Poland along its ethnic boundaries and in 1919 also came to support Finnish independence. The rest of Russia was supposed to remain united, but he could not say how this Russia would be brought about.

In American policy toward Europe in 1919, the Baltic states fell between two stools: they were regarded alternately as part of eastern Europe or part of Russia. National self-determination was meant for eastern Europe, but not for the peoples of Russia. We do see the advocacy of a Wilsonian ideology of self-determination to include the Baltic states among some members of the American Peace Conference delegation in Paris. Here we may note the views of Colonel Edward House, William Bullitt, Herbert Hoover, Robert H. Lord, and Samuel Eliot Morison. We may add that American economic policy and relief activity in Paris supported the economic integration of the Baltic states into Europe and separated them from Russia. That means that in a practical sense the United States aided the Baltic states to achieve their independence. In effect, Wilsonianism and the application of the principle of national self-determination in eastern Europe aided the creation of a Europe that had a place in it for the Baltic states (Wolff 2020). But we also find among American leaders in Paris, and Secretary of State Robert Lansing is the best example, individuals who rejected the principle of national self-determination as an organizing principle in international relations and who always regarded the Baltic countries as a part of Russia. While he hesitated at times, in the end, Wilson adopted a somewhat similar position (Lansing 1921, 93–105).⁶³

In 1919, Lansing and Wilson defined Russia as the former czarist Russia minus an ethnic Poland and Finland. In 1922, Hughes and Harding defined (Soviet) Russia as not including the Baltic states where the population consisted of ethnic groups that were not Russians. The Baltic states could then be recognized on the basis of national self-determination. The new US definition of Russia meant that Poland, Finland, and the Baltic states were separated from it. The principle of a united Russia was to be upheld for the rest. In 1933, when the United States recognized the Soviet Union by treaty, in a territorial sense this meant recognition of a Russia without Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

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Additional information

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Olavi Arens

Olavi Arens received his PhD from Columbia University. He is currently Professor of History in the History Department of Georgia Southern University, Savannah, Georgia, USA. He has published numerous articles on Estonian and Baltic history, in particular on the 1917 revolutionary period and the establishment of the Estonian state.

Notes

1. This article is a moderately revisionist account compared to Tarulis (1968) and is a modified version of an article that appeared in Estonian (Arens 2022). For an older discussion, see Graham (1939). For a current discussion, see the special issue Acta Historica Tallinnensia 28 (2) (2022). The issue includes the following articles: Baxenfield and Rändi (2022), Rifk (2022), Medijainen (2022), Jēkabsons (2022), Grigaravičiūtė (2022), and Piirimäe (2022).

2. Among numerous biographies of Wilson there is a comparatively recent one by Cooper (2009). For an early work by Wilson’s press secretary at the Paris Peace Conference that is good on Wilsonianism, see Baker, (1922−1923); also interesting is Hoover (1958). Finally, we have the 69 volumes of Wilson’s correspondence, speeches, memorandums, and other texts. For this, see Link (1966−1994).

3. Woodrow Wilson, Address to a Joint Session of Congress (Request for Declaration of War), 2 April 1917, in Link (1966–1994), vol. 41, 519–527.

4. Woodrow Wilson, Address to a Joint Session of Congress (Fourteen Points), 8 January 1918, in Link (1966–1994), vol. 45, 534 − 539.

5. William C. Bullitt, Political developments in Germany since Hertling’s Address, in Link (1966–1994), vol. 46, 183 − 193; William C. Bullitt, Comparison of the Addresses of Czernin and Hertling, in Link (1966–1994), vol. 46, 222 − 229. William C. Bullitt, The Strikes in Germany, in Link (1966–1994), vol. 46, 266 − 268.

6. Woodrow Wilson, An Address to a Joint Session of Congress (Four Principles), 11 February 1918, in Link (1966–1994), vol. 46, 319 − 320.

7. Woodrow Wilson, An Address to a Joint Session of Congress (Four Principles), 11 February 1918, in Link (1966–1994), vol. 46, 321 − 323.

8. Max, Prince of Baden, Translation of Communication from German Government to the President of the United States, 6 October 1918, in Link (1966–1994), vol. 57, 253.

9. In today’s terms House’s position was in some ways analogous to that of a National Security Adviser.

10. Edward M. House, diary, 28 October 1918, MS 466, Series II, diaries, vol. 6, Edward Mandell House Papers, Yale University, Manuscripts and Archives. Accessed 25 July 2023. digital.library.yale.edu/digital/collection/1004_6/id/4931. House had earlier (19 September) expressed similar ideas in a conversation with Wilson, who favored the unity of Russia. House, diary, 19 September 1918.

11. House to Wilson, telegram, 29 October 1918, in Link (1966–1994), vol. 51, 498 − 499.

12. Wilson to House, telegram, 30 October 1918, in Link (1966–1994), vol. 51, 511.

13. Frank Lyon Polk, comments on Cobb-Lippmann memorandum, MS 656, Series III, Box 25, Folder 248, Frank Lyon Polk Papers, Yale.

14. Wilson to Lansing, 20 November 1918, in Link (1966–1994), vol. 53, 136.

15. Hankey’s Notes of a Meeting of the Council of Ten, 22 January 1919, in Link (1966–1994), vol. 54, 205 − 206.

16. These terms were more or less the same that M. Litvinov had presented to the American diplomat William Buckler in Stockholm on 14 − 16 January 1919. Buckler’s report was forwarded to the American Peace Delegation in Paris. William H. Buckler, ‘Notes by W. H. Buckler of conversation with Mr. Litvinov in Stockholm, 14–15 January 1919,’ House Papers, Box 207, Folder 2/795, Yale.

17. Boris Bakhmeteff, ‘Memorandum for General Bliss replying to the memorandum of General Bliss of July 4th and with reference to the conversation between the General and Mr. Bakhmeteff of July 3^rd,’ 8 July 1919, Bakhmeteff Papers, Box 1, Columbia Rare Book and Manuscript Library. Bakhmeteff lists 27 communications between Secretary Robert Lansing and himself for January−June 1919: Bakhmeteff, ‘Perepiska B. A. Bakhmeteva s R. Lansingom,’ Bakhmeteff Papers, Box 5.

18. S. Sazonoff, Prince Lvoff, N. Tchaikovsky, and W. Maklakoff (Conférence Politique Russe), memorandum to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau), 9 March 1919, MS 466, Series 1, Box 10, Folder 281, House Papers, Yale.

19. Boris Bakhmeteff to Edward House, memorandum, 17 February 1919, House Papers.

20. Sidney Edward Mezes, David Hunter Miller, and Walter Lippmann, memorandum ‘The Present Situation: The War Aims and Peace Terms it Suggests,’ in Link (1966–1994), vol. 45, 459 − 474.

21. Morison, ‘Memoranda-1919,’ Box 1, 107, Morison Papers, Harvard University Archives.

22. Morison to Isaiah Bowman, memorandum, Box 207, folder 2/800, House Papers, Yale.

23. Morison, diary, 20 February 1919, Box 1, 11, Morison Papers, Harvard. ‘Balts’ here means ‘Baltic Germans’.

24. Morison, diary, 23 April 1919.

25. Robert Lansing, Secretary’s Notes, 9 May 1919, Council of Foreign Ministers, in Fuller (1943), 688.

26. Morison, diary, 9 May 1919, Box 1, 63, Morison Papers, Harvard.

27. ‘Report of the Committee to Consider the Baltic Question,’ Appendix C to IC − 190 (FM − 19), in Fuller (1943), 762 − 763.

28. Hoover to Wilson, 20 December 1918, in Link (1966–1994), vol. 53, 453 − 454.

29. Wilson to Hoover, 11 January 1918, in Link (1966–1994), vol. 53, 714.

30. ‘Baltic States food may last one or two months on much reduced scale they sent deputation our Minister Stockholm imploring food.’ Hoover to the Food Administration, telegram, 6 January 1919, in Link (1966–1994), vol. 53, 648.

31. Appendix 85, Supreme Economic Council, in Fuller (1947), 173.

32. Appendix C to IC − 190, in Fuller (1943), 762 − 763.

33. Notes of a meeting of Foreign Ministers, 23 May 1919, Appendix C to IC − 190, in Fuller (1943), 752 − 757.

34. Hoover to Wilson, 9 May 1919, in O’Brien (1978), 149 − 151.

35. Hoover to Judge Parker, 17 March 1919; Hoover to Wilson, 22 March 1919; Wilson to Judge Parker, 22 March 1919, in Bane and Lutz (1943), 346 − 348.

36. Hoover to Judge Parker, 10 April 1919, in Bane and Lutz (1943), 396.

37. Samuel E. Morison, memorandum (added to Lansing’s letter to Wilson, 27 May 1919), in Link (1966–1994), vol. 59, 547 − 549. The published version of the Morison memorandum in Link (1966–1994) has been abridged by the editor.

38. Lansing added his opinion in the letter to Wilson. Samuel E. Morison, memorandum (added to Lansing’s letter to Wilson, 27 May 1919), in Link (1966–1994), vol. 59, 547 − 549.

39. Philip Kerr, Draft Dispatch to Admiral Kolchak, 23 May 1919, in Link (1966–1994), vol. 59, 468 − 470.

40. Morison, diary, 27 May 1919, Box 1, 75, Morison Papers, Harvard.

41. Morison, diary, 27 May 1919, Box 1, 75, Morison Papers, Harvard.

42. Aleksandr V. Kolchak to Georges Clemenceau, telegram, 4 June 1919, in Link (1966–1994), vol. 60, 141 − 144. F. Kennan (1960, 38) opines: ‘The reply, actually, was largely drafted for him by the French and British representatives at his headquarters, who thought they knew what President Wilson wished to hear.’

43. Copy of Morison letter, 15 June 1919, Box 1, Morison Papers, Harvard.

44. Morison went on to have an outstanding career as a historian. Besides a two-volume work on Christopher Columbus and a 15-volume work on the American navy in World War II, he wrote numerous additional works.

45. J. C. Grew (Secretary-General of Commission to Negotiate Peace) to Acting Secretary of State (F. Polk), telegram, 25 June 1919, in Fuller (1937), 385 − 386.

46. Robert Lansing, Secretary of State to Commission to Negotiate Peace, telegram, 15 October 1919, in Fuller (1937), 723 − 724. In the 1921 letter Lansing marshaled two basic arguments against recognition of the Baltic states. One was based on a fear of Germany: ‘In my judgment the most potent deterrent to the revival of the Pan-German idea is a Great Russia for it would be too vast in territory and too great in population to fall under German domination.’ The other had to do with Bolshevism: ‘I am convinced that Bolshevism will ultimately be swept away, and as I can see no conclusive argument for the independence of the Baltic Provinces without the existence of Bolshevism and can see many opposed to it if Bolshevism disappears.’ Lansing to Morison, 31 May 1921, Box 1, Morison Papers, Harvard.

47. Lansing to Commission to Negotiate Peace, telegram, 6 November 1919, in Fuller (1937), 447.

48. John Spargo to Bainbridge Colby, 24 May 1920; John Spargo, ‘Memorandum on Russian Policy,’ after 24 May 1920, Box 10, John Spargo folder, Bakhmeteff Papers, Columbia.

49. Colby Note, 9 August 1920, in Link (1966–1994), vol. 66, 19 − 25.

50. Spargo to Bakhmeteff, 9 August 1920, Box 10, John Spargo folder, Bakhmeteff Papers, Columbia.

51. Evan E. Young, letter, 31 January 1921, Box 6, Baltic States folder, Loy Henderson Papers, Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress. This letter as well as the following documents are copies that Loy Henderson made of the originals in the U.S. National Archives.

52. Office of Foreign Trade Adviser, 2 April 1921, Box 6, Baltic States folder, Loy Henderson Papers, Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress.

53. Norman Davis, 23 March 1921, Box 6, Baltic States folder, Loy Henderson Papers, Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress.

54. E. L. Packer, Division of Russian Affairs, 25 March 1921, Box 6, Baltic States folder, Loy Henderson Papers, Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress.

55. Division of Far Eastern Affairs, 7 May 1921, Box 6, Baltic States folder, Loy Henderson Papers, Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress.

56. Bakhmeteff to F. N. Dearing, letter, 1 July 1921, Box 6, Baltic States folder, Loy Henderson Papers, Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress; Bakhmeteff to D. C. Poole, 13 June 1921, Box 9, Bakhmeteff Papers, Columbia.

57. Evan E. Young, 6 April 1922, Box 6, Baltic States folder, Henderson Papers, Library of Congress.

58. A. W. Kliefoth, Division of Russian Affairs, 1 May 1922, Box 6, Baltic States folder, Henderson Papers, Library of Congress.

59. D. W. Poole, 12 April 1922, Box 6, Baltic States folder, Henderson Papers, Library of Congress. Hoover was at the time Secretary of Commerce.

60. William Philipps to Charles E. Hughes, 3 May 1922, Box 6, Baltic States folder, Henderson Papers, Library of Congress.

61. Charles Hughes to Warren G. Harding, 24 July 1922, Box 6, Baltic States folder, Henderson Papers, Library of Congress. According to Henderson, D. W. Poole (Division of Russian Affairs) wrote a draft of the letter.

62. Warren G. Harding to Charles E. Hughes, 24 July 1922, Box 6, Baltic States folder, Henderson Papers, Library of Congress. Medijainen (2012) argues that the debt owed by the Baltic states to the U.S. played a role in the recognition.

63. See also Lansing’s letter to John Spargo: ‘[...] your letter of the 11^th relative to my declaration against the dismemberment of Russia […] I believe that the President holds the same views judging from conversations with him last summer, but of course I have had no opportunity to consult with him in regard to Lithuania.’ Lansing to Spargo, 23 February 1920, Box 10, Bakhmeteff Papers, Columbia.